Please make a tax-deductible donation to GlobalSecurity.org - Click Here Please make a tax-deductible donation to GlobalSecurity.org - Click Here Quick Kill In Slow Motion: The Nigerian Civil War CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence ABSTRACT Author: STAFFORD, Michael R., Major, United States Army Title: QUICK KILL IN SLOW MOTION: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Date: 1 April 1984 This paper examines the lessons of the Nigerian Civil War from the perspective of a U.S. military officer. It seeks to analyze the factors which stand out from the first modern war in independent Black Africa and equate their significance to general military concepts. A summary of the historical and cultural aspects which predicated the civil war preceeds a review of the development of the Nigerian military. Capabilities of the Federal and Rebel forces are acknowledged and lead to discussion of the strategies of the respective sides. Selected battles and campaigns are evaluated to define the strengths and weaknesses of the combatant organizations. The impact of the introduction of relatively sophisticated technology is viewed in light of the capacity to use that technology. The effects of the personalities of the two principle leaders, Gowon (Nigeria) and Ojukwu (Biafra), on the war's character are studied. Several themes surface. First is that once the military politicized, it could not control the course of events in Nigeria. Second, the necessity for rapid expansion of military forces on both sides predestined their inefficiency and limited effectiveness due to training and leadership shortfalls. Finally, technology, and its application, must fit the specific battlefield. The paper closes with a review of conclusions generated from the analyses throughout the work. WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR Quick Kill in Slow Motion: The Nigerian Civil War Major Michael R. Stafford, USA 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe my sincere appreciation and gratitutde to the many professionals who assisted and encouraged me during the production of this paper. First, Lieutenant Colonel William Isom, Director of African Studies, National War College, and Lieutenant Colonel William Hubard, USA, Major Mary Becka, USA, and Dr. William Stoakley (all of the Defense Intelligence Agency), gave their time, considerable expertise, and recommendations to the direction of this work. Second, Lieutenant Colonel Musa Bitiyong, Nigerian Army, provided substance to my research through his correspondence. Finally, I need also acknowledge Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bittner, USMC, Mrs. Mary Porter, the Reference Librarian at Breckinridge Library, and Mrs. Marvella McDill, Lieutenant Colonel Bittner's encouragement was substantial, and he painstakingly edited the first draft of this manuscript. Mrs. Porter amazed me with her dexterity in obtaining relatively scarce documents which were used in the research for this paper. Mrs. McDill diligently and cheerfully typed this document. To each of these kind people, I offer my thanks. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Maps I Africa iii II Nigeria iv III Nigerian Regions-January 1967 v IV Midwestern Invasion, August-September 1967 vi V Status, October 1968 vii VI Airlift, November 1968 viii VII Biafra, May 30, 1969 ix VIII Final Collapse, December 1969-January 1970 x INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I ROOTS OF CONFLICT 5 Pre-War History 5 The Nigerian Military 10 The Ibo Experience 16 II THE COMBATANT FORCES 20 The Federal Side 20 The Rebel Forces 26 III THE WAR BEGINS 30 Initial Phase (June-July 1967) 30 The Midwestern Invasion (August-September 1967) 35 IV THE WAR DEVELOPS 43 The Influence of Gowon 43 1 Division Operations 45 2 Division Operations 50 3 Marine Commando Division Operations 54 V OJUKWU'S BIAFRA 62 IV TO THE END OF THE WAR (SEPTEMBER 1968- JANUARY 1970) 71 VII THE AIR WAR 80 The Rebel Air Force 80 The Federal Air Force 86 VIII CONCLUSIONS 90 END NOTES 97 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 107 APPENDICES A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 113 B. LIST OF PROMINENT PERSONS 115 Click here to view image INTRODUCTION The Nigerian Civil War marked a significant milestone in the military history of independent Black Africa. For the first time, 20th Century technology reached a battlefield where Black African met Black African in conventional combat. The expansion of capabilities, from the chaotic spears-and-knives of the Congo to the set piece, automatic- rifles-and-jet-airplanes of Nigeria, introduced new dimensions in devastation to Africa south of the Sahara. The premise of this paper is that a study of the Nigerian Civil War offers the opportunity to understand how the introduction of sophisticated weapons affects the combat capabilities and actions of the military in the developing countries of the world. The quantities of modern weapons in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict were not substantial, but their impact was great. There were no tanks or heavy artillery (122mm Russian Guns were the largest), so the individual battle lethality can not compare to the Arab-Israeli conflicts or other technology-intensive campaigns. However, the Nigerian Civil War caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, primarily through the starvation associated with seige warfare. In the end this war proved as unjust and deadly as war can become. Those who suffered the most were once again the very young and the very old. Much has been written about the Nigerian Civil War. There are many fine histories detailing the development of the country and the factors which led to the Civil War of 1967 to 1970. For this reason, this paper only capsulizes this information. Likewise, there is only limited space expended here to review the Nigerian military's evolution, growth and eventual initiation of two 1966 coups d'etat which proved to be immediate causes of the Nigerian Civil War. Robin Luckham thoroughly analyzes this subject in his book, The Nigerian Military (Cambridge: University Press, 1971). Other areas which have received considerable analysis include international politics and foreign intervention, the relief efforts and the implications of the policy of starvation, the economics of civil war, and the propaganda war waged within the civil war itself. Because of the wide range of information available on these topics, I selected an area of research more directly related to my professionthe analysis of the military campaign. This paper is not a detailed history of the war in Nigeria. Rather, selected battles and campaigns are discussed and analyzed based on their significance to the outcome of the war, their edification of certain lessons of the conflict, or their benefit in illustrating points regarding the development of the forces involved or the war itself. In all cases, effort has been exerted to use written accounts from actual participants and observers, especially military personnel, in formulating analysis of the subject events. This proved necessary for two reasons. The first was the propaganda war mentioned above. Press releases from the two sides were so distorted that the New York Times, for example, ran adjacent Biafran and Nigerian sourced stories. The other reason is the bias exhibited by foreign correspondents covering the war. On the Nigerian side, access to the war zone was extremely limited since the military controlled the movements of journalists, thus effectively censuring much information. The Biafrans allowed freer movement by the media, seeking every advantage in courting world opinion. This often resulted in the co-opting of journalists. As Frederick Forsyth noted about his perspective, if "I may be accused of presenting the Biafra case, this would not be without justification. It [his book] is the Biafra story, and it is told from the Biafran standpoint."(1) Realizing that participants may have reputations at stake, multiple accounts of individual incidents were a must. This has been possible in most cases, since Biafran and Nigerian versions of most episodes were available. After assembling the military analyses of the selected battles and campaigns, a summary of historical factors leading up to the Civil War was compiled to aid the reader in understanding the content of the conflict. This is found in Chapter One. Finally, a brief summary of conclusions is provided as the final chapter to highlight the most significant aspects of the Nigerian Civil War. For those interested in further reading or study on the details of the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, the bibliography has been annotated with this writer's comments on the content and value of each listing to this research. It is important to note that readings should be balanced between authors of Biafran and Nigerian perspectives. CHAPTER 1 ROOTS OF CONFLICT Understanding the nature of the Nigerian Civil War begins with a knowledge of the unique and complex factors which led to the secession of Biafra and subsequent open hostilities. By their nature, these causes drew worldwide attention to the potential redivisions of Black African boundaries along traditional cultural, tribal and geographical lines. (The Organization of African Unity attempted to avoid the possible disintegration of its states into conflict and civil war by establishing in its 1963 charter the policy of keeping the national boundaries drawn by the former colonial powers.) Later in this chapter, I shall examine how the military in Nigeria was shaped and driven by these influences and as an institution contributed to the chaos that ended as civil war. Pre-War History. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. At the start of the civil war in 1967, she possessed about 56 million inhabitants. Most of these people belonged to one of three tribesthe Northern HausaFulani, the Western Yoruba, or the Eastern Ibo. The West and East are collectively called "The South." Before the imposition of European influence in the 19th Century, these tribes shared little common experience. They were separated geographically. The Northern Hausa-Fulani tribes were situated in dry savannahs south of the Sahara and accessible to the influences of the Mediterranean region, especially Islam. City states there developed under the rule of powerful emirs and the Islamic religion took root. The Yoruba in the West maintained more contact with the North than did the Eastern tribes, due to their highly developed trading activities and moderately open territory. Urban dwellers, the Yoruba were divded into states, each centered on a city. The tribe was industrious; crafts were numerous; and the religion complex due to interaction with many outside cultures. The relative sophistication of Yoruban society helped it withstand the trauma of European rule.(1) The Ibo of the Eastern region were initially quite different from the hard-working, intelligent people that developed after the arrival of the British. Isolated in the dense, wet woodlands of the Niger Delta, the Ibo lacked the sophistication of the Yoruba or the coastal minority tribes. In contrast, the originally backward Ibo emerged from the British colonial period as the most westernized tribe, espousing Christianity (as did some Yoruba) and proving adaptable to the imported work ethic due to their initiative and vigor.(2) Having earlier exploited the Niger area slave trade, Britain decided to stop it in the early 19th Century. First the Royal Navy patrolled the coastal waters with vessels controlled from a consulate set up on Fernando Po, a Spanish island possession 150 miles southeast of the Niger River Delta. In 1861 Britain claimed control of Lagos with the goal of ending the slave trading which originated at that port. Having established a mainland foothold, British influence gradually reached further inland.(3) The Oil Rivers Protectorate was established in (what is now) Southern Nigeria to administer traders doing business in that region, and the Niger Company was chartered to trade in the Niger River Basin. By 1885, when Bismarch called the Berlin Conference. Britain was firmly established in Nigeria. As was the purpose of the conference, Africa was divided among the European nations into spheres of influence. This division was made wholly on the competitive political situations in Europe and did not take into account those factors on which western nation-states had historically been built. Geographical and cultural influences such as natural boundaries, tribal locations and tribal differences were totally ignored. With the acceleration of British involvement, this set the stage for the artificial fusion of three distinctly different populations. In 1886 the National African Company (also known as the Royal Niger Company) was granted a royal charter to oversee the territories north of Oil Rivers Protectorate; by 1893 this had become the Niger Coast Protectorate. The National African Company was empowered to establish a police force and provide government services in the north. In 1897 the kingdom of Benin was brought under British control. After the annexation of other southwest areas, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was established in 1900. In the same year, the charter of the National African Company was revoked and the North redesigned the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. The two southern protectorates were united in 1906, and by 1914 the British consolidated control over all of Nigeria. What had in fact happened was the joining of three different foreign administrative organizations rather than the unification of three different indigenous peoples.(4) The first governor of the unified Nigeria was Frederick Dealtry Lugard, 1st Baron Lugard. He introduced in Nigeria the system of indirect rule, in which local government was essentially delegated in toto to tribal chiefs or indigenous ruling bodies. These local authorities acted under the supervision, or more accurately in many cases, the advice of British administrators. In Nigeria, this allowed the continuation of strong regional political differences. Little progress occurred in Nigeria until the end of World War II, when nationalistic movements surfaced in Africa as well as much of the rest of the colonial world. This was actually part of the unrest in the European empires as peoples in various areas sought to remove outside rule from their homes. Powerful political parties developed n each sector of the country. Chief Awolowo founded the Action Group in the West. However, the old city-states remained, dividing the West between local and regional interests. The East saw the formation of a single democratic party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). The theme of this party, which was led by Dr. Azikiwe, was national unitythe formation of a single, powerful independent state. The Northern emirs responded to the growing political awareness in the South by submerging their region in the "designedly local and monolithic" Northern Peoples Congress.(5) With British assistance, these three regions negotiated a constitutional government which resulted in the loosely constituted federation established when independence was achieved in October of 1960. In this federation, two of the three parties had to form a coalition to gain control of the government. Incredibly, the Ibo of the East who advocated a strong federal union and the more conservative Northerners who favored a weak confederation united.(6) Dr. Azikiwe became President and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the North was named Prime Minister. The Westerners, as oddman out, vented their frustration in a division of their party between Awolowo and his followers, and local party segments led by Western Regional Premier Akintola. Akintola's faction aligned with the North, and formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), while the other factions united with the Eastern Ibo to establish the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). Open hostility in the West resulted in Federal intervention, under strange circumstances, and the discovery of "immense defalestions of regional revenues into party funds and private hands"(7). Awolowo was tried, convicted and imprisoned for treason, and his rival, Akintola, gained power based on his alignment with the Northern Party. Civil unrest was increased by other incidents during this time. The 1962 census results were released in 1963 and showed a total Nigerian population of 55.6 million people, of which 29.8 million were identified as living in the Northern Region. This outright majority caused other regions to vehemently discount the accuracy of the census. As the 1964 parlimentary elections neared, corruption was rife. Local political activity was marked by intimidation, and cheating was rampant, especially in the North. The UPGA boycotted the elections, but later accepted a second election in 1965 and garnered about a fourth of the seats. In that year the events surrounding the Western Regional legislative election bordered on civil war. Clashes between Akintola's NNA and the UPGA brought about many deaths and recorded another episode in the headlong tumble from independence to civil war (8). The Nigerian Military. Into this cauldron of seething historical, political and cultural antagonism stepped the military in the first coup attempt of January 1966. The discord between regions was based on tribal differences accentuated by religious and social disparities. The military, as an institution, was intertwined with these contradictions and could not act independently from the rest of Nigerian society. Hence, instead of stabilizing the country, the armed forces led it to civil war with a coup in Jaunary 1966 and a counter-coup in July of the same year. Former military ruler Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo maintained that these coups were the immediate causes of the Nigerian Civil War. He has noted that the political equation was altered, and the fragile trust existing among the three major tribes was shattered.(9) But the military lacked the size to control Nigeria. At the time of the first coup, Nigerian forces totaled only 10,500. The Army was the largest with 9,000 soldiers. The Navy numbered 900, including 80 officers, and the newly formed Air Force boasted about 700 men. In a country more than twice the size of California, the military was spread too thinly and was without the training, equipment and sophistication to suitably dominant Nigeria's vast area and population. Additionally, this small organization reverberated with the ethnic turmoil confronting the rest of the country which further reduced its ability to handle the civil strife. The Nigerian Army traced its roots back to the West African Frontier Force created in the late 19th Century by the chartered companies to administer their respective regions.(10) By 1914 this force included a Gold Coast Regiment, the Sierra Leone Battalion and a Gambia Company. In that year, Nigerian and Gold Coast (Ghana) units fought in Togoland against the Germans there, and a detachment of British Colonial forces and a French Senegalese unit campaigned in the German Cameroons.(11) In Accra, the British established the West Africa Command to exercise command and control of its regional colonial units. It remained until 1956, when it was disbanded because Ghana gained independence and desired its own army, thus forcing the break up of the Regional Force.(12) About 30,000 Nigerians served with the British Forces in World War II. The 81 and 82 (West Africa) Divisions included Nigerian soldiers who saw action in Burma. Nigerian troops also served with the Royal West African Frontier Force in Ethiopia against the Italians, and later Nigerian units served with British units in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Palestine and Sicily. Allied commanders were reportedly generous in their praise of Nigeria's soldiers and units.(13) Until independence the Nigerian Army consisted of recruits essentially from the lower levels of Nigerian society, with a high concentration of minority tribe members. The officer corps was predominately British with a gradual, slow transition to "Nigerianization" from 1949 to 1964. Ethnic politics delayed the announcement of a Nigerian Commander of the Army until 1965 when Major General Johnson A. Ironsi, an Ibo, was given that position. After independence, military service gained prestige, and the more educated Southerners, particularly Ibo, began to enlist in increasing numbers. With decreasing British funding, the Nigerians were forced to escalate military spending. The armed forces which before received little interest (14) became a matter of national pride and pressures to expand the military size became a popular issue.(15) In 1958 the Nigerian military numbered 7,600 officers and men. By 1964 it had increased by 2,900. Growth in the Navy and a relatively ambitious Air Force program accounted for much of this expansion. Quota systems were implemented in 1958 for the enlisted ranks and in 1961 for the officer grades to balance service compositions with national regional demographics. These two efforts served to highlight tribal differences within and politicize the small military. Along with the Nigerianiza- tion of the Officer Corps (see Table I), the quota system thoroughly confused the dynamics of officer development. The rapid influx of officers created an age imbalance and a professional gap. Promotion rates accelerated, especially for officers commissioned before 1960. An officer accessed at age 20, could be a lieutenant colonal at 31. When the Click here to view image officer ranks began to stabilize in 1965 after all the British officers had departed, younger officers became frustrated because of slower promotion rates.(16) This frustration may have found outlets in political action, first by the "Majors' Coup" in January 1966 followed by the counter-"Captains' Coup" the following July. The most direct impact of these two coups on the Nigerian military was the destruction of the command structure and the polarization of the forces along two lines, basically Ibo and non-Ibo (the first coup was planned and executed by a predominately Ibo group of officers, while the second coup was led by non-Ibo officers; this served to create a mutual suspicion). The loss of relatively experienced officers (see Table II) would prove particularily damaging to the Federal side in the Civil War because of the migration of middle grade Ibo officers to Biafra. The impact of the coups was even more devastating to the country as a whole. The early coup destroyed the delicate first republic. Though the coup was organized to end corruption throughout the Nigerian political system, the net effect only placed the military in power, while the corruption found a way to continue. It in fact was a standard justification for subsequent coups, cited in military takeovers in 1975 and as recently as January 1984. In a British TV interview, the leader of the January 1966 coup, Major Chukwumah Nzeogwu stated, We wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trades unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system. We wanted to gun down all the bigwigs on our way. This was the only way. We could not afford to let them live if this was to work. We got some but not all. General Ironsi was to have been shot, but we were not ruthless enough. As a result he and the other compromisers were able to supplant us.(19) Instead of ending the corruption, the coups triggered hostilities which blanketed the country in civil war and forced the rapid expansion of the military. But the Nigerian military could not provide the stability to serve as a unifying institution for an oil-rich emerging power in Black Africa. The Ibo Experience. A final point needs to be made regarding the animosity toward the Ibo. In their acceptance of European values and the Christian religion, the Ibo further differentiated themselves from the other tribes of Nigeria, particularly those of the North. The Ibo proved themselves intelligent, ambitious and conscientious. These traits enabled the Ibo to capitalize on educational opportunities and saw them dominate administrative organizations, like the civil service and similar positions in industry. They did especially well on the General Qualification Examination for Officer Placement in the military, due to their higher education level.(20) This eventually became a factor in the establishment of a regional quota system for officer recruitment, so as to achieve an ethnic balance in the armed forces. Resentment built up among the other tribes of the near Ibo monopoly of the skilled professions and white collar jobs. Old tribal prejudices were aggravated by the belief that the Ibo were trying to dominate Nigeria. The coup of January 1966, instigated by Ibo majors, led to the death of the key non-Ibo leaders in the country and, though apparently unplanned, placed Ibo General Ironsi in power. After an initial period of relief at the believed end of corruption, doubts formed among the non-Ibo population and a fear developed that the coup was another step in an Ibo plan to control the country. Hundreds of Ibo were massacred in May 1966 in a backlash to the coup. General Ironsi had failed to take positive steps to stabilize the political situation by harshly punishing the plotters, most of whom were jailed indefinitely. The appearance of complicity and the growing nationwide unrest created the climate for the counter-coup in July 1966; this coup was initiated by non-Ibo company grade officers. Ironsi was brutally slain and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu "Jack" Gowon, was a compromise choice as his replacement. Gowon was the senior Northern officer serving in the Army at the time; however, his choice created some interesting aspects since he was Christian, from a middle belt minority tribe, and had been hitherto relatively obscure. The second coup saw the directed movement of troops and troop units to the regions of their respective ethnic heritage. The exodus of Ibo to the Eastern Region grew and, increasingly, that region in a de facto sense partitioned itself from the rest of Nigeria. Led by Lieutentant Colonel Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu, like Gowow a British-trained combat officer, the Eastern Region slowly emerged as the safe haven homeland of the Ibo peoples. In October of 1966, despite Gowon's declaration that the Ibo would be protected, pograms and rioting resulted in the mutilation and death of thousands of Ibo and a mass flight to the Eastern Region by a million and a half Ibo. This October 14, 1966 Time eyewitness account indicates the terror of that period: ...A Lagos-bound jet had just arrived from London, and as the Kano passengers were escorted into the customs shed, a wild-eyed soldier stormed in, brandishing a rifle and demanding, 'Ina Nyammari?'Hausa for 'Where are the damned Ibos?' There were Ibo among the customs officials, and they dropped their chalk and fled, only to be shot down in the main terminal by other soldiers. Screaming their bloody curses of a Moslem holy war, the Hausa troops turned the airport into a shambles, bayoneting Ibo worders in the bar, gunning them down in the corridors, and hauling Ibo passengers off the plane to be lined up and shot. From the airport the troops fanned out through downtown Kano, hunting down Ibos in bars, hotels and on the streets. One contingent drove their Land Rover to the rail road station where more than 100 Ibos were waiting for a train, and cut them down with automatic fire. The soldiers did not have to do all the killing. They were soon joined by thousands of Hausa civilians, who rampaged through the city armed with stones, cutlasses, machetes, and homemade weapons of metal and broken glass. Crying 'Heathen!' and 'Allah!!' the mobs and troops invaded the sabon gari (strangers' quarter), ransacking, looting and burning Ibo homes and stores and murdering their owners. ...All night long and into the morning the massacre went on. Then tired but fulfilled, the Hausas drifted back to their homes and barracks to get some breakfast and sleep. Municipal garbage trucks were sent out to collect the dead and dump them into mass graves outside the city...:(21) The fear of extermination built out of such incidents was the foundation of the will to resist a vastly superior force throughout the Civil War. The Ibo nurtured fear in their enclave of Eastern Nigeria with the resulting belief that only secession and the formation of a separate country would ensure their security and safety. On May 30, 1967. Ojukwu cast aside Gowon's continuing efforts to maintain a federal government and proclaimed the formation of the independent Republic of Biafra. The resulting Civil War lasted over two and half years. The cost in human life has been estimated as high as two million people, and Nigeria's expanding oil-based economy simmered when its unimpeded growth could have raised the country to a position of international responsibility unparalled in Black Africa. CHAPTER 2 THE COMBATANT FORCES The Federal Side. When war broke out, the Nigerian military was beset with numerous problems. The Army was not totally inexperienced, having sent two battalions with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force to the Congo between 1960 and 1964 and a smaller force to Tanzania later for a similar peacekeeping mission. But the small 10,000-man Army that existed in 1966 was wrecked by the divisiveness of the tribal strife. Many senior leaders were killed during the two coups, and the migration of Ibo to the East resulted in the loss of more experienced officers and NCOs. According to one source, the Federals were able to claim about 184 officers while the Biafrans had 93 at the start of the war.(1) The difficulties of selection, training and development of officers, including the distorted promotion schedules and age structures (note that the military head of the country, Lieutenant Colonel Gowon, was 32 years of age at the outbreak of the war), were outgrowths of the rapid expansion of the Army to 80,000 at the end of 1967 (2) and more than 200,000 by the end of the war. Battalions were formed with 5 or 6 (vice 30+) officers in late 1967. The resulted in tentative command and control and rudimentary staff work.(3) The seeds of indiscipline were watered by the nature of the force constructed. The Nigerian Army never had to resort Click here to view image What existed on the Nigerian Air Force was located at Kaduna in the Northern Region. Naval Forces were headquartered at the port near Lagos. to conscription to fill its ranks. Instead, it raised the pay of privates to $46 a month (in a nation with per capita income at the time of about $120/year) and quickly filled its ranks with thousands of recruits, notably the uneducated from the middle belt minority tribes; but immigrants came from Chad seeking a better life. These untrained, unsophisticated soldiers highlighted the shortage of skilled personnel in specialized areas like maintenance and administration.(5) Table III documents the concentration of Nigerian Army Forces in the North before the war. This disparity was probably due to political manipulation. In any event, the structure left the Midwest State completely unprotected and only ceremonial and administrative units in Lagos. To counter this situation and prosecute the early Nigerian strategy, the Army was reorganized along these lines: Click here to view image Army Headquarters was in Lagos and even with early growth of the Army, it still tried to maintain the centralized administrative control that existed before the war. No central field control was established, and this problem was exascerbated when the Chief of Staff, Colonel Joe Akapan, died in a helicopter crash in the first month of fighting. Until the last months of the war, the Nigerians failed to exert unity of command in their operations. By the time three divisions were formed, each operated independently. No Corps Headquarters was established. Instead, each Division Commander acted as a "feudal baron", competing with the other Divisions for resources amd attention, often returning to Lagos to conduct business at the headquarters while fighting continued in sector. For most of the war, the Nigerian Army was configured into three divisions: Click here to view image a. 1 Division had been organized around what remained of the Nigerian Army. Representing the best trained and disciplined of Nigerian forces, the division had about 40,000 soldiers in six infantry brigades. Although its leaders were slow and meticulous, 1 Division never failed in accomplishing its missions (6). b. 2 Division included three infantry brigades and around 20,000 troops (7). Hastily formed during the Midwest Crises of August 1967, its lack of capable leadership and limited experience resulted in numerous failures on the battlefield. c. 3 Marine Commmando Division distinguished itself throughout most of the war. With a total strength of about 35,000 (8), this division was divided into eight commmando brigades which executed numerous amphibious and riverine operations throughout the war. The Nigerian Navy was instrumental in blockading Biafra. Though there were few ships available, the Nigerians fully demonstrated their conceptual understanding of the need to control the coastline and adjacent waters. A frigate, the N.A.S. Nigeria, and a submarine chaser had been obtained from the Netherlands in 1966. The British had provided two minesweepers, a landing craft and a patrol craft.(9) The Russians also sold the Federals three torpedo boats (10) and several radar-equipped seaward-defense vessels (11) after the war started. These last vessels were effective in canalizing relief flights for Biafra into uncovered air avenues. The Nigerian Air Force had not existed until 1962 and was building as the war commensed. The British had started the Air Force training, but terminated it when the Nigerians unilaterally voided a military landing rights agreement. The West Germans than assumed the program in 1963. Training was conducted both in West Germany and Nigeria, but ended in July 1967 with the first air raid on Kaduna Airfield when a West German trainer reportedly was killed. The other trainers left immediately.(12) Over 100 Nigerian pilots were qualified on trainer aircraft. Many of these pilots were Ibo who were lost to the Air Force with the advent of war. Regardless, the Nigerians had no combat aircraft. In early 1967, her fleet consisted of five Dakota (C-47) transports, 20 Dornier DO-27 light liaision planes, and 12 P149D Piaggios.(13) The Dorniers and Piaggios had come from the Luftwaffe Training Mission. But help soon arrived; a July 1967 trip to Moscow bore fruit in mid-August 1967 when the Soviets sent MIG 15's and 17's, as well as Czech Delfin L-29 light attack trainers (adapted for strafing and bombing). In all the Nigerians received about 15 MIG's and 12 Delfins during the war (14) and hosted hundreds of Soviet and Czech technical advisors. Egyptian, European and South African mercenaries piloted the jet aircraft through the first part of the war. In early 1968, three IL-28 Ilyushin bombers were received at Makurdi. Additionally, the Federals boasted two BAC Jet Provosts (gifts from Sudan), eight Westland Whirlwind Helicopters (purchased from Australia) and five DC-3's (borrowed from Nigerian Airways).(15) In total, the Nigerian Air Force represented a flexible and intimidating factor which had significant theoretical strategic impact on the war effort. Yet even with its tremendous superiority over the Biafran opposition, the Nigerians never fully exerted their advantage. In fact, the Air Force figured prominently in two of the more negative aspects of the conflict, the bombing and strafing of the civilian population and the failure of the Federals to stop the airlift into Biafra after it was cut off from every other means of support. The Rebel Forces. The Biafran Army grew to a strength of nearly 90,000. Formed around the nucleaus of 2000 former Nigerian soldiers, the Rebel Army also felt growth pains; it was eternally wanting for experience, ammunition and food. Overwhelmingly outmanned and outgunned, poorly led and lacking an adequate support base, the Biafran Army still managed to survive for two and a half years against what easily became the strongest military force in Black Africa. The Biafrans maintained five undersized divisions and several special units like the Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighters (BOFF) and the 4th Commando Brigade. Though guerrilla tactics did enhance Biafran operations, they were never embraced as the disparity between the two forces might have indicated. Ojukwu, in fact, was marked as a "prisoner of classic British tactics."(16) His methods were based on the belief that a secure homeland was essential for the Ibo. As such, his priority was the maintenance of an impenetrable defensive parameter. There was little artillery or mortars in the Biafran Army, and advanced armaments consisted of homemade rockets and land mines, fabricated tanks and pre-World War II French armored cars. Desperate for war materials, the Biafrans were often dependent on captured Federal equipment. This created problems. Rebel soldiers would stop to pick up clothing and supplies instead of pursuing retreating Federal troops. When the Nigerians discovered this trait, they baited preplanned artillery and mortar targets with military supplies.(17) The shortage of equipment also meant that the Biafrans were unable to capitalize on the large numbers of volunteers which initially streamed in. Time magazine reported that one of the elite Biafran Brigades had enough arms for only 3,000 of its 6,000 men.(18) This situation persisted until the summer of 1968 when the French announce support of the Biafran cause. The Biafran Navy was essentially a non-entity after the raid on Bonny. It consisted almost entirely of machine gun mounted Chris-Crafts taken from the Port Harcourt Sailing Club (19), and armed harbor and river craft. Though the Rebels tried to obtain naval vessels, they were unsuccessful and never seriously influenced the naval war. The Biafran Air Force, however, evolved into a viable institution. Twice it countributed to Biafran initiatives. Early in the war, the Air Force consisted of: Click here to view image Keeping this ancient fleet in the air rapidly overwhelmed the Biafrans. The initial value of these aircraft was the psychological effect they created in the disorganized early stage of the war. The bombers made harassing attacks on Lagos and the Northern air fields, creating large scale panic with their erratic bombing with homemade munitions. The helicopters likewise dampened Federal fervor on the battlefield. Used primarily for reconnaissance, Federal soldiers soon discovered they were not safe when the Alouettes were in the air due either to aerially supported artillery or mortar attacks, or homemade bombs dropped from the aircraft. They quickly learned to seek cover when the helicopters were flying.(22) Besides the continuing airlift, the next important contribution made to the air war came at the end. A Swedish citizen was moved by the suffering created in Biafra by Federal air raids. This man, Count Carl von Rosen, decided to get the Biafrans a countering air capability and introduced 19 Swedish single engine MFI-90 airplanes. Each of these trainers had 12 rockets in a pod mounted under the wing and was capable of flying undetected at tree top level to its targets. These tactics had an immediate impact on the Nigerians, but it was a case of too little, too late as the war ended before the potential of this small air force could be realized. They were particularly effective in attacks against fixed targets, like oil wells and equipment.(23) The Biafrans simply were never able to match the relative Federal might. The oil revenue with which they expected to finance their war effort was soon cut off as the Federal blockade was enforced. By the time massive French aid was received, the war was lost and the aid merely prolonged the suffering. CHAPTER 3 THE WAR BEGINS I need not tell you what horror, what devastation and what extreme human suffering will attend the use of force. When it is over and the smoke and dust have lifted, and the dead are buried, we shall find, as other people have found, that it has all been futile, entirely futile, in solving the problem we set out to solve. (1) Initial Phase. (June-July 1967). No one heard the prophetic words of Colonel R.A. Adebayo, Governor of the West Region of Nigeria. Both sides were totally unprepared for what was to come. This was the foremost lesson at the start of the war. On the Federal side, there was no comprehension of the paranoia which encompassed the Ibo being. Instead, Gowon expected a "police acton" whereby the rebellious Biafrans would be surrounded and isolated from the world; then Biafran resistance would quickly fade and Federal victory would be rapid"a quick kill." Even before the Biafran Independence Announcement, the Federal government cut off telephone, telegraph and postal service to the rebellious state. Afterwards, airlines, railroads and highways were closed, and the small Nigerian Navy prepared to blockade all shipping except oil tankers. Even these were restricted from transit as hostilities intensified. Mobilization was half-hearted at best. In the North, the Chairman of Internal Administrative Services warned provincial administrators of the impending conflict. Limited training in civil defense began and evacuation planning was conducted in the event of raids on the larger cities. Ex-servicemen, some 7,000, were recalled to active duty and formed four new infantry battalions. The Army started recruiting members from the local and national police forces.(2) After a five week lull, the first offensive actions began. Barely qualifying as skirmishes, they marked a Federal campaign to advance from the North on four axes with the objective of crushing Biafran resistance and seizing their capital of Enugu. After some initial successes, the Nigerians began to meet increasing Rebel resistance. It became apparent that they had underestimated the measure of resolve of the poorly equipped Biafran Army. Also highlighted were the lack of training and discipline of the Nigerian Army and the difficulties they would experience due to their long lines of communication. The offensive ground to a halt, and the rebellion that they expected would take only days to crush exhibited more long term potential. The Biafrans set their strategy as the establishment of a secure homeland for the Ibo and the development of a might which, as Ojukwu stated, no force in Black Africa could overcome.(3) Like the Federals, the Rebels stressed civil defense procedures. With limited military resources, yet driven by terrible fear, the people of the region prepared defensive positions on likely avenues of approach, formed local militias and secured Nigerian-owned war materials that remained in the region. In fact, Rebel preparations began well in advance of the actual secession date. They started in earnest with the massive influx of refugee Ibo during and after the September/October 1966 pogroms. Non-Easterners had been ordered out of the region at that time, and there are clear indications that secession was planned from that point.(4) The Biafrans met the initial Federal advances from the Northern Region with full resistance. They used to their advantage the fact that they were fighting in their home territory, capitalizing on the availability of manpower to hinder Federal advances. Traps, ditches and obstacles were placed in the paths of attacking Nigerians. These only slowed the Federals, who used their superior firepower to saturate prepared positions and their mobility advantage to outflank Biafran strong points. At Obollo Eke, for example, artillery and mortar shelling began at 6 a.m. August 3, 1967, and continued until 8 a.m. After a brief attack, artillery preparations resumed, followed by another probe. This alternating pattern of two hours of shelling and a probing attack continued during daylight hours for four days before the Rebles were pushed out of Obollo Eke.(5) The extensive road network in northern Biafra created flank defensive problems. After the first loses of Biafran territory at Obudu, the Rebels planned to fall back to Ogoja. In retreat they ran into a Federal ambush and learned just how vulnerable their flanks were.(6) Quickly they adjusted their tactics, moving to the flanks when armored vehicles assaulted their lines and reclosing the ranks after they passed. The Rebels soon resorted to hit-and-run tactics in the form of ambushes to harrass Nigerian operations. But they never abandoned their static defenses, and from the very beginning the Biafrans were victims of their lack of military experience. One bright spot for the Biafrans appeared on July 21, 1967 when a World War II American-made B-26 bomber piloted by a Polish expatriot, called "Kamikaze" Brown, bombed and strafed Federal positions at Obukpa. This greatly lifted Biafran morale (7), but offered ominous clouds for future events. Both Great Britain and the Untied States had rejected Nigerian requests for aircraft. By July 31 Nigerian representatives were reported in Moscow (8) and expansion of the war's lethality was imminent. (Note: Arms supply was a major part of a critical issue, outside intervention, which dominated international discussion of the Nigerian Civil War.) Another event which portended the calamities to follow was the amphibious assault on and capture of the Island of Bonny at the mouth of the Port Harcourt Harbor. This Federal operation was important for two reasons. First, it demonstrated a boldness, fluidity and imagination seldom seen in Federal operations. The Bonny assault was not remarkable in its execution; however, the operation was in marked contrast to the "skirmishes, slow, cautious probes, and long distance bombardments of doutful object with doubtful accuracy [and an] incredible amount of aimless and wasteful shooting" (9) which dominated the northern battlefields. On Bonny a 1000 man invasion force loaded on two ships overwhelmed a companysized garrison after a limited naval bombardment. Destroyed was Biafra's only real naval vessel, a Nigerian patrol boat seized at secession; more important, Port Harcourt, the major port and oil terminal in Biafra, was effectively sealed off. This leads to the second importance of the Bonny capture. It pinpoints the failure of Biafran leaders to appreciate the incredible consequence of losing their sea lines of communications. They did not see the need to secure adequate sea power before the war began and were unable to correct their shortcoming when it became apparent how serious the Federals were about enforcing their blockade of the Biafran coastline. The New York Times noted at this stage of the war that Biafra had a "better-than-even chance of survival" ...but that it was... "clear, that the East cannot survive for many months unless the naval blockade is broken."(10) Instead of confronting this problem, however the Biafrans turned inward. The Midwestern Invasion (August-September 1967). The two forces fought tentatively through July of 1967 and into August, with the Federals steadily gaining ground. Then the Biafrans, who had seemed interested only in a defensive war, launched an attack into the Midwestern State. This marked the turning point in the war, as the Rebels gambled on a disastrous offensive campaign. "We have no territorial ambitions. We do not want to capture anybody or punish anybody. We just want to be left alone,"(11) Ojukwu wrote. The drive into the Midwest, however, stood in stark contrast to this claim, Biafra had moved boldly beyond simply protecting the Ibo enclave and seized the initiative, taking the war to the Federals. The objectives of the strike were lightning attacks on, and the capture of, the Federal capital of Lagos and the Western State capital of Ibadan. The occupation of these two capitals was expected to cause an immediate collapse of the Federal government and an end to the war. But the way the Rebel forces spread throughout the region, it is clear that Ojukwa had other objectives in their advance. Among these were establishment of internal control of the Midwestern State and limited prosecution of the war into the Northern State. The execution of the plan higlighted the incompetence of the strategic planners in Biafra. Just as they failed to fully grasp the implications of a naval blockade, they lacked the professional skills and imagination (and patience, and resources) to coordinate an effective attack. The plan took advantage of the sparse Federal forces which were thinly spread throughout the region in small garrisons, more an internal security force than an army. But the plan did not correctly account for many of the non-military factors bearing on the situation, nor did it have sufficient flexibility to confront in any realistic sense changing conditions. The Midwestern State was in a precarious position, a small, wealthy area caught between the secessionist Ibo and the Federal captial of Lagos. In its boundaries were some 800,000 Ibo who could be expected to have sympathies for the East. Primarily agrarian, the region was rich in palm oil, rubber and timber, while oil was a growing resource. One-third of Nigeria's 1967 production and one-half of her reserves were located here. This made the Midwest a desirable property for both sides.(12) At 3 a.m. on August 9, a 100 vehicle column (about 1000 men) crossed the Onitsha Bridge over the Niger River. Within hours Rebel troops occupied the Midwest captial of Benin, while others had fanned out towards Okene (see Map IV) in the north, Owo, also north, and Sapele and Warri to the south. The takeover was facilitated by an insurrection of Ibo-led troops in the region and few shots were actually fired. Evidence is strong that Federal military leaders of Ibo origin secretly collaborated with the Biafrans, providing intelligence on Federal troop dispositions and coordinating a revolt from Nigeria in conjunction with the offensive.(13) As a result, operational security and surprise were achieved. The inital success of the raids, coupled with an August 11 air attack on Lagos, had a devastating psychological effect on the Federal side. In compensation for the tremendous security surrounding the operation, the Biafrans delayed the formation of their brigade-sized task force, conducted no rehersal and even withheld appointment of the task force commander until the day before the attack.(14) This demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the necessity of building teamwork and cohesion in military units and entered several unknowns into the Midwest operational equation. a. Lieutenant Colonel Victor Banjo, a Yoruba, was selected to be the operational commander for politcal reasons rather than his military skills. There was a belief that a non-Ibo leader would help gain Midwest and Western support for the Biafran attack and in the end, help unite all of the South against the North. This not withsanding, Banjo ignored his principal objective, Lagos, and twice held up his advance. At Benin he halted to "reorganize" his forces, though they had not fired a shot. Time was lost in an argument between Benin and Enugu over who was to be the new governor of the region.(15) After three days the Rebels advanced on to the west before stopping at Ore. Forgeting that their success depended on speed, the Biafrans were hesitant to face the uncertainty of continued advance.(16) Lack of agrresive leadership and unity of purpose resulted in a two week delay after which the Rebels lost the initiative. b. The shock of the invasion and the lack of discipline displayed by Biafran soldiers produced adverse results. The support expected for the Midwest Ibo did not materialize as expected, and the negative reaction by non-Ibo in the Midwest and West was far worse than anticipated. It evidenced a political blindness in the Biafran leadership akin to their military shortcomings. John de St. Horre notes that this political blindness was "too often repeated to be a chance phenomenon."(17) c. The political "wheeling and dealing" that took place in Benin over control of the region, at the expense of military objectives, lent a suspicious cast to the Biafran leadership. The motives and actions of all officers became suspect because of the rumor of "saboteurs" within the leadersip.(18) This prejudgement severely hampered command and control in Biafra thereafter and is discussed in Chapter 5. d. The Biafrans probably lacked the capability to conduct such an offensive operation. In his book, Reluctant Rebel, Fola Oyewole details the lack of preparation for the Midwest offensive by his company. Here is a summary of one episode. Upon his return from a battalion field exercise, he was ordered to form a new company at Onitsha. He delivered his car and possessions to family members in that city and reported immediately to his battalion. Within hours he moved to the Midwest. His unit's mission was the capture of the army barracks at Ugbelli. With an officer cadet as his executive officer and no experienced noncommissioned officers, the company was bused to the objective area. Ten miles from Ugbelli, he stopped the column and provided a short briefing, though he was without intelligence or reconnasissance. Fortunately there was no opposition at the objective. Even so, the untrained and undisciplined troops engaged in sporatic firing which resulted in one wound.(19) Such episodes illustrate just how unprepared the Rebels were for the war. The vehicles used for the attack included homemade armored cars, farm trucks and passenger cars. The Biafran soldiers were poorly equipped, and many were without uniforms. They were lucky to meet only token resistance from the few Federal Forces. From the Federal side, the Midwest Invasion achieved one significant result. It broke the complacency surrounding the Federal war effort, and unified the ojectives of Lagos, the West and the North. The entire country was intimidation by the aggressiveness of the Eastern Ibo and the response was immediate. In a demand for Federal action, anti-Ibo riots broke out in Lagos and Ibadan. A dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed at Ibadan, and troops and armored cars presented a show of force in Lagos to buoy public confidence. Militarily, the reaction was more substantive. A war cabinet was formed in Lagos. Remaining Federal forces operating in the Midwest fell back to blocking positions, most notably to the south of Ore about 120 miles from Lagos on the overland axis of advance from Benin. There they were reinforced by a company of Federal Guards from Lagos. A new unit, 2 Division, commanded by then Lieutenant Colonel Murtala Mohammed, sent its 7 Brigade to Ore, while the 6 and 8 Brigades were placed on the northern border of the Midwest to occupy the Biafran's right flank. Lagos must have been reminiscent of Paris and her taxis during the first battle of the Marne. Ground wagons and red- and-silver buses delivered soldiers from Lagos to the front. Six hundred soldiers were recalled from Bonny, and 500 more were moved by rail from Kaduna in the north. The war in the north of Biafra slowed as attention and resources were drawn to overcome the threat in the Midwest. Nigeria's leading playwright, Wole Soyinka, observed that "the short, surgical police action is being conducted with blunt and unsterile scapels."(20) By mid-August, blown bridges and their own hesitation had stopped the Biafrans. The very factor which had hampered the Federal offensive earlier, long lines of communcations, now was a problem for the Rebels. A small force from the beginning, it was stretched too far to withstand the growing Federal pressure. Abruptly, the Rebel offensive ended as the Federals took the initiative. After a single, fierce, battalion-level, infantry battle at Foriku, just south of Ore, Biafran resistance faded into an "accelerating retreat" characterized by minor delaying actions, blown bridges and cratered roads.(21) The two northern brigades were in a race to outflank the Biafrans and cut off their retreat to the Niger River Bridge at Onitsha. In their haste, the Biafrans left behind many soldiers who did not receive word to withdraw and were consequently captured. Benin was evacuated days before the Federals arrived. The remnants of the invading force crossed the Niger Bridge at Onitsha, blowing two spans in their passing. The destruction of the bridge, a giant edifice commemorative of Nigerian progress, was symbolic of a final isolation for Biafra and a new and deadlier phase of the war. From the Midwest Invasion the Biafrans had hoped to show the world that they were a legitimate power deserving of international recognition; instead the foray ended with disaster. The Rebels gained some food, materiel, and the assets of the Bank of Benin which were expropriated in the occupation. But the losses far overshadowed those minor gains: a. The Federals declared all out war, launching the first air strikes of the war at Enugu, Onitsha, Port Harcourt and Calabar among others.(22) b. The Biafrans removed the buffer of the midwest state. All sympathy in the South was lost as non-Ibo became pro-Federals. Additionally, the blockade became more effective as trade that had flourished in the Niger died.(23) c. The loss of resources, men and materiel, in the Midwest hastened the fall of Enugu. The withdrawal of these assets had weakened the defense of the northern region. When these forces did not return and the Federals resumed their advance with a rekindled fervor, the early fall of the Biafran capital was assured.(24) d. Finally, the initiative was surrendered to the Federals. With the offensive they initiated in mid-August, the Federals began to display their superiority. The conflict slowed to the plodding war of attrition that would continue for over two years. The norther border was closed by the Nigerian 1 Division, the Midwestern Region had been clearly by 2 Division, and the Navy had blockaded most of the sea approaches. The Cameroons had closed their rugged border in June 1967, and the noose was slowly tightened by the Federals. CHAPTER 4 THE WAR DEVELOPS (October 1967-August 1968) The Biafrans had gambled on taking the initiative away from the Federal forces. Pushed back across the Niger River after the abortive Midwest invasion, they had lost any chance of victory and had spurred the Nigerians into action. The Federal response was a three-pronged offensive from the north, the west and the south, while they methodically tightened their blockade. The result was the isolation of Biafra and the gradual collapse of the Rebel state into a smaller and smaller enclave. The Influence of Gowon. The deliberateness of the Nigerian effort was indicative of the character of the Federal leader, now Major General Yakubu "Jack" Gowon. This occurred despite the fact that personally Gowon was atypical of the people he led. Born into a Methodist minister's family in 1934, Gowon was a Christian from a minority tribe in the predominantely Moslem north. He was educated in Nigeria and received military training in the British- operated Officer Training School at Teshire, Ghana and at Eton Hall and the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst in England. He and his counterpart on the Rebel side, Ojukwu, had similar military backgrounds. Both were commissioned in the Army in 1957 and served with the United Nations Force in the Congo. After staff college in Camberley, England, Gowon was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1963. In 1965 he attended the Joint Services Staff College in England, returning to Nigeria two days before the first coup of January 15, 1966; his absence from Nigeria may actually have saved his life. In any event, Major General ironsi took power and appointed him Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army. In the aftermath of the July 1966 counter-coup, Gowon was a compromise selection to head Nigeria though he apparently was not involved in the coup. Where Ojukuw was outgoing, openly ambitious and charismatic, Gowon was more sedate. A man of slight stature, Gowon was trim, dapper and polished. He radiated little of the fire and exhibited none of the clever intelligence of his adversary; but Gowon was stable, serious and determined. He had the talents to hold together and orchestrate the wartime administration of the emerging power engaged in a bitter civil war. This General Gowon did under the intensive scrutiny and criticism of the international media, yet he displayed insight that tinged his leadership with Lincolnesque qualities.(1) His moderation is regarded as possibly the greatest single asset that he brought to the war.(2) There was no panic in his headquarters, and Gowon let his field commanders run their operations with little intervention. In fact, his visits to the fronts were virtually nonexistant; he depended on radio and telephone contact for information.(3) Gowon was sensitive to the fear of genocide in the Ibo and to the necessity of rebuilding the country when the war ended. He issued a code of conduct for the military. He refused to authorize any awards for the conduct of the Civil War. Finally, General Gowon invited a team of international observers to the front to appraise the conduct of Federal soldiers.(4) Gowon balanced his understanding of the long term aspects of his policies with a resolve which demonstrated his comprehension of the short range needs of Nigeria to conduct war. He gradually built up his forces and arms rather than immediately acquiring armaments and munitions in bulk, thus avoiding morgaging his country's furture.(5) Additionally, once he decided that siege warfare was the best method to secure victory, he applied the blockade and did not waiver under the intense international pressure to allow mass relief operations into Biafra. Regardless of whether his position was morally right or wrong (considering the people who died of starvation), Gowon maintained the commitment necessary to direct his country througout the war and the insight to reunite it when peace arrived. 1 Division Operations. The unit that most reflected Gowon's cautious resolve was 1 Division which fought in the north of the Eastern Region. Containing the bulk of the remaining Nigerian regular prewar army, the division applied renewed pressure around Enugu after the Midwest offensive. Enugu's importance went beyond the fact that it was the Biafran capital: it was a coal mining and steel town which lay on the only railroad into the Eastern Region. As a captial, the city had symbolic value; but as an industrial center, it represented a major asset to the Biafran war machine. Characteristic of 1 Division, detailed planning and preparation went into the operational concept for the Enugu assault. 1 Brigade was tasked with capturing Enuku; it had seven battalions (1000 men each) with another 1000 men available as individual replacements. The first brigade was tasked with capturing Enuku. The plan called for a two axes advance from Nsukka to Nine Mile Corner and Eka, followed by a single axis movement to Enugu.(6) On September 10, 1967 the Rebels launched a pre-emptive counter-attack in which they introduced their own armored personnel carriers, pre-World War II French vehicles called "Red Devils." Slow and bulky, the "Red Devils" were particularly vulnerable to antitank weapons, and the attack quickly stalled.(7) Two days later the Federal attack renewed. It was a deliberate process as the Federals met the typical Rebel rear guard delaying action. Obstacles were created using craters, trenches and debris, and progress was futher hampered by well planned covering fires on the obstacles. The shelling of Enugu commenced on September 26th and continued sporatically, but in volume, until the city was taken on October 4th.(8) The serious fighting occurred on October 1st when Nine Mile Corner was captured by the Nigerians. The dominant high ground, Millikin Hill, was controlled after weak resistance as the Biafran support base fled from Enugu and the soldiers, isolated, soon followed.(9) The Federals had clearly demonstrated their superior firepower with the capture of Enugu. The relatively extensive artillery preparation was the key to capturing the city. However, the psychological damage done by, and resources diverted to, the loss in the Midwest (which was cleared at the end of September by the Nigerians) can not be overlooked as factors in the defeat at Enugu. Additionally, Lieutenant Colonel Banjo and three others held responsible for the Midwest debacle were executed by the Biafrans on September 24th, feeding the suspicion of the Biafran populace regarding "saboteurs." The fall of Enugu highlights several problems which were to haunt the Biafrans throughout the war: a. The tremendous shortages of food and materiel were exacerbated by the support base which the Biafrans developed. Administrative directorates, completely civilianized, were responsible for providing services to military units. For instance, the food directorate set up kitchens behind the lines. These cookhouses prepared food which was moved to the troops for consumption. Throughout the war, as at Enugu, when the Army was forced to withdraw, the kitchens were disassembled and reestablished several days later in a safer location. Meanwhile, the troops were without food for days as they continued to fight.(10) By the end of 1967 the Army formed the Biafran Army Service Corps (BASC) to help with food distribution and other support requirements, but the BASC often engaged in petty arguments with the directorates over control of resources. Many of these disputes required personal intervention by Ojukuwu and clearly showed a lack of logistics awareness and unity of purpose in the Biafra war effort. b. Disorganization is also apparent in the way that reserves were thrown pell mell into battle when the situation was desperate. Time and again, the Federals would attack and overwhelm their objective; thus, the Biafrans would frantically mobilize every available resource and try to reverse an already lost cause. At Enugu, it was the formation and deployment of the "S" Brigade, raised to recapture the city from the Federals. This brigade continued resistance at Enugu for weeks until it was outflanked and forced to withdraw. The lesson here is that the Biafran leadership did not fully consider its operational problems. Fighting a defensive war, the superficial, obvious preparations for battle were made. Defensive fortifications with concrete bunkers, alternate positions and preplanned ambushes were planned and emplaced. Yet the leadership did not plan for the worst case. Consequently, hectic scrambling occurred to regain lost positions when some degree of realistic foresight and planning might have saved precious resources and ensured more successes. c. Perhaps the reason that the Biafrans did not consider the worst was because discussion of such cases would have cast suspicion on the planner as being a "saboteur." Paranoia was rampant throughout Biafra. Even in official channels, the truth, if disastrous, was avoided. After the fall of Enugu, Biafran documents, books and press releases were identified as originating from "Enugu." Umuahia, where the govenment moved from Enugu, was called the "Administra- tive Center," a euphemism for capital, and Port Harcourt later was said to be "disturbed" instead of captured.(11) Ultimately, the air of suspicion and the lack of reality in the precautions of the government hindered the military capacity and caused thousands of civilian deaths. The Federals also demonstrated patterns which were to follow them through the rest of the war. a. Their long lines of communications, dependence on artillery bombardment (which required massive resupply efforts) and reliance of armored personnel carriers to lead combat formations, initially tied them to over-the-road movements. This was especially true since they started the war in the rainy season. Soon their supply lines were overextended. This may have been a major factor for the deliberateness of 1 Division operations. After their cautious movement during combat, they took six months to resupply and reorganize before their next operations. b. The Federals did not capitalize on the use of infantry tactics. Systemic is the word one author used to define every Federal operation. The saturation shelling which preceeded Federal assaults left the soldiers with little to do other than walk-in and mop-up the various objectives.(12) This meant that the inexperienced troops gained minimally from each successive operation. It also allowed for greater civilian casualties, especially as the war continued, and the Biafrans were squeezed into smaller and smaller areas. c. Lastly, Enugu once more pointed out shortcomings in the Federal intelligence capabilities. At the outbreak of the war, the Federals had inaccurately predicted the Biafran capacity to wage war and had planned a short "police action." The Midwest Invasion had caught them by surprise, and when retaking Benin, Federal forces barraged the city even though the Biafrans had vacated the premises days before.(13) At Enugu, 1 Division did not realize in their caution that pursuit of the disorganized, retreating Biafrans, and the destruction of the Rebel force which was then possible, might have brought a rapid conclusion to the civil war.(14) 2 Division Operations. Things were not all one-sided on the northern front. At Onitsha, the Federal 2 Division was bogged down. Its continuous setbacks there were one of the major failures of the Nigerian Army in the war. The green, untrained and poorly led 2 Division offered a marked contrast to 1 Division. Thrown together in the heat of the Midwest Invasion, 2 Division got a false sense of its own and Biafran capabilities as the Rebel forces melted away in the Midwestern Region under slight pressure. Securing the Region by the end of September, the Division Commander, then Colonel Murtala Mohammed, prepared for his next operationthe capture of Onitsha on the Biafra side of the Niger River. Onitsha was important because it was a commercial center with the largest market in West Africa. Denial of access to these resources would seriously reduce Biafran logistical capabilities. Additionally, securing a bridgehead on the east bank of the Niger at Onitsha would shorten Nigerian lines of communications with Lagos. Even with the Niger River Bridge down, waterborne movement from the main road on the western side would greatly reduce transit time for replacements and supplies into the Eastern Region. Finally, Onitsha marked the route into the Ibo heartland and therefore would take the war to traditional tribal home. The possible psychological gain was great. All available ferry boats in the country were collected at Asaba on the western side of the river, and limited special training was conducted on river crossing operations. The Army and Supreme Headquarters advised against the opposed river crossing, recommending instead that 2 Division should transit the Niger unopposed, north at Idah and then attack overland to Onitsha. Both staffs realized how complicated this operation was for inexperienced troops with inadequate equipment. The General Officer Commanding (GOC), Colonel Mohammed, had his way. Onitsha was attacked with mortars and artillery in preparation for the assault. On the night of October 12, the Federals crossed in strength, established a bridgehead and fanned out into the city with two armored personnel carriers in the lead. Here, the conduct of the operation faltered. The undisciplined soldiers became obsessed with ransacking Onitsha for spoils, forgetting the need for securing the bridgehead. The Biafrans, under Colonel Joe Achuzie, counter-attacked; the Federals were surprised, out of position and routed. Driven back to the river's edge, the soldiers discovered that expected reinforcements and supplies had not arrived because of the mechanical failure of the follow-on support vessel. The 1000-man assault battalion was decimated in their disorganization under the Rebel fire. In this and other crossing attempts, drownings accounted for an excessive number of losses, pinpointing the lack of detailed training/rehearsals for the crossings.(15) The second crossing was tried on September 28. It failed when the Biafrans machinegunned the boats in the water. By the time the third attempt came, demoralized 2 Division troops were on the verge of mutiny and chaos.(16) The Division Commander then abandoned further river assaults and executed the plan originally recommended by his higher headquarters. He crossed the Niger unopposed at Idah which was under Federal control and moved slowly to Onitsha in 1 Division territory. Planning and operational security were poor, but the Rebels were overextended and could not redeploy in sufficient numbers to counter the 2 Division attack.(17) At the end of March 1968, six months after the first abortive river crossing, Onitsha fell to a two-pronged attack, one brigade closing from the north and another conducting a river crossing over the Niger (near the original sites). The battle only lasted five hours (18), belying the difficulty the Federals experienced at Onitsha. The victory was pyrrhic. 2 Division was demoralized and largely ineffective as a combat orgainzation. It had difficulty moving beyond Onitsha and clearing its sector. The road between Onitsha and Enugu where 1 Division maintained its headquarters was closed by Rebel activity until the last days of the war. The Division later had to return elements to the Midwest to counter recurring Rebel guerrilla activities in that region. One strong Rebel raiding expedition in April 1968 took Asaba and briefly closed direct supply across the Niger.(19) Such harassment with its drain on manpower constantly degraded 2 Division capabilities on the eastern side of the Niger. Two final events starkly characterized 2 Division during this period. First, soldiers of the Division massacred, without apparent provocation, 300 Ibo men, women and children who had gathered in Onitsha Cathedral to pray during the city's seige. This brutal act typified the lack of leadership, discipline and professionalism in 2 Division. Such incidents solidified sentiments that the Federals wanted to exterminate the Ibo, thus hardening the Ibo resolve to fight on.(20) The second incident occurred during resupply operations for the battle at Onitsha. A division convoy of over 100 trucks, led by two armored cars, was ambushed by Colonel Achuzie's forces at Abagana, a few miles northeast of Onitsha. The armored vehicles sped away from the convoy when it was ambushed, while the packed column provided a spectacular target when a petroleum tanker went up in flames. The fire swiftly spread through the convoy which was lost in its entirety, including almost all the drivers and escorts.(21) Once more poor planning, training and discipline haunted 2 Division, as the whole supply column was destroyed in one lucky ambush. 3 Marine Commando Division Operations. The war in the south took on a different nature. Colonel Benjamin Adekunle had obtained permission to redesignate his 3 Infantry Division as 3 Marine Commando Division. This was based on the unique role the unit had played up to that point in the war, first with the amphibious assault at Bonny and then with riverine operations to help clear the Midwestern Region. The new division took on the special qualities of its GOC. Colonel Adekunle, Age 29, was diminuative and aggressive, known to be more daring than the other division commanders. A staunch disciplinarian, Adekunle carried a golf club shaft or bat which he used to prod soldiers under fire. Colonel Adekunle apparently was able to get away with this because of the universally accepted belief that he was fearless. He was noted for personally leading his brigades into battle.(22) Adekunle was dynamic and innovative in his plans and operations. In early October 1967, he put these traits to use as 3 Marine Commando Division finalized preparations for an amphibious assault of Calabar. Calabar was the eastern most port on the Biafra coastline. Through it, small quantities of materiel were still shipped into the region. Calabar also lay on the remaining passible road to the Cameroons. By capturing Calabar, the Federals would interdict all land routes into Biafra and control the entire coast, thus cutting off the secessionists from the rest of the world except by air and telex. A garrison of 1000 men was left at Bonny to defend the island, whiel the rest of the division, six battalions of 500 men each, loaded out naval shipping for the assault of Calabar. It is important to note that this operation took all of the Federal naval force, leaving Bonny weakly supported. The Rebels later attacked and overwhelmed the Federal garrison which was pushed to a perimeter on the waterline before adequate relief arrived in early 1968. Adekunle and the headquarters at Lagos had been willing to take this risk, because of the additional front opening at Calabar. The total of five fronts (Bonny, Onitsha, Enugu, the Northeast, and Calabar) significantly overextended the already strained resources of the weaker Biafrans. By this reasoning and their comprehension of the import of the naval blockade, the Federal leadership demonstrated its superior grasp of strategic issues. One battalion of Biafran infantry was defending both Calabar, to the east of the Cross River inlet, and Oron to the west of the inlet.(23) Adekunle ignored the company- sized Oron contingent and attacked near Calabar to seize that city. After a naval bombardment interspersed with aerial bombing and strafing, the Federal's lone tank landing ship, the NNS Lokoja, debarked one battalion in late morning. Resistance in the form of small arms fire was soon overcome. The Lokoja embarked another battalion which it delivered to an adjacent beach head that afternoon. The two battalions proceeded on separate axes into Calabar. Fighting was spirited and confused by pro-Federal snipers. Several sources stated that Federal troops were infiltrated into Calabar disquished as fishermen and later created havoc.(24) Hand-to-hand fighting occurred in the streets and heavy civilian casualties resulted. The defending battalion (-) was reduced to 350 men by the end of the first day and 200 men on the second day (25) when the Federals landed a third battalion. The old slave port fell to the Nigerians on October 19, as the Biafrans were simply overwhelmed by a superior force. The capture of Calabar was followed by a one month consolidation period as 3 Marine Commando Division found how difficult reorganization and resupply of an amphibious beach- head were to accomplish. At night Rebel snipers engaged Federal targets, and the lone Biafran B-25 attacked Federal activity during the day.(26) Meanwhile, white mercenaries were introduced to the ground battle on the Biafran side. Led by a Frenchman, Roger Faulques, a contingent of about 50 foreigners saw action at the Dunlop Rubber Plantation just north of Calabar. They soon discovered the situation in Nigeria was unlike their Congolese experiences. They lost several comrades and their taste for fighting quickly. Faulques recommended retreat to the western side of the Cross River, and the remnants of the Biafran battalion soon set up riverline defensive positions on the other side. The surviving mercenaries soon left Biafra for safer environs.(27) With resistance gone, the Federals linked up with Federal elements from Ikom to seal off the Cameroon border and complete the encirclement of Biafra. The Calabar operation showed the diverse capabilities of the Federal forces. Even moreso, it put the spotlight on the imaginative and dynamic Colonel Adekunle. He proved skillful and courageous in the assault of the town, landing on the first day to lead the forward units. His operational concept was pertinent and gave a quick foothold to the Federals. Unfortunately, the offensive bogged down as the Federals consolidated. They allowed the surviving Biafrans to establish themselves on the western banks of the Cross River and grow from battalion size into a brigade and later a task force division.(28) Since the heavily forested southeastern region severely limited mobility and dictated river crossing points, this was a serious mistake. The predictability of options reduced the potential for surprise or success and resulted in heavy Federal losses as early attempts at crossing failed.(29) Making the same mistakes in the east as at Onitsha, the Federals found that the riverline defense greatly favored the Biafrans in opposed encounters, especially when proper equipment and well trained troops were unavailable. Later the Federals gained a foothold using a canoe-borne assault and a fording operation further down-river. After consolidating, they rapidly pushed the Rebels back.(30) On the Biafran side, they learned how flexible the Federals could be, as they were once again surprised by an amphibious landing. They also were subjected to the possibility that the minority tribes in their territory were not firmly on their side. They had earlier suspected this, but the sniping and open-armed acceptance of the Federals by the residents of Calabar further confirmed this suspicion. Lastly, the Biafrans received an object lesson in the fact that mercenaries would not be their salvation. They did employ many for their airlift, but only a few, most notably Rolf Steiner, who was responsible for forming 4 Commando Brigade, were used for ground operations. Both sides turned their attention to the tightening pressure. The Biafrans were fighting a desperate defensive war, while the Federals looked to the offensive. Their next major target was Port Harcourt. The Rebel losses of Enugu, Calabar, and later Onitsha, left Port Harcourt, with its airport, oil processing facilities and businesses (including department stores), as the only remaining Biafran major urban center, and the sole link to the outside world for the Rebels. Adekunle had started planning for the attack on Port Harcourt while his division was still clearing hte southeastern state. His plan called for a three-pronged attack from the Cross River to Port Harcourt. Materiels and men were built up at Opobo on the coast to support the operation. Before the division was ready, an abortive amphibious assault was attempted by 15 Brigade, the unit formed around the garrison that Adelunke had left at Bonny. The Brigade proved too weak to challenger the Port Harcourt defense and was crushed. the Biafrans cut off future amphibious attempts by pumping crude oil into the Bonny Channel and setting it on fire. The Rebels frantically watched the unchecked advance of Federal columns from the west. Colonel Joe Achuzie, who enjoyed some success at Onitsha, moved to Port Harcourt to organize the defense. He was unable to rally the dispirited Rebels as the Federals moved through the surrounding mangrove swamps and brush to isolate the city. On May 16, 1968, the artillery and mortar bombardment began. The shelling of Port Harcourt saw a first in the civil war. Colonel Adekunle allowed a corridor through which civilians could escape the seige. Whether his intent was humanitarian or not is unknown, but within a few hours of the bombardment's start, traffic was backed up 15 miles.(31). The defense of Port Harcourt was just as disorganized and haphazard as the evacuation. The occupation of Port Harcourt was anti-climatic. By May 18 it had fallen, and the Federals continued on. First they secured the local sector with riverline operations and then drove north to Owerri and Aba. By September 16 both had been captured, and Biafra was reduced to one fourth of its original size. The war was now confined to the Ibo heartland. Air- lifted supplies were temporarily halted with the loss of the Port Harcourt Airport until alternate fields became opera- tional. Peace talks, an on again, off again phenomenon throughout the war, slowed down as a surrender announcement war expected.(32) The Biafran Navy and Air Force ceased to exist for the moment. The militia was disbanded. The Federals sensed the war was almost over. The desire to reduce friendly casualties was shown in the pattern of heavy artillery preparations that characterized the advance from Port Harcourt to Aba. The relative superior firepower was used the "soften up" the Biafrans who were forced to move from their defenses under intense bombardments. The Federals then moved slowly into the vacated positions, occasionally "...leaving ojectives(s) empty as a sort of no-man's land for several days."(33) But the war would not end in 1968. The Federals never truly understood the fear that embraced the Ibo; equally important, they did not realize that Charles deGaulle would chose Biafra as a surrogate to challenge the level of Britain's influence in Western Africa. Thus the war continued. CHAPTER 5 OJUKWU'S BIAFRA Understanding the nature of the Nigerian Civil War requires review of the special qualities that allowed the Biafrans to wage war for two and a half years even though they were outnumbered, outgunned and isolated from the world except by a tenuous airlift. On reflection, the character is not all positive, but it still bears examination. Much of the national character of the Biafrans is revealed through the actions of their leader Major General Chukuwuemeka ("Emeka") Odumegwu Ojukwu. Intelligent, ambitious and resolute, Ojukwu displayed the traits commonly attributed to the Ibo as a tribe. An Ibo born in 1933, Ojukwu was the son of one of Nigeria's most wealthy entrepreneurs, a man who converted a few used trucks into a giant transport business. His family's position made it possible for Ojukwu to be educated in England, first at Epson College for secondary school and then Lincoln College, Oxford, for a bachelors degree in modern history. But when he returned to Nigeria, Ojukwu forsook the family business and went into the civil service. In 1957 Ojukwu entered the military and was caught in the rapid Nigerianization. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1964 and was serving as the 5 Battalion Commander at Kano in January 1966 when the first coup occurred. Although no military officer in Nigeria was completely untouched by the politization that occupied the Army after independence, Ojukwu managed to avoid open involvement in the coups. He remained loyal to General Ironsi after the first coup attempt and shortly thereafter was rewarded with an appointment as Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria. In this position, Ojukwu emerged as the leader of the Ibo. Said a former Secretary in the Biafra Govenment, Raph Uwechue, "It is sad but instructive irony that Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwa, one of Africa's one-time most brilliant political promises, was the man that led his own people with such a lack of ingenuity into what was clearly a foreseeable disaster."(1) The tragedy was built on Ojukwu's inflexibility and the resultant inability to effect compromise on the political side. He fueled the disaster with his ambition, desire and ability to control the situation in Biafra. Ojukwu was fighting a war within the Civil War, as he struggled to keep and consolidate his position of leadership. And the tragedy was prolonged and insured by the divisive actions Ojukwu used to maintain his position of power. These methods had particular impact on the capabilities of the Biafran Army. Based on his military training and experience, Ojukwu should have understood the complexity and difficulty of establishing a cohesive fighting force in the Eastern Region. Instead he alienated the military and rendered the leadership ineffective through a series of intimidating acts and witchhunts to find "the guilty" after tactical failures. The former is best seen in how Ojukwu handled his first Army Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hilary Njoku who returned to Eastern Nigeria with other native Easterners after the July 1966 Coup. Soon Njoku and the other Army leadership were distressed at the lack of policy direction in the region. Either efforts were needed to negotiate the peace, or preparations for war had to begin. These officers met with Ojukwu, but their fears were not allayed by Ojukwu's arguments. He demonstrated his ruthlessness and his modus operandi in the way he preempted the potential threat to his power by these military officers. In a few hours during the evening, he had the parents and relatives of Lt. Col. Njoku brought to Enugu. He also sent for leading personalities, men and women carefully selected, as well as bishops and chiefs. Before them he blandly accused Njoku of plotting to overthrow him by force. Not that he cared about himself, he said with emotion, but only for the disaster and tragedy that such a move would bring to the people of Eastern Nigeria, particu- larly the Ibos, for whom he was fighting! Women began to weep and invoke everything against any person concealing such an evil idea. The bishops began to pray solemnly. Njoku was bereft of words. Activity continued during the whole night and the following day, mainly by bishops and some selected leaders. Njoku had to give promises and under- takings, both orally and in writing, never to do anything to disrupt the government. But the Governor could not take chances. With Njoku in the country and about, he could not feel comfortable or safe. He therefore decided that Njoku must leave. An excuse for this was not difficult to find. Njoku had been with the former Supreme Commander in Ibadan when the latter was abducted by the army. He was wounded but managed to escape. His bones needed treatment and this was a good enough reason for sending him to Britain. Immediately Njoku had gone, the Governor reorganised the army by splitting Njoku's former responsibilities and making himself the over-all commander. In order to create rivalry among the senior officers he promoted Imo, Njoku and Effiong to the rank of Brigadier with the same seniority. By accident or design, Njoku returned to Eastern Nigeria about the very day on which the civil war started. He was given charge of the fighting but under the over-all control of the Military Governor. Even thus, he was not to last very long.(2) Njoku did not last long because of the paranoia that permeated the Ibo mentality. At once this mindset was the key to the strength of the Biafran defense and simultaneously a factor in destroying the secession from within. The Ibo were so driven to protect themselves that they developed the attitude that they could not lose. They perceived the threat of extermination of the tribe as so real that any weakness or flaws in the defense of the Eastern Region was unthinkable. When military setbacks occurred, scapegoats had to be and were found. Instead of realizing obvious factsthat men armed only with rifles could be overwhelmed by armored columns; that the Federals had superiority in terms of manpower and firepowerthe Biafran's believed that "saboteurs" caused military reverses. This phenomenon, begun when Ojukwu as Governor warned the Easterners in late 1966 to be on the vigil for traitors, infiltrators and even the indifferent, (3) caused the downfall of Njoku and other military officers. The loyalty of every officer, save Ojukwu, was question- able, a situation that seemed to stem also from a distrust generated of those officers who initiated the first coup. Once the first blood flowed, all Nigerians became suspicious, and they lost confidence in the Officer Corps. The list of examples of the result is endless. Here are a few: a. With the early loss of Opi Junction in the North, Colonel Okon, the local commander was demoted and removed from the Army (he was reinstated later).(4) b. When the town of Oron fell, the defending brigade commander, Colonel I.N. Aniebo, was identified as the scapegoat and disgraced.(5) c. As the Federals shelled the capital of Enugu, remaining civilians were adamant in their belief that Biafran Army "saboteurs" were firing the rounds. Soldiers had to be sent from the lines to check the stories so Nioku's replacement, Colonel A.A. Madiebo, would not be thought a collabor |
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