Book Description
The book is an analytic exposition of Brentano's early theoryof intentionality. In spite of the immense influence of this theory itis the first separate monograph on this topic. The book is based ingreat part on the unpublished manuscripts where one can findsubstantially better articulated formulations then those expressed inthe already published `standard' works. Our analysis concentratesmainly on the ontological and epistemological problems of Brentano'simmanent object. We highlight an interesting ambiguity of this conceptand try to outline the inner logic of its evolution.
It turns out that Brentano's early philosophy of intentionality shouldbe conceived not as a single, well defined theory but rather as abundle of kindred but not always fully consistent and sometimes evencompeting ideas.
Primary audience for the work are philosophers interested inBrentano's philosophy, theory of intentionality and its epistemologyand ontology, phenomenologists and cognitive scientists.

Das Buch bietet eine analytische Darstellung von Brentanos früherTheorie der Intentionalität.
Trotz der großen historischen Bedeutung dieser Theorie bildet esdie erste Monographie zu diesem Thema. Das Buch basiert zumgrößten Teil auf den unveröffentlichten Manuskripten,in denen man die Formulierungen findet, die viel besser artikuliertsind als jene, die in den publizierten Standard-Werken Brentanos zufinden sind. Unsere Analyse konzentriert sich in erster Linie auf dieontologischen und epistemischen Probleme des Brentanoschen immanentenObjekts. Wir besprechen eine interessante Mehrdeutigkeit diesesBegriffs und skizzieren die innere Logik seiner Entwicklung.
Es stellt sich heraus, daß die frühe Philosophie derIntentionalität Brentanos nicht als eine einheitliche, eindeutigbestimmte Theorie, sondern eher als ein Bündel von verwandten,jedoch nicht immer völlig koherenten und manchmal sogarkonkurrierenden Ideen interpretiert werden soll.
Das Buch wendet sich in erster Linie an die Philosophen, die sichfür die Philosophie Brentanos, für die österreichischePhilosophie, für die Theorie der Intentionalität und ihreEpistemologie und Ontologie interessieren. Es wird ferner auchfür die Phänomenologen und die Forscher im Bereich dercognitive science interessant sein. ... Read more

Book Description
Phenomenology, according to Husserl, is meant to be philosophyas rigorous science. It was Franz Brentano who inspired him to pursuethe ideal of scientific philosophy. Though Husserl began hisphilosophical career as an orthodox disciple of Brentano, heeventually began to have doubts about this orientation. TheLogische Unterschungen is the result of such doubts. Especiallyafter the publication of that work, he became increasingly convincedthat, in the interests of scientific philosophy, he had to go in adirection which diverged from Brentano and other members of thisschool (`Brentanists') who believed in the same ideal. An attempt ismade here to ascertain Husserl's philosophical relation to Brentanoand certain other Brentanists (Carl Stumpf, Benno Kerry, KasimirTwardowski, Alexius Meinong, and Anton Marty). The crucial turningpoint in the development of these relations is to be found in theessay which Husserl wrote in 1894 (particularly in response toTwardowski) under the title `Intentional Objects' (which is translatedas an appendix in this volume).
This study will be of interest to historians of philosophy andphenomenology in particular, but also to anyone concerned with theideal of scientific philosophy. ... Read more