Product Description

THE SEMINAL WORK ON FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ART OF DIPLOMACY

Moving from a sweeping overview of history to blow-by-blow accounts of his negotiations with world leaders, Henry Kissinger describes how the art of diplomacy has created the world in which we live, and how America's approach to foreign affairs has always differed vastly from that of other nations.

Brilliant, controversial, and profoundly incisive, Diplomacy stands as the culmination of a lifetime of diplomatic service and scholarship. It is vital reading for anyone concerned with the forces that have shaped our world today and will impact upon it tomorrow. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (92)

School Book
My son needed this book for school and with the price and quick delivery Amazon comes through again.

Brilliant Masterpiece
I have wanted to read Henry Kissinger's "Diplomacy" ever since it was first published, and I regret that it took me so long to undertake this task. This is definitely one of the most informative and attitude-changing books about foreign policy, diplomacy and geopolitics that I have ever read. Kissinger writes from the perspective of someone who is actually an actor and protagonist in making history, and not a passive historian who is bookish and far removed from the historic events. Diplomacy in one form or another has been practiced throughout history, but it may not have been a major factor in the relations between different nations. The kind of high-level diplomacy that is described in this book deals with predominantly European affairs from roughly the middle of the seventeenth century until the end of the twentieth, with more emphasis given to the later centuries. Kissinger is actually very reserved when it comes to his own achievements, and this is not a book that is meant to be an apologia for his years in the White House. His concern is mostly with placing US diplomacy within the context of wider historical and geopolitical developments in order to see how each particular policy can be understood within this larger intellectual and practical framework. Kissinger is often accused as someone who practiced and preached "Realpolitik" - a kind of political machinations that leave all ethical considerations out, a form of modern Machiavellianism. However, the impression that I got from reading this book is that far from being uninterested in ethical considerations, Kissinger is actually very much appreciative of their importance, and holds in high regard those statesmen and politicians who had aspired for a higher purpose in their work and who had a reverence for the high offices that they held. Two statesmen in particular that I have a higher regard for are Henry Truman and Konrad Adenauer. Kissinger's attitude seems to me to be more that of a healthy skepticism for overly idealistic approaches to the resolution of world affairs. As the twentieth century has painfully demonstrated, idealism and ideology can be painfully close to each other, and some of the worst atrocities and military and humanitarian disasters can stem from the noblest of intentions.

In addition to being thought-provoking, informative and educational, this is also an eminently readable book. If you are not intrinsically drawn to history books you may still appreciate this one. I also found that the kind of outlook and insights that permeate this book do have their everyday equivalents when it comes to day-to-day interpersonal relations. We all live and work with people whose interests and values clash with our own. Reading those interests and values accurately and figuring out the best course of action on our parts is an important life skill. If it is possible to extrapolate from the domain of states and countries all the way down to the level of individual, then this book has a great value well beyond its original intended audience.

A great book even if it is written by a war criminal
Henry Kissinger's "Diplomacy" is a terrific primer for anyone interested in the concepts of Realpolitik and how it has manifested in world history. Although I found his chapters on Vietnam to be loathsome (he at one point expresses his sympathy to the Cambodian people) and Chile and the overthrow of Allende were suspiciously absent, Kissinger's insight in world history are concise and brilliant. His chapters on the genius of Otto von Bismark are especially a must-read. One cannot understand Realpolitik without knowing about Bismark; he truly was the master of diplomacy. Kissinger may be a war criminal, but he definitely knows his history and knows how to write a good history book. The length of the book may scare some people away, but anyone true student of history needs to read this.

Superb work
Comprehensive. It was a nightmare for my highlighter. If there were 7 stars instead of 5, I would definitely choose that.

A Splendid Read
Although a bit lengthy, Diplomacy as a whole stands as a well put together work that is informative to those who are both new to foreign policy or well-versed in the field. A definite must-read for any budding politicos out there. ... Read more

Product Description

The Definitive Account

Many other authors have written about what they thought happened -- or thought should have happened -- in Vietnam, but it was Henry Kissinger who was there at the epicenter, involved in every decision from the long, frustrating negotiations with the North Vietnamese delegation to America's eventual extrication from the war. Now, for the first time, Kissinger gives us in a single volume an in-depth, inside view of the Vietnam War, personally collected, annotated, revised, and updated from his bestselling memoirs and his book Diplomacy.

Here, Kissinger writes with firm, precise knowledge, supported by meticulous documentation that includes his own memoranda to and replies from President Nixon. He tells about the tragedy of Cambodia, the collateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the disagreements within the Nixon and Ford administrations, the details of all negotiations in which he was involved, the domestic unrest and protest in the States, and the day-to-day military to diplomatic realities of the war as it reached the White House. As compelling and exciting as Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August, Ending the Vietnam War also reveals insights about the bigger-than-life personalities -- Johnson, Nixon, de Gaulle, Ho Chi Minh, Brezhnev -- who were caught up in a war that forever changed international relations. This is history on a grand scale, and a book of overwhelming importance to the public record. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (12)

Interesting but not what I expected
The subtitle of this book is misleading.It is in no way a "history of America's involvement and extrication" in Vietnam.What it is is a very detailed account, from Kissinger's poing of view, of the laborious negotiations with the North Vietnamese to end the Vietnam War in as honorable a way as possible.

I can't say it was a bad book.I learned a lot.I finished it with a new appreciation for the difficult situation we were in.It changed some of my opinions about this war and reinforced others.But, a history of America's involvement in the war it was not.There is anectotal information on the broader military and political context at best.Most of the book is a meticulous account of the negotiations between Kissinger and the N. Vietnamese.

One of the Best!!
As an avid reader of Military History, Vietnam in particular, I thought Dr. Kissinger's book was one of the best i have read. His insight was great and it was very well written. I highly recommend it.

Henry Looks Back
More than three decades have passed since the fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh--two seminal events that finally ended the American war in Indochina. And now that we have the benefit of hindsight, it is appropriate that one of the key figures of that era gives us a new version of how the American foreign policy debacle in Southeast Asia came about.

Henry Kissinger has written a new book, "Ending the VietnamWar; a History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War", (Simon and Schuster) that documents his version of the events leading up to American withdrawal from Indochina. And while a large part of the book is drawn from his previously published memoirs, this new book on Vietnam provides fresh information and historical material that make it must reading for anyone seriously interested in the history of war in Vietnam.

As usual, Kissinger writes cogently about his perspective of history. He's as feisty as ever, too. While he acknowledges that the Nixon and Ford administrations (in which he played crucial roles) made their shares of mistakes, he doesn't hesitate to take on his legion of critics. In fact, Kissinger cedes nothing to his enemies in the government and the media who continue to lambast him as some sinister, Dr. Strangelove-like manipulator of American foreign policy. And he laments the fact that the war in Vietnam has become a scar, as it were, on his record as a statesman:

"A balanced judgment on Vietnam continues to elude us--and therefore the ability to draw lessons from a national tragedy which America inflicted on itself," Kissinger writes in the Foreword to his new book. "As a result, Vietnam has become the black hole of American historical memory."

Kissinger then sets forth his version of the Vietnam experience in considerable detail drawn from his perspective--and buttressed by his access to State Department records. It is a familiar story, spun out masterfully in Kissinger's readable style. In a fascinating narrative, he weaves in such key developments as the French colonial experience, the performance of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, the opening to China, Watergate, and the Vietnam peace negotiations in Paris (for which Kissinger and Le Duc Tho won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973), and finally the collapse of the American position in Indochina--with the United States watching "as an impotent spectator."

Most of the book focuses on the Nixon-Ford years when Kissinger was the linchpin in the evolution of American foreign policy in general, and the tragic developments in Indochina, in particular. Kissinger clearly wants to go on the record to defend and clarify, as necessary, the existing historical record of the debacle in Vietnam.

Kissinger uses "Ending the War in Vietnam" to takes stock, and tries to lay down some lessons learned. In the process, he settles some old scores. Here's his take on the liberals and what he perceives to be their aversion to foreign policy that has led to Republican control of the White House for 16 of the last 28 years:

"The liberal wing of the generation whose formative experience had been during the (Vietnam) war recoiled from the use of American power. It focused its efforts on the so-called 'soft issues,' such as the environment that did not imply reliance on military force.... On the whole, this group distrusted the concept of national interest unless it could be presented as in the service of some 'unselfish' cause--hence the devotion to multilateralism.... As a result, strategy became largely the provenance of American conservatives and neoconservatives."

The domino theory still exists, according to Kissinger, except the dominos that were to ultimately fall weren't those that were in fashion in the 1960's when the domino theory was first advanced. Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines still have their independence, but in more distant places, other dominos were to topple in the aftermath of Vietnam. The United States was weakened by its defeat in Vietnam, with the result that some of its stronger allies, such as the Shah of Iran, fell from power. Cubans destabilized parts of Africa. Even the Soviet Union fell when it overextended itself in places like Afghanistan.

According to Kissinger, lessons learned from the Vietnam experience are important ones: "One clear lesson...is the importance of absolute honesty and objectivity in all reporting, within and from the government as well as from the press."

At times, this book can be heart-breaking, particularly the chapters on Cambodia. This writer spent three years covering the war in Cambodia and indeed was one of the 82 Americans who left in U.S. helicopters in the final evacuation of Phnom Penh just before the Cambodian capital fell to the Khmer Rouge. Prime Minister Long Boret was a friend, and it was painful to read once again about his brutal demise (he was shot to death by the Khmer Rouge within hours of their takeover of the city).

Kissinger provides interesting and personal insights on Cambodia. He tells how he and his ambassador to Cambodia, John Gunther Dean, and the rest of the State Department tried desperately through diplomatic channels to salvage Cambodia. But the U.S. Congress would have none of it, and made the tragic mistake of thinking that the suffering could only end in Cambodia if the United States withdrew. Consequently, on March 13, Congress voted to immediately end all aid to Cambodia and Vietnam.

Cambodians revered Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in exile in Beijing, and he was a last resort to salvage a peace before the country entered into its own holocaust at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. But, Kissinger says, even Sihanouk and his patrons, the Chinese government, had lost control of the situation. The Khmer Rouge had achieved unstoppable momentum, and the vote in Congress was the signal that the Khmer Rouge (and the North Vietnamese) needed to mount the final siege that was to come within weeks.

From the Cambodian perspective, one final, appropriate comment came from Sirik Matak, a former prime minister, who had been close to the Americans. When Dean gave the order to evacuate Phnom Penh, he offered to evacuate Sirik Matak on one of the U.S. Marine choppers. But Sirik Matak refused. Instead, he penned the following handwritten note to Dean:

"I thank you very sincerely for your letter and for your offer to transport me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion. As for you, and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection, and we can do nothing about it.

"You leave, and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under this sky. But, mark it well, that if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is no matter, because we all are born and must die. I have only committed this mistake of believing in you (the Americans)."

Five days later, Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge. Their retribution was swift, and Sirik Matak was shot in the stomach. He received no medical aid, and he died a painful death three days later. His demise was to be followed over the next four years by at least a million of his countrymen as the Khmer Rouge instituted their horrendous campaign of genocide.

Note:The reviewer was a foreign correspondent in Southeast Asia and Japan for United Press International from 1970-1980. He lives in Phippsburg, Maine, and is president of Marks & Frederick Associates LLC, a strategic marketing firm in the news and information industries.

History and not journalism
This is what happened as told by someone on the inside.People interested in history will find this book invaluable.Others should read it to get a good feel for how much dishonesty and incompetence existed in journalism and academia at the time.Things have not changed much in these fields during the 30 years since then.

Revising History
if you want the evil truth about Dr K and how he undermined the 1968 peace talks, read "No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam" by Larry Berman.

This book explains how Nixon and Kissinger illegally colluded with SVN and Nguyen Van Thieu - he was told by Nixon via Anna Chenault to "hold on, we are going to win" and "you will get a better deal with us". So Thieu says he won't talk peace, Nixon wins, Kissinger openly changes sides after working with the Democrats, and together they crank up the war.

The point is: The War could have ended in 1968 if it were not for this man - Dr Death himself, Henry Adolf Kissinger!

[...]

An interview where HK is asked what would have happened if America had not fought in Vietnam and it was "lost"

He says "it wouldn't have mattered much"!!!!!

So he conspired to continue the war when he thought it was not worth fighting!

Peace Prize? he should receive the "Death Prize" ... Read more

Product Description
Drawing on first-hand testimony, previously unpublished documentation and broad sweeps through material released under the Freedom of Information Act, Hitchens mounts a devastating indictment of a man whose ambition and ruthlessness have directly resulted in both individual murders and widespread, indiscriminate slaughter.Amazon.com Review
Christopher Hitchens doesn't mince words when it comes to Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state and national-security advisor: Kissinger deserves vigorous prosecution "for war crimes, for crimes against humanity, and for offenses against common or customary or international law,including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture." The Trialof Henry Kissinger is a masterpiece of polemics; even readers who don'tagree that its target is an emanation of "official evil" will appreciate theverve and style brought to Hitchens's fiery brief. ("A good liar must have agood memory: Kissinger is a stupendous liar with a remarkable memory.")

The book is best understood as a prosecutorial document--both becauseHitchens limits his critique to what he believes might stand up in aninternational court of law following precedents set at Nuremberg andelsewhere, and also because his treatment of Kissinger is far from evenhanded. The charges themselves are astonishing, as they link Kissinger towar casualties in Vietnam, massacres in Bangladesh and Timor, andassassinations in Chile, Cyprus, and Washington, D.C. After reading thisbook, one wants very badly to hear a full response from the defendant.Hitchens, a writer for Vanity Fair and The Nation, is a manof the Left, though he has a history of skewering both Democrats (he is theauthor of a provocative book on the Clintons, No One Left to Lie To) aswell as Republicans (Kissinger).

At the root of this latest effort is moral outrage, and a call forAmericans, of all people, not to ignore Kissinger's record: "They caneither persist in averting their gaze from the egregious impunity enjoyedby a notorious war criminal and lawbreaker, or they can become seized bythe exalted standards to which they continually hold everyone else," writesHitchens. "If the courts and lawyers of this country will not do theirduty, we shall watch as the victims and survivors of this man pursuejustice and vindication in their own dignified and painstaking way, and attheir own expense, and we shall be put to shame." --John J. Miller ... Read more

Customer Reviews (58)

Documents well atrocities committed and their connection to Kissinger but not as good at making the case for his indictment
This book does an excellent job at documenting the human costs and tragedies that resulted from U.S. foreign policy in Indochina, Chile, Cyprus, East Timor, death squads in Latin America and even assassinations and attempted abductions of foreign dissidents in the U.S.The book also does an excellent account at tying these to Dr. Kissinger, despite his many denials.

Where the book really falls short, however, is making the case that these were the actions of Kissinger per se (i.e., independent of U.S. foreign policy goals).Even if Kissinger did not exist it seems highly unlikely that U.S. foreign policy goals and actions would have differed much from Kissinger's. If Kissinger did not exist does Hitchens really believe that the U.S. would not have taken the policies and actions he documents (and describes as atrocities)? It is hard to imagine any U.S. government, especially during the height of the cold war, not doing its best to overthrow Allende (and doing it by any means possible, including supporting, if not Pinochet, anyone just as bloodthirsty)? Would the U.S. really have left Chile elect a government potentially and perceived (with emphasis on potential and perceived as opposed to actual) with leanings towards the Soviet Union?Does Hitchens believe that the U.S. (again, any administration) would not have supported Indonesia's invasion and genocidal policies to prevent an independent East Timor state that may lean towards China or the Soviet Union?Does Hitchens believe that the U.S., under any circumstances, would not have supported (directly and indirectly) attempts by"Western leaning" Latin American governments to eliminate (i.e., murder) their political opponents, even if in exile outside of their own countries?

Would, for that matter, any government (i.e., non-U.S.) would have acted significantly different than the U.S. would have been in the place of the U.S. in those particular circumstances? Not very likely.Hence it is not Kissinger (or the U.S. or any other foreign minister or nation in place of the U.S.) that is in need of indictment but instead "Realpolitik". This is what really needs to be put on trial.

Wormtongue the Rockefeller lackey
Covers all of Kissingers mass murdering greatest hits from east Timor, southeast Asia, Chile, Bangladesh and more. Hitchens intentionally puts this book together as if he was putting forth a case for Henry Kissinger to be tried for war crimes. Of course Kissinger will never be tried and in fact when he finally dies he will be hailed as a great man even though he is an incredibly evil sociopath.

Really if you study history you can find numerous characters like Kissinger, quite often they were Jews, whispering in the ears of Kings, Presidents, Prime Ministers, etc. They remind me of, if you've ever read Tolkien and remember the Wormtongue character. But like Wormtongue they also are usually doing the bidding of someone else and act as agents to this higher power. In Kissingers case he was an agent of the Rockefellers. If this book has a fault Kissingers role as a Rockefeller lackey is glossed over but overall its a good read and makes the obvious case that Kissinger should be tried for mass murder.

"Our" Nobel Peace Prize winner...
Richard Stampfle's excellent review of this book, posted over two years ago, nails the central issue of Henry Kissinger's criminal conduct. He draws on the old saw analogy of money owed to a bank - if you owe a small amount, the problem is yours; if you owe megabucks, it's the bank's problem. Likewise, if you are high on drugs, and kill one person, you have the problem; but if you are high on the arrogance of power, and cloak your actions in "statecraft," and are responsible for the death of millions, it is unlikely that you will be prosecuted, particularly if your country does not lose a war.

Christopher Hitchens wrote this indictment, in polemic form, almost ten years ago. He admits that he is (or at least was, when he wrote it) a political opponent of the "Doctor," and points out how, as one of his "achievements," Kissinger managed to have virtually everyone call him by that honorific, even though he is not a medical doctor. In the preface Hitchens eliminates from his indictment certain Kissinger actions that might not be indictable offenses, but are despicable enough, such as encouraging the Kurds to rise against Saddam Hussein, as well as his support for apartheid South Africa. Setting these aside, Hitchens details Kissinger's bloody hand in the events in Indochina, Chile, Bangladesh, Cyprus, East Timor, and the murder of a journalist in Washington, D.C. Prior to Hitchens' book, I was most aware of Kissinger's malevolence in the events in Indochina and Chile. Hitchens details Kissinger's efforts to prolong the Vietnam War by encouraging South Vietnamese obduracy at the Paris Peace talks in 1968, so that Richard Nixon could be elected. My personal involvement in the Vietnam War, serving as a medical corpsman, during a period of that prolongation, places me also in that "political opponent" camp. Considering that half the names (some might quibble- and have - that it is only a third) on the black wall in Washington D.C. might be alive today if "Dr." Kissinger had not practiced his "statecraft" in Paris is enough to beg for a revision of Dante, and create a special 10th circle of Hell, for his exclusive residence. And if that is not enough, consider that one to two million Vietnamese who died during that period, or the auto-genocide of the Khmer Rouge, attributed in large portion to the horrific B-52 carpet bombing that Kissinger orchestrated. His hand in the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende, as well as the murder of General René Schneider, which occurred, ironically in retrospect, on September 11, has also been fairly well known, particularly since the fall of the Pinochet regime, and the release of Chilean government papers on this CIA conducted coup. The less well known crimes, at least to me, but certainly not to the victims, were Kissinger's actions involving Bangladesh, Cyprus and East Timor, and only serve to pile more brimstones into that 10th circle.

I read all the 1 and 2-star reviews, searching for some sort of refutation to the charges, and found none. I only found excuses, and rationalizations, such as others have been as bad, like Stalin and Mobuto, or that the presidents are also responsible. And then there was the classic cover for all crimes made by people who had never experienced a B-52 strike, the old stand-by, with shrug, "you can't make an omelet without breaking a few eggs." Even Kissinger himself, as included in the appendix, does not provide refutations, only dissimulations, in the infamous style of the "doctor" who still nourishes his foreign accent... a la Strangelove?

Overall, Hitchens has provided a strict legal brief, examining Kissinger's actions by the standards that the United States has held others, primarily defeated military powers. Hitchens engages in the more that occasional rhetorical flourish however, which I would consider hard not to do, and is probably better than a deadpan bureaucratic document. He has shown considerable courage for taking on a subject that the mainstream media, still showing the Doctor immense deference, would consider "too hot to handle." But there is a major postscript that has been omitted from this book, and that is the transformation of Hitchens himself, from a contrarian gadfly of the establishment outlook to a major promoter of right-wing Islamophobia. That story, however, as they used to say in college is "beyond the scope of this course," (or, in this case, the particular merits of this book, which deserves a solid 5-stars).

Siegfried Sassoon's famous poem, "Base Details," concerning the scarlet majors at the base (who were more prosaically known at REMF's in Vietnam) concluded with the line: "And when the war is done, and the youth stone dead, I'll toddle safely home- and die in bed." Another architect of the wars, Robert McNamara, who at least showed partial remorse, has already safely exited via his bed, at a ripe old age, as no doubt will Kissinger. But he almost certainly will pass without even the partial remorse.

My standard quip remains, which denotes the possibility of the most unlikely events: "In a world in which Henry Kissinger can win the Nobel Peace Prize, anything is possible."

review
Superb book.There are a few generalities, lousy index, and no footnotes or bibliography. Otherwise, very good and it seems very accurate.

Christopher Hitchens is a persuasive writer
but the title, and the book itself, is full of hyperbole - and unsupported allegations.Christopher, shame on you. ... Read more

Product Description
Written by Henry Kissinger. This is about the Cold War. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

a great read
Henry Kissinger gets slammed for self-promotion, but like the saying goes, 'it ain't bragging if you've done it,' and this volume is full of 'been there, done that' anecdotes. It should be read together with 'white house years.' ... Read more

Product Description
During the 2008 election season, the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates both aspired to be understood as foreign policy "realists" in the mold of Henry Kissinger. Kissinger, who is distrusted on the neoconservative right for his skepticism about American exceptionalism and on the liberal left for his amoral, realpolitik approach, once again stood as the sage of foreign relations and the wise man who rises above partisan politics. In The Eccentric Realist, Mario Del Pero questions this depiction of Kissinger. Lauded as the foreign policy realist par excellence, Kissinger, as Del Pero shows, has been far more ideological and inconsistent in his policy formulations than is commonly realized.

Del Pero considers the rise and fall of Kissinger's foreign policy doctrine over the course of the 1970s-beginning with his role as National Security Advisor to Nixon and ending with the collapse of détente with the Soviet Union after Kissinger left the scene as Ford's outgoing Secretary of State. Del Pero shows that realism then (not unlike realism now) was as much a response to domestic politics as it was a cold, hard assessment of the facts of international relations. In the early 1970s, Americans were weary of ideological forays abroad; Kissinger provided them with a doctrine that translated that political weariness into foreign policy. Del Pero argues that Kissinger was keenly aware that realism could win elections and generate consensus. Moreover, over the course of the 1970s it became clear that realism, as practiced by Kissinger, was as rigid as the neoconservativism that came to replace it.

In the end, the failure of the détente forged by the realists was not the defeat of cool reason at the hands of ideologically motivated and politically savvy neoconservatives. Rather, the force of American exceptionalism, the touchstone of the neocons, overcame Kissinger's political skills and ideological commitments. The fate of realism in the 1970s raises interesting questions regarding its prospects in the early years of the twenty-first century. ... Read more

Product Description

What made Henry Kissinger the kind of diplomat he was? What experiences and influences shaped his worldview and provided the framework for his approach to international relations? Jeremi Suri offers a thought-provoking, interpretive study of one of the most influential and controversial political figures of the twentieth century.

Drawing on research in more than six countries in addition to extensive interviews with Kissinger and others, Suri analyzes the sources of Kissinger's ideas and power and explains why he pursued the policies he did. Kissinger's German-Jewish background, fears of democratic weakness, belief in the primacy of the relationship between the United States and Europe, and faith in the indispensable role America plays in the world shaped his career and his foreign policy. Suri shows how Kissinger's early years in Weimar and Nazi Germany, his experiences in the U.S. Army and at Harvard University, and his relationships with powerful patrons--including Nelson Rockefeller and Richard Nixon--shed new light on the policymaker.

Kissinger's career was a product of the global changes that made the American Century. He remains influential because his ideas are rooted so deeply in dominant assumptions about the world. In treating Kissinger fairly and critically as a historical figure, without polemical judgments, Suri provides critical context for this important figure. He illuminates the legacies of Kissinger's policies for the United States in the twenty-first century.

Customer Reviews (3)

New Spin on Traditional Biographies - looks at kissinger the man, not his actions
Jeremi Suri presents Henry Kissinger in a very unique way, unfamiliar to traditional biographies. His writing and analytic abilities set this book far ahead of any others. Sure, you may read an eight hundred epic on every little think Kissinger did. In "Henry Kissinger and the American Century" the author provides a concise analysis of Kissinger's life and its implications on his later decisions which have gathered such controversy and his impact upon history as a whole.
A fantastic, well written, unique take on Henry Kissinger - a man who is, without a doubt, one of the most influential figures of the twentieth century.
Five Stars - I can't think of a bad thing about it.

What makes Dr K tick
Henry A. Kissinger, one of a handful of memorable secretaries of state, is a German-born Jew haunted by the failure of democracy in his birthplace and the subsequent failure of the world's democracies to stop the Nazi drive for mastery of Europe in the 1930s. Those failures made possible the massive slaughter of World War II, the nearly total destruction of Jewish life in Europe (which marked Kissinger personally)and in its aftermath left the United States and the exercise of its power the main arbiter of the world's fate. Stalin's Soviet Union, however, had other plans.
Kissinger did not view war with Soviet Russia as inevitable, nor did he regard Russian ambitions in Eastern and Central Europe as altogether unreasonable. But he did think that unless America was willing to project its power in strategic areas of the world, such as Europe and the Middle East, and confront Soviet ambitions in those areas, the Cold War would be lost with dire consequences for Americans.
Kissinger thought the Cold War would make strange bedfellows--reactionary kings, military dictators and strongman-types whose personal vanity outweighed any concern for the future of their people.
Kissinger was a supreme realist. He did not seek the make the world a better place, only a safer one for his adopted country and its friends.
His hero was Metternich, of Congress of Vienna and Balance of Power fame. There was no room for sentimentality, and not much room for public opinion, in his world view. Wars and rumors of wars were not only expected, but exploited by Kissinger, which his critics viewed as coldly cynical, immoral and in some cases (Vietnam, Chile) indifferent to human lives.
Kissinger owed his power, at the height of his career, to Richard M. Nixon, whose feelings toward Jews were mixed at best, bigoted at worst.
Oddly, his Jewish background was an asset in dealing with Arab rulers. They figured that American Jews dictated U.S. policy in the Mideast anyhow, so Kissinger essentially cut out the middle man.
The only weakness of the book is its brevity (less than 300 pages) which doesn't leave much room for analysis of complicated issues. Nuclear weapons negotiations are barely mentioned. None the less, an excellent introduction to a complex man who left a large imprint on America's place in the world.

A remarkable book about a remarkable man, a genuine 20th century iconoclast.
In "Henry Kissinger and the American Century," Jeremi Suri has chronicled the political history of arguably one of the world's most brilliant personalities.Suri's book leaves out much of Kissinger's personal history, beyond his childhood in Weimar and Nazi Germany, which is generally vague."Henry Kissinger and the American Century" does, however, provide readers with the background necessary to begin to understand the man and his policies.Suri pays particular attention to Kissinger's skepticism of democracy, which truly helped shape those policies.
Henry Kissinger is a Cold War oracle, subject to the failings of the human condition as any of us, but arguably far more attuned to the strategic and political situation than anyone ever was.
Suri does not dodge logical criticisms and critics and provides a groundwork for understanding of Kissinger's philosophies.Reading the book, you might notice how just when you begin to forget Kissinger's German-Jewish childhood, Suri extols this fact in context throughout.
The book reveals Kissinger's innate ability to address both his genteel and gentile contemporaries.If any American in history ever leveraged their "outsider" status to the maximum and re-define the idea of an "insider", it was Kissinger.
The book is full of exceptional quotes from Kissinger, his influences and his contemporaries that are no less relevant in the War on Terror than they were in the Cold War.
REVIEW EVERY BOOK YOU READ!



... Read more

Product Description

Perhaps the best-known American diplomatist of the twentieth century, Henry Kissinger is a major figure in world history, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, and arguably one of the most brilliant minds ever placed at the service of American foreign policy, as well as one of the shrewdest, best-informed, and most articulate men ever to occupy a position of power in Washington.

The eagerly awaited third and final volume of his memoirs completes a major work of contemporary history. It is at once an important historical document and a brilliantly told narrative of almost Shakespearean intensity, full of startling insights, unusual (and often unsparing) candor, and a sweeping sense of history. Years of Renewal is the triumphant conclusion of a major achievement and a book that will stand the test of time as a historical document of the first rank.Amazon.com Review
There is an old joke that Henry Kissinger is so full ofhimself he once wrote a book called Famous People Who Have MetMe. That strong sense of self is on full display in this thirdvolume of memoirs (the other two are White House Yearsand Years ofUpheaval). Kissinger, a national security advisor andsecretary of state in the Nixon and Ford administrations, is aforeign-policy maestro fond of describing the difficult subtleties ofhis job. He is also, at times, generous with his praise--especiallywith this whopper: "I am certain the time will come when it isrecognized that the Cold War could not have been won had not GeraldFord, at a tragic point of America's history, been there to keep usfrom losing it." Years of Renewal begins during Nixon's finaldays, and provides a few key insights into the man Kissinger calls"perhaps [the] most complex President of the twentieth century." Oneeye opener is the revelation that Nixon ordered the bombing of theDamascus airport in 1969 during a hijacking incident "to impress hispals." (It was called off the next morning.) The bulk of the book (andbulk is the right word--there are nearly 1,100 pages of textbefore the footnotes) focuses on Ford, who comes across as much morestatesmanlike than the popular image of him as a bunglingcaretaker. The portraits of contemporary world leaders are alsovaluable. Kissinger combines detail and clarity to deliver animportant chronicle of American diplomacy during the 1970s. --JohnMiller ... Read more

Customer Reviews (18)

Looking Better With Time
It is hard to imagine that any future secretary of state will ever enjoy, if that is the right word, the power and responsibility invested in Henry Kissinger in the critical years 1974-76. For in this time frame he served an unelected president, Gerald R. Ford, on the heels of a constitutional crisis, the forced resignation of another president, Richard M. Nixon. His tenure included the agony of the final days of America's first lost war, the Viet Nam conflict, and the international perception that America was in a state of political disarray. Russia, Cuba, the Arab League, emerging African independence leaders, and scores of others would take advantage of this perception, which was not entirely wrong. The 1974 Congressional elections had brought to power what the author disparagingly referred to as McGovern Democrats seeking to reign in executive excesses of the Nixon years.

This work was published in 1999, a quarter century after the events it narrates, and thus Kissinger must set the table with a lengthy prolegomena of the "Nixon Problem," so to speak. Kissinger, of course, had been there from the beginning in 1969 and does give his own tenure a cohesive organic flow. Though a Harvard professor and Rockefeller Republican, Kissinger proved to be a genuine cold warrior to Nixon's liking. To his credit, Kissinger's fascination with Nixon was tempered by his equally strong admiration for Metternich; thus he was able to channel Nixon's raw knuckle world view into such dramatic accomplishments as the opening to China.

Gerald Ford was no Nixon, for better or worse. Kissinger, who generally subdues his paternalistic tendencies in this work, expresses genuine respect for Ford's decency but does not hide his opinion that Ford's Grand Rapids advisors were not quite ready for prime time, and probably would never be. Thus the table is set for a memoir of a beleaguered yet noble statesman moving incessantly around the globe, hamstrung by a president of modest skills and a slew of elected and bureaucratic enemies back home while maintaining a strong American visage toward the two nuclear superpowers and a staggering range of agendas of every sort.

Self-aggrandizement came so natural to the author in his professional life that those of us who remember his career will scarcely take notice of it in this volume, the third of his executive trilogy. Kissinger believed that Nixon's foreign policy was on an essentially sound trajectory, particularly in relation to Russia and China. Thus his time under Ford was, in the secretary's mind, a crusade to continue this Nixon trajectory without Nixon. Détente, linkage, and triangulation--Kissinger's stock in trade--would be put to the test.

In this 1100+ page work Kissinger spills a lot of ink on his dealings with China. He could hardly have foreseen the economic world order of 2010 and China's role today; in 1974 nuclear holocaust dominated diplomatic concerns, and diplomacy with China was still in its exploratory stages, with Chairman Mao still at the helm. Mao had the good political sense and the long historical view not to unduly burden Kissinger's day about Viet Nam. In other working relationships this would not always be the case.

Kissinger had a better feel for the problems of his Russian counterparts, notably Premier Leonid Brezhnev, who was not as bold as Nixon in disengaging from the past and thus was held hostage to it. Not surprisingly the matter of arms control occupied much of the diplomatic calendar, often in a Russian exercise of face saving. Brezhnev's health and competence were further matters of concern.

Certainly the most maddening and time consuming of Kissinger's international duties involved what has come to be known as his "shuttle diplomacy" between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Again, it is wise to reflect upon the times: Israel had fought back Egypt twice within the past decade, and little progress on such issues as Palestinian refugees could be made before more basic questions of boundaries and security were settled. To his credit Kissinger backed the right horse among Arab leaders, Egypt's Anwar Sadat, who shared something of Kissinger's long view of the region, and it is fair to say that the American secretary of state had certainly improved the prospects of the Carter Administration in the region several years later.

Like his predecessors Kissinger worked with an eye toward the containment of communism. The ever-present threat of communist subversion in the 1970's was always on his mind, even as the American public was re-evaluating this cost, and communism certainly put Africa in Kissinger's sights. The major African flashpoint on his watch was Angola, where Cuba sent a liberation army of sorts in a clear gesture of both invitation to and intimidation of emerging African nations into the communist sphere.

Kissinger's detailed accounts of his African work are intriguing to read. For the most part he was dealing with nations in a state of political adolescence, where aging heroes of the decolonization period wrestled with younger upstarts seeking advantageous international alignments. Kissinger knew many of the senior leaders and describes the charism of each along with the future shock of tribal peoples entering the family of nations.

In Africa, as much as anywhere, we see Kissinger's existential play-calling severely hindered by an anti-war American backlast. In the case of Angola, for example, he was thwarted by the controversial "Tunney Amendment" which prohibited funding of covert American counter insurgence. But throughout his work Kissinger scorns the "McGovernites" in a way that suggests he never quite "got" Viet Nam. Having had no role in starting the war, he apparently believed his work should not be impeded by it, either.

I do commend Dr. Kissinger's decision to take his time in publishing this third volume. The extra time has resulted in a particularly thoughtful analysis of a most peculiar time for American statecraft. The hubris, what there is of it, has been acquired honestly.

how the world was run in the ford administration
kissinger details how the white house was run after nixon resigned and ford came into power--the photographs are excellent and the text is inciteful----kissinger has been accused of some very bad decisions inhis time that caused many innocent lives--this book gives the reader for why he made those decisions

"In The Moment of Victory, Button Your Chin Strap!"
Henry Kissinger's book, "Years of Renewal," is a complete review of U.S. foreign policy initiatives while he was Secretary of State under President Gerald R. Ford.In it, he details how they built upon the foreign policy successes of the Nixon Administration and laid the foundation for the resurgence of the American spirit seen during the Reagan Administration.From a diplomatic standpoint, this may have been America's finest hour.

With the possible exception of Lincoln, no U.S. president has inherited a nation as severely divided as Gerald R. Ford.Immediately after assuming office, he faced one international crisis after another with a hostile, "McGovernite Congress," and an emasculated intelligence gathering system that made effective response to even the most extreme provocations virtually impossible.Kissinger says throughout, Ford made decisions solely on what was best for the nation, not on what was politically expedient.His reward for such selfless service:defeat in the next election.

Like Kissinger's other works, this book can be read either in individual chapters or be taken as a whole.In each segment he details, what they did, what their options were, the assumptions their actions were based upon, and if unsuccessful, what their fall back plan was to be.In spite of seemingly insurmountable odds, they were able to hold the Atlantic Alliance together, strengthen our ties to the Peoples Republic of China, and keep the Soviets out of both the Middle East and Africa.

The Chinese war philosopher, Sun Tsu said, "In the moment of victory, button your chin strap."History has proven theSoviets should have listened.Given our national paralysis following Vietnam/Watergate, it seemed they could not be stopped.In the international chess game--that is diplomacy at the highest levels--they were stopped through the efforts of a few, dedicated statesmen who blocked them at every turn.The fall of the Soviet Union and Communism was the ultimate result.

This book is a textbook on how to conduct foreign policy.Enlightening and informative, it has inspired me to read Kissinger's other works, "White House Years," and "Years of Upheaval."I highly recommend it to any serious student of the era.

An excellent historic book.
I have admired Henry Kissinger for many years. I think he is one of thoselimited intellectual diplomacies who really have, not only limited to one'sword, a long term vision. It's really enjoyable when you read his book andshare his thoughts.

A Remarkable Tour de Force!
Dr. Kissinger, for all of his hubris and arrogance will truly go down in history as a great statesman. His intimate and sometimes self-deprecating writing style will keep the reader at the edge of their seat especiallyduring the end of the Vietnam War and the crisis with Cyprus. All threevolumes could very well serve as textbooks for anyone interested in thefiner points of statecraft. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (8)

Wonderful
Quick delivery and in good condition.The book is a real weighty tome, written by a great mind; I love it.A great example of why second-hand book buying through Amazon is such a wonderful idea.

Powerful.
Whatever your views on Kissinger, and let's be honest we all have a view, this is a fascinating look into the Nixon White House and Kissinger's role throughout it.Though Years of Upheaval/Renewal are good in their own right, White House Years sets the table for a fascinating series and should be a part of any government/political junkies reading diet.

Dont be stupid
1 "1" how the hell could they have ended the war when Hanoi demanded a unilateral pullout and that the US toppled the Saigon government on the way out?? It took years of political and military pressure for Hanoi to abandon that demand. Dont be stupid.

1-1 is a raving idiot
1-1 has cut and pasted the same idiotic rant for all three volumes of Dr. Kissinger's memoirs, and has obviously NOT READ ONE SINGLE PAGE OF ANY OF THEM!!!! Go post your polemics on Indymedia you moron.
This is a first rate account of one of the most influential statesman in history.

War Criminal
if you want the evil truth about Dr K and how he undermined the 1968 peace talks, read "No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam" by Larry Berman.

This book explains how Nixon and Kissinger illegally colluded with SVN and Nguyen Van Thieu - he was told by Nixon via Anna Chenault to "hold on, we are going to win" and "you will get a better deal with us". So Thieu says he won't talk peace, Nixon wins, Kissinger openly changes sides after working with the Democrats, and together they crank up the war.

The point is: The War could have ended in 1968 if it were not for this man - Dr Death himself, Henry Adolf Kissinger! ... Read more

Product Description
The eminent historian and strategist reflects on how China's past illuminates its twenty-first-century trajectory, drawing on forty years of intimate acquaintance with the country and its leaders.

In Untitled on China, Henry Kissinger turns for the first time at book length to the country he has known intimately for decades and whose modern relations with the West he helped shape. Drawing on historical records as well as on his conversations with Chinese leaders over the past forty years, Kissinger examines how China has approached diplomacy, strategy, and negotiation throughout its history and reflects on the consequences for the twenty-first-century world.

As Kissinger underscores, the unique conditions under which China developed continue to shape its policies and attitudes toward the outside world. For centuries, China rarely encountered other societies of comparable size and sophistication. China was the "Middle Kingdom," treating the peoples on its periphery as vassal states. At the same time, Chinese statesmen-facing threats of invasion from without and the contests of competing factions within-developed a canon of strategic thought that prized the virtues of subtlety, patience, and indirection over feats of martial prowess.

Untitled on China examines key episodes in Chinese foreign policy, from the earliest days through the twentieth century, with a particular emphasis on the modern era. Kissinger illuminates the inner workings of Chinese diplomacy during such events as the initial encounters between China and modern European powers, the formation and breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Korean War, the opening of relations with the United States, the Tiananmen Square crackdown, and China's accession to the World Trade Organization.

The book traces the evolution of Sino-American relations in the past sixty years, following their course from estrangement to strategic partnership and toward an uncertain future. Kissinger analyzes the two towering figures of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, and their divergent visions of China's modern destiny. With a final chapter on China's twenty-first-century world role, Untitled on China provides a sweeping historical perspective on Chinese foreign policy from one of the premier statesmen of the twentieth century. ... Read more

Product Description
By drawing upon hitherto unpublished transcripts of his telephone conversations during the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the last days of the Vietnam War (1975), Henry Kissinger reveals what goes on behind the scenes at the highest levels in a diplomatic crisis.

The two major foreign policy crises in this book, one successfully negotiated, one that ended tragically, were unique in that they moved so fast that much of the work on them had to be handled by telephone.

The longer of the two sections deals in detail with the Yom Kippur War and is full of revelations, as well as great relevancy: In Kissinger's conversations with Golda Meir, Israeli Prime Minister; Simcha Dinitz, Israeli ambassador to the U.S.; Mohamed el-Zayyat, the Egyptian Foreign Minister; Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.; Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary General of the U.N.; and a host of others, as well as with President Nixon, many of the main elements of the current problems in the Middle East can be seen.

The section on the end of the Vietnam War is a tragic drama, as Kissinger tries to help his president and a divided nation through the final moments of a lost war. It is full of astonishing material, such as Kissinger's trying to secure the evacuation of a Marine company which, at the very last minute, is discovered to still be in Saigon as the city is about to fall, and his exchanges with Ambassador Martin in Saigon, who is reluctant to leave his embassy.

This is a book that presents perhaps the best record of the inner workings of diplomacy at the superheated pace and tension of real crisis.

... Read more

Customer Reviews (5)

Specific to Kissinger's section on Vietnam
Anyone who has read Kissinger extensively could predict what he would be saying in this book, and he did not disappoint.The same old story of the failure of the democrats, in the House and Senate, from 1973 until the Fall of Saigon, to provide the necessary resources, as Kissinger articulates them (primarily dollars), to support the South Vietnamese government and their American allies. What Kissinger does not address, nor has he in the volumes that he has written about himself, is the fact that Kissinger, the CIA, many of the diplomats on the ground in Saigon, as well as key members of the administration knew that the context of the war, in the "waning days" haddramatically changed.Through ports in Hanoi and Haiphong, the Russians provided the North Vietnamese Army(NVA) with sufficientmilitary resources to support a massive build-up - in the form of artillery and armor - to ensure an NVA military victory.All the dollars Kissinger and the administration blamed the democrats for failing to appropriate, in order to shore up the Saigon government, would not have affected the war's outcome because the NVA had decided on a military victory and prepared for it.How, then, would increased dollars, given the American mood and cyncism of the time, from the democratically controlled Congress, made any difference, given the NVA military initiative?Kissinger reinforces his previously stated analyses, with more self-serving bias, as predicted.

Kissinger uses the method of transcribed telephone conversations to drive certain other points home -points to support a favorable image.When one reads a response to a Kissinger question, from Ambassador Martin, for example, the reader cannot deduce what Ambassador Martin really was thinking about the Kissinger question or even the man.The "response" is not telling.While admittedly, Kissinger and Ambassador Martin shared the same principles, for many reason, Martin was often sketpical of the arrogant, aloof Harvard professor.

Dennis W. Hallinan
Peninsula, Ohio
evaluation_dwh@yahoo.com

Kissinger shows his incompetance once again
I don't know why I try to stomach reading books from a war criminal.I suppose we all must read and listen to the criminal mind so that we can understand why they become such monsters.I've read Hitler, Stalin, and Kissinger (and the rest).Don't buy this book...instead find yourself a copy of the book or documentary called "The Trial of Henry Kissinger".

Disappointing
After reading this book, the question looms large as to why Dr. Kissinger bothered to "write" it.It is essentially a selected collection of phone logs between Dr. Kissinger and his cohorts during the Yom Kippur War and the last days of the Vietnam War.If you are halfway interested in politics and history, there is nothing in this book that you don't already know, other than being able to glean through the actual words spoken by the policy makers of the time - what was "behind the scenes" was not startlingly different than what was on the TV screen.

I am disappointed with this book, not least because I am much impressed by Dr. Kissinger's other work, especially his defining tome: Diplomacy.

I am thankful for the tip given by the previous reviewer from Amsterdam, pointing out where to get the declassified information from the NSA.He was right.The account (of the Yom Kippur War) from the declassified NSA documents was more succinct, balanced and overall more informative.

Student of American foreign policy since 1960
Kissinger has done another book which reveals far less than was discussed in the contemporary press.His accounts are mainly inane and trivial. The transcripts on Vietnam are almost wholly on the evacuation of April 1975 and trivial details, well known. As for the Yom Kippur war, the National Security Archives has released crucial declassified documents and they are free at
http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98. They are much more important and insightful than this exceedinly lame production.

Helps understand our current problems in the Middle East
The book helps understand our current problems in the Middle East, in particular, our relation to Israel and the tensions and stresses between Israel, the Arab states and the United States.
The brilliance of Henry Kissinger is revealed.The intelligence and savy of Nixon was a supprise. ... Read more

Product Description
In Years of Upheaval Henry Kissinger recalls the turbulent years of the second Administration of Richard Nixon, which began on 20 January 1973. Two momentous events and their consequences dominate this account: the Watergate scandal, and the 1973 October war in the Middle East. The books opens at the Western White House on a summer afternoon in August of that year, when Dr Kissinger is told by the President during a poolside conversation that he is to become Secretary of State. The memories that follow are a rich compendium of his experiences in the months before and after appointment: an eerie trip to Hanoi shortly after the Vietnam cease-fire; efforts to settle the war in Cambodia; two Nixon-Brezhnev summits and the controversy over detente; the Shah of Iran; the oil crisis and the efforts to covercome it; the US airlift to Israel and the military alert during the Middle East war; the origins of shuttle diplomacy; the fall of Salvador Allende in Chile; and the events surrounding Nixon's resignation.His frank portrait of Nixon's last days is perhaps the most perceptive to date At once illuminating, fascinating, and profound, Years of Upheaval is a lasting contribution to the history of our time, by one of its chief protagonists. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Kissinger War Criminal
if you want the evil truth about Dr K and how he undermined the 1968 peace talks, read "No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam" by Larry Berman.

This book explains how Nixon and Kissinger illegally colluded with SVN and Nguyen Van Thieu - he was told by Nixon via Anna Chenault to "hold on, we are going to win" and "you will get a better deal with us". So Thieu says he won't talk peace, Nixon wins, Kissinger openly changes sides after working with the Democrats, and together they crank up the war.

The point is: The War could have ended in 1968 if it were not for this man - Dr Death himself, Henry Adolf Kissinger!

"They sew the wind and reap the whirlwind. . ."
This second volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs begins with Nixon's sweeping victory in the 1972 presidential election over George McGovern.Nixon/Kissinger, now operating with an overwhelming national mandate initiated some of the most formidable foreign policy initiatives in history.Success seemed inevitable.However, there was a cancer growing on the Nixon presidency, one that would ultimately prove fatal; it was called, "Watergate."

The Nixon/Kissinger team did the seemingly impossible by negotiating an end to the war in Vietnam.Sadly, after Congress refused further support to South Vietnam, all they could do was watch as the Communists systematically violated every agreement solemnly sworn to in Paris.His description of the strange alliance between liberals and conservatives to hamstring the presidency is interesting.George Wallace said, "Politics makes strange bedfellows!"Never were, "bedfellows," so strange as here.

The crisis in the Mid-east made the author a legend in his own time.He describes the key leaders and analyzes their positions and motivations brilliantly.From these analyses, the famous, "shuttle diplomacy" that forged a peace agreement between the seemingly intractable parties was born.Students of international relations should read this section carefully.

Not all was well.The Year of Europe, the Arab oil-embargo, and the decline of détente were all seen during this period.Regrettably, all probably could have been accomplished except for Watergate.

Kissinger shows how Watergate steadily sapped the presidents' base of support, preventing him from operating effectively.Congress, the media, and even some members of his own cabinet eventually turned on him.Kissinger's explanation of how this was handled domestically and internationally is essential reading for political scientists and students of international relations.

The title of this review comes from the the book of Hosea, Chapter 8, Verse 7 of the Holy Bible.Despite good intentions and spectacular successes, Nixon had "sewn the wind" with his unnecessary misdeeds during the election.He then "reaped the whirlwind" of protest caused by moral outrage and national discontent stemming from a decade of war.Was this justified?You decide!

Years of Upheaval is essential reading for historians of the period, political scientists and students of international relations.I highly recommend it to anyone desiring insight into the events of this turbulent era.

Superb
What I most enjoyed about this book were (1) Kissinger's analyses of leaders and diplomats like Sadat, Meir, Dayan, Mao, and Chou (the last of whom he seems to admire the most), (2) his humor, as when he describes his dinner with King Faisal or how he missed the TV announcement about his appointment as Secretary of State, and (3) his candid portrayal of Nixon, who comes off as awkward and bizarre.Kissinger's own egomania is very much in evidence, but in a way that is entertaining rather than irritating, because you can tell that he is not trying very hard to conceal it.

Action under the most difficult of circumstances
In this continuing memoir, Henry Kissinger writes of his experiences of his transition from National Security Advisor to Secretary of State during a point in the Nixon Administration that represented the greatest constitutional crisis in America since the Civil War. Starting with the beginning of Richard Nixon's second term, Kissinger goes into stunning detail by describing the immense frustrations in trying to stop the war, not only with Vietnam, but also with Cambodia and Laos. He goes on to discuss "The Year of Europe", a soon to be defunct policy about American action in Europe in 1973. Naturally, the Year of Europe was mortally wounded by Watergate. The Watergate scandal politically forced Nixon to make Kissinger, one of the most Popular people in America, The New Secretary of State. In that role, Kissinger continued and extended his influence in such matters as SALT, and a hugely surprising war between Israel and an Egyptian-Syrian coalition. He discusses his gradual high respect for Anwar Sadat, and his mother-son like relationship with Golda Meir. Most importantly, he discusses his interactions with the soon to resign Richard Nixon. This book does its best work by teaching respect for foreign policy leaders who are in almost impossible positions and who must find a way to make their country safer in the world. ... Read more

Product Description

In this timely, thoughtful, and important book, at once far-seeing and brilliantly readable, America's most famous diplomatist explains why we urgently need a new and coherent foreign policy and what our foreign policy goals should be in this new millennium. In seven accessible chapters, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? provides a crystalline assessment of how the United States' ascendancy as the world's dominant presence in the twentieth century may be effectively reconciled with the urgent need in the twenty-first century to achieve a bold new world order. With a new Afterword by the author that addresses the situation in the aftermath of September 11, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? asks and answers the most pressing questions of our nation today.Amazon.com Review
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asks a question in the title of his book Does America Need a Foreign Policy?--but there's really no doubt about the answer. That's not to say it shouldn't be asked: "The last presidential election was the third in a row in which foreign policy was not seriously discussed by the candidates," writes Kissinger. "In the face of perhaps the most profound and widespread upheavals the world has ever seen, [the United States] has failed to develop concepts relevant to the emerging realities." Kissinger tours the world in this book, describing how the United States should relate to various regions and countries. This is not a gripping book, but it is sober, accessible, brief, and comprehensive--and an excellent introduction to international relations and diplomacy.

Kissinger has opinions on just about every topic he raises, from globalization (for it) to international courts (against them, for the most part). He supports a vigorous missile-defense system: "The United States cannot condemn its population to permanent vulnerability." He opines on peace in the Middle East: "Israel should abandon its opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state except as part of a final status agreement." His claims are often eye-opening: "There are few nations in the world with which the United States has less reason to quarrel or more compatible interests than Iran." He is especially critical of domestic politics interfering with America's international relations: "Whatever the merit of the individual legislative actions, their cumulative effect drives American foreign policy toward unilateral and seemingly bullying conduct." The media has been a special problem in this regard, as it zips around the world in search of exciting but ephemeral stories, which are "generally presented as a morality play between good and evil having a specific outcome and rarely in terms of the long-range challenges of history." Does America need a foreign policy? Of course it does, and Henry Kissinger has done readers a service by outlining what a good one might be. --John J. Miller ... Read more

Customer Reviews (39)

How come the kindle version is more expensive than the print version????
This one-star is intended for the Amazon and/or the publisher, not the author. It does not make any sense!

Realism vs Idealism
Does America Need a Foreign Policy? by Henry Kissinger was published in 2001, shortly before 9/11. In the current paperback edition, he has added an Afterword on 9/11 and terrorism. While the Afterword is helpful, what is remarkable is how relevant his pre-9/11 text remains in the post-9/11 world.

Kissinger's title question is purely rhetorical. Of course America needs a foreign policy. His point in the title appears to be that American foreign policy has too often been the subject of domestic political campaigns which are focused more on electing the next president than on the country's real, long-term interests. This is a theme that he shares with the late George Kennan.

Kissinger's text follows a straightforward outline: Suggestions for US foreign policy with regard to Europe, the Western Hemisphere, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, Globalization, and "Peace and Justice". I'll say more on this topic below.

Throughout the text, Kissinger advocates his standard theme of realism versus idealism, as he did in his magnificent prior work, Diplomacy. As a brief example, he points out that a seemingly desirable goal such as the peaceful reunification of Korea may not be as desirable as it might seem at first glance. A unified Korea, he points out, would become a major economic, political, and military power in East Asia. A more robust Korea might be seen as a threat by Japan, thereby destabilizing the current US-Japanese-South Korean alignment. Seeing a unified Korea as a threat, Japan might be tempted to go nuclear and withdraw from its close ties with the US. Do we really want this?

The theme of realism versus idealism becomes particularly pronounced in the chapter on "Peace and Justice". Kissinger's point here is that the basis for diplomacy established by the Peace of Westphalia (1648) was that the governments of the European powers agreed to:

* Deal with other governments as the sole, legitimate diplomatic representatives of their countries, regardless of the level of cordiality or hostility between them

* Refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other nation-states, specifically religious affiliations, which were the basis for the preceding Thirty Years War which had devastated Europe

These precepts held sway until WWI when the US President, Woodrow Wilson, injected a strong theme of idealism when the US entered the war. His goals were (1) self determination of nationalities, regardless of prior national boundaries, (2) "making the world safe for democracy", and (3) collective security. These goals flew in the face of the Westphalian accords by postulating the existence of a higher (but undefined) diplomatic/legal/moral authority that took precedence over peaceful relations between established governments.

This issue is of particular importance today as it underlies many aspects of US foreign policy. Without offering answers, I'll pose the following dilemmas which Kissinger's book brings to mind:

* There appears to be an inherent conflict between the goals of maintaining peace among nations (diplomacy based on realism, the Westphalian accord) and supporting idealistic goals generally accepted by Americas, including democracy and human rights in other nations (diplomacy based on idealism, the Wilsonian approach). Can we achieve both peace and our idealistic goals? If not, how do we prioritize between them?

* Legal structures in the West, especially Anglo-American legal structures, are based on the mutual acceptance by all parties (or at least most parties) of the existing legal system as a means of settling differences within nations. The concept of "international law" among nations is not so well defined and certainly lacks the level of universal acceptance required to make it effective.

There are tough questions. I thank Kissinger (and Kennan) for helping articulate them. Solving them will be up to their successors.

A Valuable History Lesson
While he does not take history to his typical intimate detail, this book is a valuable history lesson with a specific connection to a recommendation of American foreign policy. While I was expecting his recommendation to be finite in nature, I was somewhat let down, yet history and our current world order as he describes precludes such a narrow mind.

Europe

It is a popular concept in the western world, that sovereignty is derived through a democratic process whereby the people elect leaders who proscribe common law to abide by. Kissinger points out that the Westphalia agreement in post 30 Years War, where regions of land actually were bound by a specific demarcation line, lay the beginning of this popular belief. We have evolved from Kingdoms and Fiefdoms to a world largely dominated by a democratic process. Whether this is merely a transitional phase or the ultimate end is examined in the book. He does fall short in this book in proper examination of China. That review is forth coming.

In taking a historical look at America's relationship with the various regions of the world, one can conclude that many of today's nations either a.) Do not fall into this definition, or b.) Fall into this definition as a result of a settlement of a war. Kissinger takes the time to examine the difference between a nation and state, and the application of Wilsonian imposition of human rights versus national interest. Where is the balance in the answers? Again, Kissinger resorts to history in drawing his conclusion. Yet he takes a stand early on is stating that "So long as post Cold Was generation of national leaders is embarrassed to elaborate an un-apologetic concept of enlightened national interest, it will achieve progressive paralysis, not moral elevation. Certainly, to be truly American, any concept of national interest must flow from the country's democratic tradition..."

Asia...To see Kissingers prognosis on all the regions in the world please do a keyword search for my blog at cigarroomofbooks.blogspot. There are a few interesting recomendations.The review is on the 2007 list.

A Diplomatic World Tour
Dr. Kissinger dissects the world into their geopolitical grouping, and discusses where current trends are taking each group.The book may be a little outdated since 911 and world terrorism was pushed to front stage, but generally the geopolitical groups remain.A united Europe dealing with a Russia once again as a rising power, the Middle East and the consequences of China becoming a mature power.As a reader that was of draft age during the Vietnam war it was ironic to read that Dr.Kissinger believes that the USA should not be a major player in the far East, but a better plan would be to play the power broker for the rivaling countries referencing Britain's role in regard to the powers on the European continent during the era of Napoleon.
This book is an easy read, very understandable.I read this book because the USA is always criticized for having no foreign policy every time World events hit us broadside.

Does America Need a Foreign Policy? ... by Dr.Kissinger PhD
Dr.Kissinger discusses the waning influence of Russia and the
rising Chinese modernization program. The author asks that we
develop a bond and new world order rather than a sheepish
acceptance of whatever happens over time. American pre-eminence
is a concommitant part of our ultimate destiny. The Treaty of
Westphalia in 1848 set forth the policy of national soverignty.
This policy implementation has been in place for decades since that time.

There is a new concept of Universal Humanitarianism and Jurisdiction by individual nations or even groups. Currently,
the historic nation states group together in order to formulate
strategies which benefit all. NAFTA is a clear example of this
doctrine in implementation. In the past, far lesser alliances and
transformations lead to big wars. The author believes that
nuclear proliferation renders war less likely because of the
strategic congruence of interests and stakes.

Currently, India, China, Russia and Japan treat each other as
strategic rivals. Previously, the Atlantic Relationship lasted
due to Russia, the unification of Germany and a growing European
identity. Russia proclaimed a zone of special influence in the
Balkans. Asia's challenge is how to prevent neighbors from
joining coalitions against it. The Middle East and Africa are
in a considerable state of flux. According to Dr.Kissinger,
humanitarianism is limited by our willingness to pay an
incremental price which may or may not be the ultimate price.

The book is a good historic rendition of the previous approaches
to global challenges, the new challenges posed and the strategic
interests aligned for the future. ... Read more

Product Description
Henry Kissinger dominated American foreign relations like no other figure in recent history. He negotiated an end to American involvement in the Vietnam War, opened relations with Communist China, and orchestrated detente with the Soviet Union. Yet he is also the man behind the secret bombing of Cambodia and policies leading to the overthrow of Chile's President Salvador Allende. Which is more accurate, the picture of Kissinger the skilled diplomat or Kissinger the war criminal? In The Flawed Architect, the first major reassessment of Kissinger in over a decade, historian Jussi Hanhimaki paints a subtle, carefully composed portrait of America's most famous and infamous statesman. Drawing on extensive research from newly declassified files, the author follows Kissinger from his beginnings in the Nixon administration up to the current controversy fed by Christopher Hitchens over whether Kissinger is a war criminal. Hanhimaki guides the reader through White House power struggles and debates behind the Cambodia and Laos invasions, the search for a strategy in Vietnam, the breakthrough with China, and the unfolding of Soviet-American detente. Here, too, are many other international crises of the period--the Indo-Pakistani War, the Yom Kippur War, the Angolan civil war--all set against the backdrop of Watergate. Along the way, Hanhimaki sheds light on Kissinger's personal flaws--he was obsessed with secrecy and bureaucratic infighting in an administration that self-destructed in its abuse of power--as well as his great strengths as a diplomat.We see Kissinger negotiating, threatening and joking with virtually all of the key foreign leaders of the 1970s, from Mao to Brezhnev and Anwar Sadat to Golda Meir.This well researched account brings to life the complex nature of American foreign policymaking during the Kissinger years. It will be the standard work on Kissinger for years to come. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

yet again, a horrid book about Kissinger
For once I'd like to see a scholar write a book about this man that is based on some primary source scholarship.Books based on newspaper clippings and speculation make for trashy books, not works of true scholarship.Really, don't bother with this book. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Limited nuclear warfare
Pernicious is the best way to describe Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons & Foreign Policy. His argument for limited nuclear war being not only possible, but under certain circumstances effective, is compelling. It is both a necessary and dangerous book, but one which everyone opposed to war and to understand the threat facing the world today, should read.

Dangerous, Outdated, Interesting.
I would have given the book more stars had it not been for the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the resultant loss of most of the books grounding.

Kissinger is a smart man and a good writer. He is of course famous for his career in the Nixon administration. However, his views on the possibility of limited nuclear wars, whilst interesting and important, are (thankfully) unsubstantiated. He is of the opinion that limited nuclear wars are possible, but does not fully consider the dangers of escalation/miscalculations by the other/both sides. I think his ideas would only work effectively with large nations that have small nuclear arsenals to begin with -- they might have to be satisfied with 'small' nuclear wars bacause that is all they could fight, and would fortunately still be large enough to survive them. Clearly not the USA/USSR. He seems to treat war as a civilised chess game.

It is also (apparently) possible to misapply/ misinterpret Kissingers words in accordance to justify your own prejudices.

Consider one anti-Muslim reviewer below, who has somehow twisted in his ideas that Western liberals want blind disarmament (they don't -- rather, they don't consider it good enough for prejudice and brute force to be the basis of our foreign policy), that anti-western Muslims hate us for what we are (they don't -- they dislike some of our foreign policies which kill Muslims. They react to us in many different ways, e.g. some behave diplomatically, others use terrorism.) and that Muslims were stopped from conquering all of Europe only by military defeat and relative loss of military power (all empires -- Christian, Muslim and others -- have to stop somewhere. Defeat is only part of the story. A proper history would have to consider poltics, economics, theology, technology, personalities and many other aspects over dozens of countries and hundreds of years. Also, many Muslim leaders had Christian allies and Muslim enemies, and vice-versa. Religion was merely a PR tool in advocating war for many Christian/Muslim rulers. The analysis is complex and not for the shallow-minded bigot).

Apparently too, one cannot deal with a 'revolutionary power' because it does not fit in with the 'presuppositions of Western civilisation'. Another dig against Muslims? Yet the American, French and Russian revolutions were hardly oriental incidents. Incidently, Kissinger examines revolutions, but not particularly so in this book.

If a person can twist a book on nuclear weapons (which only one Muslim country -- Pakistan possesses anyway) into an anti-Muslim rant, then consider what others might make of this book! But, to be fair, some reviewers would turn a review of MaryPoppins into an anti-Muslim rant.

The reason I make much of this is that some might mistakenly read the review below and consider this book to be about Muslims/Islam. I would advise the anti-Muslim reader not to be entranced into buying this book on the basis of expecting anti-Muslim prejudice. They would be wasting their money. Kissinger does not indulge in that area, so you'll have to find another book for that. He was a pragmatist and definitely not a neocon. This book is mainly cold war, USA/USSR, NATO/Warsaw Pact oriented.

So, to sum up: the book is outdated, but still interesting and worth reading, by an obviously intelligent writer. It has clever ideas, but they are probably dangerous and impractical, for other than countries with limited nuclear arsenals in the first place. It wouldbe great if Kissinger updated this book for the present world situation. If he did, I (and I expect many others) would buy it.

Pertinentto todays political situation
Why write a review on a book about nuclear weapons and foreign policy that is nearly fifty years old and does not reflect the current geo-political situation?Because it is a darn good book.Kissinger has a way writing that is succinct and to the point, he has the genius of explaining complicated subjects in simple terms.The basic premise of the book is that the United States should not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in foreign policy.He argues persuasively that the limited use of nuclear weapons need not escalate into cataclysmic nuclear exchange.The forces of history have made this a moot point.The Soviet Union lies in the dustbin of history and the surviving Russian republics are not capable of launching an effective nuclear counterstrike- the United States alone is now the worlds surviving superpower.It is entirely conceivable that we could initiate a nuclear strike with relative impunity now.Whether or not this would be politically or morally correct is a matter of debate. But more importantly, the development of smart weapons have made the use of massive nuclear or even limited nuclear attack unnecessary.

But what makes this book worth the read is Kissingers insightful political analysis.For instance, he argues that it is impossible to use traditional diplomacy based on good faith and a willingness to come to an agreement with a revolutionary power because such governments do not operate under the presuppositions of Western civilization. Diplomatic meetings between such diverse powers are not seen by revolutionary powers as opportunities to come to an agreement and to avoid conflict, but as elaborate stage plays which to seek to influence and win over public opinion in other nations.This is a lesson that those who wonder why the Moslem world hates the United States and who believe that if we just sit down and talk we can come to a reasonable understanding need to learn. Kissinger would say that such people live in a fools paradise.

The use of force is not an evil but a strategic necessity if civilization is to be preserved.Many liberals today believe that if the United States would just disarm and be more understanding of the Moslem world that the Osama Bin Ladens of this world would cease their hatred of us.What these starried-eyed liberals do not understand is that the Moslem extremist do not hate us for what we do, but for who we are.Their attacks will not stop until our civilization is destroyed.Kissinger noted that the Turks did not stop voluntarily at the gates of Vienna or the Arabs in Southern France. Rather, a line was established because they had been defeated in battle, and the decay of Arab power did not set in until the West exercised unremitting pressure to push them back.

Kissinger does not argue for the use of force over diplomacy, but that diplomacy is ineffective when the use of force has been abdicated.Only when a nation stands ready to defend itself and is willing to use force will diplomacy work.Thus, in our conflict with the Moslem world, if the United States unilaterally declares it will abdicate the use of force and will not retaliate for terrorists attacks against our citizens (or only purse retaliation only in the courts of law) there is no reason for Moslem extremists to give an inch- they will get everything they want.Yes, it is still worth the read.

ADVOCATES DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE
The main premise of this 1958 book is that the USA must plan for a limited war and not assume that all wars will be total ones, like World War II.Kissinger argues that our failure to do this caused great trouble in Korea and put us at a disadvantage in dealing with the Soviet Union.Chapters discuss our allies, Soviet propaganda, and disarmament.The book is well written and most persuasive.

Of course it should be clear to everyone that a book over forty years old is of limited value today, especially as the Cold War is over.Kissinger warns us about the now disproved missile gap and fails to appreciate the Chinese-Soviet split, which had already started.

My one major disagreement concerns Kissinger's contention that limited use of nuclear weapons in war could be more appropriate than convential ones.He ignores the profound consequences crossing such a line would entail.He is right that any side using regular forces would be vulnerable to nuclear attack, but that does not mean that we must use them to start with!In fact, not using them sends the world an important message about how serious we are in wanting to avoid a total, nuclear war. ... Read more

Product Description
The Napoleonic Wars were followed by an almost unprecedented century of political stability. A World Restored analyses the alliances formed and treaties signed by the world’s leaders during the years 1812 to 1822, focussing on the personalities of the two main negotiators: Viscount Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, and Prince von Metter-nich, his Austrian counterpart. Henry Kissinger explains how the turbulent relationship between these two men, the differing concerns of their respective countries and the changing nature of diplomacy all influenced the final shape of the peace. Originally published in 1957. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Legitimacy, and the intricacies of politics and diplomacy...
I think that this book is a classic, because its historical analysis on the problems of peace after a revolutionary period is truly insightful, and contains valuable lessons that are still very important nowadays.

Kissinger allows us to understand the difficulties inherent to finding a new legitimacy, accepted by all. He also delves into the best ways to solve the disputes that often arise in coalitions that include actors whose interests differ a lot. His comments were specifically about the Quadruple Alliance (Great Britain, Austria, Prusia and Russia) but can be applied to many other cases.

I specially liked how he dissected the personalites of the actors in this play, Napoleon, Metternich,Castlereagh and Talleyrand, and the manner in which he highlights that those personalities influenced the course of history.

This is an important period, because as the title of the book claims, a world was restaured. The Concert of Europe began and a new era of peace started, thanks to the perspicacy of Metternich and after the instability caused by the napoleonic wars. In this book we get to know a little more of Kissinger as an historian but also as a diplomat, as he shows us the intricacies of politics and diplomacy.

Even if this book is sometimes a little slow, I give it my highest recommendation, because it leaves you with much more knowledge, not only about this period but also regarding political realism.

Belen Alcat

Timeless wisdom at all levels from a master of diplomacy
Henry Kissinger, who wrote the essence of this book as a graduate student at Harvard, encapsulates his version of diplomatic lessons in this timeless masterpiece.Whether you are dealing with Napoleon, Hitler, Stalin or a tyrannical boss at work, this work contains insights which transcend the period of study.In picking an obsure historical period, the time around and after the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the 18th century in Europe, Kissinger runs the risk of seeming irrelevant to the modern (or post-modern) sensibility.Even a cursory review of the book will disprove this.Kissenger basically discusses the problems and politics of building a coalition, proving a tyrant to be a tyrant, and finally how to construct a practical enduring peace.His writing is insightful, full of preternatural wisdom and of enduring value.The lessons transcend a time period, but also transcend an historical scale: they apply to a variety of coalitions at the national and individual level.I recommend the book whole-heartedly. You will come away with a deep understanding of politics at all levels and also why Kissinger dominated the diplomacy of his period.

Kissinger at his best
This book lives up to and exceeds all expectations.Kissinger shows us in great detail what his Balance of Power Doctrine is based upon by showing the great diplomat Metternich in all his glory, when the Concert of Europetruly began.When the Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain and the imperialpowers allied and the Holy Alliance between Prussia, Russia, and Austriabegan, it was the beginning of years of uninterrupted peace, its only flawthat it did not anticipate the rise of nationalism that had already begununder Napoleon. This is in its most basic form a philosophic justificationfor all the diplomatic initiatives undertook in the Nixon and FordAdministrations under Kissinger in an analogic manner.Kissinger is one ofthe giants of our time, and he proves that save for Metternich, he is oneof the diplomats most capable of comprehending all the subleties of andexercising brilliantly the Balance of Power Doctrine.A remarkabledissertation that foreshadows the birth of a giant on the world stage.

Embryonic Kissenger - the birth of a reactionary
Originaly Herr Doktor's disertation, this work has all of the hallmarks (in embryonic form) of Kissenger's later neo-fascism, and reactionary justifications for the iron-fist-school of politics. His selective use ofinformation on the Napoleonic era serves his Cold War mentality well,for aswith numerous other reactionaries, he uses the French Revolution andNapoleon as cudgels with which to beat the idea of revolution, in general,and the Soviet Revolution specificaly. Despite its title, and what appearson the pages, this book has nothing to do with Napoleon, Metternich, orCastlereagh, and everything to do with Kissenger's fanatical defence of hiscrypto-fascist philosophy that it is the duty of citezans to obey theirmasters, that social control from "above" (however cruel) ispreferbale to revolution, and that Herr Doktor knows best. Concidering thatthis is a man who was able to look the other way (to be conviently"out of the loop" for the only time in his political life)whilehis boss was trying to tear up The Bill of Rights, one may thank fourtunethat more people have seen Kubrick's Doctor Stangelove, than have readbooks by Kissenger. On the other hand, it's Kissenger, not people like thelate Kubrick, who have their spidery fingers on the proverbial button... ... Read more

Product Description
Now in paperback, a "fascinating trove" (Jonathan Spence, New York Review of Books cover review) of transcripts of some of Kissinger's most secret conversations with world leaders. Considered "among the most important Cold War records to emerge thus far" by the former Beijing bureau chief of the New York Times, The Kissinger Transcripts gives us the unvarnished record of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy during the Nixon years. Here are the transcripts, formerly classified "Top Secret/Sensitive," of Kissinger's talks with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Leonid Brezhnev, Andrei Gromyko, and others. The Kissinger Transcripts lets readers make up their own minds about the most controversial Secretary of State in modern U.S. history.Amazon.com Review
Henry Kissinger brought a near-obsessive sense of secrecy tothe execution of his duties as secretary of state during theadministrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and took steps toensure that this secrecy would continue even after he leftoffice. Much of his paperwork is under seal at the Library ofCongress, making use of a loophole in the Freedom of Information Actto keep the material away from prying researchers. The KissingerTranscripts is based, then, on files obtained from the NationalArchive and the State Department.

The conversations with Soviet and Chinese officials reproduced here donot contradict the accounts in Kissinger's memoirs so much as theyshow just how much he omitted in his version of events. For example,Nixon and Kissinger, willing to bend U.S. foreign policy in apro-China direction, made a stunning offer in 1971 to the ChineseAmbassador to the United Nations: "We would be prepared at yourrequest, and through whatever sources you wish, to give you whateverinformation we have about the disposition of Soviet forces. I don'thave it with me, but we can arrange it easily wherever you wish and inan absolutely secure way."

There are some interesting human touches, which, along with thehistorical data, make an invaluable contribution to our understandingof Kissinger's role in world politics. In 1972, he tells the ChineseUN ambassador that (then UN ambassador) George Bush needs "morebackbone;" in sporadic appearances throughout the transcripts, thefuture president doesn't do much to nullify that appraisal. In aBeijing meeting, Mao tells his American audience that he enjoys hisreputation for troublemaking:

"You must say that Chairman Mao is an old bureaucrat andin that case I will speed up and meet with you. In such a case I willmake haste to see you. If you don't curse me, I won't see you, and Iwill just sleep peacefully.... I will only be happy when allforeigners slam on tables and curse me."

Customer Reviews (10)

Mao's greatest talk

Mao's greatest talk is in this book, from page 183 to page 203.

Very useful for digging into certain Cold War negotiations
When this book came out it caused a bit of a stir.However, as the editors note, a careful review of the material actual tends toward moderation.Supporters can see a bit to criticize and the critics can see things aren't quite as black as they had supposed.I found the transcripts to be fascinating because we get to read conversations that were the subject of much debate and speculation for the past several decades.

However, transcripts are subject to several issues.First, they are all in English.We do not know what the original Russian, Chinese, or what have you in order to see what the translation may have missed in nuance or simply gotten wrong.Second, transcripts are only as good as the transcriber and some of the conversations were put together well after the fact, so the question stands, do we really have an exact transcription of the conversations.Third, while the editor does his best to provide very good context for the transcript and compares what is said to other sources such as Kissinger's memoirs, we do not have all of the context that went into setting up the meeting and the private thoughts of the parties prior to and after the conversations transcribed.So, what is said is still subject to misinterpretation by inferring incorrectly the intent of the various parties to these conversations.

These concerns aside, I find this a very valuable and useful reference to certain key events during both Nixon administrations.The cover photo is a bit too cute.A black and white photo of a somber Kissinger with, what, rose colored glasses (the Red of the communists coloring his world?A too optimistic view of the communists?) with one lens displaying a faint hammer and cycle of the Soviets and the other the Chinese star.

Study and enjoy.

Fascinating
Although much of Burr's analysis leaves a lot to be desired, this book is a must have for a first hand look at Kissinger's diplomatic legacy. There is still much information that has not been declassified and therefore _The Kissinger Transcripts_ presents only a partial picture at best, but Burr's compilation is well worth the effort to see Kissinger's many different diplomatic faces show themselves as he deals with different characters such as Mao, Brezhnev, Zhou Enlai, Gromyko, Deng Xiaoping and others. It is truly fascinating to examine the different rhetorical tactics employeed by Kissinger to suit his particular audience. Incidentally, this bit of genius appears to be lost upon Burr, and others too, who view these many Kissinger faces with a seeming lack of understanding and even think of it as somewhat contradictory. The guiding theme when examined as a whole, however, is that Kissinger worked toward the improvement of the position of the United States in the world power structure. There is no doubt that the opening of China, coupled with Kissinger's deft Middle East diplomacy, did just that. These transcripts shed some much needed light on the operations of perhaps the United States' greatest executor of foreign policy.

Essential reading on Foreign Policy
The lengths to which Kissinger went to recruit the Chinese on the American side in the Cold War are instructive to those who believe that America played its cards well on the international arena in the Cold War. Much of the story that William Burr has pieced together--quite admirably in my opinion--is sad reading from the American point of view. Less so, of course, from the Chinese perspective. At points, it is easy to forget which of the parties was the superpower, and which the third world nation rising from internal turmoil, economic collapse and a severely hostile international situation. It is particularly instructive to read this book in context of the question of dealing with China, a problem which America has grappled with fitfully over the past two decades. The roots of Chinese suspicion of "peaceful evolution" and "engagement" lie in their recollection of the avid wooing of China in the 1970s.

On a local note, for the Asian reader, Kissinger's views on dealing with the Indian subcontinent are also instructive, including his open willingness to pressurise India in the Bangladesh crisis. In general terms, the Nixon administration's bias was perceived in India, and has been one of the reasons for the difficult relationship between India and USA in the 1970s and early 1980s. This book only provides proof of that less-than-subtle 'tilt'.

This book is invaluable reference material to all students of international relations, even if it is used as a "how-not-to" manual. The only gripe is the shoddy proof reading, with typos and inconsistent romanisation of Chinese names. But that is a small price to pay for this excellent piece of research.

Buy this book, you won't regret it.

Necessary material for students of international relations
Individuals indeed can change the world, as evidenced by some of the transcripts in this excellent collection of original documents.William Burr has delivered an important record of the actions of the principle actors during the United States' shift from Kennan-inspired containment policy to balance-of-power politics.

Reaping the benefits of the Freedom of Information Act and declassification projects at the federal agencies responsible for U.S. foreign policy, Burr and his colleagues at the National Security Archive project at George Washington University have brought us the raw, unadulterated truths surrounding the diplomacy behind Nixon's detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China.Gems such as the momentous first meeting of Nixon and Mao with Zhou Enlai and Kissinger in attendance cannot be missed.

Excellent primary source material with copious notes from Burr.A must-have for anyone interested in Kissinger and his relationships with Nixon, Mao and Brezhnev. ... Read more