Book Description
Although some of Nelson Goodman's views have become unfashionable or seem unorthodox, much in his work is of lasting significance. Daniel Cohnitz and Marcus Rossberg assess Goodmans contribution to philosophy, including his acceptance and critique of positivism, his defence of nominalism and phenomenalism, his formulation of a new riddle of induction, his work on notational systems, and his analysis of the arts. They offer an analysis of the unifying features of Goodman's philosophy - his constructivism, conventionalism, and relativism - and discuss his central work, The Structure of Appearance, and its significance in the analytic tradition. They also examine Goodman's views on mereology and semiotics, which underly his philosophy and provide the background to his aesthetics. ... Read more

Book Description
Here, in a new edition, is Nelson Goodman's provocative philosophical classic--a book that, according to Science, "raised a storm of controversy" when it was first published in 1954, and one that remains on the front lines of philosophical debate. How is it that we feel confident in generalizing from experience in some ways but not in others? How ore generalizations that ore warranted to be distinguished from those that are not? Goodman shows that these questions resist formal solution and his demonstration has been taken by nativists like Chomsky and Fodor as proof that neither scientific induction nor ordinary learning can proceed without an a priori, or innate, ordering of hypotheses. In his new foreword to this edition, Hilary Putnam forcefully rejects these nativist claims. The controversy surrounding these unsolved problems is as relevant to the psychology of cognitive development as it is to the philosophy of science. No serious student of either discipline can afford to misunderstand Goodman's classic argument. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Simply brilliant!
Goodman starts out with an attempt to tackle the problem of interpreting counterfactuals ("What would happen if X would be the case instead of Y."). He doesn't solve the problem but gives some deep insights, especially on the connection between counterfactuals and scientific laws. In the next section he tries to tackle the problem by taking a look at a specific sort of counterfactuals, dispositional predicates. These are predicates like "flexibility" ("If I would bend this..."). He does tackle that problem. He doesn't use strange concepts like "possible worlds", that are more problematic than the original problem, but shows how dispositional predicates can be interpreted as statements about past observations, which reduces the problem to the good old problem of induction, which he adresses in the third section. He argues that Hume has solved the problem on how we can know that the future will behave like the past (we simply can't). The real question is not justifying induction but describing how it is done. Several people have attempted to do just that and Goodman discusses their work in some detail. He shows that there is a new, deeper problem: How can we separate theories about predicates ("All X are Y.") from these predicates. He constructs a strange predicate, grue, that is green until some future time t and blue afterwards. The theory "All emeralds are green." is as well supported as the theory "All emeralds are green." One can also construct "blue" and "green" from "bleen" and "grue", so the choice of predicates seems to be somewhat arbitrary. It is easy to construct similar predicates and noone has found a general way to rule them out yet. So how can we decide what predicates we should use in our theories? Goodman argues that this is pure convention, based on tradition. Not everyone will accept this answer (I don't), but this isn't necessary for seeing the brilliance of this work.

A new look at the problem of induction
This book is clearly written and undeniably rigorous.In his first chapters, Goodman examines problems in counterfactual conditionals and sets up the problem of what he calls 'projectibility'.But, it is the chapter entitled "The New Riddle of Induction" where the book takes off.In this chapter, Goodman takes the reader through, first, the common misconceptions of the problem of induction.The way that Goodman perceives our inductive system is unique and refreshingly simplistic.(John Rawls later names Goodman's picture 'reflective equilibrium'.)Next, Goodman takes you through a journey of rule-finding for our inductive system; which includes examining Hempel's famous Raven's Paradox.Goodman ends the journey with discovering his own paradox, which he calls his 'Grue' argument.He demonstrates that predicates like 'grue' are the lingering problem with constructing a valid inductive system.In his last chapter, Goodman attempts to resolve the grue dilemma.It is in this chapter that we see the full philosophic mind of Goodman.The depth and relentless thought that Goodman puts into this chapter will forever 'entrench' his name in the philosophic discipline. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

construct.represerntation/reproduction
Languages of Art enables a person to review the deep structure ofaesthetics through symbolic diagram.Goodman presents/offers a model ofaesthetic production based on a flow from microperceptions into themacroperception of affect.He allows one to review the product ofaesthetic direction through symbolic structure based on folds. ... Read more

Book Description
A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the familiar framework. Others considered the arguments compelling, but despaired of doing philosophy without the framework. Goodman disagreed with both factions. Rather than regretting the loss of structure, he capitalized on the opportunities that arise when the strictures of tradition are loosened. ... Read more

Book Description
A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the familiar framework. Others considered the arguments compelling, but despaired of doing philosophy without the framework. Goodman disagreed with both factions. Rather than regretting the loss of structure, he capitalized on the opportunities that arise when the strictures of tradition are loosened. ... Read more

Book Description
A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the familiar framework. Others considered the arguments compelling, but despaired of doing philosophy without the framework. Goodman disagreed with both factions. Rather than regretting the loss of structure, he capitalized on the opportunities that arise when the strictures of tradition are loosened.
Available individually by volume
1. Nominalism, Constructivism, and Relativism in the Work of Nelson Goodman (0-8153-2609-2) 296 pages
2. Nelson Goodman's New Riddle of Induction (0-8153-2610-6) 312 pages
3. Nelson Goodman's Philosophy of Art (0-8153-2611-4) 284 pages
4. Nelson Goodman's Theory of Symbols and its Applications (0-8153-2612-2) 344 pages ... Read more

Book Description
A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the familiar framework. Others considered the arguments compelling, but despaired of doing philosophy without the framework. Goodman disagreed with both factions. Rather than regretting the loss of structure, he capitalized on the opportunities that arise when the strictures of tradition are loosened. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

Also called playing with metanarratives
"The non-Kantian theme of multiplicity of worlds is closely akin to the Kantian theme of the vacuity of the notion of pure content. The one denies us a unique world, the other the common stuff of which worlds are made. Together these theses defy our intuitive demand for something solid underneath, and threaten to leave us uncontrolled, spinning out our own inconsequent fantasies." (...) "Truth, far from being a solemn and severe master, is a docile and obedient servant. The scientist who supposes that he is single-mindedly dedicated to the search for truth deceives himself. He is unconcerned with the trivial truths he could grind out endlessly; and he looks to the multifaceted and irregular results of observations for little more than suggestions of overall structures and significant generalizations. He seeks system, simplicity, scope; and when satisfied on these scores he tailors truth to fit. He as much decrees as discovers the laws he sets forth, as much designs as discerns the patterns he delineates." (...) MY notes: this seems to exhibit the influence of the later Wittgenstein. There are several quotes to this effect. "...while readiness to recognize alternative worlds may be liberating, and suggestive of new avenues of exploration, a willingness to welcome all worlds builds none. ... A broad mind is no substitute for hard work." (p. 21) From the footnote on (...): "Even though a metaphorical statement may be literally false, metaphorical truth differs from metaphorical falsity much as literal truth differs from literal falsity."Chapter III is an interesting discussion of the nature of quotation which could come in handy during discussions of plagiarism. Chapter V - the puzzle about perception seems to deal with issues contemporary brain science has better answers for. But VI - The Fabrication of Facts looks like a good chapter. "...we must distinguish falsehood and fiction from truth and fact; but we cannot, I am sure, do it on the ground that fiction is fabricated and fact found." (...) There is a nice (and very useful) summary of the ancients searching for the arche from (...) (Some ancient worlds). Note the quote from "Professor" Woody Allen on (...) and G's interpretation of it. Here is something important I think: "Incidentally, recognition of multipleworlds or true versions suggests innocuous interpretations of necessity and possibility. A statement is necessary in a universe of worlds or true versions if true in all, necessarily false if true in none, and contingent or possible if true in some." (...)

Goodman and Anti-Realism
Goodman is neither a realist nor an anti-realist. He argues neither for nor against the existence of a real world out beyond all our knowledge and our active efforts to cope with our experiences. He calls himself an "irrealist," or someone who couldn't care less whether or not such a real world exists.

Ways of Worldmaking contains one brilliant argument after another for the idea that no appeal to a real world beyond our "conceptual schemes" is necessary to understand, or to produce, science and scientific knowledge. What's more, Goodman also shows how art is just as necessary as science if we are to understand ourselves and the world. He explains that neither art nor science is a copy of the world: as the old joke has it, "one of the damn things is enough." Instead both art and science succeed when they provide us with symbols that re-categorize things and people in ways we find useful.

It is this usefulness, not a connection to a world beyond all categories, that we actually seek when we generate both theories and artworks. Notice that we do in fact stop our seeking when we achieve this kind of satisfaction. Goodman's neo-pragmatic explanation of how we should investigate the world pays close attention, and gives proper respect, to the ways in which we actually do investigate.

A wonderful book from an underappreciated thinker.

Confusion
Although Goodman is generally attributed as on of the leaders of the Anti-Realist position, Ways of Worldmaking does not provide a good argument for that position.Goodman's talk is highly open to interpretation, butmost interpretations lead to trivial truth or outlandishly bizarrescenarios.The lack of detailed argument makes refutation difficult, butstill it is a must read for those interested in what Anti-Realism is. ... Read more