Product Description
The twentieth century witnessed the transformation of the area known currently as Iraq from a backward region of the Ottoman Empire, to one of the most important and dynamic states in the Middle East. This book focuses on the interaction between the old and the new, or between continuity and change, as it is manifested in the nature of social development, nation-building, the state and the political opposition The author examines the rise of modern Iraq and its roots in the second half of the nineteenth century when Ottoman reforms led to gradual state modernization and increasing integration in the World Economy. British control after World War I is examined as one of the major determining factors in the establishment of the current borders of the country and the nature of its subsequent national identity. The other important factor explored is the highly heterogeneous nature of Iraqi society and its division along tribal, ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines.Readers wanting a background to current events in Iraq and the Middle East ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

An Excellent Brief and Balanced Account
This is the best brief book on Iraq and its history as it tells the story of this country starting with its pre-Islamic times of the Sessanids and going well into modern day. The brilliance of this book is based on two factors. First, its choice of what to highlight and what to leave out was extremely successful and relevant for those who want to read history to understand modern day Iraq, and second, its dependency on the bottom lines of reliable secondary sources instead of amassing a big number of quotes from primary sources in order to make a point or two.
The choice of what to cover and how to cover events from Iraq's history yielded this extremely helpful book that brings 5000 years of history into this concise and brief book.
Abdullah's style is extremely catching and flows with practically no repetition. Unlike most history books on the subject, Abdullah economizes with the number of names and dates that he included in the book in order not to distract the reader's attention by bombarding him/her with an unlimited number of often irrelevant names.
Furthermore, Abdullah maintains much needed objectivity when telling Iraq's story at the time most of history books on the Middle East are loaded with prejudice and either explicit or hidden propaganda.
Other valuable insights include Abdullah's tracing of the regional influence on Iraq, both from the Sunni Arab West and the Shiite Persian East. Abdullah also writes with the current internal Iraqi divisions in mind and as you finish the book, you will certainly end up with the impression that history repeats itself.

Iraq - The Original Melting Pot
Grasping to make some sense of the chaos that is today's Iraq, I found A Short History of Iraq by T.A.J. Abdullah to be a throroughly engaging and enlightening read.Concise and with no apparent ax to grind Abdullah helps the inquiring reader gain some clarity to questions like "Who are these people of the Garden of Eden, caught betwen the Persians and the Turks?"What is the attraction of the poor of Baghdad to figures like Muqtada al-Sadr?What are the roles of Imams and shaykhs? How do the lingering shadows of the Ottoman Empire give a modern basis to the strife between Shi'i and Sunni.What is so important about Najaf and Karbala,why does everyone seem so contentious and why were the British so anxious to move back into Basra as the invasion wound down.After reading Professor Abdullah's book, today's chaos will seem no less chaotic. Taking account of two thousand years of turbulent history, however, gives one a feeling of empathy for the people civilizaton's oldest melting pot, and maybe a grain of hope.

I would recommend A Short History of Iraq to anyone who longs for a better understanding or feels compelled to offer an opinion on what he sees on the evening news, not the least of whom might be the commentators.I would like to say "Thank you" to Professor Abudllah for his timely work. ... Read more

Product Description
This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Thomson Gale on May 1, 2007. The length of the article is 4775 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Citation Details
Title: Potential limitations on U.S. military operations in and around Iraq (8).(FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes)
Author: Stephen Daggett
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: May 1, 2007
Publisher: Thomson Gale
Page: NA

Distributed by Thomson Gale ... Read more

Product Description
This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs on August 1, 2008. The length of the article is 15082 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Citation Details
Title: Defense contracting in Iraq: issues and options for Congress.(CRS Report for Congress)(Report)
Author: Valerie Bailey Grasso
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: August 1, 2008
Publisher: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs
Page: NA

Article Type: Report

Distributed by Gale, a part of Cengage Learning ... Read more

Product Description
Saddam Hussein is high on America's enemies list—but does an Iraq without him hold the seeds of the next Yugoslavia? To the dismay of many in the West, the Gulf War ended with Saddam Hussein still in control, still defiant, and determined to use any means of striking back. This book sounds an urgent note of caution: a future Iraq without Hussein could be even more unstable and more problematical to the security of the United States.

The Reckoning is an account of the forces—historical, religious, ethnic, and political—that produced Saddam's dictatorship. Iraq was forged after World War I from the Mesopotamian region of the collapsed Ottoman Empire, and its people have never had a national identity or a sense of common purpose. Hussein, ruling by terror, pitted the various ethnic groups, religious interests, and tribes against one another, and in so doing achieved the destruction of Iraq's middle class and civilized society. After he goes, the country could be the site of conflict even more vicious than the Balkan wars. With a new epilogue for this paperback edition. 16 b/w photographs, 6 maps. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (26)

Another Great Work by Mackey
This is the fourth book i have read from Sandra Mackey and as usual her work is just fantastic.This book gives you a very good understanding of the root of the problem in Iraq, altough the book was finished in 2001.She is excellent in her research and digs deep into the real problems in Iraq.As usual, her account is easy to follow and crystal clear, but without being to simplistic as to what is going on in Iraq.I especially liked her description of the problems of the Kurds which is part of the situation in Iraq.Again excellent work by one of the best.

Best book I have read about Iraq
Great overview of Iraq's history and racial ethic makeup/tensions. The author has a point of view but does not beat you over the head with it. Great book

Decent background
Mackey does a good job drawing some of the historical background of Iraq.However, she gets a bit too emotional and political in her analysis of Gulf War I and II.A bit more balance and rationality would have sustained the book's credibility, which wanes toward the end.

Not the best book on Iraq, but still worth the read
Sandra Mackey has somehow attracted the scorn of many amazon reviewers.The most familiar criticism is that she's never been to these countries and is just recycling old information.I don't beleive that just because a person has never been to a certain place, that that disqualifies that person from writing about it.I've never been to Iraq, but I'd like to think I know more than a bit about the place.

There are more general history books such as this about Iraq than perhaps any other Middle Eastern country, and of the ones I've read I would definitely say that Mackey has written one of the "good" ones.Some of the other books are too short, some focus heavily on certain time periods while breezing through others.Mackey's book covers a very broad time span and is of sufficient length and detail.There are some issues that she glosses over, particularly if the U.S. was doing something questionable, but on the whole, this is a book worth reading.

If you're only able to read one of these books about Iraq, I would recommend Anderson and Stansfield's Future Iraq: Democracy, Dictatorship, or Division?However, if you'd like to read multiple books about Iraq, make sure you get around to this one at some point.

A prediction of the hardships to come.
This is the fourth book I have read from Mackey.She is a very good writer with great knowledge of the Middle East.This book has very limited accounts of what she found in Iraq, but investigates the coming conflict well.She details how an occupation of this country would lead to a Civil War between the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd groups.How right she was.

Mackey details the short history of Iraq.This country is at the center of civilization in the Middle East, but few know of the disparite elements that make up the population.When the British took three provinces from the Ottoman Empire and put them together, the world should have known this was an artificial state.When they imposed the Sharifian Feisal I on the throne and put the Sunnis in power, they were asking for trouble.Since that time, government in Iraq has gone from bad to worse.Saddam or the Buthcher of Baghdad was the worst of all.What is left out is all the problems the Americans have faced in Iraq since that time.The author can righly state that I told you so.

For those interested in the conflict in Iraq, this is a nice, informative read.Mackey always does a good job of writing her books.
... Read more

Product Description
"An incisive, firsthand account of policymaking in a crisis." (General Wesley Clark)

Things didn't go wrong in postwar Iraq because the United States lacked a plan. Things went wrong because the United States was blinded by ideology and ignored planning that was already underway. Losing Iraq tells the story of the tragedy of Iraq, from the first discreet meetings to plan the political transition through the debacle the United States finally created. Losing Iraq is a stunning and revealing look at our recent past--with a candid take on how we can prevent this sort of tragedy from happening again.

"The best recapitulation we have so far had of the position of those who ardently supported U.S. intervention in Iraq.... What makes [Losing Iraq] essential reading for anyone interested in why the postwar went so badly is his insider's view of how the United States planned and how it failed to plan for the Iraq over which it would hold sway after the fall of Saddam." (David Rieff, The Nation)

"A fascinating, unbiased read, from an author who has witnessed the events first hand." (Rocky Mountain News)

"Losing Iraq...[shows] how the neoconservatives' blind faith might have benefited from a blunt reality check." (Austin American Statesman) ... Read more

Customer Reviews (16)

Madness of imperialism
Sad but true. Entering a war with dishonorable motives (i.e., lying about WMD and then changing war goals to nation building and establishment of democracy) only gets the imperialist into more trouble. Fortunately for the US, it had enough money to get through this little bush war, but imagine what one trillion dollars could do to alleviate poverty and ignorance in America over the past eight years. The American political class has the farsightedness of a common mole. Frank Wallis explored similar themes in his _Iraq 2003: Causes and Consequences of an Imperial Expedition_ (Editions Tour Blanche, 2007). ISBN: 978-0963833211.

In touch with Washington, out of touch with Iraq
This book is an insider's look at the building of the American occupation regime in conquered Iraq.As such it is full of detailed criticism of this process from the inside - the shortsightedness of the occupation viceroy, of the President, the difficulty in finding worthy native collaborators who would perform as expected.As a nuts-and-bolts account of the US invasion of Iraq, and installation of its satellite regime, it's an interesting and useful addition.This is why I have given it four stars.

It loses a star, however, because it is after all a rationalization of conquest.The author's final sentence - "Winning the peace requires cooperation from freedom's beneficiaries" - shows the moral obtuseness of the entire American colonization project.At no time does Phillips show awareness of the most basic truth: that the United States has no right to be in Iraq.The statement also betrays the author's complete lack of contact with Iraqi reality.During the same period covered by Phillips' negotiations, journalist Nir Rosen was gathering ground-level material for his book, "In the Belly of the Green Bird."Rosenencountered and described an entirely different universe from Phillips' smoke-filled drawing-rooms and idealist banter - militias run rampant, the doors of peaceful citizens kicked in by gun-wielding US occupation forces, insubordinate natives shot for insufficient submission, the whiff of civil war arising from these corpses and sweeping over the land.While Phillips quotesKurdish leaders on the freedom and opportunity the American regime has brought, Rosen took a deep look into Kurdistan during the 2005 elections to see few Arabs voting and Kurdish leaders plotting ethnic cleansing.Both books should be read side-by-side for a truly eye-opening experience: not just as a corrective to David L. Phillips, but to the entire Wilsonian naivite he embodies.

Iraq was never America's to lose, and the true fiasco was assuming the moral right to believe otherwise.

I just couldn't get through this one; my apologies to the author
My apologies to the author, but I just couldn't get through this one.

The first typo I encountered was on page 24, line 30: "...Saddam counterattacked agains Shi'a militia...."Should be "against" -- terminal "t" was dropped. As I've said before, I hate typos, ungrammatical syntax, etc., -- and yes, even my own. But I don't claim to have a batch of editors, and know from experience that it's difficult to be both author and editor, unless you take several hours after the writing to put on the editor's green eyeshade, cuff protectors, all the accouterments of the ink-stained wretch. And, my druthers notwithstanding, these linguistic lapses do impede the communication between author and reader.

I didn't get much farther than that typo. Reason: In my view, an excessive, annoying use of the first person singular, references to 'this person was jealous of that person,' making it seem more like a work of gossip and an explanation of the author's personal personnel impressions, rather than any new, concrete, substantive information. Seems to me that I've read it all before and this work did not increase my net knowledge or understanding of this illegal invasion and occupation.

There is one sense in which the book is useful, I suppose, but I doubt it's the one the author intended. The utility, for the reader, is that it shows how profoundly petty, egotistical, self-centered and self-serving -- disgusting, actually -- are the folks in the inner circles of power in this rogue Cheney/Bush administration.

Just as in the case of the well-written recent novel by Philip Zelikow, entitled "Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," our republic has been ill-served by its public servants and their "senior advisors," as was this book's author, David L. Phillips, and camp followers. Recalling folks like Bill "Shrill Shill Bill" Kristol, Richard "If you've got the power, use it" Perle, Paul "I don't darn socks. That's what girlfriends in high places are for" Wolfowitz, Dick (why bother with a nickname--he's hardly worth the effort, anyway "I can lie out of the side of my mouth better than anybody) Cheney, Donald "Stuff Happens" Rumsfeld, John "Man Without a Seoul" or "better..." Yoo "...than me," All the Vice President's Men, All The President's Women, All Karl Rove's Women... and so on, ad nauseam.

(By the way, all this wasted palaver about "Winning The War in Iran" is just so much hogwash. The US has ALREADY won in Iraq, and has so declared. The US won the illegal war of invasion it waged from March 19, 2003 to about April 9, 2003, when the photo-op "toppling of Saddam's Statue" was staged. And Bush declared victory in his typically mushy and misleading language in the cowboy photo-op aboard the carrier USS Abe Lincoln on May 1st, 2003.

The Wikipedia entry on this topic ("Mission Accomplished") is particularly useful, IMHO. The White House, after much lying, confessed that Bush's minions had made the "Mission Accomplished" banner, had hung the banner from the carrier's superstructure, and was responsible for it all along -- they just didn't want their full complicity in the 30-miles offshore publicity stunt to become known, didn't want to be stung/hung with the proper elementary-school taunt, "Liar, liar, flight-suit on fire." And, more particularly, did NOT want it to appear that the US was declaring that we had won the war, had achieved victory, had "accomplished" the "mission." Though Bush said, "In the Battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed," (Rumsfeld had edited out any reference to "Mission Accomplished" in the speech, but either didn't know about or was too late to "roll up" the triumphant banner, the administration did NOT want to claim victory, because that would have meant they'd have to give up the specter of a permanent, forever, never-winnable, never "accomplished" "global war on terror" which was their most powerful lever -- the "fear card" -- over Congress, the cowardly Democratic Party, and the electorate.

But I digress.

There are many more books on this topic that are far, far more useful. Among the many I've read, Iraqi insider Ali Allawi's "TThe Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace. Author's the brother of Ayad Allawi, if I remember correctly.

If you do want to read this book anyway, I'd take it out of the library, unless you've got money to burn and bookshelves to fill. Or you could download the Amazon digital book--cheaper, smaller space requirement.

Mistitled- the fiasco was in pre-war planning
This book has some insight on the early stages of pre-war planning, particularly as it pertained to the Kurds.The Kurds considered the years after the first gulf war to have been a "golden age".They enjoyed the implicit military guaranty of the U.S., and an economic boom from controlling border crossings used by smugglers evading the embargo.The Kurds were at first ambivalent about the invasion, but became supporters in the hope that Iraq would follow them in secular politics and economic development.

There is also some material on the Democratic Principles Working Group (AKA The Mother of All Working Groups).That was a committee of Iraqi opposition groups that sought to develop a plan of the postwar Iraqi government.The committee suffered from infighting and distrust, and was dominated by groups with limited constituencies in Iraq (i.e. Kurds and exiles).The group also suffered from an academic focus- developing a theory of an Iraqi government when they needed to BE the Iraqi government.As dysfunctional as it was, the administration discarded its work and transferred the responsibility for postwar government to an even more unqualified and incompetent group:the Defense Department's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance under Doug Feith.And things went downhill from there...

The rest of the book is a readable but generic account of the occupation and the failure to confront the insurgency.

Recommended primarily for the Kurdish material.

Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco
Losing Iraq illustrates what went wrong with planning for post-liberation Iraq although not for the reasons its author, a Council on Foreign Relations staffer, intends. In the run-up to the Iraq war, the State Department hired Phillips to moderate seminar discussions among Iraqis. He uses this limited experience to conclude that the cause for difficulty in post-liberation Iraq was not lack of planning but rather a failure to listen. "How could such noble intentions [Iraq's freedom] go so wrong?" he asks. "The White House and Pentagon political appointees thought they could liberate a county without talking to those they were liberating," he replies.

Phillips appears unaware that every Iraqi who met with him also visited the Pentagon, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency. U.S. officials would meet almost daily at the National Security Council, chaired by officials such as Zalmay Khalilzad, then the president's special assistant for Iraq, and Stephen Hadley, then-deputy national security advisor.

Rather than researching and analyzing prewar planning, Losing Iraq becomes a testament to the author's ego and pettiness, features that caused Iraqis and U.S. officials alike to push Phillips aside. He describes Kanan Makiya, with whom he clashed on issues including de-Baathification, as poisoned by neoconservatives who transformed him from an academic to a polemicist. Most Iraqis and Americans differed and questioned whether Phillips's hostility was due to jealousy of Makiya's prominence in fields in which Phillips sought to compete. Phillips also writes that he initiated ideas like a Kirkuk commission to adjudicate competing property claims but was ignored. Actually, such a commission was up and running weeks before his epiphany.

Phillips revises events liberally, saying, for example, that he and Ryan Crocker, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, opposed the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority because it did not empower Iraqis. Actually, Crocker opposed the transfer of sovereignty.

The irony of Phillips's argument is hubris. He chides Bush administration officials for not listening to Iraqis, but he himself did not bother to travel to Baghdad in the wake of Iraq's liberation. Rather, as revealed in a Wall Street Journal review by Rob Pollock, he lifted descriptions from newspapers. His experience in Iraq was limited to a few brief trips to Iraqi Kurdistan before the war, the sheltered guest of a Kurdish politician.

Losing Iraq may try to castigate the White House but instead becomes an example of the arrogance about which so many Iraqis complain. Phillips treats Iraq as a template upon which to lay down his theories. The Iraqi voice is subsumed to his own. If the White House really lost Iraq-the success of the Iraqi elections suggests otherwise-it was because it subordinated the voice of Iraqis to outside advisors like Phillips, more interested in pumping up their own importance than in the welfare of Iraq.

Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2006 ... Read more

Product Description
On March 15, 2006, members from both parties in Congress supported the creation of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group to review the situation on the ground and propose strategies for the way forward. For more than eight months, the Study Group met with military officers, regional experts, academics, journalists, and high-level government officials from America and abroad. Participants included George W. Bush and members of his cabinet; Bill Clinton; Jalal Talabani; Nouri Kamal al-Maliki; Generals John Abizaid, George Casey, and Anthony Zinni; Colin Powell; Thomas Friedman; George Packer; and many others. This official edition contains the Group’s findings and proposals for improving security, strengthening the new government, rebuilding the economy and infrastructure, and maintaining stability in the region. It is a highly anticipated and essential step forward for Iraq, America, and the world.


From the Trade Paperback edition. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (65)

Insightful.Provocative
If you are interested in why we are in Iraq, the dynamics of our being there, and what has gone wrong, THIS is the book you want to buy.It is short, concise, and written by "the insiders" who have the authority to speak knowingly about this.

A good addition to one's reference shelf
There are some books you just need to have on hand for when somebody screaming on a blog starts misquoting said books. I didn't buy this book to read it cover to cover, but I'm glad I've got it to refer to when needed. You'd be amazed what some people out there are claiming are "recommendations of the Iraq Study Group"! Then, when you look it up, you can correct those bandied about misperceptions (or misinformation) in a hurry. For that kind of information, you can't beat the price!

You Break it, You Bought it
With an economy of words, the book begins: "There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in Baghdad and several provinces is dire.... There is great suffering and the daily lives of Iraqis show little or no improvement." It then details the problems with security, politics, economics, and international support that transcend a purely military solution to Iraq.

The problems of security begin with the factions of Shiite leaders who do not want to surrender their new-found power and disarm their militias. The Sunni Arabs, long the rulers of Iraq are not ready to abandon their insurgency, al-Qaeda must be progressively pursued and destroyed, and the Kurds are not willing to give up their autonomy.

The politics is equally bleak. The Iraqi government is unable to provide essential services. There is no security for key infrastructure. Corruption is rampant and capacity is inadequate. Their elected representatives "treat ministries as political spoils." The judiciary is also weak and intimidation against them has been ruthless.

With inflation at more than fifty percent and unemployment running from 20-60 percent, Iraq is not ripe for international investment. Oil production has fallen because of a lack of security, investment, and technical expertise. With corruption and negligible security accounting for as much as 500,000 barrels of oil a day being stolen, international support and investment are not likely to occur in the near future.

The Study Group adds seventy-nine recommendations for change in Iraq. First and foremost, it would be wrong for US forces to leave, which has consequences if we do stay, and consequences if we don't. It's the classic lose-lose situation. Unfortunately, the study does not go into any depth how these recommendations are to be accomplished.

Initially, I was skeptical of a board that was co-chaired by James A. Baker III, the virtual Bush family lawyer who argued before the Supreme Court that the all the votes had been recounted when they hadn't been. Seeing the name of Edwin Meese didn't allay my suspicions that this study group might end up throwing soft balls George Bush's way, or would not hold him accountable. On the contrary, they have made it clear that this administration made many mistakes and severely underestimated the situation after it declared that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended."

The study group makes it abundantly clear that Iraq is a complex problem that goes far beyond simple-minded phrases of "stay the course," or "we will not leave until victory is achieved."

For anyone wishing to get a thorough and concise description of the complex problems we face in Iraq, this is an excellent compendium.

It's not surprising that George W. Bush rejected the report.


ECP
01.04.08: 1,710 days since major combat operations in Iraq have ended.




P.S. Also recommended:

"The Battle for Peace" by General Anthony Zinni
"Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq" by Thomas E. Ricks

Baker Report Would Turn Failed Ideas Into Policy
As Daniel Pipes expounded upon on the New York Sun, The Iraq Study Group Report, cobbled together by ten individuals lacking specialized knowledge of Iraq, dredges up past failed U.S. policies in the Middle East and would enshrine them as current policy.

Most profoundly, regarding the American role in Iraq, the report moronically splits the difference of troops staying or leaving, without ever examining the basic premise of the U.S. government taking responsibility for the country's minutiae, such as its setting up public works projects. Instead, the report unthinkingly accepts that strategic assumption and only tweaks tactics at the margins.

A preposterously lengthy list of 79 recommendations lies at the heart of the report. These include such gems as bringing in the (Saudi-sponsored) Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League (no. 3) to decide Iraq's future. Another creates an "Iraq International Support Group" that includes Iran, Syria (no. 5), and the United Nations secretary-general (no. 7).

Other brilliant recommendations call for the UN Security Council to handle the Iranian nuclear problem (no. 10) and for the support group to persuade Tehran to "take specific steps to improve the situation in Iraq" (no. 11). Right. The Iranian regime, whose president envisions a "world without America," will save Washington's bacon. Such counsel smacks at best of what the Jerusalem Post calls "staggering naïveté" and at worst of ghastly foolishness.

Of course, small minds assert that problems in Iraq are "inextricably linked" to the Arab-Israeli conflict - thereby repeating the precise mistake that lead co-chairman James A. Baker, III, made in 1991. He then led the effort to abandon the Persian Gulf and turn to the Palestinians, leaving Saddam Hussein in power for another dozen years and contributing directly to the present mess. In the new report, Mr. Baker and his colleagues call for a Palestinian state (no. 12) and even demand that a final settlement address the Palestinian "right of return" (no. 17) - code for dismantling the Jewish state. They peremptorily declare that "the Israelis should return the Golan Heights," in return for a U.S. security guarantee (no. 16).

Besides the astonishing conceit of these Olympian declarations, one wonders how exactly the Iraqi civil war would be ended by pleasing the Palestinian Arabs. Or why the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict is any more relevant to Iraq than the unresolved Azeri-Armenian conflict, which is closer to Iraq.


James A. Baker, III, instructs the president how to use the "Iraq Study Group Report."


To make matters worse, Mr. Baker had the nerve to admonish the Bush administration not to treat the report's 79 recommendations "like a fruit salad," choosing one idea while rejecting another, but to accept it as a whole. Even in Washington, a town famous for arrogance, this statement made heads turn. That Mr. Baker and his co-chairman, Lee Hamilton, sat for a picture spread with famed photographer Annie Liebovitz for Men's Vogue, a fashion magazine, only confirms the vacuity of their effort, as does their hiring the giant public relations firm, Edelman.

In all, the Iraq Study Group Report offers a unique combination of bureaucratic caution, false bi-partisanship, trite analysis, and conventional bromides.

Although the press reacted to this drivel, in the words of Daniel Henninger writing in the Wall Street Journal, with "neurotic glee," Robert Kagan and William Kristol deemed it "dead on arrival," and Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, called it "dead in the water." One hopes they are right, that President George W. Bush ignores its recommendations, and that this "new lipstick on a very old pig" (Spencer Ackerman) quickly disappears from sight.

That's not to say that Mr. Bush should "stay the course," for that course has not worked. A host of creative ideas have been floated by individuals knowledgeable about Iraq, sympathetic to the administration's goal of building a free, democratic, and prosperous Iraq, and not tempted to see their role as an exercise in preening. The White House should call on these talented individuals to brainstorm, argue, and emerge with some useful ideas about the future American role in Iraq.

Doing so means breaking with a presidential tradition, going back at least to 1919, of what I call a "know-nothing" Middle East diplomacy. Woodrow Wilson appointed two completely unqualified Americans to head a commission of inquiry to the Levant on the grounds, an aide explained, that Wilson "felt these two men were particularly qualified to go to Syria because they knew nothing about it." This know-nothing approach failed America 87 years ago and it failed again now.

Fantastic book
The book The Iraq Study Group Report investigated the problem within Iraq, in regargs to the ensuing militant insurgency and ongoing civil war that we have sometimes seen on the television news in our home countries around the world. Sometimes from these pictures it is hard to view the whole picture which is the Iraqi dilemma of which the US and her allies though fewer in number are still trying to deal with, without further enflaming the racial fundamentalist any further, who from this conflict in Iraq have inspired a coming generations of radical fundamentalist to Al Qaeda radical Fundamentalist Global empire of Usama bin Laden's.

This book analysis of the problem we face and the ideas and method that we can use to destroy this Fundamentalist GLobal network of so called jihadist will only continue if these recommendations are not adapted in Iraq, but also in the wider global context of the worldwide global threat we are facing right at this moment.

I can strongly recommend this book to anyone seriously interested in countering the current fundamentalist jihadi global War we are deeply now engaged in. ... Read more

Product Description

Product Description
Beginning with a telling phone call from Condi, the former president of the UN Security Council tells for the first time the behind-the-scenes story of the Iraq war, as seen from an international perspective. Ambassador Muñoz examines the United States controversial decision to take a unilateral stand and the repercussions for both the U.S. and the rest of the world. This fascinating case study explains why a multilateral approach to foreign policy, including reliance on international organizations such as the UN, is imperative in today s world. A Solitary War offers a compelling argument for rebuilding trust among the international community and returning to a truly cooperative global order. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

What isn't said makes the difference
Munoz's thesis is a simple one: multilateralism good, the US decision to go it alone in Iraq bad.Alas, he leaves too much else unsaid:

1. It's all about the oil stupid.Munoz does not even mention oil till 12 pages from the end of his text.Yet the permanent members of the UN Security Council, US and Britain, who wanted the war, got the oil that went with it, and the permanent members, Russia, France, and China, who did not want the war (but did want Iraq's oil for themselves) didn't. To be fair, U.S. citizens did not get the oil either, not even to pay for the war, as President Bush forbid this; the U.S. multinational oil companies got the oil and got the U.S. taxpayer to pay and pay for it.

2. 9/11.Munoz, a loathsome support of the Pinochot regime is desperate not to remind us that for much of the world 9/11 symbolizes the U.S. sponsored assassination of President Allende and the torture and death of tens of thousands of his fellow countrymen.

3. Taking Iraq Away from the Iraqis.The author devotes a single sentence to the UN's endorsing Bush's give-away of Iraq's resources to his political cronies.UN Security resolution 1546 specified that "the new interim Iraqi government ..would not fully control some areas--such as the administration of ports and airports, which had been awarded by contracts to foreign firms."

Still, to give him credit, Munoz amply documents how the Bush administration used threats and bribes (remember, the Nazis?) to bend other nations to its will.A short-term solution that only guarantees long-term retaliation.

The failure of unilateralism
This is a very readable account from the Chilean ambassador to the United Nations. He tells the story of the international maneuverings and manipulations during the run-up to the Iraq war as well as its aftermath. Much of the first part of the book adds little to what we already knew of the debates and interactions of the members of the UN Security Council. It is not a colorful account, but the author does add details as the story develops of the Bush administration's attempts to cajole and even threaten other members of the Security Council to bend to the will of the USA. As the US involvement in Iraq deepens, Bush is forced to turn to the UN for help, a tacit acknowledgment at least of the stupidity of our Iraq policy.
Most interesting is the story of Katharine Gun, a translator at Government Communications Headquarters in the United Kingdom who blew the whistle on a joint American/British spy plan to wiretap the other members of the UN Security Council. Ms. Gun was fired and was threatened with prosecution for a time but the British government decided to back down. Perhaps the incident was embarassing enough for British intelligence (and the USA). A trial might have focused too much attention on the issue. This story was not covered much at all by American media. I'm glad to see it here. But why wasn't this investigated in the USA? Our Congress continues to ignore its oversight responsibilities of our "intelligence" agencies. The plan was apparently hatched at the National Security Agency, one of our least regulated spy agencies.
For anyone who thinks a unilateral approach to international affairs still works for the USA, this is a good book that will make you think.
Too bad George W. Bush and co. did not see things that way sooner. ... Read more

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Dr. Diane Hassan is a native of Dothan, Alabama, and holds a B.S. degree in biochemistry from the University of Alabama at Birmingham and a M.D. degree from the University of Baghdad College of Medicine. She is a popular speaker at schools, civic clubs, churches and other organizations. She currently resides in Dothan with her husband, Dr. Hashim Hassan, an oral surgeon, and their son, Dr. Mohammed Hassan, a dentist.Angels Among Us . . . Even in Iraq is a fascinating story of love and survival, of how people can overcome any obstacle to fulfill a dream. In a highly entertaining fashion, the American wife of a prominent member of Saddam Hussein's political hierarchy chronicles her life in Iraq until she and her family dramatically escape after an attempted assassination of her husband during Saddam's purge following Desert Storm. Dr. Taha Al Baka, a former Iraqi government minister, comments, "If you are among those Americans who care about their democratic freedoms, constitutional government and due process of law, then you should read this book. You will have a greater appreciation of your country and a greater resolve to guard the basic principles on which it was founded." ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Shumez (Sunshine) In The Storm
Dr. Hassan brings to light just what was happeing in Iraq during the time Saddam Hussein was in power.Her strong Christian beliefs are very evident has she takes us through 17 years of her life in Iraq. The reason this book is so great is the fact that Dr. Hassan did not write this book from second hand information about the situation in Iraq.Her husband was in different positions of power within goverment and had some influence. This influence almost cost him is life, as you see when you read this book.In other words, Dr Hassan was not a poor uninformed American just visiting Iraq. She herself became a Medical Doctor and gained a great deal of respect amoung the Iraqie people.It is truly difficult to do justice to this book and to give the true respect that Dr. Hassan deserves for writing this book, in this short review. Please take time to read this wounderful true story. You will find out just how wondeful the Iraqie people really are.You will also gain an apprication for what we are doing over in Iraq even now.

A Story Americans Should Read
Dr. Hassan's story reveals life in Iraq from the late 1970s and just beyond Desert Storm. Through her life and that of her husband, she paints a picture of life in Iraq after the rise to power of Saddam Hussein--and it's not a pretty one. Readers are reassured by stories that show us people are the same everywhere. We all want to live in peace and freedom. Hers is the story of an American woman who willingly lived in this country, even in dangerous times, and fell in love with its people. ... Read more

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U.S. withdrawal could affect Iraq1s internal security and stability, which could, in turn, affect U.S. strategic interests and the safety of U.S. troops and civilians in Iraq. U.S. policy-makers need a dynamic analytic framework with which to examine the shifting motivations and capabilities of the actors that affect Iraq1s security. Within this framework, the United States should be able to contribute to continued strengthening of the internal security and stability of Iraq even as it withdraws its forces. ... Read more

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Contractors are big business and a big part of war, with businesses taking upon themselves many tasks previously designated to the armed forces. By 2007, there were over 100,000 individuals working on U.S. contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan-versus about 160,000 U.S. combat troops. By some estimates, contractors account for some 40 percent of the costs of running operations.

This important work examines how that came to be, as well as answering a number of critical questions: How have Congress, public interest groups, and other parties dealt with the issue? How is the marketplace affecting the American way of war? What impact will this have on force structure? How will the growing involvement of the private sector influence such matters as the all-volunteer force and the procurement and maintenance of advanced warfighting systems?

The emergent role of contractors on the battlefield reflects a deeply significant transition in the nature of armed conflict, a significant rebalancing between the roles of the private and public sectors. This change is the most significant upheaval in the nature of warfare since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century. It represents a transformation started long before the invasion of Iraq and, absent a dramatic change in the evolution of the global marketplace, it will continue to increase, regardless of the course of American domestic politics. Government will have to change to keep up.

Understanding why the private sector has come to play such a prominent role in public wars requires tracing a story as torturous and, at times, mysterious as the search for the Holy Grail, a tale filled with deceit, greed, courage, selflessness, stupidity, misdirection, and myth. It includes following a winding path from Medieval Tuscan hills, to England, to colonial America, to the sands of Iwo Jima and of Iraq, the mountains of Afghanistan, the corridors of Wall Street, and the halls of the Pentagon. It demands walking through the cross sections of military, political, social, cultural, economic, intellectual, and business history. At the end of the journey lies the unvarnished truth about contractors in combat. That is the story Private Sector, Public Wars means to tell.

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"There is no reason why America's withdrawal from Iraq should be as dishonest as its intervention has been judged to be."—Brendan O'Leary, from the Preface

Both the American people and Arab Iraqis have voiced their overwhelming desire to see U.S. troops removed from the country. How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity argues that the U.S. military intervention in Iraq must come to an end. But it must come to an end in a judicious, pragmatic, and orderly fashion. In this book, Brendan O'Leary spells out why that withdrawal can begin to occur now, why it is in the best interests of the United States and the Iraqis that withdrawal occur, and why Iraq can function as a federation once the U.S. military has left the country.

How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity provides an in-depth analysis of the new Iraqi constitution, an evaluation of the political goals and powers of the major ethnic and religious groups that will constitute the new Iraqi state, and an assessment of the regional realities of a Saddam-less Iraq. With a viable constitution and other institutional structures already in place, Iraq is poised for a future as a sovereign state. If U.S. leaders facilitate the remaking of Iraq as a federation with four or more regions instead of a recentralized state, the United States can begin successfully to remove its forces.

Propelled by this incisive and bold argument, How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity provides the foundation for the incoming presidential administration to do just that, without betraying U.S. commitments to Arabs, Kurds, or democracy. To make his case, O'Leary draws on his extensive background as constitutional advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government, the European Union, and the United Nations, along with expertise in constitutional design and ethnic reconciliation in Northern Ireland and South Africa.

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The attempt in 2004 to draft an interim constitution in Iraq and the effort to enact a permanent one in 2005 were unintended outcomes of the American occupation, which first sought to impose a constitution by its agents. This two-stage constitution-making paradigm, implemented in a wholly unplanned move by the Iraqis and their American sponsors, formed a kind of compromise between the populist-democratic project of Shi'ite clerics and America's external interference.

As long as it was used in a coherent and legitimate way, the method held promise. Unfortunately, the logic of external imposition and political exclusion compromised the negotiations. Andrew Arato is the first person to record this historic process and analyze its special problems. He compares the drafting of the Iraqi constitution to similar, externally imposed constitutional revolutions by the United States, especially in Japan and Germany, and identifies the political missteps that contributed to problems of learning and legitimacy.

Instead of claiming that the right model of constitution making would have maintained stability in Iraq, Arato focuses on the fragile opportunity for democratization that was strengthened only slightly by the methods used to draft a constitution. Arato contends that this event would have benefited greatly from an overall framework of internationalization, and he argues that a better set of guidelines (rather than the obsolete Hague and Geneva regulations) should be followed in the future. With access to an extensive body of literature, Arato highlights the difficulty of exporting democracy to a country that opposes all such foreign designs and fundamentally disagrees on matters of political identity.

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Shi'i Islam has been the focus of sustained attention since the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979. Yet beyond the Iranian case, the role of Shi'ism in politics across the Middle East has attracted little serious research. Even less attention has been given to Shi'ism and Shi'ite militancy in Iraq-which preceded the Iranian revolution--and less still to their nature and origins; the social movements they engendered; the ideological responses they gave rise to and their specific sources of power and legitimacy. This book is an attempt to fill the gap in our understanding of the social and cultural identity created through the ideology of Shi'i Islam in Iraq.
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Customer Reviews (1)

This is a masterpiece work on Iraqi Shiites
Faleh Abdul-Jabar's book on Iraqi Shiites is a unique, sophisticated and well-researched work of sociology. The book traces the origins of the formation of political Shiism (Shiites are the second major faction in Islam after main stream Sunnis) in Iraq.
Abdul-Jabbar argues with skill that the evolution of the institutions of this sect was closely tied to the unfolding political events in the region starting with Ottoman Iraq, followed by the period of the formation of the Iraqi nation-state under the Hashemite monarchy toppled in 1958, and ending with the rule of the Baathist regime which lasted until 2003.
Even though this first edition includes an updated introduction covering the role of the Shiites in the Iraqi opposition movement outside of Iraq and the downfall of the Baathist regime, the book was clearly written while the Baathists were still in power. This makes it especially imperative for the author to print an updated second edition with an appendix that highlights the role of the Shiites and their religious leadership in post Baath Iraq.
The book is also an excellent encyclopedic document recording the creation of Iraqi Shiite parties and prominent figures and puting them in their greater Middle Eastern context as it includes brief information on Iranian and Lebanese Shiites. The book, however, leaves the Shiites of Eastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the dark.
The Shiite Movement in Iraq also documents the formation of the first militant Shiite movement the Islamic Daawa Party, which first engaged in theoretical debates with the Iraqi Communists and was later bitterly oppressed by the Baathists. The book also talks about the evolution of the institution of the Marja' (the highest ranking Shiite ayatollah), its centralization and decentralization, its legitimacy and the religious-temporal relations in leading the Shiites. Most importantly, Abdul-Jabbar describes the procession of the Shiite rituals such as Ashura and the Arba'een and traces the origins of the people who sponsor these events and who perform them.
Abdul-Jabar's includes a fortune of names, dates and references to Shiite cultural events. Readers need either to have minimum background information about the Middle East and Shiites or at least read attentively in order to be able to follow up as the book builds up.
This work is a masterpiece and is definitely five stars. ... Read more

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Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq examines the controversial role of military contractors in the reconstruction of Iraq. When 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' was launched in March 2003, few, if any, of the Coalition's political leaders could have envisaged that within a few months the number of private contractors engaged to keep the troops supplied would exceed their actual combat strength. This alternative 'army' was not only to become the largest assemblage of contractors in living memory to accompany a military force into a war zone, but was also responsible for a fundamental transformation of how military logistics were delivered.

This book explains how and why the US and UK governments became so dependent upon military contractors during the war in Iraq. It also examines the ramifications this new dependency will have on future military operations, as the conflict in Iraq has shown that private contractors are now indispensable to the attainment of both the military and political objectives of war. Finally, the book discusses what advantages and disadvantages these companies have brought to the reconstruction of Iraq, and what lessons need to be learned from this experience.

This book will be of great interest to students of military and strategic studies, Middle Eastern politics and international security, and as well as policymakers and military professionals.

Christopher Kinsey is a lecturer in international security at King's College London, Defence Studies Department, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham. His previous publications include Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies (Routledge: 2006)

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In studying the withdrawal from Iraq, RAND assessed logistical constraints, trends in insurgent activity, the readiness of Iraqi security forces, and implications for the size of the residual U.S. force and for security in Iraq and the region. This report presents alternative schedules: one consistent with the Obama administration1s intentions, one somewhat slower, and another faster. It also identifies steps to alleviate constraints and risks. ... Read more

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Iraq, Lies, Cover-Ups, and Consequences,details and documents the pattern of lying used to invade Iraq, the cover-ups by almost every government check and balance, the lying, misinformation, and cover-ups by media people, many of whom have been on the payroll of the CIA and other government offices for years. ... Read more

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This digital document is an article from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, published by Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs on October 1, 2009. The length of the article is 20918 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Citation Details
Title: Iraq: regional perspectives and U.S. policy.(Congressional Research Service)(Report)
Author: Christopher M. Blanchard
Publication: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs (Report)
Date: October 1, 2009
Publisher: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs
Page: NA

Article Type: Report

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Due to political realities, America seems about to take steps to leave Iraq within 1 or 2 years in large numbers - an outward surge. Yet because of the geopolitical significance of the region, vast oil reserves and the rampant terrorist activities - wholesale retreat will not be easy and perhaps not even desirable. This book brings together important analyses dealing with the current status in Iraq as well as projecting a post-war Iraq. ... Read more