Customer Reviews (2)

So what does Feyerabend believe?
A short while ago, I wrote a favorable review of "Against Method" by Paul Feyerabend. This book, though, is much more difficult to swallow. Feyerabend suggests that many Western intellectuals (by this, he usually means Karl Popper) are skeptical of relativism and after reading this, I can see why. Feyerabend is almost too good at what he does. The relativism, or Rorty-like 'pragmatism', that he seems to champion, undercuts him at every turn.

First, this book focuses more on culture than scientific belifs. Feyerabend makes clear from the get-go that he is a believer in 'democratic relativism" - literally, that what works for one culture may not work for another. This is really not a radical view untill you take Feyerabends conclusion that because of this, there can be no objective truths, standards, or even critierion for deciphering either. Here's how he undercuts himself though. For Feyerabend, this relativism demands that we recognize our ability to learn from other cultures, engage in dialogue and even argue from time to time. The problem is that if reason is just as good (no better) than any other way of proceeding, it is difficult to imagine how dialogue can proceed, outside of a reasoned structure. At the end of the first essay, Feyerabend stretches further still. If quarks and gods are both theoretical (that is, not empirical) then isn't it strange to regard quarks as more 'real' than gods. Well, Paul, not if you consider that quarks are a) open to falsification, b) accountable to scientific prediction that CAN falsify them and c) have so far enabled us to make accurate predictions without being falsified, then I guess the answer is "no".

Many readers will also read this book as a diatribe against Karl Popper. I would urge these readers, if they've not read Popper, to first read either "Conjectures and Refutations" or "Objective Knowledge". Many of Feyerabends characterizations are wrong. Feyerabend constantly underestimates Popper's recongintion of theory and ideology in conjectures and observations. Feyerabend also miscarachterizes Popper's falsification as a view that as soon as an individual sees her theory falsified, she should abandon it as quick as possible. Nope! She should defend it while keeping in mind that she could be wrong. Third, Feyerabend misconstrues Popper as an elitist of science who claims that Western scientific conclusions are the most valid. Popper would be the first to admit that good ideas can come from anywhere. Popper's only suggestion is that matriculation of those ideas into our lives involves making up our minds, which involves reason and that empirical methods are good insofar as they HAVE TO BE the common denominator of intersubjective discussion.Overall, Feyerabends conclusions are all-in-all self defeating, his arguments are largely misunderstandings and his book is verging on being a waste of time.

An energetic read.
Once again Paul Feyerabend has produced an energetic commentary on the modern philosophical constructs of the philosophy of science, especially those of Popper. In this, his second book, he concentrates on the main on answering negative comments on his earlier book "Against Method" by various philsophers of science such as Popper and Putnam. Although this seems to occupy his attentions there are chapters on various aspects such as Xenophanes, Greek Gods, a fascinating chapter on Aristotle's theory of the continuum, the role of theories in science, relativism and a very interesting and rare discussion of Mach's theory of research.

As usual his groundwork is thorough, although not as detailed as that in "Against Method", and full of interesting asides which both support the argument and fascinate the reader. His energy is infectious although some of his comments are quite abrasive especially those concerning Popper. It compares well to the first book and is far better than his last "Conquest of Abundance" which seemed tired by comparison and lacking the zest of the earlier works such as this one and the first. To me, the two outstanding chapters are the ones on Mach and Aristotle which alone make the book worth buying. Feyerabend is a rare breed of philosopher in that he does not construct systematic theories but rather deconstructs existing ones and criticises them consistently at the same time giving credence to his ideas of relativism which are quite at odds with the usual interpretation of this idea. Feyerabend does not constrain himself overly in the sense of a solid theoretical basis prefering to remain loose and free to move. There are many advantages to this process although it does not introduce new ideas or concepts which by themselves could lead to further insights, this is possible without stagnation or a crystallisation of views which often occurs. He is also aware of his own propensity to intellectualise, something which he tries to supplement with a kind of living discourse which partly compensates.
An energetic read. ... Read more

Book Description
This third volume of Paul Feyerabend's philosophical papers, which gathers together work originally published between 1960 and 1980, offers a range of his characteristically exciting treatments of classic questions in the philosophy of science, including theoretical pluralism, the relationship between theory and observation, the distinction between science and myth, the role of science in society, and the vexed question of the nature of scientific method. The volume is completed by a substantial introduction and a comprehensive list of Feyerabend's works. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (12)

A superb philosopher
Paul Feyerabend is one of the most pioneering of the contemporary pragmatist philosophers of science.This is the 1988 edition of his first book originally published in 1975. Most of his philosophical ideas are set forth in this book, and its "Analytical Index", which functions as a table of contents at the opening of the book, is wonderfully convenient for entering his thought.

His thesis of "scientific anarchy" or "anything goes" is probably the most controversial of his ideas about the empirical sciences.It is fully intended to be more radical than Kuhn's phrase "scientific revolution."Feyerabend ridicules any positive valuation of scientific institutions or rational processes involving criteria for scientific criticism in basic science.He is thus explicitly and emphatically opposed to Popper's philosophy of scientific criticism, and he caricatures it as "ratiomania" and "law-and-order science."

His "incommensurability" thesis of the semantics of successive scientific theories is his best-known idea, and it resembles Kuhn's use of the same term.Unlike Kuhn who qualified his earlier statements, Feyerabend makes no concession to the radical nature of his thesis.In this book he elaborates his "incommensurability" thesis in terms of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity.Like Kuhn, he unfortunately never developed a theory of meaning description.

His rejection of the positivist observation language makes his philosophy characteristically post-positivist, and his thesis of "counterinduction" is one of his most interesting ideas.His exemplification of counterinduction in Galileo's defense of the Copernican theory is one of the most insightful philosophical analyses I have ever read.Had Feyerabend not taken Bohr's ideas as definitive of quantum theory, he might also have exemplified counterinduction in Heisenberg's reinterpretation of the electron's track in the Wilson cloud chamber, which Heisenberg describes in his book, Physics and Beyond.

I believe that retrospection will reveal that Feyerabend is one of the truly great philosophers of the twentieth century.For more about his philosophy Google my book titled History of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science at my web site philsci with free downloads.See especially Book VI.

Thomas J. Hickey

Why science and why not astrology or voodoo?
A friend of mine who worked in a restaurant once told me that if I knew what was going on in the kitchen, I would never go to eat there.After having read Feyerabend I wondered: if the general public knew the inside world of science, would anything with "scientific" basis still be trusted, would we admire their celebrities like Einstein, Feynman, etc.?

Against Method calls into question the position that science enjoys in modern society (politics, education, etc.).The separation of state and science the same way it was done in the case of state and religion during the Enlightenment is suggested.The main reason is that science is hardly distinguishable from the myths often encountered in religion, it can be equally as dogmatic (if not more), aspects of religion often criticized by scientists (such as giving more weight to ideas coming from prestigious sources) are very much present in science as well, and the concept of scientific method that is supposed to distinguish science from myth, according to Feyerabend, does not exist.Scientists on their way to useful discovery use a variety of tools, which includes rational argument and experimental checks, but it can also include rhetoric, propaganda, opportunism, etc.Furthermore it is not only that the scientific method does not exist, but it would hinder progress (in particular of science itself) if it existed, since proposing new ideas would be prevented from coming to light by the strict and binding criteria of any method, and in fact spontaneity would be sacrificed.It is also mentioned that the situation in science is steadily worsening since science has become a business in which producing bulk, (not mentioned are politicking at conferences, kissing up to powerful maffiosos of the field), etc. are more essential in building a scientific career than in depth investigations or great ideas.

Essentially the above is the analysis of science according to Feyerabend.His criticism of modern science (or perhaps more its institutes which intertwine with politics and business) is rather apposite.His solution is a sort of democracy or anarchy of ideas where science, religion, voodoo are more or less given "equal opportunity" to contribute, and everyone takes from them what s/he needs at any given time.

It seems to me that one of the conclusions of the book is not to give automatic trust to what is called science.Scientific achievements are not to be under-appreciated, but there is no reason to follow the advice of scientists (or so-called experts), necessarily, on issues such as their critique of religion (or other competing ideas of the world at large), what should be taught in schools, where tax money should be spent, or even scientific issues such as whether genetically modified organisms necessarily benefit everyone.The invention of the transistor certainly has made life easier, but science can do as much harm as good: some of the most talented and intellectually persistent individuals are drawn into an institution where they are likely to spend their energy on publishing papers in obscure journals (of which millions of pages are published weekly), and their talent geared at solving questions important only to a tiny part of the community (mainly other academics).(To some extent they become like medieval monks, only that medieval monks did not hold their annual conferences at the most expensive vacation resorts of the Mediterranean.)Thus science, even in ideal circumstances (that is neglecting the possibility of corruption, nepotism, etc.), can be a major obstacle to the spontaneous flow of human creativity.

All in all the issues raised in the book are likely to become more important in the future, since the position of science as the key to humanity's salvation or progress is less and less taken for granted unlike for much of the twentieth century (at least in the West).

A shortened sequel to this book is "Science in a free society", where much of the details are not elaborated but the ideas are stressed.

Troubliing to say the least!
Paul Feyerabend, in writing this book during the anti-authoritarian, hippie infested, mid 60's was, like Kuhn, just asking for heavy misinterpretation. This should make us want to read the book all the more. Feyerabend, as you will discover, is NOT anti-science, Feyerabend is NOT anti-reason and for god's sake, FEYERABEND IS NOT A SUBJECTIVIST! What he is advocating is scientific anarchism, meaning: science does not proceed by any set of rules, criterion or methods. So, as may suprise you, Feyerabend is not even that contraversial.

Feyerabend supports himself like this. Science operates from theories which inextricably use observation, preconcieved theories (like "the earth is moving right now"), language and subject-dependent vantage point. Since none of these are completely, or ever could be, accurate, no theory can ever be proved, and so many theories would be refuted because of changing paradigms, preconceptiois and world-views affecting all of the above, science would never make any progress. Thus, if there are any rules, they are pragmatic hence science is purely instrumental meaning it can only be judged in retrospect and rules only exist situationally. All may be broken.

So how is Feyerabend not contraversial? Between Popper (all theories are inextricable from preconceptions that sometimes are shown erroneous), Dewey (science is pragmatic and instrumental) and Kuhn (paradigm shifts mark heavy changes in science and because of their scope, make scientific change excruciating and unreliable), all of these Feyerabendian critiques have been made before. The other detriment is that while he makes strategic points against method, it would've helped his credibility if he guided us to a new starting point. If we can only judge science in retrospect, but still can't even be sure that are preconceptions won't get in the way, than how could we even do THAT. An attempt at an answer (even in guess form) would have been nice.

To his credit, the book is written well (certainly not difficult to read), is thought provoking (this coming from a Popperian) and does make some good adjustments to what came before. Popper's insistence that theories, when replacing others, need to be at least as explanative as the old ones. Feyerabend smartly answers with a quick retort - 'Why? Why couldn't a new theory solve most of the problems so well, that we use it assuming the rest will be figured out in due course?' There is also a brilliant post-script where Feyerabend advocates 'seperation of science and state' and makes a beautiful case for science education that teaches many 'hows' instead of many 'whats'. Also his "postscript on relativism" and three prefaces (original, third edition and chinese edition) give a much deserved slap in the face to those that still look at Feyerabend as a relativist and non-believer in science. They need to read this book like they should've the first time. You should read it too.

Anything goes-but where?
"How can an enterprise depend on culture in so many ways, and yet produce such solid results? Most answers to this question are either incomplete or incoherent. Physicists take the fact for granted. Movements that view quantum mechanics as a turning-point in thought - and that include fly-by-night mystics, prophets of a New Age, and relativists of all sorts - get aroused by the cultural component and forget predictions and technology."

What deeply untrendy, lab-coated person wrote that? None other than Paul Feyerabend in 1992. 'Against Method', the book that made his name, is dense, quirky and deliberately provocative, in parts a good read, but never intended to be taken as solemn holy writ. The joke is that some people do just that. Those who use the very technology he was talking about to propagate the latest fashions in radical relativism are like the lady who told Bertrand Russell that she had been a solipsist all her life and was disappointed not to have met anyone else of the same persuasion.

Outside the madhouse there is a distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Feyerabend's 'solid argument', based on the usual historical case-studies (Copernicus, Galileo etc.), applies at best to the context of discovery, which, as staid old Popper pointed out long ago, can be and often is anarchic. Feyerabend goes much further and asserts that the context of justification is anarchic too, or rather that the traditional epistemic distinction is illusory. This is the crucial step, after which, indeed, anything goes. As far as I can see he adduces no convincing argument for it. Why should he? If he's right - or if his assertion is right, which may be a different matter - then propaganda is as good as rational argument. Quite a lot of people believe this. If they tell you it's smart to blur the distinction, or insist that none can be defined, relax - you won't have to go to the local witch doctor next time you get a bad dose of flu, or call in a voodoo priest to fix your computer. Those smart people don't do that; they're not that sort of relativist.

Cheap shot, I hear you say. So read this book, read Laudan's 'Science and Relativism', read Stove's shocker 'Scientific Irrationalism' (hide it from your friends inside a copy of Deleuze & Guattari); then make up your own mind. One caveat: if you find Kuhn's 'Structure' hard going, you'll likely find this even harder - it isn't a laugh a minute, whatever the fans say. Of course this sort of thing flushes all the usual suspects out of the woodwork, from creationists to New Agers, who see it as lending support to their fads. But should rational people take it seriously?

"Always remember that the demonstrations and the rhetorics used do not express any 'deep convictions' of mine. They merely show how easy it is to lead people by the nose ..." - Feyerabend.

Anything Goes
Feyerabend was probably the first philosopher of science who really stated that science as it is practised by scientists themselves is NOT an enterprise which can be strictly constructed or even fully described in any conventional methodical way such as the philosophies of positivism and even rationality or idealism for that matter propose. As is true for any human enterprise, no matter how strongly this is denied by the popular science press, it is, as Feyerabend puts it, an anarchaic enterprise, this does not mean random chaos or a process with no order rather he refers to the fact that scientists just as authors of great literature or poets, pursue their subject via many paths rather than the strict methodologies which are supposed to define science, in fact these methodologies fail to be `...capable of accounting for such a maze of interactions'. Einstein is noted as saying that `The external conditions which are set for the scientist by the facts of experience do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted, in the construction of his conceptual world, by the adherence to an epistemological system'. Feyerabend goes on to say that `The attempt...to discover the secrets of nature and of man, entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal standards and of all rigid traditions.' So starts his book "Against Method" and through detailed analysis of the scientists and the phenomenon in question Feyerabend proceeds to demolish any assertions which compress science into a box which stands alone outside of all other influences such as religion, history, culture or philosophy.

The idea that irrational means are used by scientists to form theories and understand phenomena is stressed. Similarly the fact that an observation is made does not necessarily imply the theory which follows eg the moon seen through Galeleos eyes. Also, reason is sometimes discarded in favour of new, seemingly unreasonable, ideas which explain the phenomenon and finally science itself becomes a kind of tradition in its own way. The blindness of the usual ways of thinking about science as expressed in the popular press is made clear and it is shown science is not and never has been or will be the only true way of understanding the universe.

Feyerabend's book is very entertaining given the radical and playfull nature of the man himself (see `Killing Time', his autobiography), nonetheless it is very well researched and his argument is solid. He does not shirk his academic responsibilities but rather writes as he thinks is best in order to explain his ideas without necessarily having to write in a cold or overly rational way.

Feyerabend also includes excerpts from his experience of famous scientists during his life such as the radical Felix Ehrenhaft, the young Popper full of vitality or Wittgenstein. He further explores his own misgivings when teaching people of cultures other than his own eg native Americans, Mexicans and so on and his own understanding that he had no real right to say his own phiosophical view or rather the one pushed by his society was any better than theirs or that intellectual procedures which approach a problem through concepts are the right way to go. Feyerabend stresses that the phrase "anything goes" is far more relavent to the progress of human knowledge and science.

An excellent book written with style ... Read more

Book Description
Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. ... Read more