Product Description
Game Theory for Economists introduces economists to the game-theoretic approach of modelling economic behaviour and interaction, focusing on concepts and ideas from the vast field of game-theoretic models which find commonly used applications in economics.
This careful selection of topics allows the reader to concentrate on the parts of the game which are the most relevant for the economist who does not want to become a specialist.Written at a level appropriate for a student or researcher with a solid microeconomic background, the book should provide the reader with skills necessary to formalize economic games and to make them accessible for game theoretic analysis.

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* Is a concise introduction to game theory which provides economists with the techniques and results necessary to follow the literature in economic theory.
* Helps the reader formalize economic problems.
* Concentrates on equilibrium concepts that are most commonly used in economics.
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Customer Reviews (1)

Best intro book for game theory
I have read Martin Osborne and Gibbons' books as well as this book. I think this books is much clearer, understandable and easy to read. Lots of clear examples make the topic easier to understand. Osborne also has lots of examples but his language is not good. Being a native English speaker doesn't necessarly mean that you can write a good book even if you are one of the masters of the topic.
I recommend you to read this book before Fudenberg&Tirole and Osborne&Rubinstein's books which are the best books on game theory. ... Read more

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Customer Reviews (2)

An Excellent Introduction for Mathematicians
I offered an undergraduate course in game theory two years ago, and as I performed the usual search for a course text, I was surprised by the shortage of current, up-to-date books on the subject that are written specifically for advanced students of mathematics.There are scores of books on game theory written by and for economists and social scientists;however, most of those books are simply not appropriate for a more rigorous, proof-based course in which the mathematics takes central stage.

After examining dozens of books, I reached the following conclusions.
(1) There is a wonderful old book (1952) written by J. C. C. McKinsey which is mathematically rigorous and written with such clarity that any good student of mathematics could read the book on his own and learn the subject through independent study.Sadly, McKinsey's book (now reprinted by Dover) is too out of date to serve as the primary reference for a modern course.It is still a useful supplement, however.(2)The "classic" mathematical reference by Guillermo Owen is now available in an updated 3rd edition and includes new material on topics of recent interest, such as evolutionary game theory, bargaining, indices of voting power, etc.But while I greatly admire Owen's book as a reference, I find that it is written in that terse, "old school" style that characterized so many classic mathematics texts from the 1960s;the book is heavy onTheorem-Proof-Lemma-Proof, with little in the way of explanatory or motivational text to help the reader gain contextual and historical understanding along with technical proficiency. Even though I am familiar with the material, I read Owen's 9-page Chapter I on games in extensive form and scratch my head;my undergraduate students, who are far less inclined to read critically and repetitively, would never make it through this dense, challenging prose. (3) There are a handful of other game theory texts written by and for mathematicians, but they are either written for a more introductory course (Mendelson, Straffin, Stahl) or are inappropriate for other reasons.

When I finally received a copy of the book "Game Theory" by Antonia Jones, which is difficult to find on library shelves in the U.S., I discovered a text that is mathematically rigorous, extremely well written (very suitable for independent study if you have the background), and full of excellent exercises and applications.A note of caution to university instructors:Dr. Jones has an extensive "Solutions to Problems" section in the back of her text; this is perfect for the student pursuing independent study, but may force the professor to seek additional sources of problems in a traditional course where problems are collected and graded. As a guide to its level:the text assumes a familiarity with multivariable calculus, linear algebra, and elementary probability.There are occasional uses of transfinite ordinals, the fixed point theorems of Brouwer and Kakutani (used to prove the existence of Nash equilibria), and some elementary concepts from point-set topology.

I was told by a colleague that Professor Jones has now moved on to other research interests, but I sincerely wish that she could find the time to return to her wonderful game theory text and write an updated edition. Some exciting applications of game theory have emerged since the 1980 first edition of this book was written;the inclusion of these recent applications would make the text more comprehensive and self-contained, and thus suitable as the sole or primary text for an advanced course.But even without an updated edition, I strongly recommend this book to every mathematician studying game theory on his own and to professors of mathematics who are looking for a text for a first course in game theory at the senior/graduate level. With minor supplements on newer applications, Dr. Jones' text provides (by far) the single best reference that I have been able to find.

Summary
The first chapter is an informal introduction to game theory, which can be understood by non-mathematicians, which covers the basic ideas of extensive form, pure and mixed strategies and the minimax theorem. The general theory of non-cooperative games is then given a detailed mathematical treatment in the second chapter. Next follows a "first class" account of linear programming, theory and practice, terse, rigorous and readable, which is applied as a tool to matrix games and economics from duality theory via the equilibrium theorem, with detailed explanations of computational aspects of the simplex algorithm.
The remaining chapters give an unusually comprehensive but concise treatment of cooperative games, an original account of bargaining models, with a skilfully guided tour through the Shapley and Nash solutions for bimatrix games and a carefully illustrated account of finding the best threat strategies.
... Read more

Product Description
Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics.

• Written for introductory courses seeking a little rigor.
  
• The 4th edition brings the material fully up-to-date and includes new end-of-chapter problems and classroom projects, as well as a math appendix.
  
• Accompanied by a comprehensive website featuring solutions to problems and teaching notes.

Customer Reviews (3)

Great introduction
This textbook was required in the game theory class I took in economics graduate school. For a grad text, it's simple and easy, but that's the beauty of it. I read it cover-to-cover, enjoying each page, and coming away with a deeper understanding and wanting to continue learning and applying the concepts. I guarantee I couldn't do this with the books used in most of my other classes. It helped me do exceedingly well in class and impress my department chair.

The author explains concepts in a step-by-step approach, so I never felt overwhelmed. They always returned to examples that were as simple as possible to illustrate the concepts, then built on them as you learn more through the chapters. Applications ranged from war games to business competition to downright silly anecdotes.

I see uses for the understanding of game theory I first acquired in this book all the time. People around me become interested and ask me where to get a good primer on the subject. I always recommend this book and lend it out so much that, in honesty, I should just buy another copy.

Wanna Make a Game?
Are you familiar with the PAPI model? (Players, Actions, Payoffs and Information, by the way.) Do you understand what equilibrium means to a game design?

This book is a good introduction to those who are looking for a background in game theory, as well as those interested in problem-solving domains of applied logic.

A good introduction for game theory students
This is a good text for game theory students. Concise and well structured, it gives sufficient details to provide a good understanding of the subject. The math is easy to follow although the choice of words may sometimes beinappropriate resulting in a logical jump, but that is well compensated bythe content. There are some typo mistakes which should be corrected by thenext edition. The author tries to moderate the math with logicalexplanantions and does it with reasonable success although some sectionscan still be improved. The section on bargaining, for example, is poorlyexplained. Overall, a good text for teaching. ... Read more

Product Description
Game Theory has served as a standard text for game theory courses since the publication of the First Edition in 1968. The Third Edition updates several recently developed subfields. It adds fresh chapters on subjects such as games with incomplete information and spatial games. Owen has expanded "Two-Person General-Sum Games" into two chapters, the second becoming "Two-Person Cooperative Games." There are new sections in the chapters "Two-Person Cooperative Games" and "Indices of Power," and there is new information throughout the book on non-cooperative games. Game Theory remains the only book to cover all salient aspects of this field that, having displaced Keynesian economics, is making inroads throughout the social sciences.

Key Features
* Explains work of 1994 Nobel Prize Winners
* Full expansion of cooperative game theory sections
* Covers games with incomplete information
* Spatial games section features many illustrations
* Updated bibliography ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

The Standard Reference for Mathematicians
It is perplexing that the explosion in the popularity of game theory has not resulted in a large number of texts on the subject written by and for mathematicians.One can find entire books devoted to the application of game theory to a single subject:economics and biology, of course, but also business management, linguistics, the analysis of voting systems, political science, psychology, the law, etc.However, the classic introduction for mathematicians, first written by Guillermo Owen in the 1960s, remains the standard in that particular niche several decades and three editions later.

Let the prospective buyer be aware of one thing up front.This book was written by a professional mathematician who wrote many papers in game theory.The book is written for a mathematical audience, and it assumes a level of mathematical maturity roughly equivalent to that of the typical senior majoring in mathematics.The book makes unapologetic use of the calculus of several variables, linear algebra, probability theory, statistics, linear programming, convexity in R^n, some results from topology (fixed point theorems), and even Stieltjes integration.Section IV.2, Games on the Square, provides a beautiful application of Stieltjes integration in the analysis of a duel (game of timing) between two combatants;I remember studying Stieltjes integration out of Apostol's advanced calculus text as an undergraduate and wondering what possible use the subject could find. Here is one answer.

Owen last updated the book after the 1994 Nobel prizes in Economics were awarded to John Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten.Many of the topics these men studied, such as subgame-perfect equilibria and games with incomplete information, have been included in the Third Edition.There is even a (very) brief introduction to evolutionary game theory and evolutionary stable strategies, but it occupies only a few pages.

This last remark illustrates the dilemma facing the mathematician who wants to study contemporary game theory.Owen's book remains the unrivaled reference for studying classical von Neumann--Morgenstern game theory from an advanced mathematical point of view.However, much of the activity in game theoretic research during the past three decades has occurred in evolutionary game theory, a subject first created by biologists.To the best of my knowledge, no mathematician who specializes in the field has written the sequel to Owen, providing a mathematically rigorous introduction to evolutionary game theory. It is a reference that is much needed.The handful of books on evolutionary game theory that are most often cited are written by economists (2) and biologists (2);these are wonderful books and serve their intended audiences well, but they are unlikely to be used in advanced mathematics courses where the emphasis is on providing rigorous proofs of all the results that are used.The emphasis and approach is just too different.

If you are looking for a definitive reference on von Neumann--Morgenstern game theory that is written with mathematicians in mind, then Owen remains the first choice.Even as I use other, less demanding books to teach my undergraduates, I find that I continually return to Owen to get the mature view on various topics.For a first course in the subject for undergraduate mathematics majors, I would prefer the book by A. J. Jones;it is far more accessible.But as a reference for the working mathematician, I know of no rival for Owen at the present time.

Only good if you're a math genius
I think this book is definitely aimed at people with at least college level maths background, by which I mean you actually majored in maths, not just took some maths classes. Pretty much the enitre book is filled with theorems, definitions and advanced formuli that require knowledge of advanced calculus, set theory, linear algebra, and graph theory (to name a few) to understand.

It has very little in the way of examples and actual explanations. For example, in chapter 8, when talking about equilibrium pairs, the book doesn't give any methods to actually calculate equilibrium pairs, but just give a whole collection of theorems and definitions that explain what equilibrium pairs are, and then referred readers to other books for the methods to actually calculate them.

If you don't have an advanced maths background, the first problem you'll have reading this book is just understanding all the mathematical notations used in this book. If you can get past that, then you're still faced with trying to understand the implications of all the theories and formuli presented in the book. Suffice it to say that I still couldn't understand 75% of the material in this book, even though this was a textbook for a class I took and I had a professor to explain to me what the book is actually saying.

I understand that this book is supposedly some kind of a seminal work in game theory. But it definitely is not intended for someone seeking an introduction to game theory or someone trying to learn by him/her self.

Well written, unfortunately it contains many misprints
I believe this book to be an excellent introduction to game theory, also for self - study purposes. Unfortunately, it seems to contain too many misprints, which are particularly annoying if it is used for self study:You always wonder,whether you are wrong, or the book is. This is all themore amazing as I read the third edition. ... Read more

Product Description
Does game theory ― the mathematical theory of strategic interaction ― provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts?Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory ― the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory ― is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. De Bruin proves new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and he explores in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. He argues that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents.Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, De Bruin argues, has been rather successful in achieving this aim. ... Read more

Product Description
Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

A must-read for game theory students
This is a great book! Nice discussion of the intuition behind results, good choice of examples, a must-read if you are interested in dynamic games. ... Read more

Product Description
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose.

Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life.

While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

outstanding textbook for behavioral economics
This book is an extremely well organized presentation of key theories and evidence in behavioral game theory, a subset of topics from the field of behavioral economics.I have often assigned chapters 1 and 2 in behavioral economics classes at Harvard and Duke, and recommended other chapters to students who want to learn about Learning theory.(I would cheerfully assign the other chapters if I happened to be covering those topics, but there's only so much you can squeeze into a 1-semester undergraduate course!)

The book has many strengths.First, Camerer is one of the Very Important Scholars in behavioral economics, and there are less than a handful of people (Matt Rabin) who could conceivably be argued to be more authoritative on the subject matter. Second, Camerer makes extraordinarily good use of summary tables, explicit sections/subsections/subsubsections, summary paragraphs, and the like to help the reader keep track of the details, and to quickly locate the particular details of interest.Third, the introductory chapter offers a wonderful and intuitive introduction to the field; I have often started the first class of a new semester by reproducing the experiments in the chapter as classroom demonstrations.Fourth, the appendices to the introduction offer a good overview of economics experiments and of game theory (no substitute for a full textbook on game theory, of course, but a good refresher, and enough to get the bare bones of the subject).I expect the reader will quickly find many other reasons to admire this book.

This is NOT a book for a casual read by a non-economist.It's a textbook, or a handbook for economists and other people with a reasonable mathematical background who want to see, in one place, the most important results in behavioral game theory (as of a few years ago).It's also designed to present scholarly research, which means the reader should be prepared for the scholar's willingness to leave a lot of loose ends lying around and NOT to claim to know the definitive answers to the questions.

If you are a lay person looking for a behavioral economics book for the general audience, you should probably look to Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein's Nudge or Dan Ariely's Predictably Irrational.All three of those authors are first-tier scholars and major contributors to the literature in their own right, and those books are written with a non-specialist audience in mind.

Game Theory For All
The required math knowledge to truly understand game theory is rather intense, and this book will allow one to put their knowledge to the test. However, the book also enables readers with limited math skills to appreciate and conceptually understand what behavioral game theory is, how it works, and the implications it has on future research in the strategic/behavioral theory camps. ... Read more

Product Description
Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics.Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Well Organized Overview
This book provides a well organized review of Game Theory as applied to Political Science. It is at an appropriate level of technicality. The one thing I would say it is lacking would be examples. Many definitions are just listed or proven and are hard to conceptualize for those unfamiliar with the field. Used in conjunction with other books, however, the value of this book increases and a concise account of the field. ... Read more

Product Description
Ken Binmore's previous game theory textbook, Fun and Games (D.C. Heath, 1991), carved out a significant niche in the advanced undergraduate market; it was intellectually serious and more up-to-date than its competitors, but also accessibly written. Its central thesis was that game theory allows us to understand many kinds of interactions between people, a point that Binmore amply demonstrated through a rich range of examples and applications. This replacement for the now out-of-date 1991 textbook retains the entertaining examples, but changes the organization to match how game theory courses are actually taught, making Playing for Real a more versatile text that almost all possible course designs will find easier to use, with less jumping about than before. In addition, the problem sections, already used as a reference by many teachers, have become even more clever and varied, without becoming too technical. Playing for Real will sell into advanced undergraduate courses in game theory, primarily those in economics, but also courses in the social sciences, and serve as a reference for economists. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

I never received it
I never received the delivery. I wrote to Amazon asking for clarification, they never got back to me. After spending for years on Amazon, I didn't expect such a bad experience. I think I'll never buy again on this website. I'm sorry but customer care services are more and more disappointing.

Andrea

Excellent Treatment of Game Theory
The book is an excellent text on Game Theory.If you are into Game Theory, then this is a must have on your bookshelf.It covers Game Theory concepts in great detail and clarity.On the downside, the language used in the book, can, cat times, be vague and may require re-reading sections of the book to tease out what was being said.Nevertheless, the re-read is definitely worth it because you will find gems of wisdom bubbling to the surface.

A Comprehensive Introduction
As the author of an excellent and innovative text on game theory (Game Theory Evolving, Princeton University Press), Herbert Gintis is far better qualified than this reviewer to provide a substantive evaluation of Ken Binmore's new book;I encourage all prospective buyers to read Gintis' comprehensive review very carefully.

I would, however, like to offer some additional information for the specific audience of mathematicians and students of mathematics who are searching for an introductory text on game theory.

Ken Binmore studied mathematics before becoming an economist;thus, one might expect that this book would provide rigorous proofs for all the results used, and mathematically inclined readers will be happy to hear that this is indeed the case.The intended readership is quite broad, however, and so Binmore ensured that it is possible for those who are inclined to skip the proofs to do so without suffering serious loss of continuity.

In determining whether this text is appropriate for one's specific study or instructional needs, one encounters two problems:(1)the table of contents is not available on Amazon, and (2) even when the chapter titles are made available, they are written in somewhat whimsical language that makes it difficult to determine precisely how the book is organized and precisely what it contains.In order to provide a bit of help in this area, I have provided the prospective buyer with both the chapter titles AND the section headings at the end of this review;I sincerely hope this helps in the process of determining whether this book represents a worthwhile investment, based on the specific needs of the buyer.

One cautionary note for university instructors, especially instructors of mathematics;in the Preface, Binmore states that his book contains enough material for at least two courses in game theory.He writes

"I have tried to make things easy for teachers who want to design a course based on selection of topics from the whole book by including marginal notes to facilitate skipping."

Thus, the instructor who is used to "possible course" charts, showing clear interdependence of chapters and identifying sections that might be skipped without penalty, will not find them in this book.The inclusion of this material would definitely have been a great kindness to university instructors;scouting one's way through this 639-page text to find a realistic and effective one-semester course is not easy!

Table of Contents

1 Getting Locked In

1.1 What is Game Theory?
1.2 Toy Games
1.3 The Prisoners' Dilemma
1.4 Private Provision of Public Goods
1.5 Imperfect Competition
1.6 Nash Equilibrium
1.7 Collective Rationality
1.8 Repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma
1.9 Which Equilibrium?
1.10Social Dilemmas
1.11Roundup

2 Backing Up

2.1Where Next?
2.2Win-Or-Lose Games
2.3The Rules of the Game
2.4Pure Strategies
2.5Backward Induction
2.6Solving NIM
2.7Hex
2.8Chess
2.9Rational Play?
2.10 Roundup

3 Taking Chances

3.1Chance Moves
3.2Probability
3.3Conditional Probability
3.4Lotteries
3.5Expectation
3.6Values of Games with Chance Moves
3.7Waiting Games
3.8Parcheesi
3.9Roundup

4 Accounting for Tastes

4.1Payoffs
4.2Revealed Preference
4.3Utility Functions
4.4Dicing with Death
4.5Making Risky Choices
4.6Utility Scales
4.7Dicing with Death Again
4.8When are People Consistent?
4.9Roundup

5 Planning Ahead

5.1Strategic Forms
5.2Payoff Functions
5.3Matrices and Vectors
5.4Domination
5.5Credibility and Commitment
5.6Living in an Imperfect World
5.7Roundup

6 Mixing Things Up

6.1Mixed Strategies
6.2Reaction Curves
6.3Interpreting Mixed Strategies
6.4Payoffs and Mixed Strategies
6.5Convexity
6.6Payoff Regions
6.7Roundup

7 Fighting it Out

7.1Strictly Competitive Games
7.2Zero-Sum Games
7.3Minimax and Maximin
7.4Safety First
7.5Solving Zero-Sum Games
7.6Linear Programming
7.7Separating Hyperplanes
7.8Starships
7.9Roundup

8 Keeping Your Balance

8.1Introduction
8.2Dueling Again
8.3When do Nash Equilibria Exist?
8.4Hexing Brouwer
8.5The Equilibrium Selection Problem
8.6Conventions
8.7Roundup

9 Buying Cheap

9.1Economic Models
9.2Partial Derivatives
9.3Preferences in Commodity Spaces
9.4Trade
9.5Monopoly
9.6Perfect Competition
9.7Consumer Surplus
9.8Roundup

10Selling Dear

10.1Models of Imperfect Competition
10.2Cournot Models
10.3Stackelberg Models
10.4Bertrand Models
10.5Edgeworth Models
10.6Roundup

11Repeating Yourself

11.1Reciprocity
11.2Repeating a Zero-Sum Game
11.3Repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma
11.4Infinite Repetitions
11.5Social Contract
11.6The Evolution of Cooperation
11.7 Roundup

12Getting the Message

12.1Knowledge and Belief
12.2Dirty Faces
12.3Knowledge
12.4Possibility Sets
12.5Information Sets
12.6Common Knowledge
12.7Complete Information
12.8Agreeing to Disagree?
12.9Coordinated Action
12.10 Roundup

13Keeping Up to Date

13.1Rationality
13.2Bayesian Updating
13.3Bayesian Rationality
13.4Getting the Model Right
13.5Scientific Induction?
13.6Constructing Priors
13.7Bayesian Rationality in Games
13.8Roundup

14Seeking Refinement

14.1Contemplating the Impossible
14.2Counterfactual Reasoning
14.3Backward and Imperfect
14.4Gang of Four
14.5Signaling Games
14.6Rationalizability
14.7Roundup

15Knowing What to Believe

15.1Complete Information
15.2Bluffing
15.3Incomplete Information
15.4Russian Roulette
15.5Duopoly with Incomplete Information
15.6Purification
15.7Incomplete Information about Rules
15.8Roundup

16Getting Together

16.1 Bargaining
16.2 Cooperative Game Theory
16.3 Cooperative Payoff Regions
16.4 Nash Bargaining Problems
16.5 Supporting Hyperplanes
16.6 Nash Bargaining Solution
16.7 Collusion in a Cournot Duopoly
16.8 Incomplete Information
16.9 Other Bargaining Solutions
16.10Roundup

17Cutting a Deal

17.1Noncooperative Bargaining Models
17.2The Nash Program
17.3Commitment in Bargaining
17.4Nash Threat Games
17.5Bargaining Without Commitment
17.6Going Wrong
17.7Roundup

18Teaming Up

18.1Coalitions
18.2Coalitional Form
18.3Core
18.4Stable Sets
18.5Shapley Value
18.6Applying the Nash Program
18.7Roundup

19Just Playing?

19.1Ethics and Game Theory
19.2Do People Play Fair?
19.3Social Choice Paradoxes
19.4Welfare Functions
19.5Impersonal Comparison of Utility
19.6More Bargaining Solutions
19.7Political Philosophy
19.8Which Fairness Norm?
19.9Roundup

20Taking Charge

20.1Mechanism Design
20.2Principals and Agents
20.3Commitment and Contracting
20.4Revelation Principle
20.5Providing a Public Good
20.6Implementation Theory
20.7Roundup

21Going, Going, Gone!

21.1Telecom Auctions
21.2Types of Auctions
21.3Continuous Random Variables
21.4Shading Your Bid
21.5Designing Optimal Auctions
21.6Common-Value Auctions
21.7Multiunit Auctions
21.8The Chopstick Auction
21.9Roundup

A Great Cook offers an Immensely Varied Menu of Ideas
Ken Binmore is the broadest thinker working within the classical game theory tradition. Unlike most technicians, he has read widely in philosophy, history, and anthropology, combining a passion for analytical detail with a deep feeling for the broad strokes of human behavior. These characteristics are reflected in this textbook on game theory, which is light-years more sophisticated than the standard fare, yet never sacrifices clarity or expositional elegance on the alter of mathematical or notational rigor. While I would urge anyone who is not math phobic and can recall a bit of high school algebra to tackle this book as an introduction to game theory, I am afraid it will not be widely used in courses because most instructors simply will not have the personal intellectual resources to teach this material. This is because Binmore tackles some of the deepest issues in game theory, whereas most instructors will have had the standard graduate course in which these issues are totally ignored. Moreover, in the interest of clarity, Binmore does not supply the full analytical frameworks in which these deep issues are normally cast, so the instructor will have few resources to deal with the material in a classroom setting. On the other hand, each chapter has plenty of problems that an instructor could use to illuminate the text, say by assigning half to the students and solving some of the remaining problems in class.

Like every textbook writer before him, Binmore treats the Nash equilibrium with great reverence as a solution concept. I consider this a significant error, but at least Binmore tries to explain why (p. 18-19). His answer is sufficiently weak that the critical reader might decide to explore the issue himself. Binmore does not present a set of sufficient conditions under which agents will play a Nash equilibrium (for instance, as presented in the famous paper by Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995). Had he done that, the student might have a better idea of why the Nash equilibrium criterion is of limited value. Binmore's defense of the Nash concept draws on evolutionary game theory, but a notable absence from the book is a treatment of evolutionary game theory. A possible reason for this omission is that the math involved is fairly advanced (dynamical systems theory), but there are versions that avoid these technicalities for beginners (evolutionary stable strategies and stochastic dynamical systems a la Thomas Schelling, Robert Axtell, and Peyton Young).

Among the refreshing positions taken by Binmore in this text is that equilibrium refinements are generally not worth much, except for subgame perfection, and even that is highly suspect except in special situations. Whereas backward induction (a.k.a. finding subgame perfect equilibria) is treated with great reverence in most text books, the technique has been under constant attack theoretically, and it is well known that individuals generally do not use more than a few rounds of backward induction. Binmore actually presents "The Surprise Test" (pp. 45-46) which I believe reveals the deepest contradictions of backward induction, although Binmore believes that the example shows nothing and has a simple non-paradoxical resolution. I believe he is wrong. Binmore's answer is that the teacher makes two statements (you will be tested on day next week, and when the test occurs, you will be surprised). Backward induction shows that the teacher's statement is false, but the student is mistaken by inferring that he will not be tested, since it could be the other half of the teacher's statement that is false. However, in fact, the test is given on Monday, and the student is surprised. So, the teacher was correct, contrary to the backward induction reasoning. Binmore is wrong, because the student was indeed surprised.

Binmore does not particularly care for the concept of rationalizability (it isn't mentioned until p. 424) because it assumes nothing but Bayesian rationality with arbitrary priors. I think this is an error, because it leads him away from an investigation of when even rationalizability is violated. Thus, on p. 153, he confidently asserts "a rational player will never use a strongly dominated strategy."Yet, there are many games of strategic complementarity (e.g., Carlsson and van Damme, 1993), not to mention Basu's Traveler's Dilemma, in which the iterated elimination of strong dominated strategies leads to a unique Nash equilibrium that no collection of reasonable players would ever play. Binmore presents Basu's game in the problems on p. 174, and shows that if players don't care about small amounts of money, there is a plausible Nash equilibrium. This is an interesting idea that is pursued in different ways throughout the book, but is not systematically developed.

One of the most embarrassing questions for classical game theory is why anyone would ever play a mixed strategy in a one-shot game. There are a couple of important attempts at answering this in the literature, and Binmore presents them uncritically. This is uncharacteristic of him. The attempt to define an equilibrium in "conjectures" solves the problem, but says nothing about how people actually play. Binmore presents the usual example of the plausibility of this approach, which uses Throwing Pennies, in which each player "conjectures" the other will use heads or tails with equal probability. But, what if the equilibrium probabilities are 99/100 and 1/100? Why shouldn't the players still play 1/2 and 1/2, in fact? The alternative, Harsanyi's purification theorem (p. 445) deals with this issue better, but it has its own serious limitations, which Binmore does not mention.

Binmore's chapter on game theory and ethics is a gem, and his put-down of Kant in the introductory paragraph is just choice. Since Binmore has written at least three books on this subject, I would have expected more, but this book gives a foundational treatment. Binmore is a noted critique of behavioral economics, which he takes as being an enemy of game theory. However, behavioral economics is bare mentioned in this text, and never in a disparaging way. I think one of the major contributions of game theory is to the methodology of empirical economics, but this aspect of classical game theory is slighted in Binmore's text.

There is much excellent material in this book that I have not had the space to mention, including bargaining and auctions, to which Binmore has personally contributed so much. This book is way beyond virtually all others in exposing the reader to the nitty-gritty issues of classical game theory. Whether that speaks for or against it's being a commercial success remains to be seen.
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Drawing on a wealth of new archival material, including personal correspondence and diaries, Robert Leonard tells the fascinating story of the creation of game theory by Hungarian Jewish mathematician John von Neumann and Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern. Game theory first emerged amid discussions of the psychology and mathematics of chess in Germany and fin-de-siècle Austro-Hungary. In the 1930s, on the cusp of anti-Semitism and political upheaval, it was developed by von Neumann into an ambitious theory of social organization. It was shaped still further by its use in combat analysis in World War II and during the Cold War.Interweaving accounts of the period's economics, science, and mathematics, and drawing sensitively on the private lives of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Robert Leonard provides a detailed reconstruction of a complex historical drama. ... Read more

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Steadily growing applications of game theory in modern science (including psychology, biology and economics) require sources to provide rapid access in both classical tools and recent developments to readers with diverse backgrounds. This book on game theory, its applications and mathematical methods, is written with this objective in mind.

The book gives a concise but wide-ranging introduction to games including older (pre-game theory) party games and more recent topics like elections and evolutionary games and is generously spiced with excursions into philosophy, history, literature and politics. A distinguished feature is the clear separation of the text into two parts: elementary and advanced, which makes the book ideal for study at various levels.

Part I displays basic ideas using no more than four arithmetic operations and requiring from the reader only some inclination to logical thinking. It can be used in a university degree course without any (or minimal) prerequisite in mathematics (say, in economics, business, systems biology), as well as for self-study by school teachers, social and natural scientists, businessmen or laymen.

Part II is a rapid introduction to the mathematical methods of game theory, suitable for a mathematics degree course of various levels. It includes an advanced material not yet reflected in standard textbooks, providing links with the exciting modern developments in financial mathematics (rainbow option pricing), tropical mathematics, statistical physics (interacting particles) and discusses structural stability, multi-criteria differential games and turnpikes.

To stimulate the mathematical and scientific imagination, graphics by a world-renowned mathematician and mathematics imaging artist, A T Fomenko, are used. The carefully selected works of this artist fit remarkably into the many ideas expressed in the book. ... Read more

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In recent years game theory has swept through all of the social sciences. Its practioners have great designs for it, claiming that it offers an opportunity to unify the social sciences and that it it the natural foundation of a rational theory of society. Game Theory is for those who are intrigued but baffled by these claims, and daunted by the technical demands of most introductions to the subject. Requiring no more than simple arithmetic, the book: * Traces the origins of Game Theory and its philosophical premises * Looks at its implications for the theory of bargaining and social contract theory * Gives a detailed exposition of all of the major `games' including the famous `prisoner's dilemma' * Analyses cooperative, non cooperative, repeated, evolutionary and experimental games. ... Read more

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Great review
Great review of game theory. I had to read this book for a class on game theory for my graduate program.My teacher is an expert in the field and he makes all of this students read this book. ... Read more

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Best suited for advanced graduate students
Unless you've had two or three years of economic theory or mathematics graduate study, you are unlikely to get anything from this book. The description doesn't indicate the relevant audience, so as a mathematically-inclined first-year PhD student, I was surprised when I couldn't get more than a few pages in.

I gave four stars because it seems like it would be useful if you specialize in general equilibrium theory or mathematical economics, but be sure you meet the prerequisites. ... Read more

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Game theory is a field of applied mathematics that describes and analyzes interactive decision situations. It consists of a set of analytical tools that predict the outcome of complex interactions among rational entities, where rationality demands a strict adherence to a strategy based on perceived or measured results. In the early to mid-1990's, game theory was applied to networking problems including flow control, congestion control, routing and pricing of Internet services. More recently, there has been growing interest in adopting game-theoretic methods to model today's leading communications and networking issues, including power control and resource sharing in wireless and peer-to-peer networks.This work presents fundamental results in game theory and their application to wireless communications and networking. We discuss normal-form, repeated, and Markov games with examples selected from the literature. We also describe ways in which learning can be modeled in game theory, with direct applications to the emerging field of cognitive radio. Finally, we discuss challenges and limitations in the application of game theory to the analysis of wireless systems. We do not assume familiarity with game theory. We introduce major game theoretic models and discuss applications of game theory including medium access, routing, energy-efficient protocols, and others. We seek to provide the reader with a foundational understanding of the current research on game theory applied to wireless communications and networking. ... Read more

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Striking an appropriate balance of mathematical and analytical rigor, Strategy and Conflict: A Non-Technical Introduction to Game Theory teaches by example. While Game Theoretic principles are the same across the board, learners typically relate better to examples from their own fields, and McCain provides illustrations everyone can relate to. In addition, the book is organized along the lines of the Karplus Learning Cycle, making it appealing to readers with contrasting learning styles. ... Read more

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Examples
The book makes good use of examples and follows many common examples as the learning progresses throughout the book.Chapters are broken up into managable pieces coupled with end of chapter learning exercises.The text and charts do contain a number of errors. ... Read more

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This book consists of five acts and two interludes, which are all written as dialogues between three main characters and other supporting characters. Each act discusses the epistemological, institutional and methodological foundations of game theory and economics, while using various stories and examples. A featured aspect of those discussions is that many forms of mutual misunderstanding are involved in social situations as well as in those fields themselves. One Japanese traditional comic story called the Konnyaku Mondo is representative and gives hints of how our thought is constrained by incorrect beliefs. Each dialogue critically examines extant theories and common misunderstanding in game theory and economics in order to find possible future developments of those fields. ... Read more

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Game Theory in Five Acts- fresh style, great book
Written like a play in five four-scene acts with two interludes, this book is a joy to read - a pure joy!Academic writings of this kind, on as technical a subject as game theory, are scarce. I picked up the book thinking it would be a parody on some aspect of either economics, game theory, or both. Wrong - the book turned out to be one of the most effective and entertaining readings I have done in a while. The cast, the setting, and illustrations are all well done and likeable. The writing is so easy to understand that I found myself playing many parts and liking it: the audience, the actors, the director/producer, and the narrator.

The first act focuses on the fallacy of composition in economics and game theory. In a few page the author beautifully succeeds in showing the thin line between the profundity and triviality of scientific endeavors.

Act 2, entitled "Konnyaku Mondo and Game Theory" deals with the epistemological foundations of game theory. Apparently "Konnyaku Mondo" means "common knowledge" in Japanese. Common knowledge is just another game in which participants often think they understand "each other, but actually ... may be thinking about totally different things" (p. 42). Common knowledge is one of the sources of mutual misunderstanding.

The conversations of Act 3 enlighten understanding of the prisoner's dilemma and the challenge it poses for the efficacy of the Invisible Hand, and therefore the stability, perhaps even existence, of market equilibrium. One learns and re-learns that market failures are more pervasive than usually admitted, and not incomplete or asymmetric information alone, but also due to this Konnyaku Mondo phenomenon. However, before the act ends, it leaves a cautionary note against jumpy and unreasoned forays that confuse perfect competition and free competition - another source of mutual misunderstanding. Clearly I learned more about the prisoner's dilemma and game theory than I did from the movie A Beautiful Mind, and for less.

The two interludes provide an essential breather by concentrating on the "crises" in economic theory and game theoretic research. The brief literature review is global; the perspective mainly Japanese; the net gain definitely positive.

Act 4 is frontal in its attack of issues and ideas, and the most technical of all the acts. It deals with the implications of the Nash equilibrium for decision making. Along with Act 3 it clearly reveals that the author is an active theoretical gamer. Only an insider would have been so intimately familiar with extensions to game theory made by RJ Aumann and TC Schelling. The majority of us came to hear about the two only after they won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for 2005. The book may be an academic autobiography, but I like it nonetheless.

The final act (Act 5) discusses "the philosophical foundations of the social sciences" from the viewpoints of both "methodological individualism and methodological collectivism" (p.195). Another source of mutual misunderstanding is that many of us fail to see that individualism is the basis for collectivism - which sounds like something I read from Bertrand Russell.

If W. Arthur Lewis's Hobbesian assertion is correct that human progress would have fared poorly without reading, writing, and the Scientific Method, this book does well for all three. I strongly recommend this little book, especially to researchers. Amazing - just AMAZING!

Voxi Heinrich Amavilah, Author
Modeling Income Determinants in Embedded Economies : Cross-section Applications to Us Native American Economies
ISBN:1600210465
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Emphasizes the application of game theoretical tools to understand important economic phenomena. Covers applications in the fields of labor economics, international trade, environmental economics, industrial organizations and more. Paper. DLC: Game theory. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (5)

ERRORS ARE RAMPANT!!
While the content is pretty good the number of errors in this would result in an "F" if a high school student had submitted this work.There are parts that are unusable because of the rampant errors that fundamentally change outcomes of problems and understanding of concepts.

Anyone that bought this book should either receive full refund or at least a free copy of the update.I would STRONGLY urge instructors not to use this book or students not to buy it until some MAJOR revisions (and proofreads) are made.

Great ideas, poor execution
I like this book and would happily use it for advanced undergrad courses due to the number of practical economic examples.However, there are so many mathematical errors that it is just too frustrating for both students and professors.

Excellent
Excellent!Great examples and easy to understand.Should be used in all introduction to game theory courses.

This is a wonderful book
I found this book to be very useful when teaching advanced level economic students. It was well written, witty, and overall... excellent.

A good introduction in game theory
I use this book as a part of advanced ug micro component at one of the UK universities. The book uses a clear concept-building approach with examples. I give B/F four stars since the fifth star is yet to be earned insubsequent editions. Why? There are simply far too many mistakes left inthis edition. Which cannot be tolerated when game theory is the subject ofdiscussion. Just try to work through examples involving perfect Bayesianequilibria. Your solution just won't match the one provided in the text.And it turns out it is not you who is stupid. The game tree has a wrongpayoff at one of the terminal nodes. :))) ... Read more

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This collection of seven of John Nash's essays highlights his contribution to game theory in economics. It includes a comprehensive introduction by Ken Binmore, which explains and summarizes John Nash's achievements in the fields of both non-cooperative and co-operative game theory. ... Read more

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excellent compilasion of game theory papers
it is a great compilation of the principal papers that Nash wrote before his illness... The intro by Binmore is great! ... Read more

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"This book is a timely one in the rapidly growing area of evolutionarygame theory applied to economics. . . . Students and researchers alikewill be delighted by its thorough analysis of many standard examples andtheir generalizations. Research in the theory of evolutionary games byeconomists has exploded. . . while that by biologists has leveled off.The author has achieved an excellent balance between describing thebiological foundations of the theory while constantly justifying andexplaining the resultant concepts from a more rationalistic and/oreconomic perspective." -- Ross Cressman, Mathematical Reviews

This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas fromevolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing thelinks between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative gametheory. The author provides an overview of the developments that havetaken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematicaltools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation andintuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how the theoryis relevant to economics. ... Read more

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A must read...only for the serious game theorists, though.
Weibull's "Evolutionary Game Theory" has earned a distinguished place in many bookshelves for good reason: It is rigorous and never short of intuition. That said, however, this book is not the first item in the reading list of a beginner.

If you are interested in learning evolutionary game theory and your previous exposure to non-cooperative game theory and ordinary differential equations has been limited, do not start with Weibull's Evolutionary Game Theory. Consider first visiting Herbert Gintis's "Game Theory Evolving" and Maynard Smith's classic "Evolution and the Theory of Games"

For the 'technical' reader this book still is not a walk in the park becasue Weibull walks the reader not only in a math garden but also exposes the reader to several important evolutionary concepts including but not limited to 'evolutionary stability','evolutionarily stable strategy', 'replicator dynamics', 'population dynamics'. Grasping both the theoretical concepts and how they are modelled takes some thinking and patience.

Overall this is a must reader for the seriously involved and can be the single item for many students of this subject that takes them to a higher plane of understanding.

Hard to read and to apply
I'm a computer sciences engineer working on my phd thesis that is related with game thoery. I found the book difficult to read. Forget about following an entire chapter if you are weak on differential equations.

It explains Evolutionary Game Theory very well
After one makes it through umpteen refinements of Nash equilibria, the book becomes fascinating. Many ideas of Darwinism became much clearer -they got a quality of unavoidability so to speak- than when I read books on Darwinism before.
I found the level of mathematical sophistication needed rather unchallenging, without being boring - and I am not a "deep core" mathematician, but an engineer.

Highly recommendable

Not much usefull for practical purposes
During the work on my master thesis ("Learning in strategicgames") i bought several books about the topic. This one was thehardest to understand and to apply to anything practical. I guess this oneis for "hard core" mathematicians. ... Read more

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Fernando Vega-Redondo's self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics starts with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations.The discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts and their main refinements; games played under incomplete information; and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, the text includes a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics (e.g., oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions). ... Read more

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My favorite game theory book
I am a PhD student at Cornell studying game theory, and this is by far my favorite non-cooperative game theory book. It's written at a similar level as Fudenberg and Tirole's book but with better examples, explanations, and organization. These strengths make it a very good book to learn advanced game theory. Additionally, it covers popular recent topics such as evolutionary game theory and networks in more detail than in other advanced books (F&T, Osborne & Rubinstein, Myerson, etc.).

With that said, it is not an easy book, requiring strong math skills, etc. If you are looking for a simple introduction, check out the books by Gibbon or Gintis. ... Read more