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Customer Reviews (9)

A short introduction to brain-based epistemology
If you take the naturalized epistemology of the philosopher Willard Quine and extend it beyond the role of sense perception, you might arrive at what the author of this book calls "brain-based epistemology." His opinions in this book are very sensible, especially if viewed from the standpoint of what is known in contemporary neuroscience. His expertise in this field is of course well known, but to apply cognitive neuroscience to the understanding of consciousness has only recently been attempted, with some experimental support. Due to its length, the reader will not find a detailed overview of this research in this book, but it will give an introduction to some of the author's essential ideas, which he like to encapsulate in the expression `Neural Darwinism.'

One interesting feature of the author's line of thinking, as in many systems of naturalized epistemology, is that it allows room for both scientific knowledge and knowledge derived from the "humanities". It would seem improbable that evolutionary pressures would not make poetry, art, and literature part of the human survival strategy, given the widespread occurrence of at least one of these areas in all human cultures throughout history. The author would view these areas as expressions of the "pattern recognition" capability of the brain, whereas science and mathematics are more in line with the ability of the brain to indulge itself in logical reasoning. But pattern recognition is the predominant mode for human thinking, with the immediate corollary that metaphors are the tool for which this is done. Scientific reasoning then is a highly specialized (and uncommon) mode of cognition, which is specific in scope and undetermined in justification. This would explain why scientific reasoning does not come as naturally to all as other modes of thought. However, the brain encompasses all of these modes, and so the sciences and the humanities could be viewed as facets of the same brain crystal. To separate them would be fallacious, and therefore the author spends an entire chapter "repairing the rift" between the natural sciences and the humanities.

The author's view of consciousness is one of an unabashed anti-Cartesianism, for he rejects dualism and views consciousness as a purely natural consequence of brain processes, these processes having the nature that they do because of evolutionary pressures.The author also rejects the notion of "brain as computer" but he does believe that it is possible to construct a conscious artifact, and spends a fair amount of time discussing on-going research devoted to this. In addition, and most interestingly, he views language as an "invention" and thus rejects the notion of an innate language mechanism that everyone is born with.

It remains to be seen whether the author's ideas on the origin and nature of consciousness will be justified in further research, but this book does have the virtue that it does not fall into the trap of pure philosophical speculation. This is not to say that such speculation is never of value, but one must know when to stop, when to put down the philosophical drink, lest one become lost in a maze of gigantic conceptual spaces that philosophers love to construct. Experimentation and observation should govern the investigation of consciousness, and artifacts or machines constructed that allow the testing of the more rudimentary ideas proposed. It is refreshing that cognitive neuroscientists have finally given the study of consciousness a genuine place in scientific investigation. No doubt there will be many surprises to come in this investigation in the decades ahead.

its all one
Second Nature, suitable for most any reader with a dictionary, is a mind expanding look at the science of the structures and functions of the human brain and how the mysterious activity we call mind arises from the complex interconnectedness between innumerable neurons and our external conditioning and experience.His hypothesis, which puts an end to Descartes' numbing splitting of mind from the physical body, not only gives a convincing explanation of how the wonderful consciousness humans have evolved and developed has arisen, but you can feel it in your head.

Work in progress
Daniel Dennett once characterized Darwin's theory of natural selection as the best single idea anyone ever had. I generally agree with that, so I am naturally well-disposed toward selectionist accounts, of which Edelman's Neural Darwinism is an example. I also have run out of patience with the clever word games that unfortunately constitute far too much of epistemology as it exists in academic philosophy, and that makes me a receptive audience for this kind of selection-based approach. I also agree with Edelman's rejection of computer-based models of human cognition and of Chomksky's mythical language organ. So, yes, I liked the book, found many insights in it, and I recommend it as a stimulating read. All that said, and given the extremely informative review provided below by L. Guzman, I will focus on what I found less than satisfactory.

When it comes to psychology, Edelman's view of the field seems to be bounded by Piaget and Freud. He gives the occasional, semi-perfunctory nod to the environment, but never in serious detail considers the importance for both brain and behavior of the history of interaction between organism and environment. Nor does he show any knowledge of the huge literature describing detailed analyses of environmental effects on behavior, analyses that specifically emphasize the selective effects of environmental consequences. Edelman's account reminds me of how the genome-phenome distinction is sometimes treated in relation to selection, as if genes themselves are directly selected for or against, and then go forth and do things in the world. In this case, it's always the brain doing this or that, with little or no acknowledgment that it is behavior that makes contact with the environment and is subject to selection, with resultant effects on the brain. We know from sensory deprivation experiments that, absent a reasonably normal environment, brain activity quickly drifts into disorder and incoherence. One suspects that the well-known behavior-specific effects of certain brain injuries, which Edelman describes in some detail, have been overgeneralized, resulting in an overly brain-centric view of behavior. What's needed here is an explicit input-output model, where the inputs are the initial state of the organism and the functional characteristics of the environment in which it operates; the fact that computer-based models have used input-output terminology should be considered of no relevance. At some points in Edelman's presentation, I found it difficult to decide just what constituted the output side -- and whether we were ever finally emerging from the neurological realm to the world outside.

A key notion for Edelman is the idea that the organism's inherited neurological structure incorporates biases that will determine something about the way certain stimuli are responded to. This "value system" is considered to be a product of evolutionary history, but it's not entirely clear exactly what the particular functions of this value system are supposed to be. Is it a kind of pre-wiring that makes certain stimuli more salient? For example, the visual appearance and smells associated with a particular species' preferred food might as a matter of inherited tendency trigger consumatory behavior, or at least make it more probable. Besides in-born sensitivity to releasor stimuli, would the value system include inherited behavior itself, ranging from reflexes to simple fixed-action patterns to very complex response sequences? One thinks of the elaborate behavior observed in courtship displays, nest-building, or nurturing the young. Is the notion of value system meant to stand as a neurological-level explanation for the ordinary behavioral effects of reinforcing and punishing consequences? Or is it meant specifically to account for some built-in extreme susceptibility of certain behavior to its consequences, thus amplifying normal reinforcement-punishment effects? Edelman includes the inherited value system as a hypothetical entity or process in his theoretical system, but it's not clear from this book exactly what its functions are, or how they interact with behavior or with the environmental events that precede, accompany, or follow behavior.

In Chapter 12, on Brain-Based Devices, we find, as is typical, that when it comes to actually making something happen the environment suddenly becomes important. Edelman makes much of this extremely interesting work using robotic devices with simulated brains that allow them to learn through trial and error, rather than being driven by pre-programed instructions. It is noteworthy, and completely predictable, that the descriptions of these experiments turn out to be descriptions of (1) the initial structure and behavioral capabilities of the simulated organism, and (2) operations involving the provision of specific environmental stimuli and environmental feedback. Results indicate that interaction with the environment produces changes in the device's behavior and in the organization of its simulated brain. If results didn't turn out that way, the researchers presumably would tinker with (1) and (2) above until they did. One long-term potential here seems to be the rediscovery of behaviorism, but with much better illumination of its neurological underpinnings. That would be an outcome devoutly to be wished, but getting there will require a broader, less brain-centric view than Edelman's alone.

Reconciling brain science and human concern: a timely addition to one of the most distinguished bodies of work in neuroscience
Will knowing how the brain works--in particular, what consciousness is--transform our view of human knowledge itself? This is the question that looms large in Second Nature, Gerald Edelman's latest book.Though compact at 157 pages (excluding preface, footnotes, and index), this work represents Edelman's ambitious consideration of the implications of his view (likely the correct view) of the brain and mind for the broader world of human concern.Edelman seeks to understand the nature of knowledge as it is generated within a biological entity--the brain--that is shaped both by individual history and evolutionary forces.Astonishingly, in this little book, he succeeds in this quest marvelously.The result is no less than a new type of epistemology--what Edelman refers to as"brain-based epistemology."

Gerald Edelman is no mere dilettante or interloper in neuroscience.Since the publication of The Mindful Brain (a volume he co-edited and co-authored with Vernon Mountcastle) nearly thirty years ago, Edelman has diligently toiled in the theoretical vineyards to construct a comprehensive theory of higher brain function that is consistent with the latest available neuroanatomical, neurophysiological, and behavioral data.Perhaps the most significant fruit of these labors, the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, or Neural Darwinism, proposes that, during neurogenesis, a vast "primary repertoire" of physically connected populations of neurons arises. Later, in a process akin to Darwinian selection, a "secondary repertoire" of functionally defined neuronal groups emerges as the animal experiences its world, and that world in turn selects patterns of connectivity (the so-called neuronal groups) that provide a good enough fit in a given moment to engender some kind of positive outcome.Underlying this selection is a neural "value system," established over the course of evolution and believed to comprise small populations of neurons within deep brain structures, that assigns salience to particular stimuli encountered by the animal.When the response to a given stimulus leads to a positive outcome (i.e., eating satisfies hunger), the value system will reinforce, or strengthen, those synaptic connections between neurons that happened to be firing at that particular moment.There is now a greater likelihood that, when the animal encounters similar stimuli in the future, many of the same neurons that fired the first time will fire together again.When a stimulus is noxious, the value system will similarly strengthen the connections between neurons that happened to be firing at the time the stimulus was encountered, thus increasing the salience of that stimulus.When a stimulus has no salience, synaptic connections between neurons that fired upon first exposure to that stimulus will become weaker with successive exposures.Simply stated, neurons that fire together wire together.Keep in mind that the mapping of the world to neural substrate is degenerate; that is, no two neuronal groups or maps are the same, either structurally or functionally. Nor are the populations of neuronal groups that make up the neural mappings of the world exactly the same each time similar stimuli are encountered.These maps are dynamic, and their borders shift with experience.And finally, since each individual has a unique (and privileged) history, no two individuals will express the same neural mappings of the world.Indeed, from the establishment of the primary repertoire during development, no two brains are wired in exactly the same way, not even those of identical twins.

Notwithstanding any of the various attempts at historical revisionism that you may have encountered if you've read broadly across neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, the selectionist view of the nervous system begins with Edelman's highly original work.What follows from others making selectionist arguments is (whether they like it or not) purely derivative.

Although Edelman's theoretical framework has expanded to include the Dynamic Core hypothesis, a proposed mechanism for consciousness (See Edelman and Tononi's A Universe of Consciousness) that he discusses throughout Second Nature (and I will not unpack here), I believe that Neural Darwinism is his most fundamental contribution to modern neuroscience.To this day, it remains the most detailed and comprehensive theory of higher brain function ever proposed.Perhaps most importantly, and likely to the great consternation of those critics capable of lobbing only ad hominem attacks at Edelman himself, the theory is, in the best traditions of empirically grounded science, eminently testable.I have laid out a brief (and wholly inadequate) sketch of Neural Darwinism here because many of the critiques of Edelman's work are colored either by misapprehensions about this theory or the unrealistic expectation that its underlying mechanism can and should be easily described and readily digested.But unless you can appreciate the vast complexity of a biology shaped by evolutionary principles that are not well understood by the lay public (or even some scientists, for that matter), you will probably struggle to understand much of what Edelman has to say, even in this little book. The fault lies not in Edelman's prose, but rather in the nature of the subject matter he seeks to describe (contrary to the complaints of a few critics--see below).Persevere; if you love biology, are fascinated by the mysteries of the brain, and are curious about the implications of modern brain science for the nature of human knowledge and endeavors, then this book should be your touchstone.

I'm not going to give you a detailed rundown of the contents of Second Nature here; I'll simply recommend that you read it.In the remaining paragraphs, I hope to provide you with something I think will be of even greater value: a discussion of some of the most commonly raised criticisms of Edelman and his work.I hope that this will allow you to read the book--if not totally free of misconceptions--at least less encumbered by what I believe to be unfair attacks on one of the most constructive and distinguished bodies of work in modern theoretical neuroscience.

It is curious that Edelman's work engenders as much vitriolic reaction as it does.If you've read my review up to this point, you've certainly concluded that I'm firmly in Edelman's camp.That said, what follows are the most common claims about Edelman and his ideas from his most vocal critics.These can be clearly stated and quite easily dispensed with.In no particular order, here they are:

1) There is nothing original in his ideas.
2) Natural selection is not an apt analogy for what the brain does.
3) His models are instantiated on computers even though he claims that the brain is not a computer (look up the review by George Johnson).
4) He doesn't understand, or mischaracterizes, the views of modern philosophers.
5) He denigrates philosophers and their work.
6) He omits the work of others.
7) He doesn't communicate his ideas effectively, i.e., he does not write clearly or well.

Now, my rejoinders to the above claims:

Claim #1: Quite simply, those who make this claim need to practice better scholarship.Edelman first suggested the idea of neuronal group selection nearly thirty years ago.Back in the late 1970s, no one else in neuroscience ventured any such selectionist ideas.Moreover, early on, Edelman took quite a lot of heat for this notion.His transition from immunology to neuroscience, though logical from a theoretical perspective (moving from one selectional domain to another), may have offended stalwarts of the neuroscientific establishment.In any case, later, when the evidence suggested that Edelman was indeed correct about competition among groups of neurons (see, for example, the work of M. Merzenich), the attitude of many within and outside of neurobiology was something along the lines of, "oh yeah, but of course there are competitive interactions between functional neuronal assemblies; everybody knows that!"Well, clearly not everybody, and certainly not back in 1978.Over three decades, an original idea had thus been unfairly relegated to derivative status.It wasn't derivative; it was the source.

Claim #2: There is much evidence to suggest that neural representations of the world are dynamic and based on the competitive interactions between functionally defined and degenerate (e.g., non-identical) groups of neurons.Many alternative views of the central nervous system (CNS) have invoked formal computational principles.But everything we know about the CNS suggests that it functions nothing like a computer.If it were a sort of Turing machine, it would represent the only such example known to biology.Most modern biologists steeped in evolutionary principles (whether strictly Darwinian or of the Punctuated Equilibrium variety championed by Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge) would probably balk, first, at the notion of the emergence of organized populations of cells (or proteins or molecules, for that matter) capable of executing computations in the same manner as a digital computer, and second, at the idea that this sort of arrangement, if it had appeared at all, would have appeared only once over the course of evolutionary history. Finally, a challenge to those who too easily dismiss Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection and all that has followed from it: Go ahead and TRY to formulate a detailed, testable theory of brain function that takes account of the underlying biology of the central nervous system.Any takers?No?Enough said.

Claim #3: A number of Edelman's critics, such as the science writer George Johnson (Miss Leavitt's Stars), see little distinction between Edelman's characterization of the workings of the brain and computation-based information processing.But there is one profound difference.In selection-based systems such as the immune system or the CNS, meaning or "information" is imposed from within; in instruction-based systems such as digital computing, meaning is imposed from without; there is no internal meaning--a lot of lights may be on, but nobody's home.Often, traditional digital computers fail in tasks that involve discriminating novelty in a changing environment or generalizing across categories; brains excel in such tasks.But brains built like computers would be neither flexible nor adaptive.Moreover, a computer built like a brain, with little or no specific point-to-point wiring, would not be a functional computer.Precise instructions could not be implemented on such a machine in the absence of point-to-point wiring.
Some critics perceive something of a contradiction in the fact that, while Edelman has strongly rejected the notion of brain-as-computer, he and his colleagues have created simulations of the brain using massively powerful supercomputers.This point is either a red herring or simply represents a woeful ignorance of the nature of computer-based modeling and its applications in biology.When one models biological structures and their interactions on a computer--whether these are proteins folding a certain way, bones reacting to mechanical forces, or brains that can interact with, and adapt to, a world of novelty--one essentially uses software to approximate the analog and not infrequently stochastic behaviors of elements within the biological system being modeled.So, in the case of a biologically based brain simulation, the software instantiates on the computer a functional approximation of neurons with firing thresholds which shift in a circuit interaction- and context-driven fashion.The computer's overt behavior--or that of the device it controls--is not binary when this software is being run.The computer--or more properly, the simulation running on it--does not behave like a classical Turing machine.Why is this so hard to understand?

Claim #4: Actually, Edelman's descriptions and characterizations of various philosophical stances are generally detailed and accurate, and show a depth of understanding that could only have come from a thorough and voracious reading of much of philosophy, not just the philosophy of mind.Edelman has obviously taken in and "gets" the bulk of what philosophers have to say about the nature of knowledge.

Claim #5: In fact, I think Edelman has pulled his punches when it comes to taking on modern philosophical approaches to brain, mind, and the nature of knowledge.Although in his review of Second Nature, David Papineau clearly took offense at Edelman's characterization of philosophical approaches to epistemology as "armchair operations" (Nature, 2007, 446(5):614-615), it is not at all clear that Edelman actually meant this as an attack.When he makes this statement, though, I think he is clearly on the right track; he just doesn't follow that track far enough.Like it or not, these are armchair operations, and few philosophers have ventured beyond such musings to explore the actual neural substrate that generates knowledge in the first place.There are notable exceptions; the efforts of some philosophers, including most prominently John Searle, Hilary Putnam, Ned Block, and Thomas Metzinger, demonstrate a truly deliberative and concerted effort to incorporate what is known about the biology of the brain into thinking about the nature of cognition in general, consciousness in particular, and human knowledge.But many modern philosophers, I believe, are not merely armchair theoreticians; they are intellectually lazy.They think that, when considering the nature of mental processes, it is actually possible to do an "end-run" around neurobiology.Why bother actually relating organic structure and function to cognition?This stance is, quite simply, bizarre; it seems to be akin to a sort of a holdout syncretism of the ideas of Fodor and Skinner.Whatever the roots of this particular philosophical strain, it is wrong and intellectually dishonest.That Edelman has never actually expressed this in print I can only ascribe to some sense of old school propriety and intellectual fairplay.Would that his critics could exercise the same measure of propriety and fairplay.

Claim #6: Nothing obligates Edelman to give a précis of the state of the art of all of theoretical neuroscience (such as it is), particularly in such a compact book.In his review of Second Nature, David Papineau takes Edelman to task for the absence of "scientific comparisons" and suggests that "[a] naïve reader could easily form the impression that Edelman and his associates are the only people trying to use scientific information to cast light on the human mind." (p.615)Well, this is a rather silly point, as a book of this size is clearly not intended to serve as a reference text or primer.Moreover, had any other neuroscientists actually offered competing comprehensive and testable theories of higher brain function and/or consciousness, I have no doubt that Edelman would have felt obliged to take full account of these in Second Nature.So far, they haven't.David Papineau offers that the book presents a senior scientist's "potted cultural history." (p.615)For what it's worth, I eagerly await Prof. Papineau`s version of the cultural history of the science and philosophy of mind.What would such a [presumably] unexpurgated historical landscape actually look like, Prof. Papineau, and precisely who and what, in the way of deep theoreticians and theory, would populate this landscape? Offer some examples and I might even relent and recant my denigration of your odd and useless proclamation.

Claim #7: This is a very old criticism, dating way back to the publication of Neural Darwinism in 1987.In his thick body of work, Edelman has tried to explain nothing less than the workings of the most complicated object in the known universe.Moreover, early on, he attempted this at a time when there were no commonly accepted terms for the interactions he sought to describe ("reentry" and "degeneracy" are examples of terms Edelman coined more than twenty years ago to describe phenomena and properties not previously recognized by neuroscientists).There are many biological properties, principles, and concepts that, by their nature, don't lend themselves to simple descriptions or easy explanations.In Second Nature, Edelman's prose and its organization are clear and amazingly methodical for such a brief book.The book is densely packed, and the subject matter is obviously difficult.Unlike some philosophers, whose abstractions of cognitive properties resemble nothing more or less than a functionalist's "black-box," offering [biologically] context-free and meaningless thought experiments and little depth or intellectual satisfaction, Edelman has gone to great pains in previous works to describe very complex neural properties in the clearest possible manner.With Second Nature, he has taken on the additional task of reconciling his view of brain function--specifically consciousness, that most mysterious of all neural processes--with the nature of human knowledge itself.Edelman addresses the question of whether the highest expressions of human concern--creative pursuits such as art, poetry, and music, or the ethical and moral codes that glue human societies together--can ultimately be " . . . reduced to a series of epigenetic rules of brain action." (p. 156)Unlike Patricia Churchland, Edelman is not a reductionist, so his answer to this question is a resounding "no."(playing or listening to the Chaconne from Bach's Partita #2 cannot be boiled down to an orderly, reproducible code of neuronal firing; and, contrary to the view offered in Churchland's Neurophilosophy, the terms that refer to complex neural function will not simply fall away as neural mechanism reduces to the description of the electrochemical properties of firing neurons; nor, finally, will consciousness come down to the subatomic states of microtubules, as Penrose has suggested). But within the subtext of Second Nature is another, very provocative, question that few before have posed in earnest: Would knowing how the brain works down to the finest detail fundamentally alter the nature of human concern?Although he offers no explicit answer to this question, I suspect Edelman's answer would be "probably not."

So, in sum, don't be put off by the acerbic musings of Edelman's critics (or the length of this review); go ahead and read Second Nature.It may change profoundly your perspective on the nature of human knowledge and its ultimate creator and locus, the human brain.

Disappointing
With excitement I looked forward to learning more about Dr. Edelman's interesting ideas in detail in this book, only to be served yet again philosophical musings. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (5)

Grounding Psychology in Neuroscience
Nobelist Gerald Edelman "theory of neuronal group selection" can be taken to provide a neurological understanding for psychoanalytic theory and experience. Because of the dense overlapping of dendrites and
axons in gray matter, a given area of cortex is capable of a varying
array of responses to a given input. Of the many possible responses,
one inevitably leads to the strongest, most adaptive, or rewarding
output. Suppose that this "fittest" response were "selected" for

synaptic changes enhancing the likelihood of future firing of just
that pattern of response when the same or similar input next arrives.
That pattern of function would have "won" in a Darwinian competition
to dominate the activity of that group of neurons when those same or
similar experiential conditions occur again. (I hope the reader can
hear in this a basis for transference experience: the neuronal response previously selected, perhaps by childhood experience,will be reactivated again in the future under specifically evocative conditions.)

We can thus anticipate a direct neurophysiologic account for how
"object relations" may in part derive from internalized__introjected__ experiences with objects and with their functions. Each experience in present real time consists of, is generated by,and resides in the activation of neural groups, interconnected in an ad-hoc network, distributed throughout the brain anatomically, and thus involving many functions of sensation, perception, motor function, emotion and cognition. The specific functioning of that network just then may be in effect "selected" by facilitative synaptic changes; its components might be be predisposed to fire together again under the right conditions.

Reentrant signalling over anatomically complete loops probably allows
anatomically distributed (distant) neuronal groups continuously to
communicate with one another and to synchronize their activities,
according to Edelman. Groups active in one area (eg, visual) can thus
reciprocally excite and cause synaptic enhancement of groups in a
separate area (eg, tactile). Edelman points out that particular
patterns of response in one brain "map" (consisting of many groups)
thus can become functionally associated with particular patterns in
other(s). Responses to present inputs can thus be linked to previous
patterns , across maps. Thus, a sight can stimulate the memory of a
touch. A sound, perhaps a spoken word or melody (obviously lots of unaddressed complexity here) can stimulate and reactivate a visual, operational,or cognitive memory, and, "inscribing" on it in the present, change it.

A mapping of many such selected groupscouldthus provide the neurophysiologic correlate to and substrate for unconscious object representations, which could potentially, if laterreactivated, be expressed as affect-full object-related fantasies, impulses, and behaviors, potentially conscious, yet, perhaps exerting a neurologic influence thatcould remain unconscious.

A potentially responsive neural network representing past experience
will be activated, Edelman theorizes, if current input is a "good
enough match" to previous input which led to the original synaptic
enhancement. That is, if enough of its neighboring, or synaptically
linked, groups are activated ("the present context"), it will be
activated too.Thus, the present experience is categorized according to previous experience. Thus, presentation of a current object (eg, the
analyst) may activate a sufficient number of groups previously
functionally related in experience of the original object ( eg, a
parent), and thus a "memory",specific feeling state, or a behavioral repetition may arise.

This perhaps provides some neurophysiologic correlate to Charles Spezzano's recent observation that,"the immediate
situation is idiosyncratically and unconsciously put by us into a category of
situations and it is this idiosyncratic and unconscious categorizing that
leads to the feeling we have... Still, the patient may hear us saying that,
while we see them putting the immediate event into a category that leads to
a feeling, we don't understand why it has to be put into that category (don't
understand in the sense that we see how it could just as easily be put into
other unconscious meaning categories and is categorized by the patient in an

idiosyncratic way, maybe one we trace historically..."

How does the daily free-associative process work? The superolateral prefrontal cortex, "connected to a multitude of (remote) sensory association areas and limbic and paralimbic cortex," apparently may address andretrieve representations of memories from many fields distributed in the brain.It has been shown in pet scan studies consistently to be activated in tasks which are not run by external stimuli, ie, it is activated in tasks (eg, "visualize walking down your street and turning left at the corner") requiring organization by the brain itself of itself. (ROland, 1993)

In Edelman's model, the continuous reciprocal communication via reentrant signalling betweenmaps of neural groups activated in current experience and those previously enhancedand synchronized in past experience (eg, with the original objects) allows the two sets reciprocally to "translate" or to "inscribe" their activities upon one another. This furthers our account of the brain activity in free association. The functional interaction between maps may permit continuous rearrangement according to unpredictable variations in the environment, (eg, the analyst's challenging an accustomed assumption, or "destabilizing a compromise formation", with a question, or action.) THus, past and present are recategorized in terms of one another, producing change in neurologic and thus in psychic structure. The present real experience with and of the analyst thus can "insinuate itself" into the prior arrangements ( the prior neuro-psychic structure), necessarily reorganizing the object relations constellation (transmuting internalization).

"We do not simply store images or bits but become more richly endowed with the capacity to categorize in connected ways." (Rosenfeld, 1986)Increasing the number of neural arrangements by which one experience is compared to, contrasted with, and categorized according to prior experience or fantasy allows greater richness and flexibility in functioning, one result of a successful psychoanalysis.

Samuel T. Goldberg, M.D.
Baltimore-Washington Institute for PSA

Not an easy read, but worth the effort
Mike Vanier's experience with Edelman's prose gave the typical bioassayresult: its hard to read Edelman's books. I often try to imagine the stateof mind of people in 1875 who tried to wade through Darwin's "Originof Species" or someone who came across the work of Gregor Mendel inthe 1890's. Unfortunately for the Science of Mind, Mike is just the kind ofperson Edelman might have hoped to be able to reach. Well, Mike, did youread right through the Bible (or substitute "Your First CalculusTextbook" for "Bible") the first time you picked it up?There really is a forest in "Neural Darwinism" once you get pastthe trees.

The claim "his ideas are neither new, nor original, norcorrect" is one of the standard put-downs of the academic world.Anyone who works on non-trivial scientific issues and is intelectuallyhonest will admit that his work in based on ideas taken from others andthat his work is incomplete and contains errors. Edelman makes theseadmissions. Edelman's ideas about how brains can learn and function toproduce what we experience as minds are positive contributions to scienceand worth getting to know.

Deliberately obfuscated nonsense.
I got about one-third of the way through this book, and then just couldn'tcontinue.This is without a doubt the worst science book I've ever (triedto) read.Edelman goes out of his way to use unnecessarily long, ponderousphrases to describe simple concepts.This is presumably meant to impressyou, but personally it makes me wonder what the author is trying to hide. How about this: that his ideas are neither new, nor original, nor correct.

Highly Recommended
Superlative.Outstanding scientific thinking and a must read for every neuroscientist.A few parts are too scantily discussed, but the text is (overall) of the highest caliber

Why the brain is nothing like a computer by a Nobel laureate
The distinguished Nobel Laureate proposes a global brain theory that demonstrates that the brain does not work like a computer but rather operates under principles of selection that assure individuality, autonomy, imagination, etc. Since this book was published in 1986, the essentials of its proposals have been confirmed and absorbed at almost all levels of neurobiological and psychological inquiry.More accessible are two subsequent books, "The Remembered Present" and "Bright Air, Brilliant Fire" ... Read more

Amazon.com
Emily Dickinson wrote "The Brain--is wider than the Sky," and who can argue with that?Quoted by Nobel-winning scientist Gerald M. Edelman and his Neurosciences Institute colleague Giulio Tononi in A Universe of Consciousness, Miss Emily neatly explains the problem of conscious awareness, then ducks out of the way as the two scientists get to work solving it. Testable theories of consciousness are mighty lonely, as even the soberest mind can be driven to tears of madness pondering its own activity.Centuries of work by philosophers and psychologists like James and Freud have made little progress by starting with awareness and working backward to the brain; these days we have a secure enough base to try looking in the other direction and building a theory of the mind out of neurons.

Though Edelman and Tononi do make a good effort to help out the lay reader, ultimately A Universe of Consciousness is aimed at the interdisciplinary gang of scientists and academics trying to understand our shared but invisible experience.The first sections of the book cover the basic philosophical, psychological, and biological elements essential to their theory.Swiftly the authors proceed to define terms and concepts (even the long-abused term complexity gets a reappraisal) and elaborate on these to create a robust, testable theory of the neural basis of consciousness.Following this hard work, they consider some ramifications of the theory and take a close look at language and thinking.This much-needed jump-start is sure to provoke a flurry of experimental and theoretical responses; A Universe of Consciousness might just help us answer some of the greatest questions of science, philosophy, and even poetry. --Rob Lightner Book Description
A Nobel Prize-winning scientist and a leading brain researcher show how the brain creates conscious experience In A Universe of Consciousness, Gerald Edelman builds on the radical ideas he introduced in his monumental trilogy-Neural Darwinism, Topobiology, and The Remembered Present-to present for the first time an empirically supported full-scale theory of consciousness. He and the neurobiolgist Giulio Tononi show how they use ingenious technology to detect the most minute brain currents and to identify the specific brain waves that correlate with particular conscious experiences. The results of this pioneering work challenge the conventional wisdom about consciousness. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (18)

A Commendable Attempt at our Most Miraculous Question
-This is a leading neuroscientific contribution to explaining the nature of consciousness.The authors have written other books and abstracts (an excellent, concise summary by Dr. Edelman may be found in the NY Academy of Science Annals, Vol 882), but this one seems to have the most depth and development.The book was written in 2000 and is intended to give an overview, which makes it less prone to going out of date.In fact, it seems to give a reasonably sound foundational basis for understanding more recent developments, such as the role of electrical wave propagation in conscious activity.
-The main purpose of "Universe" is approaching the problem of how objectively describable events ("the external and internal world") produces private subjective experience. Many have attempted this but only recently have we been able to scientifically probe it (although our understanding still reflects the insights of the Greeks and other capable philosophers). The authors give us some unique suggestions for current understanding and integrating further developments."Universe" builds a foundation of basic neural activity, discusses how computer modeling can offer hints to the working of the human mind although they cannot explain or duplicate it, discusses how conscious and unconscious neural activity may be integrated and differentiated, and suggests how neural activity self-selects (the authors expand upon an earlier thesis that Darwin's evolution is a far better foundation than directly psychological abstractions like Freud's)."Universe" humbly recognizes the incomprehensible vastness of the human mind (the authors call it "hyperastronomical"), and how unlikely it is that we will ever completely describe it except in a trivial sense. The authors suggest we are far better off conceiving of the mind and Consciousness as an incredibly dynamic Event rather than something static (Heraclitus was too kind -- we cannot even have the same thought once, let alone twice).The authors seem to make a major descriptive contribution by insights into the Dynamic Core Hypothesis ( a highly differentiated, anatomically clustered, complex, and self-coordinating functioning of neuronal groups) and re-entry (a continuous reciprocal signalling, roughly similar to a coordinated and massively dynamic feedback type system, which can integrate anatomically segregated areas of the brain without demanding a central "man-in-the-box" coordination area).The authors' discussion of Qualia (the quality and intensity of private subjective experience) seems to reflect our continued inability to describe these phenomena as accurately as we would like.
-"Universe" can be as challenging as you want it to be, and it is an interesting and thoughtful study of consciousness from leading and respected scientists.The notes and Bibliography are excellent, and the authors wisely uses space to develop his ideas, rather than give an overview of everyone else's. The authors admit this is not some kind of final theory of consciousness, but it seems a reasonable description of some of the issues and foundations for consciousness.It is like setting out on an expedition with a basically accurate but incomplete map, which can be changed and filled in along the way, rather than relying on guesswork or hearsay.
As a suggestion to help you enjoy this book, I found it greatly helped to set aside a few minutes to scan each chapter before reading it, which helped appreciate the continuity of the arguments.I also found a neuroanatomy atlas (such as Nolte) useful.

The BEST Book on Consciousness -- By Far
This is a most exciting and most challenging read on consciousness. Finally, neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neurochemistry return as the hallmarks of the theory, bolstered by a high amount of "Neural Darwinism," in order, "to formulate a specific hypothesis about the kinds of neural processes that can account for the fundamental integrative and informative properties of conscious experience." The theory, known as "neuronal group selection" is a completely naturalist, wholly scientific, empirically-sated theory of consciousness. (Some knowledge of statistics will help, but is not necessary, for some middle chapters.)

Rejected is Pinker's computational model of the brain ("How the Mind Words"). Gone are Damasio's dysfunctional subjects as counter-illustrations of the normative ("Descartes' Error" et alia). Gone too is Johnston's entirely solipsistic theory of mind ("Why We Feel"). Also ignored are the philosophical speculation and armchair conjectures one encounters in Chalmer's "The Conscious Mind," Dennett's "Consciousness Explained," and Penrose's "Shadows of the Mind."

Instead, Edleman and Tononi in "The Universe of Consciousness" respond to philosopher John Searle's demand for a strictly functional and biological account of consciousness (see, Searle's "Rediscovery of Mind" and "Mystery of Consciousness"). Among the some of the enigmas rejected is the representational theory of memory; in its stead is an associative and creative replicational theory of memory, which is dynamic and reacting to its environment always anew. If one learns anything from this book, it is that consciousness is not a state(s) of mind, but a complex, dynamic, and integrative neural process.

This fascinating, detective-like examination of consciousness is not for the casual reader; this is a demanding and rigorous read: Concepts like perceptual categorization, memory reactivation, concepts, values, etc. that depend on a wholly Darwinian sense of developmental selection, experimental selection, and "reentry" ("the process of ongoing and recursive signaling between separate brain maps along massively parallel anatomical connections"), all combine with detailed neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neurochemistry in order to substantiate the theory. The theory requires one's complete, but undivided, attention. It's a difficult subject, but masterful job.

While the book is both exciting and a challenge, I admire the authors' ability to tackle a difficult task without complicating it with arcane, elliptic, or meandering conversation (cf., Pinker). This is an exciting, engaging, but very serious, book on a theory of consciousness. Where difficult concepts and biologies require, analogies are provided. Indubitably, "Universe of Consciousness" is the best written, empirical, biological, and conceptual account of consciousness I've read, and I've read more than a few. My only criticism, since it's warranted, is stylistic: The dense content could be helped by less-dense sentential structures. Otherwise, I cannot recommend this book highly enough.

Boring
I have been reading about the brain and working of the mind for a few years now (I am 50).I am also a university professor in engineering and consider myself well-informed.I have read many popular science books which are popular because they are interesting to general readers.This books utterly lacks interesting points especially for someone who is already familiar with the working of the brain.I am wondering if there is a reviewing conspiracy to glamorize this book which not only throws neurological jargon at you in bundles, but, at the end offers nothing content-wise. What theory?That consciousness arises from a complex and highly integrated system?Dah.. I wonder how you reached that conclusion.There is a good use for a book full of jibberish however - I use it before bed and it puts me to sleep immediately, for that reason I give it 2 starts.For a book on this subject, one can read the first and last chapters and know what the content of the book is in a nutshell.I have read them a few times and everytime I am completely blank - nothing, this books says nothing ... but it may impress some people as highly significant becasue the presentation is highly cast in scietific terms.

Imagine a complex subject ...
How does matter become imagination? That's the compelling subtitle of this work. The answer is not easy to follow but Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi make the effort worthwhile.I had to work to keep up with the subject. It felt like a difficult but positive workout.

The subject matter is dense. The authors have created a writing style which in no way dumbs down the subject for its audience - if the audience is someone like me, a knowledgeable lay-person. I appreciated the chapter prefaces and came back to them often as I made my way into the billions of possible mind states.

Edelman and Tononi put forward an in depth theory of the brain's machinations to achieve consciousness. With effort the reader will get a wonderful perspective on how the world out there becomes the inner world of imagination. I applaud the authors for their research and communication skills on such a difficult subject. I recommend this book to everyone interested in the subject of consciousness and who are willing to expend some gray matter to follow the discourse.

Interesting, intelligent work that aims a bit too high
There is no doubt in my mind, after reading this book, that the authors have done excellent scientific work and made very interesting discoveries. On the other hand, it has certain problems.

To start with, it seems clear that they do not have a full grasp of the philosophical problems they are attempting to resolve - or if they do, they avoid going into the stickier points. This is not necessarily a reason to condemn the book; there are huge volumes of philosophy on this subject, and it would be futile to try and fit a quick resolution into one small volume already full of other facts. Nonetheless, they probably should have avoided the philosophical aspect entirely if all they were going to do is attack the mind/body problem in a way that arguably does nothing but shift the terms around a bit to produce the appearance of a resolution. There is essentially nothing new here, philosophically, and they certainly had more than enough interesting material for a book without attempting this.

A second thing that disappointed me is the lack of contrasting points of view. It seems unfair to ask an author to present a summary of theories which argue against his own, but in fact it's in the best interest of an author/scientist. What are the points of contention between theories, and what are the alternate explanations? This gives the author an ideal chance to explain why their theory is superior, what it has that the others lack... and in turn it gives the reader the chance to be convinced (or not) by the force of the argument, which is always more intellectually satisfying than being led by the nose.

Stylistically, also, it could have used a bit of revision. Long, complex sentences are fine (great, even) for something like Proust. When you populate those sentences - even if they're perfect grammatically - with large and generally unfamiliar scientific terms, it can be quite awkward. This happened just frequently enough to be a nuisance, as far as I was concerned.

So, apart from these criticisms, the subject material is still interesting. I would be inclined, however, to look for a more recent title by these authors (or others) on the subject. A lot can be discovered in a few years, and hopefully the experience they gained in writing this book will help them produce a work with a bit more polish. ... Read more

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Customer Reviews (18)

A Taste of Brilliance, Then A Let Down
I was disappointed by this book.I have read a number of recent works on consciousness, and in them I've seen quite a few positive references to bioscientist Gerald Edelman. Philosopher John Searle, who some regard as the "dean" of the consciousness debate, says that Edelman may understand the physical and functional workings of the human brain better than anyone else (see Searle's The Mystery of Consciousness).Edelman's work regarding the brain's ability to set up ad-hoc looping circuits between the many "maps" within it (i.e., small segments that specialize in a particular task, e.g. the area that identifies colors from visual inputs) is very powerful.It addresses many important questions, such as how we experience things in a unified manner when many different areas of our brain separately process the elements and sub-elements of sight, sound, smell and touch.

Thus, I had hoped that Wider Than the Sky would be Edelman's attempt to unfold his powerful insights regarding brain-mind dynamics before the reasonably educated masses.Unfortunately, Dr. Edelman chose to zip through his important ideas so as to dish out a warmed-over version of philosopher Daniel Dennett's functional materialism. This book should be compared with Steven Pinker's How The Mind Works.Pinker wrote a long book that eventually did what it promised, despite breezy asides about Queen Elizabeth, Lilly Tomlin, Leonard Nimoy and the like. Pinker ultimately stuck to analyzing the processes by which the human brain forwards the interests of the body to which it is attached, within a changing and challenging environment.Pinker remained agnostic to the ultimate question of what consciousness is and what its nature might be.I myself would have preferred it if Edelman had stuck to that script.

Edelman does indeed give the reader a taste of some important concepts regarding the dynamics of the brain.These would include: re-entrant neuron looping between processing areas; neural group selection (or day-to-day Darwinism, the on-going shaping of the "plastic" brain); degeneracy (i.e. the ability to quickly change the looping circuits in a way that responds to new stimuli, but doesn't immediately drop the thought or perception that you were attending to); and "value systems" (a spaghetti-like network of connections originating under the cortex, which in effect spray the brain with mood and mind-altering chemicals such as serotonin and ACH at the right times, helping the body to enforce its basic agenda of survival, reproduction and probably other "higher-order" agenda derived from learning experience).But Edelman doesn't take the time to develop these fascinating ideas with needed examples and analogies, so as to help the lay reader to appreciate what he and his team have discovered regarding brain processes.He's like those "I'm only going to say this once" professors that you try to forget once the semester is over.

Instead of explaining his research, Dr. Edelman leads us up the metaphysical mountain of consciousness, where we sit at his feet as he purifies us of any superstitious, dualistic notions regarding who we are and what it's like to be human.He tells us that consciousness, as we "folk" think of it, is ultimately just a side-effect of material interactions.He explains that qualia is really a function, i.e. the brain's ability to discriminate different portions of a mental image. And he fails to acknowledge those who had put forth similar ideas in the past.It's a shame; Edelman rushes through the really innovative research that he is doing, to dwell on a set of ideas that you could get the hang of in an hour or two from one of those Totem / Icon "comic books" (i.e., Introducing Consciousness by D. Papineau and H. Selina).

Edelman takes some other interesting positions, but fails to alert the reader as to their speculative and controversial nature (I mean, isn't that what footnotes are for?).Regarding emotions and feelings, he gives them minimal consideration, passing them off as a side-effect of value system operations (those mind chemicals, remember?).By contrast, some mind analysts such as Antonio Damasio and Susan Greenfield give emotions top-billing.Edelman dismisses the notion advanced by Jerry Fodor that the mind uses a "language" of sorts between its specialty components, and the related notion regarding proto-language, which underlies Chomsky's views about the universal elements of all human languages.I can't say that Edelman is wrong here, but a footnote acknowledging the existence of differing viewpoints seems to be the usual practice.Are Nobel Prize winners permanently excused from the need to footnote?

One more example of Dr. Edelman's intellectual rope-walking without a net: he posits that the human brain has greater computing capabilities than the hypothetical "Turing Machine", which is an intellectual keystone of computing theory.This sounds OK until you do a search on the topic and discover "hypercomputation", a very uncertain and controversial concept.I'd venture that Dr. Edelman is wandering quite far from the zone of expertise where he earned a Nobel Prize (regarding his work in immunology).The same applies to his metaphysical (or anti-metaphysical) admonitions regarding "folk understanding" of human consciousness. His thoughts would make for a lengthy and interesting footnote, for sure.But this book is not about footnotes - it has none (although it does contain a very useful glossary).Wider Than the Sky is another unfortunate example of a brilliant person doing some very interesting research about the brain, who gives in to the temptation of lecturing mere mortals regarding their unenlightened assumptions. I hope that Dr. Edelman came closer to the Pinker tradition of exposition and respect for the general audience in his (Edelman's) other popular works (Bright Air, Brilliant Fire and Second Nature).But I'm not in any hurry to bet on it -- too many other interesting authors on the mind and consciousness to get to.

Well worth reading if you are interested in consciousness and its neural underpinnings
This book is a short read, and thought-provoking. Edelman is one of a select group of cogniscenti on consciousness -- he really knows his stuff. He is a neuroscientist, and does not shy away from detailing neuroanatomical systems in his writing. For people who do not have any background in neuroscience, this book might seem a bit impenetrable. For those who are deeply interested in neuroscience and the information it can provide on human intelligence and consciousness, I have heard that Edelman's book Topobiology is a longer, more comprehensive version of Wider Than the Sky, and well worth reading. Although I have not read that book, I would suggest that Wider Than the Sky might be a good place to start, and make that book more easily understandable.

right ideas but could have been better written
In my opinion the author comes closer than any other in providing us with the theory of consciousness that will prevail in the future.He bases his theory on scientific and experimental basis and not on endless philosophical conversations .His scientific background is impressive and evident in every page of the book .For these he gets easily from me the 5 stars. However the author in the middle of the book fails in writting clearly, trying to understand what he wants to express becomes demanding and his endeavor to make the book both scientific and readable by the average reader doesn't succeed.Dr Edelman I look forward for your next book, I hope you have developed your ideas as I am expecting from you the ultimate consciousness theory!

One of our Greatest Intellectual Mysteries Finally solved
Building systematically and admirably on his previous work (A Universe of Consciousness), GeraldEdelman, has finally succeeded in cracking the cosmic code of the mind body problem, or how the conscious mind is a direct product of, rather than an indirect, or by-produce of, or even an epiphenomenon of, physical processes that take place in the brain.

Not only has he exhibited the brain parts, chemical processes and functions responsible for consciousness, also he has mapped them into identifiable aspects of conscious processes themselves.And more importantly, in doing so, his research meets the highest cannon of scientific enquiry:It is empirically based, definitions and hypotheses are lay out clearly; and then they aresystematically and clearly proven. Every aspect of the research is transparent and replicable.It is also simply explained, but following Einstein's famous edict, it is not explained simpler than necessary.Yet, even where it is not so simple, it is clear enough that the courageous reader -- bent on following this exiciting adventure to the bitter end -- can indeed follow and understand the meaning of these important conclusions.

In an inmaterial aside, I must say I had put all my bets on another horse in this race to immortality.I thought that Dan Dennett and his computer analogies would in the end prove weightier in this important scientific foot race.

Dispite my earlier misgivings about the Edelman approach, I now know that this always was the best horse in the race.I am thus a happy loser.Two cheers and five stars for the winner.

Zombie is possible- SORRYONLY 3 STARS
To say it is erroneous to assume that actions CAN be carried out without the conscious IS erroneous. I unfortunately know for fact(not voluntarily) that there are chemicals that are used that can block the conscious and leave the subconscious to the availability of a second party. Producing almost perfect ZOMBYNESS. Walk and talk as directed. I'd like to find a book on that subject. And what can be done to protect oneself. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

The Fundamental Neural Architecture of Consciousness
Edelman, in the third of three books which discusses the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, grapples with the fundamental neuronal architecture which comprises consciousness.This work is excellent, although the text becomes disappointingly vague about half-way through; intriguing theories are presented, but not supported, with the rigor pursued by Edelman in his earlier volume "Neuronal Darwinism.&quot ... Read more

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A Nobel laureate's revolutionary vision of how the mind works. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (13)

Consciousness as a biological Darwinist adaptation.
This is a very important book.
It proves convincingly that consciousness is a matter of ... matter (the biological matter of the brain) and that it is the outcome of a long history of biological adaptations.

It also proves that the mind is not a computer or a Turing machine, that human language is not a computer language and that physics is not sufficient to explain its working. The morphology of the brain goes deep, but not as deep as to attain the quantum level.
On the contrary, Edelman explains clearly that the mind is a process that operates in a 4 dimensional world; that it doesn't have a perfect memory or doesn't order events or objects logically. It is subject to mutation in order to select and to adapt and creates itself aspects of the reality by cultural and language interaction. Into the bargain, the biological structure of the brain is different for every individual.

Edelman's theory has also far reaching philosophical implications. It is the death of essentialism (there are no 'essences', only populations with different individuals) and of idealism (the world was there before the mind).

Is Edelman's TNGS (theory of neural group selection) the end of the story? Absolutely not. It is only the beginning. It forms the basis for further investigations. But it clearly indicates which way to follow and which ways not.

I have only one reservation: Edelman's nearly unconditional admiration for Freud.

This is an essential read.

a bit watered-down
I am a huge fan of Edelman, but I regretted having bought this book; I would say this is a kind of half-successful attempt at vulgarizing what he explained so well elsewhere: there is nothing to be found here that wasn`t already explained in more detail in "Neural Darwinism" and "The Remembered Present". So stay away from this one if you read the others. If you never read anything by him, go for his "Neural Darwinism". Reading his books was definitely a great intellectual experience of my life. Go for it!

PS: Da man is a genius.

The Light Ages
Wow. Obviously we've emerged from the dark ages into the light and....wait, Plato already made this analogy. Anyway, its always edifying to see people, anyone, confirm in print what we all already know but are afraid, for political reasons I guess, to utter. It's a material world. Edelman takes off on this theme and proceeds to deliver the underlying neural blueprints for ego, soul, cognition, and a host of other mystical magical metaphysics, minus the meta. Edelman makes some gratuitous forays into philosophy in this book, but by and large sticks to the point and discusses his work on axonal feedback/forward pathways and TNGS; the theory of neuronal group selection, an evolutionary take on neurobiology. It's always nice, in my view, when researchers deign to wtite these pop-sci books to share with us plebes what we could never encounter in our own pedestrian lives. I can't really evaluate if this is a "good" piece of literature, but anyone remotely interested in who and what they and the people they know are simply must devour evey morsel of this neurophysiology primer.

Want to know the truth?It IS out there--
The worst kind of reviewers are those who come when the play is half over.There is no "royal road" to the truth, either in mathematics, as the old tale has it, or in philosophy and science.Ethically, you can struggle through the basics and talk about your conclusions; or you should shut up.If you have no inkling about the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, you have no inkling about consciousness.Go back and do your homework. So Edelman's books are tough going?Did you expect to understand calculus without taking algebra?I read "Neural Darwinism" right after it was published, and gagged.My biology background is thin; one college course.I looked up "natural selection" and found Dawkins; I read all of his books and knew something about genetics.I read "ND" again, understanding a bit more, especially the part about "ground-breaking" ... When "Topobiology" appeared, I read it.I had to reread "ND" to get through it, but I began to understand the vocabulary, the ideas, the logic, the structure.Same thing with "Remembered Present". At that point I was working in a university psychology department (strictly as a hardware specialist, never having had a single psychology course).I mentioned this exciting work to a few professors in developmental psych who might have been expected to look at it; none of them did.Not till 1999, when a visiting professor offered a course in "Consciousness" based on "The Remembered Present", was there any hint that Edelman had some relevance for those researching the development of the mind.Draw your own conclusions. If you're not afraid to know the facts, if you really want to know the answers to the hard questions (What is life?Why is the universe only 4-dimensional?Where does thought come from?), dig for them; they do exist.Start with Edelman.

Of great interest
More than aquarter of a century ago, Edelman was distinguished with a Nobel Price for his research on the immunity system. Later he switched to neurology. He sees a parallel between the way the immunity system isprogrammed and the way the brain is programmed. These procedures have muchin common with Darwins process of evolution by way of natural selection.Edelman speaks of "neural Darwinism".

When you just thinkabout it, after reading the arguments Edelman brings forward, you will seethat evolution could hardly have produced something as complex as the humanbrain (or even more simple animal brains) by any other means. A lot has tobe investigated yet, of course, but I think Edelman has shown the way to adeeper understanding of our brain.

It is a pity Edelman and Daniel Dennetget along so badly. Edelman never mentions Dennet, and Dennet is extremelycritical in the few remarks he makes about Edelmans work. I think theirapproaches are complementary, not contradictory.

Yes, the human brain isa computer of sorts. Edelman has the clearest ideas about the structure ofthis computer, but he denies that the metaphor of the computer is valid. Ithink that, even taking Edelmans ideas about the deeper structure inaccount, the metaphor remains valid, up to a point at least. Really,Edelman has much more in common with Dennet (whom he seems to despise) thanwith the "mysterian" Searle, whom he praises. ... Read more

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Word count: 1718. ... Read more

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Interactions between cell surfaces allow embryo to develop
Analytic and innovative, yet fairly easy to read, book on the place-dependent interactions of cell surfaces with other cell surfaces that regulate the processes of embryological development in metazoans (ie, animals).

Heavy going, big payoff
Edelman's Topobiology provides an excellent introduction to the field of molecular embryology. In the book you will be introduced to CAMs (cell adhesion molecules), SAMs (substrate adhesion molecules), and CJMs (celljunction molecules) that are produced and used by the body to keep itselforganized and literally stuck together as it develops and grows. Theprocesses of development and growth are extremely complex, and involveinteractions among many different entities in the body. As the headersuggests, this book is not an easy read; it presents abstract concepts, andthe author uses extremely complex sentence constructions to tell his story.This is not a book for the faint of heart, it is written with theprofessional biologist in mind.

If you have the strength and the courage,I suggest that you give this book a try

P.S.I am the "reader"from Manchester College in the previous review -- I didn't get my name onthat one though.

Thick going, but worth the effort
Edelman's Topobiology provides an excellent introduction to the field of molecular embryology.In the book you will be introduced to CAMs (cell adhesion molecules), SAMs (substrate adhesion molecules), and CJMs (celljunction molecules) that are produced and used by the body to keep itselforganized and literally stuck together as it develops and grows.Theprocesses of development and growth are extremely complex, and involveinteractions among many different entities in the body.

As the headersuggests, this book is not an easy read; it presents abstract concepts, andthe author uses extremely complex sentence constructions to tell his story. This is not a book for the faint of heart, it is written with theprofessional biologist in mind.

If you have the strength and the courage,I suggest that you give this book a try. ... Read more

Book Description
This significant contribution to neuroscience consists of two papers, the first by Mountcastle an, the second by Edelman. Between them, they examine from different but complementary directions the relationships that connect the higher brain--memory, learning, perception, thinking--with what goes on at the most basic levels of neural activity, with particular stress on the role of local neuronal circuits.

Edelman's major hypothesis is that "the conscious state results from phasic reentrant signaling occurring in parallel processes that involve associations between stored patterns and current sensory or internal input." This selective process occurs by the polling of degenerate primary repertoires of neuronal groups that are formed during embryogenesis and development. Edelman's theory extrapolates to the brain the selectionistic immunological theories for which he was awarded the 1972 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.

Mountcastle's paper reviews what is known about the actual structure of various parts of the neo cortex. He relates the large entities of the neocortex to their component modules--the local neuronal circuits--and shows how the complex interrelationships of such a distributed system can yield dynamic distributed functioning.

There are strong conceptual parallels between Mountcastle's idea of cortical columns and their functional subunits and Edelman's concept of populations of neurons functioning as processors in a brain system based on selectional rather than instructional principles. These parallels are traced and put into perspective in Francis Schmitt's Introduction. ... Read more

Book Description
This digital document is an article from Daedalus, published by Thomson Gale on June 22, 2006. The length of the article is 5360 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Citation Details
Title: The embodiment of mind.
Author: Gerald M. Edelman
Publication: Daedalus (Magazine/Journal)
Date: June 22, 2006
Publisher: Thomson Gale
Volume: 135Issue: 3Page: 23(10)

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