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Excellent for layman and lawmaker, military and non-military
Mr. Zenko's analysis is eye-opening. This book presents an extremely detailed and obviously well-researched analysis of what is a missing yet key part of the public understanding on our use of force abroad: what he refers to as the use of "discrete military operations", or the use of limited force in circumstances other than the conventional understanding of military objectives (e.g., war, regime-change, etc.) The book examines case after case of these operations during numerous administrations since the Cold War. You get the quick sense that despite the less than outstanding record of success of these operations, which could be anything from airstrikes to rescue operations, their favored use in many occasions is often motivated by factors other than military objective. The book educates the reader about the political and other realities surrounding the decisions to use these tactics, filling a current void in the public debate. Highly recommended. ... Read more

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AMAZING - In-depth postmortem of the Iraq War - Written a decade ago!
First, know that this is NOT a political book.It's a piece of academic research that explores, in depth, the sociocognitive process of situation awareness, risk assessment, decision making, and learning/adjustment.This general process is generic and ubiquitous--essentially the same for businesses, emergency responders, the press, even doctors in addition to this domain of international relations in dealing with complex, changing, often critical situations.Doubtful?Read this along with Jerome Groopman's book How Doctors Think--it addresses the same basic challenges and behaviors only in a different domain (even leveraging some of the same sources, like the classic Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases by Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky).It describes, merely from a different perspective, the same cognitive blinders/bounded awareness also written about by Max Bazerman of Harvard Business School.

This book forensically investigates five international case studies: US interventions in Grenada (1981), Panama (1989), and Vietnam (1964-68); Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (1968); and Israel's intervention in Lebanon (1982-83).

What is shocking is that most of the book ends up also being an amazingly detailed postmortem description of the run up to the decision to intervene in Iraq and the decisions and actions that have followed so far.

This book is densely written--it's not popular press.Not something you'd take to the "rose room" for quick-read snippets.But it clearly illuminates issues that are CRITICAL today: habits of ignorance, bias, and hubris, and patterns of inattention, misperception, cognitive error, unwise actions & missed opportunities, and unintended consequences that have repeated in history, are repeating in Iraq, and will repeat in the future if not consciously avoided.It deserves a yellow highlighter and concerted critical thinking.I consider it REQUIRED READING for all citizens and media as well as congress, the DoD, and this administration.

This is not on the best-seller list, but it SHOULD be.If you only read one book this year, this should be it.It provides a template for understanding today's situation and guidance for learning how to deal with analogous circumstances in the future.

Brilliant Analysis - Hope many in Washington have read it
I don't always use superlatives and am not given to handing out five star recommendations liberally, as some reviewers are, but this gem of insight, prose and scholarship deserves both.

Although this book is ostensibly about the risks of foreign intervention (more about that in a minute) this book is actually two books in one. The first part, which runs 168 lucid, pithy pages, provides one of the most concise and cogent descriptions of risk management that I have seen anywhere. The first two chapters are pure theory; the latter two apply the theory to foreign intervention decisions in general.Vertzberger breaks with the prevailing dogma in risk management (rational choice theory) and instead pursuasively advances an alternative approach - the socio-cognitive model.Good for him - having been in the operational risk management business for a decade, I think his view holds a lot of sway. The author manages to pack so much information into this part that it could easily stand on its own - all of it written in crisp fluid prose, and masterfully referenced, indexed and endnoted, with a very thorough bibliography.

The second part of the book (which runs another 200 pages) applies the theory in Part One to five case studies (Grenada, Panama and Czechoslovakia - all deemed low to moderate risk)and Vietnam and Lebanon (both deemed to be high risk)

This is capped off and tied together by conclusions and implications that address the military, economic and political consequences, especially as they play out over time (usually for the worse).

Vertzberger drills deep and wide into many rich veins of understanding and his material is extremely relevent to the world situation today. It was a delight to read in 1998 when this book was first published, and just as much a delight, albeit hauntingly so, when I pulled it out, post Iraq-II, and wondered how many of Vertzberger's wise cautions had been considered by those responsible for the now current adventure there.

If I have one regret about this book, it is not writing this review back in 1998 when I first read the book. Who knows if that would have made any difference, but if reading this book, or writing this review, could save even one life, it would be worth it. If you are a risk manager, a foreign service officer, a military official, active in the political sphere or just a concerned citizen, you ignore this book at the peril, not just of the reader, but in the case of foreign military interventions, of many. ... Read more

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This is the first authoritative study of the Italian armed forces and the relationship between the military and foreign policies of Fascist Italy from Mussolini's rise to power in 1922 to the catastrophic defeat of 1940. Using extensive new research, John Gooch explores the nature and development of the three armed forces, their relationships with Mussolini and the impact of his policies and command, the development of operational and strategic thought, and the deployment and use of force in Libya, Abyssinia and Spain. He emphasizes Mussolini's long-term expansionist goals and explains how he responded to the structural pressures of the international system and the contingent pressures of events. This compelling account shows that while Mussolini bore ultimate responsibility for Italy's fateful entry into the Second World War, his generals and admirals bore a share of the blame for defeat through policies that all too often rested on irrationality and incompetence. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (5)

Good Study but Dry Reading
What amazed me the most was the amount of statistical data included in this volume.What would have made it utterly more readable would have been to present much more of the data in table form.Reading paragraphs of numbers becomes tiring and sadly difficult to do comparisons without writing them out by hand.As another reviewer wrote, more and better maps would have been helpful.(On map three of africa Uganda identified as Belgian Congo, and British Somaliland is missing.)For a book from Cambridge University Press there are way too many typos and grammar mistakes.If this was a student paper you'ld make them go back and spellcheck it again.

Not to mention some ongoing analysis to the millions and billions of lire allocated and spent in current terms.After a while all those zeros start to run into each other (btw what is a millard, is it an american billion). It's like trying to read the "Stimulus Package".

As to the book, if you read the bibliography, almost all of the data is taken from the actual Italian government documents.This of course makes it impossible (for me at least) to look at any of it but I'll take the Professor's word that the translations are accurate.What is amazing is that in the eighteen years the Fascists were in power prior to WW2, they could never get their armed forces in shape.As you read through the information as to the building of tanks, ships and airplanes it's almost like a study in ineptitude.

One example should suffice: because they wanted to be considered one of the "Great Powers" they felt they had to have a 'Battleship'.This entails more than just building battleships.You have to have cruisers along with it, not to mention destroyers, destroyer escorts and tenders, etc.At one point they launch two battleships and realize (hello, duh!) that they are 'short' eight destroyers to protect them.Even when they have the secondary ships they seem to be antiquated and not up to the job their supposed to do.The delays in their building program (from lack of essential materials) is such that by the time the ships are launched they are already outdated.They would have been better off building 'attack destroyers' and light Cruisers and group of ocean-going submarines.(At the beginning of the war they had over 100 subs but most could only operate in the Mediterranean.)

After eighteen years in power and the expense of billions of lire, on the dawn of war, more than half their airplanes were obsolete, their artillery was substandard and too heavy for African roads, and much of their ground forces were short of clothing, boots and ammunition. At one time the Army orders five million pairs of boots (for a million man army) and then has much of them 'rot' in warehouse and become useless.

The Air Force is made up of so many different planes, in some cases thirty different models of fighters that in most cases it's impossible to determine how they could be used.Just the maintenance problems and parts must have made this a horror for training purposes.Does it sound unreasonable that they always had a shortage of trained pilots?

Mussolini was far from the strategist that Hitler was, and the 'Italian High Command' spent more time fighting among themselves for money and prestige than devising plans.Don't get me wrong, they had a myriad of plans, they were just worthless or impossible for their armed forces to execute.For most of the thirties they couldn't decide who they were in danger from, or from everybody.They constantly worried about the French and British navies, the protection of Libya and Italian East Africa, the Dodecanese Islands (almost 500 square miles of sea) and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Greece. Unlike Germany which was very concentrated in land mass.They were so spread out, there just weren't enough Italians to go around, no the money to support them.

So the old stereotype of the Italian Armed Forces being incompetent as fighters is really false.It wasn't the men at the bottom causing the problems, it was the men at the top. Unlike the Wehrmacht, the Italian Armed Forces were constantly being redesigned so that there was little standardization in equipment or training.How hard would you fight if you didn't have the correct material to fight with and were commanded by 'strutting peacocks'.

A great study that is flawed more in it's execution (was this a conscious mistake on Gooch's part) than in the information presented.

Zeb Kantrowitz

Very good study
John Gooch's MUSSOLINI AND HIS GENERALS is very good. I highly recommend this book.

He has some small errors of detail since he is not a military person but an academic but it is filled with Italian war planning from 1921-1940. If you want to know what Italy was thinking about for war planning this is the place to go. More detailed maps would have been helpful too, but I am map person.

Excellent Book
In the second world war the Italian army performed badly. It was not able to make headway in the battle for France. It was defeated when it tried to invade Greece and Egypt. It collapsed entirely when trying to defend Sicily. The only success that it had was in Africa when the Germans supplemented an Italian infantry army with the German Africa Corps. The addition of German armour and air support led to a number of victories.

This book shows that the failure to perform was due to decisions made before the war about how to equip and structure the armed services. Italy was a relatively poor country compared to France, Britain and Germany. It fought the war with equipment that was designed in the 30's. It also had a ambitious armaments program as it sought to build a large air force a significant navy and a considerable army. Germany an economically more powerful country was not as ambitious. It had a large army and air force butonly a small navy. Italy not only had to defend a colonial empire in Libya and Somalia but it also conquered Ethiopia in the 30s. It needed the navy to protect its empire, to allow it to conquer colonies and to safeguard its shoreline. Most of the naval expenditure went into a battleship fleet. This proved very vulnerable to air attack and was ineffective in the war.

The expenditure on the air force had a range of problems. The most significant was the tendency to parcel out small orders amongst a number of firms. This meant that there were no large firms created to be able to cope with the demand of a war. In addition the design of a large number of the Italian aircraft were poor and they became obsolete quickly. The book illustrates that the Italians picked up the wrong message from the Spanish civil war. The Germans were able realise that modern fighter war fare was about speed and not manoeuvrability. Their new fighter the BF 109 was able to dominate the air for the early part of the war. The Italians on the other hand were satisfied with the performance of their aircraft not putting into context that they were only contesting against obsolete Russian aircraft.

Whilst the Italians recognised the importance of armoured warfare and sought to incorporate tanks into their army they relied on lightweight models which were armoured with only machine guns. To make matters worse the Italians failed to supply their forces with effective anti-tank guns. On top of this by 1938 the Italian army was poorly supplied with field artillery. Attempts were made to provide more up to date artillery of a high calibre but this was not complete by the outbreak the war.

During the war most of the major belligerents developed new weapons. The Germans upgraded their tanks with armour and guns. The British moved from low powered two engine bombers to four engine bombers. Italy was limited in its ability to innovate because of the nature of its aircraft and automotive industry. Its weapons simply became more and more obsolete.

This book whilst not an exciting page turner outlines in clear detail the complexity of Italian decision making prior to the war. Why a country which might have had either a modern air force or navy instead ended up with three poorly equipped services. From the 20s on it was not clear to Italy what war it was going to fight. Would it be a war against France and Yugoslavia?Would it be a war to gain colonies or a war to prevent Austria being incorporated into Germany. Each different type of war required different types of expenditure and planning. Should roads and defensive lines be created in Libya? Should there be preparations to invade Yugoslavia? The lack of focus and change of priorities led to a gradual loss of advantage against the other major powers as they re-armed in the late 1930's to the point at which its armed forces were ineffectual.

Great treatise on Mussolini & Italy's military preparations before WWII
I can only second the earlier reviewer that this book is a must for anyone interested in Italy between the wars.At times it is tedious and very slow-moving, but one garners the impression that Italy was equally slow-moving.In many ways it seems that Mussolini was gaming with his armed forces, never obtaining sufficient budgets for their development, and never seriously building the economic supports for an effective military machine nor mobilizing popular support for a military establishment.Italy remained decidedly non-martial, and Mussolini used bragging and bombast when he should have been using leadership.

The Piedmont generals also come in for substantial criticism for their incompetence and inability to forge a unity of command or consensus for action.The litany of conferences and squabbles are dreary, and no one could put aside their personal ambition or creature comforts for the good of Italy.The reader is left hoping that someone will step up to the plate, but they never do.Yes, Italy lacked natural resources, but they were obtainable in North Africa, overseas, or could be developed domestically if the will had been there.This volume shows conclusively that this will was not present anywhere -- in Mussolini or any other.

Mussolini was playing the game of being an imperialistic great power as if the date were 1880, and was out of touch with reality.Italy possessed no national will for war or the building of economic power, and would disappear from the international stage of significant nations as a result.This volume definitively shows how and why that happened.

Best summary to date of Fascist Italian military policy
This is an excellent account of the military situation in Italy leading up to World War II.There have been many myths about the Italian military which are laid to rest with this book. First and foremost the structure of the Italian military is analyzed in detail and the rise of the air force is clearly seen. With Italy's extensive coast and lack of natural resources the air force becomes increasingly important to defend the coast and protect shipping.While this book tracks the various approaches of the armed services and shows their incompatibility with eachother via command staffs it also shows how diplomacy and the military interacted under Mussolini.

Mussolini insisted on personally controlling almost all details of both his foreign policy and military. Each wing was under his intense scrutiny and he controlled much of what they did. Often as is proven here inexperienced and ineffective leaders prospered under this system only because they had the Duce's blessing.Men like Badoglio were able to professionalize and organize the services somewhat but it was only in as far as Mussolini would allow.Overall Italy is shown to be at a tremendous lack of resources which hinders their war effort from the start.Inability to build larger ships due to lack of metal, lack of oil and lack of livestock all weighed heavily on Italy in the prewar period. When the war starts these would become major points of failure for the country.

In all an excellent book for those who want to learn more in this growing field about fascist Italy.Highly recommend for not only the military historian and the World War II historian but those interested in how diplomacy and military interacted in Fascist Italy.
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This book examines how the United States uses limited military force and other means to influence adversaries and potential adversaries.It reviews when limited force can and cannot work and examines a range of current challenges, including those of guerrilla groups or minor powers armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.It also looks at the complications arising from domestic politics and the difficulties of using force in an alliance. ... Read more

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Alanson B. Houghton—American industrialist, politician, and diplomat—was the world's most influential diplomat during the "New Era" of the 1920s. Houghton, who served as ambassador to both Germany (1922–25) and Great Britain (1925–29), offers a unique window into the formation and implementation of American foreign policy. This fascinating new text by Jeffrey J. Matthews provides a clear and concise account of Houghton's diplomatic experience and consequently a fresh assessment of U.S. foreign policy during a pivotal decade in world history.

As the leading ambassador in Europe, Houghton played a key role in the major diplomatic achievements of the era, including the Dawes Plan for reparations, the Locarno security treaties, and the Kellogg-Briand peace pact. While Hougton's significant contributions to these international accords is fully explored, the major theme of this book is his emergence as chief critic of U.S. foreign policy within the Harding and Coolidge administrations.

ALANSON B. HOUHGTON: AMBASSADOR OF THE NEW ERA offers students a concise historical narrative and a substantive reevaluation of 1920s American foreign policy. This text will help students understand why the United States failed to establish a stable world order during the New Era and additionally sheds light on the key historiographical themes of isolationism, new-imperialism, and corporations. For students taking courses on the Gilded Age, the interwar years, and U.S. foreign policy, this new volume will be an invaluable resource. ... Read more

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contributing to our understanding of 20th c politics
Alanson B. houghton was a name lost as an important player in 20th century American history. Matthews work
helps connect the dots between the end of WW1 and Hitlers' invasion of Poland and illustrates Houghtons'
prescience in world affairs.Wonderfully written piece that weaves the various players in U.S. and European
government into an understandable story of diplomatic successes and failures leading to WW2. ... Read more

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This digital document is an article from Foreign Policy in Focus, published by Interhemispheric Resource Center on May 6, 2002. The length of the article is 978 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: U.S. security assistance to Israel. (Self-Determination Series).(Brief Article)
Author: Joseph Yackley
Publication: Foreign Policy in Focus (Magazine/Journal)
Date: May 6, 2002
Publisher: Interhemispheric Resource Center
Volume: 7Issue: 3Page: 1(1)

Article Type: Brief Article

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This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Thomson Gale on September 1, 2007. The length of the article is 8760 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: Post-war Iraq: foreign contributions to training, peacekeeping, and reconstruction: updated September 25, 2007.(CRS Report for Congress)
Author: Jeremy M. Sharp
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: September 1, 2007
Publisher: Thomson Gale
Page: NA

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This digital document is an article from Foreign Policy in Focus, published by Interhemispheric Resource Center on May 13, 2002. The length of the article is 832 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: Toward a new foreign policy.(Brief Article)
Author: Tamar Gabelnick
Publication: Foreign Policy in Focus (Magazine/Journal)
Date: May 13, 2002
Publisher: Interhemispheric Resource Center
Volume: 7Issue: 4Page: 3(1)

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This digital document is an article from Foreign Policy in Focus, published by Interhemispheric Resource Center on May 20, 2002. The length of the article is 1106 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: Problems with current U.S. policy.
Author: Stephen Zunes
Publication: Foreign Policy in Focus (Magazine/Journal)
Date: May 20, 2002
Publisher: Interhemispheric Resource Center
Volume: 7Issue: 5Page: 2(1)

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This digital document is an article from Foreign Policy in Focus, published by Interhemispheric Resource Center on May 20, 2002. The length of the article is 910 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Citation Details
Title: Toward a new foreign policy.(Brief Article)
Author: Stephen Zunes
Publication: Foreign Policy in Focus (Magazine/Journal)
Date: May 20, 2002
Publisher: Interhemispheric Resource Center
Volume: 7Issue: 5Page: 3(1)

Article Type: Brief Article

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Product Description
This digital document is an article from Foreign Policy in Focus, published by Interhemispheric Resource Center on August 6, 2001. The length of the article is 845 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: Toward a New Foreign Policy.(US and Colombia)(Brief Article)
Author: Gina Amatangelo
Publication: Foreign Policy in Focus (Magazine/Journal)
Date: August 6, 2001
Publisher: Interhemispheric Resource Center
Volume: 6Issue: 29Page: 3

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