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Iraq Diplomatic Handbook (World Business, Investment and Government Library) ... Read more

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In October 2002 author John Hostettler was one of only six (6) Republican members of the United States House of Representatives to vote against the resolution authorizing President George W. Bush to invade Iraq. In Nothing for the Nation , Hostettler first explains why he voted against the authorization and what led him to proclaim on the floor of the House of Representatives two (2) days before that vote that the case supporting the allegation of a program of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq was tenuous at best. Hostettler then makes the case that the true motivations for removing Saddam Hussein from power was not so much about US national security but was more personal to the two parties most prominent in selling the WMD case to the American people and their elected leaders in Congress. You've read about faulty intelligence. You've heard from politicians who say they were lied to. Now find out what really happened and find out why we are in Iraq from the man who got it right before the beginning! ... Read more

Customer Reviews (5)

How America was neoconned into the Iraq war
"In 'Nothing for the Nation' my friend and former colleague John Hostettler, who was one of the few Republicans to oppose the Iraqi War, not only demolishes the "official" justifications for attacking Iraq, but he demonstrates why true conservatives should have joined John and myself in opposing the war.I urge all Campaign for Liberty members, and anyone who wishes to understand how America was neoconned into the Iraq war, to read John's book."

"The leadership of al Qaeda hoped to lure us into a "desert Vietnam," an enormously expensive war that would deplete our resources and help their own recruitment by stirring up the locals against us. And that is just what happened. The war's ultimate cost is being estimated in the trillions. The dollar is collapsing. And more terrorists are being created. According to a study by the Global Research in International Affairs Center in Herzliya, Israel, the vast bulk of the foreign fighters in Iraq are people who had never been involved in terrorist activity before but have been radicalized by the U.S. presence in Iraq - the second-holiest place in Islam."

Ron Paul Quoted From The Revolution: A Manifesto
Another great book from Machiavelli The Prince (AD Classic)
And another Blowback, Second Edition: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire

A Must Read for All True Conservatives
A must read for anyone who wants to know how Rep. Hostettler became one of a handful of Republican Members of Congress to vote against the Iraq War in 2002.It is a behind the scenes look on the REAL reasons King George waged war in Iraq and more.

Yawn, some will write anything for a buck.
Don't bother unless you are a fan of Pat Buchanan.In which case exaggeration, historical inaccuracies & the falsehoods that are to be found in this work will be very familiar.

The truth, finally
This is a book written by a heroic author. Heroic because he bravely writes the truth about who pushed the USA into this useless war in Iraq. Of course, nobody wants Israel to fail, or worse, be obliterated, as the Iranian's proclaim. However, we should never have offered up our thousands of American lives and a trillion dollars and counting, for something that was never a threat to Israel in the first place.

The immense Jewish lobby, and their legions of Jewish public servants that have positioned themselves at all levels in our government, have basically taken over the foreigh policy of our USA. They have wrongly directed us into this useless, unnecessary war, that may never end. We should condemn such an 'invasion' of our government by persons that have strong loyalties to countries other than our own. This tome illuminates the serious problem we have allowed to mature. Will Congress do anything about mitigating this internal threat? Not as long as we continue to allow those that have dual citizenship to serve unfettered by restraint, in positions of influence in the federal government. The entire world agrees that the USA is nothing more than an arm of Tel Aviv, and they admonish our positions to no avail. Sad, so very sad. Bravo to Rep. Hostettler for his brave stand.

GIVE ME A BREAK WILL YOU?
So tired of this old saw - the anti-Jewish conspiracy baloney...The Iraq war, the Great Depression, 9/11, Communism, psychiatry and just about every bad thing ever in history was caused by the Jews.BORING.GROW UP.

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This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs on March 1, 2010. The length of the article is 10527 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Citation Details
Title: Iraq: politics, elections, and benchmarks.(Congressional Research Service)(Report)
Author: Kenneth Katzman
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: March 1, 2010
Publisher: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs
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Article Type: Report

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This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs on June 1, 2009. The length of the article is 5716 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: The Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq.(Congressional Research Service)(Report)
Author: Kenneth Katzman
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: June 1, 2009
Publisher: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs
Page: NA

Article Type: Report

Distributed by Gale, a part of Cengage Learning ... Read more

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This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs on December 1, 2009. The length of the article is 5432 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: Post-Saddam transition and governance.(Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance And Security)(Report)
Author: Kenneth Katzman
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: December 1, 2009
Publisher: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs
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Article Type: Report

Distributed by Gale, a part of Cengage Learning ... Read more

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This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Thomson Gale on July 1, 2007. The length of the article is 2005 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: U.S. Embassy in Iraq.
Author: Susan B. Epstein
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: July 1, 2007
Publisher: Thomson Gale
Page: NA

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This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Thomson Gale on March 1, 2006. The length of the article is 22313 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: Iraq: U.S. regime change efforts and post-Saddam governance.(CRS Report for Congress: Received through the CRS Web)
Author: Kenneth Katzman
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: March 1, 2006
Publisher: Thomson Gale
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This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Thomson Gale on July 1, 2007. The length of the article is 4217 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: President's January 10 initiative, Iraq Study Group report, legislation, and other options.(Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security)(George W. Bush)(Table)
Author: Kenneth Katzman
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: July 1, 2007
Publisher: Thomson Gale
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Article Type: Table

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This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Thomson Gale on July 1, 2007. The length of the article is 5589 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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Title: Iraq: U.S. military operations.(Report)
Author: Steve Bowman
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: July 1, 2007
Publisher: Thomson Gale
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Article Type: Report

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Customer Reviews (2)

Pleased with Purchase
I was very pleased with my purchase and would recommend seller.I received my item good condition.

Iraq Since the Gulf War
An all-Iraqi cast of eighteen authors has combined to put together the single most informative book on today's Iraq.In outlook, the authors (all in exile, of course, except for a few in the Kurdish autonomous region) extend from Marxist to Kurdish nationalist, but all of them share a seriousness of purpose spawned by Saddam Husayn's horrors.Their subjects range from the abstract (Kanan Makiya on the need for tolerance) to the specific (Rend Rahim Francke on the makeup of the Iraqi opposition).

Two articles particularly stand out:Suha Omar argues that the improvement of women's rights in Iraq is a sham.The government insists on at least five children per mother and uses the General Federation of Iraqi Women to police women and to procure them for high officials.Omar concludes that, given the realities of Saddam's Iraq, "women's equality before the law and their right to vote and hold office are sources of pain and oppression rather than pleasure and liberation."Faleh `Abd al-Jabbar explains that the anti-Saddam revolt of March 1991 (called the intifada) failed because the exiled opposition leadership misjudged the mood in Iraq, "overestimating the strength of Saddam's appeal to Iraqi patriotism."Had the exiles been more bold, he writes, they could have led the Kurds and Shi`is to victory over the despot.

Middle East Quarterly, March 1995 ... Read more

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In The Threatening Storm, Kenneth M. Pollack, one of the world’s leading experts on Iraq, provides a masterly insider’s perspective on the crucial issues facing the United States as it moves toward a new confrontation with Saddam Hussein.

For the past fifteen years, as an analyst on Iraq for the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, Kenneth Pollack has studied Saddam as closely as anyone else in the United States. In 1990, he was one of only three CIA analysts to predict the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the principal author of the CIA’s history of Iraqi military strategy and operations during the Gulf War, Pollack gained rare insight into the methods and workings of what he believes to be the most brutal regime since Stalinist Russia.

Examining all sides of the debate and bringing a keen eye to the military and geopolitical forces at work, Pollack ultimately comes to this controversial conclusion: through our own mistakes, the perfidy of others, and Saddam’s cunning, the United States is left with few good policy options regarding Iraq. Increasingly, the option that makes the most sense is for the United States to launch a full-scale invasion, eradicate Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, and rebuild Iraq as a prosperous and stable society—for the good of the United States, the Iraqi people, and the entire region.

Pollack believed for many years that the United States could prevent Saddam from threatening the stability of the Persian Gulf and the world through containment—a combination of sanctions and limited military operations. Here, Pollack explains why containment is no longer effective, and why other policies intended to deter Saddam ultimately pose a greater risk than confronting him now, before he gains possession of nuclear weapons and returns to his stated goal of dominating the Gulf region. “It is often said that war should be employed only in the last resort,” Pollack writes. “I reluctantly believe that in the case of the threat from Iraq, we have come to the last resort.”

Offering a view of the region that has the authority and force of an intelligence report, Pollack outlines what the leaders of neighboring Arab countries are thinking, what is necessary to gain their support for an invasion, how a successful U.S. operation would be mounted, what the likely costs would be, and how Saddam might react. He examines the state of Iraq today—its economy, its armed forces, its political system, the status of its weapons of mass destruction as best we understand them, and the terrifying security apparatus that keeps Saddam in power. Pollack also analyzes the last twenty years of relations between the United States and Iraq to explain how the two countries reached the unhappy standoff that currently prevails.

Commanding in its insights and full of detailed information about how leaders on both sides will make their decisions, The Threatening Storm is an essential guide to understanding what may be the crucial foreign policy challenge of our time. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (87)

Necessary and critical reading to understand why we invaded Iraq.
This is the single most important book to read to understand the case for invading Iraq. As a work of historical importance it stands alone for explaining the "why" on the Iraq war. For those who supported the war, it explains how people of good faith can come to a decision to go to war. For those who opposed the war, it demonstrates the factors that influence others to go to war. If nothing else, it high lights the type of information upon which decision makers depend, and of which we must be critical.

Those who dismiss this book because of the errors about WMDs, for example, are shooting the messenger, and doing a disservice to history. Kenneth Pollack does a masterful job of compiling the status quo antebellum, and deserves respect and gratitude for bringing reasoned discourse to a hyper-partisan arena. If you haven't read this book, you can't call your self a scholar of the Iraq War.

Why Saddam had to go
Kenneth Pollack, writing six months before the March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, sets out a case legitimizing such a course of action.He makes it clear from the outset that there was no link between Iraq and al-Qa'eda and therefore his case is built on entirely different grounds.The current policy toward Iraq was established by the United Nations after the first Gulf War.It was one of containment and had two essential parts:weapons inspections and sanctions.For these to be effective, the cooperation of the United Nations and especially of Iraq's neighbours was necessary.And in the early 1990's everybody was on board and it seemed to be working.

It is important to stress that the purpose of the inspections was not to find weapons of mass destruction.It was to verify that Saddam had destroyed these weapons as he had claimed.How do we know he possessed weapons of mass destruction?Because he used them on his own people, the Kurds, as well as against the Iranians during his war with Iran.Regarding the former, by the time his campaign against the Kurds was over in 1989, some two hundred thousand Kurds had been killed and "huge swaths of Kurdistan had been scorched by chemical warfare" (p. 20).

Beginning in late 1994, evidence began to emerge that the U.N. inspectors were being deceived.The head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, Wafiq al-Samarra'i, fled Iraq and during extensive debriefings, told UNSCOM that despite what it had been led to believe, Iraq had developed VX nerve agent and loaded it onto missiles during the Gulf War for use if the coalition had marched on Baghdad (p. 71).It was learned that Iraq had a far more advanced and extensive biological warfare program than the inspectors knew.

Probably the most frightening aspect of Saddam's program of WMD was his intent, and progress toward, the acquisition of nuclear weapons.In August 1990, he had ordered a crash program to build a single nuclear weapon that could be placed in a missile warhead and used against Tel Aviv if his regime was at risk.Though he was not successful, U.N. inspectors believe that Iraq could have achieved a fully workable nuclear weapon in another year had the war not set back the program.

A recent defector who worked as a design engineer stated that Saddam had ordered the entire nuclear program reconstituted in August 1998, when he announced that he had ceased all cooperation with the U.N. inspectors.The U.S. intelligence community estimated that it would take Iraq five to ten years from the start of a crash program to enrich enough uranium to make one or more weapons.The German intelligence service estimated it at only three to six years.Thus if left to its own devices it would be only a matter of time before Saddam's regime could acquire nuclear weapons (p. 174).

By the late 1990's flagrant disregard of sanctions toward Iraq by its Arab neighbours and even by countries like China showed that the climate had changed (p. 216).Iraq was bringing in around $3 billion in illegal trade, and the international community had lost interest in enforcing U.N. resolutions.Saddam, sensing this, was emboldened and kicked out the inspectors in 1998.The policy of containment, then, clearly had failed.

What were the options?Covert action by CIA operatives (or by any other nation's operatives) had not met with success and was unlikely to do so in the future as that effort played to Saddam's strengths:layer upon layer of armed protection and a police state so extensive that Iraqis could have no confidence that anything they said would not be heard by the wrong ears.The so-called "Afghan approach" whereby very limited American and international troops assist indigenous armed rebels would also be doomed to failure, as Saddam was able to crush an uprising when he was at his weakest, immediately after the first Gulf War.The opposition, whether they were Kurds in the north or Shi'ites in the south, were not nearly as strong as the Northern Alliance was in opposition to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

So we were left with deterrence or full-scale invasion.Deterrence meant allowing the elements of containment to lapse and instead relying on the threat of American military action to prevent Iraq from making mischief in the Persian Gulf region.The core assumption of deterrence was that Saddam would make the same calculation as the Soviets had - that the risk of nuclear annihilation by the United States would be too great to risk any aggressive military moves beyond his borders.But Saddam's behaviour in the past could give no confidence that he would in fact behave this way.According to Pollack, "Saddam's decision making has been characterized by miscalculation, extreme risk taking, a total disregard for human life, a willingness to suffer tremendous damage in pursuit of his goals, and a terrifying willingness to interpret reality in fantastic ways to suit the needs of the moment" (p. 416).

Furthermore, deterrence would be a policy with terrible costs.It would mean condemning the Iraqi people to decades more terror and torture under Saddam's totalitarianism.Unlike containment, deterrence also would mean giving up our ability to protect the Kurds.Human Rights Watch argued that Saddam's Anfal campaign (1987-89) constituted genocide against the Kurds, with some 200,000 dead.Pollack quotes a U.N. representative who reported that the brutality of the Iraqi regime was "of an exceptionally grave character - so grave that it has few parallels in the years that have passed since the Second World War" (p. 123).Saddam was able to "create a pervasive climate of terror throughout the country, which is the linchpin of Iraqi totalitarianism."

His was a state that "employed arbitrary execution, imprisonment, and torture on a comprehensive and routine basis."Pollack has a long list of indescribably monstrous practices of which I will reluctantly relate just two."This is a regime that will crush all of the bones in the feet of a two year old girl to force her mother to divulge her father's whereabouts".It is one "that will slowly lower its victims into huge vats of acid, either to break their will or simply as a means of execution" (p. 123).John Sweeney of the BBC said of being in Baghdad, "the fear is so omnipresent you could almost eat it.No one talks" (p. 122).The scale of Saddam's repression is such that over the last twenty years more than 200,000 people have disappeared into his prison system, never to be heard from again (p. 124).

Finally, those who said that "Bush is a maniac, an out of control cowboy" need to realize that the plan to overthrow Saddam did not originate with him.He inherited this plan from President Clinton, who, on December 19, 1998 announced that the policy of the U.S. government was now to replace Saddam Hussein's regime (p. 94).And one of the most vocal "hawks" in the Clinton administration who favored military action against Iraq was Vice-President Al Gore.What this tells us is that this was not a partisan decision but was made by both Democrat and Republican administrations.It took the events of 9/11 to galvanize the American people sufficiently that such a course of action was politically feasible.

What about the need for U.N. approval for invasion?Former President Carter, among others, made it clear that the moral legitimacy of this course depended on U.N. support.But this is dangerous moral reasoning.When morality is determined by counting noses, by community consensus, it is reduced to mere power.This would mean that the international court of opinion can never be wrong.What the former President should have been arguing was the merits of the case before him, not whether a bunch of other nations agree.

As I am writing this, five and one half years after the invasion actually occurred, I am well aware of how poorly it has unfolded.Certainly the logistics and execution of the invasion should have been carried out differently.But it is important to remember that the justification for the invasion itself is a separate issue, and as such, Pollack's 2002 analysis still has merit.

Many reviewers are unfair
Many reviewers here are criticizing Pollack for supporting the Iraq war as it was waged, talking about the disaster Iraq is now and laying that at his feet.

This is unfair. Pollack was clearly very concerned about post-war stability and blowback against the United States, and laid down a number of prerequisites to any invasion ... all of which were completely ignored by the Bush administration and other Iraq-war backers. Ultimately, the situation we face now is exactly what Pollack predicted would happen if we didn't take appropriate steps before the invasion.

Now, one may reasonably conclude that invading Iraq would have been a mistake even if we followed Pollack's advice, but recognize that such criticisms are squarely in "what if?" territory. Ultimately, to lay the chaos we now face there on Pollack's feet is to cherry-pick from his book in much the same way that the Bush administration cherry-picked evidence to argue that we must invade. It's an intellectually dishonest criticism.

OOPS!
Well Ken, guess you kind of blew it huh?Looking at the pathetic reviews here from 2002 I have to wonder do any of you feel any guilt?Even just a little?Well "Dubya" followed the advice of this book and now he and Kenny-boy have the blood of over 3000 Americans on their hands.And now this clown has a book about Iran!In the words of a REAL Republican president: There you go again.

In view of what we know now, in 2007...
...this book on the face of it has done serious harm. That's all I have to say. ... Read more

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Good book... title not precise

This is not a discussion of what we owe Iraq, which Feldman states is a decent functioning government, but an analysis of the the issues involved in getting there.

The best parts, for me, were the examples from his experiencesuch as the practical problems facing those who worked in the early occuption, his description of the Republican Palace, the meeting with the Lawyers Association.

The heart of the book is an analysis of the issues involved in achieving the goal such as authority, occupation vs. trusteeship, paternalism, elections, legitimacy/perceived legitimacy, etc.

Do not compare Germany and Iraq ...
Condoleezza Rice always takes the concept of "Nation Building" with pleasure into her mouth and tries to explain with frown to the audience how important this task is. The author Noah Feldman is an expert for this concept -- and NATION BUILDING also has his development history: On the occasion of the 1st World War the United Nations formulated guidelines which were still whisked a little with the ideology of the colonial time and carried a little of the gesture of a patriarchal guardianship into themselves, though. After the second World War one lost something of this arrogance and put as an aim into the centre only, that a nation, political ethically lagging behind (at that time Germany), should be brought by the introduction of democracy to the global community standard. Cases like Kosovo or East Timor seemed to confirm the correctness of such a target. In the case Iraq an additional thinking effort must be done. While Condoleezza Rice still compares Germany 1945 with present Iraq a little school girlishly and assumes that everything has to be fixed in the time window of four years, the expert Noah Feldman is there already a little more skeptical. Compare the educational level, the religion dependence, the power of the different population groupings and the complete missing of national feelings of guilt: these different factors forbid the comparison Iraq/Germany actually. [Nevertheless the Washington administration-rhetoric continues to do so.] Noah Feldman seems to recognize the clear difference: Because the wave of terror-acts is not tearing off. Has there been this in Germany, that police stations were classified as collaborator collection places and regularly blown up into the air? Has there been this in Germany 1945, that permanently seeped over the national boundaries from the neighboring countries Christian sympathizers to Germany, which wanted to help to cast out the Americans? NO! The USA have completely underestimated the forming strength of Islamic solidarity and the connected high aggression level . Since the debacle was got going worldwide visibly now (perhaps justified a little recklessly and wrongly)?, the USA owes to the Iraqi people, not to leave the country till at least safety is established against assassinations - this is the NEW, what Feldman is saying. Unfortunately, the installation of a constitution suffices not at all (like 1945-1949 in Germany). The production of a civilian safety as an afterwards defined aim will take up substantially more time or is successful never -- and ends with an out throw of American know-all battalions as formerly in Vietnam. Noah Feldman does not mention this point, he likes to see a positive future, not the flashbacks of nightmare-views. Of course we all hope, there soon will shine the sun of peace and freedom in Iraq -- and the US will take a break, being a global ethic police ...

Arguably the best, most practical book on post-war Iraq
I think I'll begin by addressing the two negative reviews posted thus far...

At no point in this book does Feldman argue that the U.S. should have replaced Hussein with another dictator.That kind of statement runs completely against everything contained in this book.In my opinion, only someone that had never read the book could make a claim like that.

As for the other review (posted by someone that simply pastes academic reviews onto Amazon), the view is presented that the U.S. in fact does not owe Iraq much of anything and claims that Feldman presents no argument to the contrary.This type of statement is also in the wrong.

Feldman takes the position in this book that since the U.S. is in Iraq and completely dismantled the government, there is an ethical obligation on the part of the U.S. to see the job finished.A finished job would be a functioning, self-reliant Iraq that can defend itself and promote individual liberties.This book goes about describing the set of ethics the U.S. should abide by.

A lot of people argue about Iraq today as if it were only George W. Bush's problem.This approach is terribly flawed.Iraq in 2003 was a product of (1) Saddam Hussein, and (2) EVERY U.S. PRESIDENT SINCE REAGAN.Washington has had a roller coaster of a ride with Iraq ever since the early 80's.Every decision made by the U.S. since then has contributed to how Iraq would eventually end up.Yes...Hussein is also to blame and should not be given a free pass, but neither should the U.S.As far as ethics go, we owe a huge deal to Iraq.Hussein would have most likely been defeated by Iran in the 80's had it not been for U.S. and other Western support.It's time the U.S. owned up to our decisions, regardless of whether or not George W. Bush went about it in a patently dishonest way.

In the end, Feldman presents an argument that is both ethical and pragmatic.I think his argument is the one that should ultimately be adopted.If you can get past your own partisan issues and listen to Feldman with an open mind, you'll come away with a much better understanding of Iraq and what to do about it.

Obviously faulty thinking on Iraq situation by author
At one point the author, Feldman, talks about how the USA should have just replaced Saddam with someone more benevolent and not gone to war with Iraq. Feldman, just how would we have done that? Saddam was very determined to keep his postion in Iraq as leader. He even provenly employed doubles of himself to thwart any attempted assassination overthrow of him by plotters. Also, Saddam killed over a million of his own Iraqis amd terrorized close to all of them while he was in power. Strong state you claim he had, huh? Sure! Terrorizing, national dictators often do manage to have strong states under their sway. Also, he sent SCUD missiles at Israel. Feldman, aren't you Jewish? He was bad for your Jewish cousins, if you are. Think about that for a while. Lastly, the USA has 350 million people. Iraq had around 23 million. We have a right to put ourselves before them in importance due to our much greater numbers.

Legitimizing futile occupation
"A republic to keep, not anarchy or utopia" is the zest of this book. The author strives to rationalize the futility of U.S.'s involvement in a flawed war.He discerns similarities and differences between the chaos in Iraq and those of Germany, Japan, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Kosovo, East Timor, Algeria, Uganda, Ireland, Haiti, and Afghanistan.

The book spans 130 pages of well-read and logically evolving description of the heuristic process of nation building. It falls into three chapters, plus an introduction and conclusion.

The INTRODUCTION outlines the objectives of nation building by an occupying power, the relationship between the occupier and the occupied, in the era of democracy, and the mechanism of exit, through election and security safeguards to ensure durable and sovereign government that could maintain order and legitimacy.

Chapter 1, NATION BUILDING: OBJECTIVES, compares the objective of nation building during the Cold War of thwarting the threat of "total destruction" through a "rational-actor model" of states (Germany, Japan, N. Korea) to the present involvement to restoring "civil order" through a "non-state violence actor model" (Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, E. Timor, and Somalia).

The absence of any rational model for the Iraq War that toppled a deterrable and strong government is considered a foreign policy blunder that created a failed state, threatening regional instability, with low odds of success of democracy without long, costly, and bloody US support.

The author contends that ethics and morality have a role in International affairs. He cites the examples of Kosovo and E. Timor to prove that Internationalization does not impose ethical comfort, but our national believes that "ethnic cleansing" is immoral lent the needed support.

Chapter 2, TRUSTEESHIP, PATERNALISM, AND SELF-INTEREST starts by the author's admission to the guilt of the U.S. of high-handed behavior that led to a "serious fix", the rash and mistaken disbanding of Iraqi army that created chaos, and the de-ba'thification order of Ambassador Bremer that alienated the middle class. With the absence of civil society, there is little hope to impose security. Hence comes the ethical obligation on the U.S. to produce order through monopolizing violence.

The author confesses that we do not know what we are doing, we do not understand the complexities of the Iraqi society and politics, and we are woefully unprepared for external nation building. He then delves into the modern history of international law in order legitimize occupation, as follows.

The Spanish War:
The Spanish canonists rationalized governing the Indians of the new world through Europeans' "wardship" on their behalf, on the bases that the Indians possess polities, law, religion, and are reasonable men entitled to rule themselves.

Before WWI:
The Annex of the Hague Convention of 1907, restricts the authority of the occupying power to restore order, until cessation of hostilities, without violating property, pillage forbidden, and tax collection for the benefit of the occupied state.

After WWI:
During the era of the League of Nations, trusteeship took the form of a sacred covenant to civilize "underdeveloped" countries until they become able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of modern world.This paternalistic approach entrusted the "tutelage" of the occupied to the occupier, which caused the failure of the British nation building of monarchy in Iraq after WWI. The British imported King Faisel from Arabia without legal legitimacy (Notice the role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the past and present: money and oil).

After WWII:
During the United Nations era, trusteeship defines the relationship between principals and agent: settlor creates a trust; trustee confers control; beneficiary gain ability to self-rule. The political power is based on the representative's judgment, acting like an agent, regardless of the opinion of the beneficiary, acting like principals. The Principals ensure her interests are promoted through: freedom of speech, assembly (protest and march), participation, and election. This trusteeship is limited in time and with defined responsibility of supervision. It does not intend to civilize, but to build a self-running machine that can rule itself and protect sovereignty.

Although the author observes few glimpses of the Islamic tradition through "hauza", "shura", and "fatwa", the author has a blind spot for the immense influence of Islamic thinking in that part of the world. That made him erroneously believes that the U.S. is serving the interest of the Iraqi by "seeing it through" and remaining after election to ensure a functioning republic. Although he admits that all Iraqis he had met, wanted U.S. out, he does seem to realize that that consensus undermines all American interferences in the affairs of Iraq, which had caused previous troubles when the U.S. took military bases in the Saudi Arabia.He also erroneously believes that the Iraqi Lawyers Association is an "empty shell" since he does not sense their deep mistrust and skepticism of western politics.Had the author dug into Islamic history, he might have learned that the Islamic Constitution would make the U.S. Constitution look primitive and that Muslims had occupied Spain for many centuries, on her canonists he bases his justification of occupation.

Chapter 3, THE MAGIC OF ELECTIONS AND THE WAY HOME, presents the role of modern election in legitimizing governments. The author contends that election is not a ticket home, but rather a "voice to the voiceless" to ensure large-scale accountability and enforce public preference on the choice of representatives. He cites the dangers that rose after election in Bosnia and Algeria, and concludes that the major task of occupation or nation building is to create the proper environment for election and not obsess with its magic, mystery, or danger. The author entirely misses that fact that western occupation, and American in particular, is the main cause of chaos, of murdering collaborators and resisting the humiliation of occupation by impartial and foreign authority.He skips the events of 1958 when the Iraqis dragged the dead body of their pro-American ruler in the streets of Baghdad to end their alliance with the Baghdad Pact.
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Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but much of Iraq remains violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence that, in the judgment of many, constitutes a 'civil war'. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs - without dramatic improvements in levels of violence or clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq's major communities - have intensified a debate within the United States over whether to reduce U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals. President Bush announced a new strategy on January 10, 2007 ('New Way Forward') consisting of deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces ('troop surge') to help stabilise Baghdad and restive Anbar Province. The strategy is intended to provide security conditions conducive to Iraqi government action on a series of key reconciliation initiatives that are viewed as 'benchmarks' of political progress. The FY2007 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 110-28, linked some U.S. reconstruction aid to progress on the eighteen named benchmarks, but allows for a presidential waiver to continue the aid even if little or no progress is observed in Administration reports due July 15, 2007 and September 15, 2007.The latter will include a major assessment of the effects of the 'troop surge' to date. According to the required July 15, 2007 Administration report, released on July 12, the Baghdad security plan has made progress on several military indicators and some political indicators, but progress is unsatisfactory on the most important political reconciliation indicators. The Administration report asserts that the 'overall trajectory...has begun to stabilise', a finding on the security situation that is corroborated, to some extent, by an August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate A required report by the GAO released September 4, 2007, assesses less progress on security benchmarks than does the Administration and is pessimistic, as is the NIE, on the prospects for political reconciliation. Some in Congress - as well as the Iraq Study Group - believe that the United States should begin winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq. Both chambers adopted a FY2007 supplemental appropriation to fund U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (H.R. 1591) that would have set an outside deadline of March 31, 2008, for U.S. combat withdrawal if the President did not certify Iraqi progress on the 'benchmarks'.President Bush vetoed it on May 1, 2007, and subsequent bills mandating forms of withdrawal or combat reduction have not moved forward. Some observers say such legislation might see further action after the Administration's September 15 progress report, while others say some positive assessments of the 'troop surge' might forestall immediate congressional action. Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government, although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq's independence in 1932), and the monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958). The territory that is now Iraq was formed from three provinces of the Ottoman empire after British forces defeated the Ottomans in World War I and took control of the territory in 1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq from the Ottomans earlier in World War I but were defeated at Al Kut in 1916. Britain's presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni Muslim Iraqis (as did the Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance, facing a major Shiite-led revolt in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941, during World War II.Iraq's first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E Lawrence ('Lawrence of Arabia'), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was killed in a car accident in 1939. Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was only four years old. A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said, a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times during 1930-1958. Faysal II, with the help of his pro-British Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id who had also served under his predecessors, ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam's rule. The Baath Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq as a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was to reduce religious and sectarian schisms among Arabs.One of the Baath Party's allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister (and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein, a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq's institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at Saddam's urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein, secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam's home town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions.Saddam's regime repressed Iraq's Shiites after the February 1979 Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran partly because Iraq feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements, emboldened by Iran, would try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq. ... Read more

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Operation Iraqi Freedom marked a watershed in the history of America's engagement in the Middle East--the first time U.S. troops invaded an Arab country to depose its leader and overthrow its regime. Throughout the U.S.-led liberation and subsequent occupation of Iraq, the scholars of The Washington Institute provided in-depth, real-time analysis of the often painful learning curve traced by the coalition in its attempt to build a firm foundation for a new, post-Saddam Iraq. This anthology compiles the wartime insights of the Institute's Iraq experts from a wide variety of sources, enriched with a series of new analytical essays that synthesize key political, military, and economic trends concerning America's involvement in Iraq. Taken together, this volume serves as an essential reference for the critical sixteen months preceding the handover of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government--a period that may determine both the future of Iraq and America's role in the wider Middle East for years to come. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Iraq: Insights and Forecasts
The 2003 Iraq war has spawned much punditry. Journalists, think-tank scholars, and academics compete to publish articles or offer television commentary. But their analysis falls short, particularly as few of them have spent time in Iraq, much less speak its languages. Happily, Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Iraq, a collection of short essays by scholars at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and compiled by Knights, a British scholar and defense journalist, offers real substance and quality.

Michael Eisenstadt, director of security studies at The Washington Institute, highlights lessons learned from Britain's post-World War I occupation of Iraq. Written before the U.S. occupation commenced, Eisenstadt's analysis proves remarkably prescient. Knights and former Defense Intelligence Agency official Jeffrey White contribute a number of short essays analyzing the military component of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The detailed essay showing how basing restrictions shaped the conduct of war will be highly useful to military historians and tacticians. The section on postwar coalition security policy is more relevant to the general reader. It provides useful analysis of the new Iraqi army, the alphabet soup of Iraq's other reconstructed security forces, and the multinational divisions. Of particular interest is the synopsis of a speech by General David Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne, on lessons of the Iraq war.

In a section analyzing the Sunni insurgency, White becomes a bit mired in the weeds, but Jonathan Schanzer brings useful field research to his analysis of the Ansar al-Sunna terrorist group, foreign jihadists, and other Sunni organizations. The section on the Shi'ite opposition is perhaps the weakest in an otherwise strong collection, for there is no mention of Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi and minimal mention of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the faction-ridden Da'wa party, all of which play key roles. The synopsis of a presentation by Yitzhak Nakash about the Shi'ite in Iraq's future is valuable but too brief to fill the gap.

A section on the post-Saddam economy and politics contributes valuable nuggets. Barham Salih, who became deputy prime minister in the interim government, discusses how Iraqi Kurdistan fits into the rest of the country while Soner Cagaptay provides good insight into the oft-forgotten Iraqi Turkmen community. More discussion of Kurdish politics and the question of federalism would have been helpful, though.

Unfortunately, Iraq's constitutional debate is ignored and questions of transitional justice and the trial of Saddam Hussein are dealt with only in passing.

Little writing produced in the wake of the Iraq war are as detailed and informed as that included in this collection. Despite an emphasis on military strategy, Operation Iraqi Freedom is a valuable resource for those needing nuance and informed comment beyond the news headlines.

Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005 ... Read more

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Customer Reviews (7)

An good read from an excellent writer.
Over the past several years I have become familiar with Mr. Chatterjee's writing on the topic of the privatization of war, so I was interested to see what a full length book would provide.
I was not disappointed. I found Mr. Chatterjee's breakdown of some of the companies involved in the privatized military world to very informative and well researched. I would have liked to have seen more on the military's thoughts on the privatization of thier tasks and slightly less exposé style writing, but overall the questions he asks are answered in the book. I would recommend this book to anyone wanting to learn more about the industry and its affect on the world at large.

A "must-read" expose for anyone studying the recent war in Iraq and its aftermath
Written by award-winning investigative journalist Pratap Chatterjee, Iraq, Inc.: A Profitable Occupation is a scathing indictment of how the American occupation has proven immensely enriching to private corporations - at the expense of American taxpayers and the freedom, safety, and economic stability of the Iraqi people. Chapters discuss the scams and frauds involved in reconstruction, the constant threatening presence of military men, militiamen, and civilians with guns, and the questionable and arguably unstable "shadow government" being set up. The author concludes his words in July of 2004, in fear of the future of Iraq. America and Iraq both need desperately to grapple with the difficult issues and outright larceny in order to promote the transformation of Iraq as a place where people can live without fear, and seek their destiny without the burdens of economic poverty or the hovering threat of violence. A "must-read" expose for anyone studying the recent war in Iraq and its aftermath.

Level-headed insight
I worked in Baghdad for an NGO outside the "green zone" and later worked for a British contractor that bid for reconstruction projects in Iraq on the basis there'd always be substantial Iraqi participation in all projects and decision-making. Chatterjee's Iraq, Inc is a well-researched, fair analysis of the deep involvement of big business and vested interests in the post-invasion management of Iraq, and provides striking insight as to why the last two years of occupation have gone disastrously wrong for both the US occupation authorities and the Iraqi people. Nothing in this book contradicts my experience of the sad implosion of post-invasion Iraq, changing Iraqi attitudes to the occupation and the reconstruction gravy train. A must read for those who want to understand where management of the post-war period has gone wrong; and for current green-zone employees who still haven't quite appreciated what they've contributed to in their blinded, do-gooding pompousness. A fascinating and sometimes (sadly) comic read.

Looking at the world through smoke covered glasses....
The author is a passionate speaker, as evidenced in a recent C-Span Radio interview on his new book, listened to by yours truly while sitting in the Green Zone, Baghdad.I couldn't believe what I was hearing from this "writer".Complete fabrications, sensational accusations based on misinterpretations of the most innocuous events, and a fundamental lack of understanding of the urban street war that exists in Iraq.He brags about all the places he's been, reporting on "Burger Kings in Kosovo...Starbucks in Afghanistan"

Well, I've been everywhere he's been (and more), and unlike his casual left-skewed tourist trips, I'm STILL in Baghdad.I understand everything he talks about and at the risk of sounding like a right-wing "nut"; I can tell you that his reporting is not even good enough for Fox News.He demonstrates extremely poor writing through unfounded conclusions, with no real understanding of the issues he makes so accusatory.It strikes me as a hatchet job for the leftists, bemoaning Big Business which obviously is a front for Satan, and piloting a careening world to Doomsday all for a buck...with Bush and Cheney at the helm.NOT!

Unfortunately, Chatterjee really lacks fundamental reporting skills.Why?Because he set out to tell a story, and was not swayed by the facts.Honestly, I cannot speculate as to whether he's got a strong third-world liberal bias, or whether he's just not very intelligent...but this writing project is better suited for one of those throw-away papers you get in the seamy areas of LA, New York or San Francisco...you know the ones with all the sex ads in the back?At least there you are sure you're reading the output of a fringe writer who could otherwise not be employable in a mainstream journalistic position.

Unfounded accusations against the US, major Corporations, policy decisions...Amazingly, he found nothing good about the Iraq situation, and attributes it all to American Imperialism and, at the end of it all, suggests that it was all a Republican plot to revive the economy.

I'm surprised he does not discuss space aliens, geodesic domes, mental telepathy and the importance of eating Chicken Karma everyday.

Frankly, Chatterjee is an extremely poor journalist, writing about a sensitive, easily misinterpreted subject that will sell books no mater how bad the writing.

Folks - this is bad writing. The down-side is that he misconstrues events, makes sweeping generalizations without substantive fact-finding, and simply fails to understand.Avoid it, and read Google News.Whatever your political persuasion, you'll still have that sense of honor or umbrage, but you'll have saved $15 that's much better spent in church, or in the Salvation Army kettle, or even at the Kosovo Burger King...but don't give it to this guy - simply to reward bad writing & prejudiced behaviors.That does no one any good - no matter what side of the issue you're on.

All About War Profiteering
Everyone knows that war is evil, deadly, horrible, etc. However, what some may not know is that war is also very mercenary - much of war is about a relatively few making huge amounts of money. The author writes a book explaining the war profiteering and corruption behind the war in Iraq. The author recently did an author event on C-Span2 BookTV which was very enlightening and added to the information in the book. ... Read more

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How were the American people prepared for the war on Iraq? How have political agents and media gatekeepers sought to develop public support for the first preventive war of the modern age? Bring 'Em On highlights the complex links between media and politics, analyzing how communication practices are modified in times of crisis to protect political interests or implement political goals. International contributors in mass communication, political science, and sociology address how U.S. institutional media practices, government policy, and culture can influence public mobilization for war. ... Read more

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From their limited use in China during World War II, for example, to their often clandestine use in Vietnam ferrying supplies before the war escalated in 1964 and 1965 when their role became more prominent-and public-private military contractors (PMCs) have played made essential contributions to the success and failures of the military and United States. Today, with an emphasis on force restructuring mandated by the Pentagon, the role of PMCs, and their impact on policy-making decisions is at an all time peak. This work analyzes that impact, focusing specifically on PMCs in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Isenberg dissects their responsibilities, the friction that exists between contractors and military commanders, problems of protocol and accountability, as well as the problems of regulation and control that PMC companies create for domestic politics.

Isenberg organizes his work thematically, addressing all facets of PMCs in the current conflict from identifying who the most influential companies are and how they got to that point, to the issues that the government, military, and contractors themselves face when they take the field.He also analyzes the problem of command, control, and accountability. It is no secret that PMCs have been the source of consternation and grief to American military commanders in the field. As they work to establish more routine protocols in the field, however, questions are also being raised about the role of the contractors here at home. The domestic political arena is perhaps the most crucial battleground on which the contractors must have success. After all, they make their corporate living off of taxpayer dollars, and as such, calls for regulation have resonated throughout Washington, D.C., growing louder as the profile of PMCs increases during the current conflict.

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This book is the first and only comprehensive examination of current and future legal principles designed to govern oil and gas activity in Iraq. This study provides a thorough-going review of every conceivable angle on Iraqi oil and gas law, from relevant provisions of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005; to legislative measures comprising the oil and gas framework law, the revenue sharing law, and the laws to reconstitute the Iraq National Oil Company and reorganize the Ministry of Oil; to the Kurdistan Regional Government's 2007 Oil and Gas Law No. (22) and its accompanying Model Production Sharing Contract; and to the apposite rules of international law distilled from both controlling UN resolutions addressing Iraq and more generally applicable principles of international law. This text is essential to the reading collection of every practitioner, business executive, government official, academic, public policy maven, and individual citizen with an interest in the details and controversial aspects of Iraqi energy law. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Iraqi Oil
I know the author and admire the depth and accuracy of his work.This book traces the history of Iraqi oil and the divisions within the country and puts the problems in the Iraqi war in perspective.Professor Zedalis's research is exhaustive and detailed.
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