Customer Reviews (1)

An eloquent presentation of Husserl's phenomenology
Natanson's book is amazingly well-written.Husserl's often difficult and wordy ideas of phenomenology are covered clearly enough for the beginner, and in-depth enough for the student of Husserl.Natanson offers not just areview of phenomenology, but covers all from attitudes to methods,existence to the application of phenomenology.This is the first book Irecommend to anyone studying Husserl. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

A great translation of the time lectures
The time lectures of Edmund Husserl are essential reading for anyone interested in the fields of phenomenology, psychology, or time in general. Here, Husserl attempts to unravel the many layers of our consciousness of time. Husserl's extended study stands as the most compelling analysis of the subject in the history of western philosophy and has exerted much influence onresearch in phenomenology. This particular work is also of interests since what is found here is taken up in much less detail in his other introductions. In addition, this particular aspect of Husserl's philosophy can be seen again in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. The Brough translation excels in many ways. Brough offers a thorough and clear translation of the work with many scholarly bonuses. This is not to say that he made Husserl easy to read, but he retains the power of Husserl's thought through the difficult translation. He also offers clearifying notes throughout the text that cross reference appendices and sections of the Husserl's notes and an introduction that clearifies the context in which the text was produced and the many difficulties that are present in this work. Brough's translation is far superior to that of the previous english translation by James Churchill. This work is well worth the effort and the translation is the best yet (the price is another story altogether). Husserl's lectures on the consciousness of internal time are of continued value to the student and scholar alike and this editions offers much for both types.

Awesome Bearded Philosophers
Professor Brough delivers Husserl to English-reading audiences with remarkable flair. ... Read more

Book Description

Book Description
Coming from what is arguably the most productive period ofHusserl's life, this volume offers the reader a first translation intoEnglish of Husserl's renowned lectures on `passive synthesis', givenbetween 1920 and 1926. These lectures are the first extensiveapplication of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology toperceptual experience and to the way in which it is connected tojudgments and cognition. They include an historical reflection on thecrisis of contemporary thought and human spirit, provide anarchaeology of experience by questioning back into sedimented layersof meaning, and sketch the genealogy of judgment in `activesynthesis'.
Drawing upon everyday events and personal experiences, theAnalyses are marked by a patient attention to the subtleemergence of sense in our lives. By advancing a phenomenology ofassociation that treats such phenomena as bodily kinaesthesis,temporal genesis, habit, affection, attention, motivation, and theunconscious, Husserl explores the cognitive dimensions of the body inits affectively significant surroundings. An elaboration of thesediverse modes of evidence and their modalizations (transcendentalaesthetic), allows Husserl to trace the origin of truth up tojudicative achievements (transcendental logic).
Joined by several of Husserl's essays on static and genetic method,the Analyses afford a richness of description unequalled by themajority of Husserl's works available to English readers. Students ofphenomenology and of Husserl's thought will find this an indispensablework. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (7)

BEST HUSSERL ANTHOLOGY
This text is the most comprehensive, representative, and cost effective compendium of Husserl's early and late philosophy currentlyavailable in English. Given the astronomical prices of the original works excerpted here, this text is indispensible to anyone seeking a comprehensive overview of Husserl's philosophy at a reasonable price. The editor, Donn Welton [SUNY /Stony Brook], is an internationally recognized authority in the field of Husserl studies, and the author of a number of authoritative and innovative studies on Husserl's philosophy.

One caveat: the text does need a more comprehensive introductory essay that would give the novice reader a better overview of Husserl's philosophical project and writings. GV would suggest Walter Biemel's essay, "The Decisive Phases in the Development of Husserl's Philosophy", in R.O. Elverton, The Phenomenology of Husserl, Noesis Press, 1970 - Biemel was the first editor of Husserl's Collected Works / Husserliana. New readers in this area should also note that reading a good Introduction to Husserl's work before tackling his works in the original will pay big dividends. GV would recommend Robert Sokolowski's Introduction to Phenomenology [Cambridge UP], or David Woodruff Smith's new 2007 Introduction entitled, Husserl [Routledge]. There is also a very good online overview at the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy ["Phenomenology"] by the latter author, which is available at no cost to the reader - GV would also concur that this free philosophical resource deserves your financial support.

Careful selection of texts
Husserl published two long books, The Logical Invesigatnons and Ideas Pertaining to the Pure Phenomenology. He wrote very much more than he published, leaving shelves of unfinished manuscripts. He also gave some fairly complete public lectures. Relative to the volume of his total output, only fragments of his work are tranlated into English and these aren't always representative of Husserl's best ideas or affordable for the student. Examples: as far as I know, Thing and Space has no English translation and Husserl would agree that the price of Cartesian Mediations is absurd. It's nice to have this reasonably priced and representative selection of Husserl texts. They start near the beginning of Husserl's published work (around 1900 if I remember rightly) and take us through about 40 years of his phenomenological labors.

Logical Absolutism
Durante toda su vida, Husserl defendió la objetividad de las ciencias frente a las filosofías vitalistas e irracionalistas de la época.Sin embargo, en su salvación de la objetividad lo que se dio fue una profundización de la subjetividad que, en el fondo, se trataba de una especie de formalismo metafísico ya que el sujeto puro y abstracto se convertía en la fuente absoluta de conocimiento.En este formalismo, Husserl se acercó a los positivistas que tanto combatió.La diferencia es que en Husserl las formas lógicas no son convencionales, sino esencias intuidas lo que le da a su epistemología una inusitada dimensión de irracionalidad porque la esencia se intuye de la esencia. Las Investigaciones Lógicas constituyen la base lógica de la fenomenología de Husserl.El objeto considerado desde la simplicidad lógica es lo que después se transformará en objeto intencional en la epistemología de las Ideas.Por lo tanto las Investigaciones es la teoría lógica de la doctrina de la intencionalidad.Mediante la revisión del concepto de lógica como fundamentación de las ciencias positivas y de la intencionalidad como método ideal de conocimiento, el anti- idealismo fenoménico de Husserl se revela como una restauración del idealismo -kantiano y platónico-, así como su crítica del positivismo en una resignación hacia la positividad.En las Investigaciones Lógicas, Husserl se propone fundamentar las ciencias positivas mediante una aclaración de las formas lógicas que sean a la vez la idea y el ideal de dichas ciencias.Este ideal de las formas lógicas llegará a tener en Husserl el rango del en-sí, formas judicativas válidas para todo contenido posible de cualquier juicio.La crítica está por tanto dirigida al formalismo lógico de la fenomenología, su dominio sobre la cosa en su "vuelta a las cosas" y la supuesta salvación de la objetividad en una profunidización de la subjetividad.Así, el sistema fenomenológico de Husserl resulta abstracto respecto a la cosa y transforma en esencias platónicas las categorías manejadas por las ciencias positivas sobre el ente.En segundo lugar, el formalismo lógico de las Investigaciones Lógicas se desplaza hacia una teoría del conocimiento que pone en la intención subjetiva la verdad del objeto.En la doctrina de la intencionalidad es donde la fenomenología alcanza su punto máximo de subjetivismo.El objeto adquiere, por un lado, su pureza transcendental cuando es representado en la consciencia como parte de una especie formal; y por otro, sirve como medio para comprobar el correcto funcionamiento de la consciencia.Cuando el objeto es considerado como simple medio de la certeza epistemológica -ya no psicológica, doctrina que Husserl siempre combatió- el conocimiento se convierte en una gigantesca tautología.Dicha tautología se muestra lógicamente en el fetichismo husserliano por el concepto, y epistemológicamente en la teoría de la intencionalidad.

La teoría de las esencias lógicas las desarrolla el primer Husserl en toda su en las Investigaciones Lógicas. Husserl demuestra que, para salvar la objetividad del conocimiento empírico, debe haber necesariamente un tipo lógico como ideal de toda coherencia científica.La realidad empírica debe estar estructurada lógicamente para que de ella no se diga nada que sea accidental ni subjetivo, como sucedía en el psicologismo el cual confundía la sensación con el conocimiento en el momento de la percepción: "A nosotros nos basta que la ciencia implique o deba implicar ciertas condiciones previas para la producción de actos de saber." (IL I, 32).De esta manera, al igual que Kant, el saber sobre los objetos debe estar predeterminado por un conjunto de referencias lógico-subjetivas o "nexo de fundamentaciones" que hacen posible la realidad del objeto.Husserl entiende la lógica como investigación de la idea de ciencia, para que la filosofía pueda alcanzar una normatividad sobre los contenidos científicos y para que pueda juzgar el grado de adecuación de las ciencias empíricas al ideal de la esencia lógica:"La esencia de la ciencia normativa consiste en fundamentar proposiciones en que, con relación a una medida fundamental normativa, son indicadas determinadas notas, cuya posesión garantiza la acomodación a dicha medida, o a la inversa, representa una condición indispensable de esta acomodación..." (IL I, 45).En este sentido, la normatividad de esta lógica, a diferencia de la lógica matemática, es lo que la define como trascendental.Husserl, al igual que el primer Wittgenstein, concibe la lógica como la forma de las ciencias positivas, y si ésta es superior a las matemáticas, es debido a su pureza formal.Por esto, Husserl concede a los principios lógicos en tanto formas puras del pensamiento, el rango platónico del en- sí, cuya validez para todo juicio posible sería independiente de los contenidos de los enunciados judicativos.Es decir, la lógica es la forma del mundo antes de su existencia.

En Husserl, en cambio, el concepto como función de la conciencia es elevado como fin en- sí y se prescinde del momento subjetivo -en cuanto sujeto psíquico- como del momento objetivo del pensamiento -en cuanto mediación de la experiencia real.La depuración de ambos momentos conduce a Husserl al idealismo absoluto. Pero es interesante, sin embargo, la paradoja presente aquí.El hecho de que Husserl eleve una función como el concepto a forma o finalidad pura lo conduce paradójicamente a dar una primacía al método que es precisamente solo función.La lógica pura es método de clarificación de las ciencias.La pureza de la lógica se mide por su eficacia de los medios metódico frente al objeto de la experiencia que se mantiene fuera de cualquier consideración.Esta aplicación práctica de la lógica es para evitarle según Husserl, mediante la demostración empírica o la verificación cualquier reducción psicologista:"La reducción de la lógica a su contenido teorético conduce según la forma predominante de la teoría contraria, a proposiciones psicológicas y eventualmente gramaticales..." (IL I, 50)De aquí la contradicción en la definición de lógica que la primera Investigación quiere aclarar.La lógica, como fundamento de las ciencias, es la finalidad y método de la experiencia, aún cuando la fenomenología trate de rescatar la experiencia con el "a las cosas mismas", sin embargo, estas cosas deben estar fundamentadas en una significación originaria que sólo la lógica aprehende.En la sexta Investigación, donde Husserl habla del lenguaje, éste sólo viene a finiquitar significados que ya estaban ahí como significación originaria.

El Husserl de las Ideas pasa de consideraciones lógicas a teorizar de cómo es posible el conocimiento a partir de éstas estructuras lógicas y ve en la intencionalidad el correlato epistemológico de este absolutismo lógico.En el teorema de la compleción (Erfüllung) es donde este absolutismo de las categorías se ve con más calaridad.La sensación o sensibilidad deja de concebirse como sustrato y pasa a ser el cumplimiento o lo que vuelve completa la intención, es decir, del acto de "referirse a" que para Husserl es la consciencia.En este sentido, la sensación estética es una mera subordinación del aparato categorial. La percepción presente y la sensibilidad ya están categorizadas por la intención que aunque sea consciencia del objeto, es consciencia de éste bajo el dominio subjetivo, purificado de toda heterogeneidad.La noción de noema en Husserl, que es el producto de este proceso intencional, es un término estático como el sujeto cartesiano o el yo pienso kantiano.El noema es el objeto fijado de una vez para siempre en la consciencia, y aunque Husserl, mediante su ciencia eidética, investigue sólo esencias, tiene este rasgo común con los positivistas, que investigan hechos, de aferrarse estrictamente a los hechos sin contemplar las mediaciones que lo producen.De este modo, la salvación fenomenológica de la objetividad, para resistirse ante los escepticismos y psicologismos,se producen al igual que Kant, que Husserl criticaba, en la profunidización de la subjetividad, ya no psicológica sino trascendental, pero subjetividad al fin.
El proyecto fenomenológico de concreción con el "a las cosas mismas" es lo contrario de lo que quiere ser.Si para Husserl, el conjunto o especie de fenómenos que se pueden aprehender no puede nunca acercarse a su esencia, es porque la esencia surge del acto aislado de significar un particular.Con la aprehensión de los fenómenos en su particularidad; Husserl trata de desvelar una esencia idéntica para todos los fenómenos de una especie.En la aprehensión fenomenológica, el objeto particular nos haría patente la especie en vez de su particularidad.Aquí se halla una contradicción, puesto que Husserl estaría identificando la intuición inmediata de un contenido particular (el objeto x) con el sentido o el concepto mismo (especie).El subjetivismo de la intencionalidad reside en la absolutización arbitraria de un contenido particular en un acto universal sin ninguna mediación, sino que la aprehensión del fenómeno sería ya lo universal.Es como si la intención o la "conciencia de algo" acabaría con todas las significaciones posibles del objeto de una buena vez, por el hecho de que la significación originaria o su fundamentación lógica ya está en la consciencia.

El Husserl de las Meditaciones y de los Prolegómenos sustituye la doctrina de la especie que se hace universal y conceptual en el acto de significar por la doctrina de la variación eidética por la cual el fenómeno es una variación o ejemplo de una idea (eidos).El universal de la intencionalidad no es ya la reproducción conceptual de lo estrictamente individual, sino que la variación eidética es indiferente ante los contenidos particulares.Es en cierto sentido, apriorista, puesto que los fenómenos ya no son el sustrato de la intencionalidad aislada, sino variaciones insignificantes de una idea.Lo invariable sería la idea en la constitución del objeto.En este sentido, el criterio cualitativo de la intencionalidad por el cual el objeto era significado en su particularidad por una universalidad impuesta por la consciencia es sustituido por el criterio cuantitativo del ejemplo.La idea ordena lo indeterminado que son los fenómenos particulares equiparándola como sus ejemplos y luego los determina como multiplicidad.Así, el objeto pierde sus cualidades específicas para aparecer como repetición abstracta de una idea abstracta.La falta de un contacto con el objeto es característica de toda filosofía formalista que reduce todo lo exterior a una tautología enorme, a una reproducción de la consciencia para que se halle ella misma segura ante lo heterogéneo.Husserl consuma esta tautología, primero, en el fetichismo del concepto donde toda la experiencia debe encontrar su fundamentación en él; segundo, en la reducción del objeto a mero sentido en la intención; y tercero, la reducción del objeto a mera variación de la idea.Así, la epoje fenomenológica es una reducción no de los hechos a las esencias, sino la reducción del mundo a ese yo puro resultante de dicha reducción.En este sentido, la reducción del yo a un yo puro minimalista no es un supuesto sacrificio de la subjetividad como Husserl la entendía sino que es una subjetividad prepotente que legisla sobre los objetos.Este sacrificio sí se entiende como un sacrificio de la subjetividad concreta, afectiva y emocional que Husserl la conceptuaba como psicologismo porque esta subjetividad se constituye como uno de los factores perturbadores para el objetivismo.En este sentido, tanto la esfera subjetiva como objetiva son en Husserl abstractas ya que la primera es entendida como puro psiquismo y la segunda, como trascendentalidad subjetiva.En lo que Husserl, se podría plantear, es psicologista es en su comprensión de esta subjetividad concreta que es la otra que habla en la reducción del yo puro, la que queda fuera de dicha reducción.En este sentido, el yo husserliano es como el que lleva el inventario de una oficina, da cuenta de lo existente porque es el que otorga el sentido pero renuncia a toda intervención de él mismo en el conocimiento.

Phenomenology
Though a difficult text to read, it offers a great overview of husserl's phenomenology. should be combined w/ heideggers time and being

A good book, but not an introduction
This work is better appreciated after one has gained some introduction to HUsserl.I suggest starting off with the Cartesian Meditations, and trying to find a good commentary on them.UNDERSTANDING PHENOMENOLOGY is a fantastic book, albeit unavailable. ... Read more

Book Description

The "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ISBN 90-247-0214-3. Most of Husserl's emendations, as given in the Appendix to that volume, have been treated as if they were part of the text. The others have been translated in footnotes.
Secondary consideration has been given to a typescript (cited as "Typescript C") on which Husserl wrote in 1933: "Cartes. Meditationen / Originaltext 1929 / E. Husserl / für Dorion Cairns". Its use of emphasis and quotation marks conforms more closely to Husserls practice, as exemplified in works published during his lifetime. In this respect the translation usually follows Typescript C. Moreover, some of the variant readings n this typescript are preferable and have been used as the basis for the translation. Where that is the case, the published text is given or translated in a foornote.
The published text and Typescript C have been compared with the French translation by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas (Paris, Armand Collin, 1931). The use of emphasis and quotation marks in the French translation corresponds more closely to that in Typescript C than to that in the published text. Often, where the wording of the published text and that of Typescript C differ, the French translation indicates that it was based on a text that corresponded more closely to one or the otherusually to Typescript C. In such cases the French translation has been quoted or cited in a foornote.

Customer Reviews (3)

Great Introduction
The Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology was written by Edmund Husserl (the founder of phenomenology). This means the book is not muddled by the need to reconcile conflicting views on what phenomenology is according to various philosophers, like in commentaries. Also, many commentaries follow Sartre's, Heidegger's (as found in Being and Time) and Merleau-Ponty's human conciseness centered phenomenology leaving Husserl's phenomenology as a footnote. Being that Husserl's phenomenology is underrepresented in secondary sources, it is necessary to read Husserl's own writings. Cartesian Meditations offers a full understanding of Husserl's philosophy. The only other source for this is Husserl's Ideas Pertaining to Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, which is spilt in to three volumes and is around 900 pages. Ideas... is not only long, but it gives the reader a distinct feeling that many of the sections are dead ends and could have been edited out. Cartesian Meditations, on the other hand, is concise. Also, the book is easier to understand because the structure is similar to Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy. However, one should not think Husserl super-imposed his philosophy on Descartes'. In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl only made the similarities that could already be found in Ideas... explicit to help introduce Phenomenology to a larger audience though a familiar median. Even though the book was written as an introduction (as the title indicates), the audience need not be novice of Phenomenology. People who have read Ideas... cover to cover can still appreciate the book because it contains only what is essential to Husserl's Phenomenology, unlike Ideas..., which according to Husserl contains "imperfections".Cartesian Meditations makes one of the most influential twentieth century thinkers accessible.

Too transcendental?
Don't get me wrong, Husserl's contribution to post-modern philosophy is impossible to ignore.However, his constant beating of the transcendental horse is even more annoying then the Catholic theologian Karl Rahner's!At least with Rahner, you can expect man's transcedence toward God... with Husserl, it is a transcendence toward the self by the epoche - the "bracketting" - of the world and the retreat into the self.While the ideas are immensely important, they are more valuable as a transitional piece from the work of Descartes toward the work of Heidegger, Sartre, and others than they are on their own.An ego-pole?How is a pole, as Sartre would say, not simply a thing of the world?Husserl seems wed to the idea that the mind is constitutive of the world around us, and thankfully post-modern philosophy has not devoted itself entirely to that idea.

Perhaps it is the translation, but the work is hard to read, and you would be better to borrow it from a library then to spend the [price] on a 80 page book.

Still, it gets 3 stars.why?because it is so important.The work of Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and even Rahner wouldnot be possible without this work by Husserl.He is a bridge thinker - now that we've crossed the river maybe occasionally we can look back at his thought for its worth but we don't have to spend any more time on that bridge.

An Excellent Introduction To Phenomenology
This little book is an excellent introduction to Husserl's phenomenology. He outlines his idea of the intentionality of consciousness via the "transcendental ego". If Sartre had paid more attention to this,his outlook wouldn't have been so pessimistic.

Caveat: This book is hardreading -- it's not really for the newcomer to philosophy and Husserl'stoxic and dense style will probably put off all but the determined. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Aquivocations
The fault of Husserl's main work - or at least one of them - is only that though he's very against linguistic aquivocations, he does some. It's not suddenly understandable, that the noetisch-noematisch expressions has no connection with the difference of noma and noemata (plural), but that noetisch means "refering to the noesis" and noematisch "refering to the noema" etc.

flawed translation
This translation is a huge improvement over the pioneering work by Boyce-Gibson from the 30s. But, as you read, you'll have to keep a pencil handy. Specifically, you should scratch out every occurrence of the term "mental process". That phrase is Kersten's choice to render the german "Erlebnis". In translating "Erlebnis" in this manner, Kersten is following the lead of Dorian Cairns, who made the suggestion in his "Guide For Translating Husserl." While it makes sense not to translate "Erlebnis" as "experience" (as one normally would in rendering colloquial German) since "experience" should be reserved to render the German "Erfahrung," just about any of the alternate translations would be better than the highly misleading "mental process." "Lived experience" would be much simpler and better - or you could render it with a neologism like "lived-through". Really anything other than "mental process" would be an improvement.

Also, there used to be a paperback edition of this item. Suchbooks are of interest to students. In whose interest is it to price them out of the reach of anyone except libraries? ... Read more

Book Description

Der späte Husserl spricht von dem "Ur-Ich" als dem Ich, das der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität in einem gewissen Sinne vorangeht. Dies besagt aber nicht, dass es ein solipsistisches Ich wäre, das dem Anderen einseitig voranginge. Der Terminus "Ur-Ich" zeigt vielmehr die Ursprünglichkeit einer asymmetrischen und irreversiblen Relation zwischen Ich und Anderem zugespitzt an. Um dies zu zeigen, befragt die vorliegende Untersuchung das erfahrende Bewusstsein, in dem das Ich sich selbst in einzigartiger Weise gegeben ist. Diese Selbsterfahrung ist uns im gewöhnlichen Leben allzu selbstverständlich, wir sind uns gewissermaßen allzu nahe. Wenn uns diese selbstverständlich gelebte Vertrautheit mit uns selbst als Ur-Ich, als absolutes Medium aller Erfahrung, in einer philosophischen Reflexion eigens vor Augen gestellt wird, erscheint sie uns fremdartig. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht, die Fremdartigkeit des Phänomens des "Ur-Ich" verständlich zu machen, indem sie erstens Husserls Radikalisierung der Epoché nachvollziehbar macht, indem sie zweitens das Phänomen der intentionalen Modifikation (bzw. der ursprünglichen "Monadisierung" des Ich) eingehend analysiert und drittens die Bedeutung der apodiktischen Evidenz aus einer neuen Perspektive herausarbeitet.

Book Description
Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology.The Logical Investigations is Edmund Husserl's most famous work and has had a decisive impact on the direction of twentieth century philosophy.This is the first time both volumes of this classic work, translated by J.N. Findlay, have been available in paperback.They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Logical Investigations in historical context and bringing out its importance for contemporary philosophy. ... Read more

Book Description
In this fresh translation of five lectures delivered in 1907 atthe University of Göttingen, Edmund Husserl lays out thephilosophical problem of knowledge, indicates the requirements for itssolution, and for the first time introduces the phenomenologicalmethod of reduction. For those interested in the genesis anddevelopment of Husserl's phenomenology, this text affords a uniqueglimpse into the epistemological motivation of his work, his conceptof intentionality, and the formation of central phenomenologicalconcepts that will later go by the names of `transcendentalconsciousness', the `noema', and the like. As a teaching text,The Idea of Phenomenology is ideal: it is brief, it isunencumbered by the technical terminology of Husserl's later work, itbears a clear connection to the problem of knowledge as formulated inthe Cartesian tradition, and it is accompanied by a translator'sintroduction that clearly spells out the structure, argument, andmovement of the text. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Be looking for the emotional outcries!
Edmund Husserl's "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology" resonates well. The following are my impressions and reflections after reading this very interesting book.

Every object-subject composite (relation) is a "phenomenon", and Husserl begins his phenomenology from Descartes' doubt that cannot be doubted. Husserl notes that the phenomenon is open to exploration. We explore so we can discover what is pregiven, so we can find our preconditions. Husserl reminds us that Kant was sterred from his slumber by Hume's skepticism. Kant's "appearance" is embedded in a space-time manifold, and as such it represents a phenomenon that hides the "thing-in-itself". The phenomenon is a composite uniting the provisional with the universal, and Kant had to feel it to be so reactive once Hume and Leibniz made their points known. Husserl reminds us to look beyond the ego-soul of Descartes, and to look beyond the dualism where Kant got stuck.

Every feeling is such a composite, so every feeling is also a phenomenon. Every feeling holds the slightest spark of awareness. I might add that every law of nature given by an equation is experiential in the sense that the law is first conceived in the mind, and then later is it empirically verified. Therefore, the law as an equation is abstraction that forgets the experiential. Because natural laws are experiential they involve feelings, and therefore these laws are phenomenological too. It is not surprising that Husserl is very critical of objective philosophy and positive science that has lost track of the subjective ingredients that come with all phenomenon.

Husserl tells us that meaning may become lost in history, and meaning relates to the preconditions of history which has to do with the geometrical horizons that history grows into. Husserl (page 49) is translated to write: "The geometry of idealities was preceded by the practical art of surveying, which knew nothing of idealities. Yet such a pregeometrical achievement was a meaning-fundament for geometry, a fundament for the great invention of idealization; the latter encompassed the invention of the ideal world of geometry, or rather the methodology of the objectifying determinations of idealities through the construction which create `mathematical existence.'"

Science grew out of traditions, and geometry is no less a tradition. The pregivens are found sleeping, Husserl tells us that the pregivens are taken for granted. Husserl (page 69) writes: "Only a radical inquiry back into subjectivity - and specifically the subjectivity which ultimately brings about all world-validity, with its content and in all its prescientific and scientific modes, and into the `what' and the `how' of the rational accomplishments - can make objective truth comprehensible and arrive at the ultimate ontic meaning of the world."

In Husserl day (right before World War II) positivist science and existential philosophy lost their meaning (I add that the meaning is still lost today), as these were all about extensions of the status quo that were no longer connected to their original preconditions.

To find the original meaning there must be a reactivation of the construction of geometry, among other exercises. Husserl tells us that meaning is discovered by reactivating the construction that have hid themselves in history. This leads us to what is self evident and beyond doubt.

The precondition of history is the stark reminder that the universal has connected with the provisional; this is the stark mystery of life, the relation again.

Husserl's phenomenology studies the precondition as it is, rather than through presumptions that derive from an extended historicism that has lost its meaning.

Husserl has much to say about intentionality, and the validation that is always sought when truth statements are attempted. And we all see people that seek validation; the pay received for a hard days work; the affirmation that is required when gifts are exchanged; the suicide note that betrays its own reason for being, as no message is needed to announce a departure unless the issue of validation is found even in the confused.

We see the need for validation in others, but can we also see it in ourselves too? Ask yourself if you seek validation in all your activities? Am I to expect an angry reaction, a denial? If so, an emotional reaction (the phenomenon again) that denies validation is an emotion that is found announcing its need for validation. In which case, the announcement is only concealed from you, but the meaning is clear to me and others that the answer is found to be yes again. If emotion is not expressed, and the answer is - yes -, then there is no disagreement. Therefore, the challenge remains to answer - no - while expressing a more reflective emotion. This challenge may be impossible to meet, as a calm denial today may follow by an angry release tomorrow, and this will cause me to return to my original conclusion: that the intentionality that seeks validation is a universal, and leads to Husserl's intersubjective person. But note also the emotional issues. It is no wonder that Husserl takes his phenomenology into psychology.

This drive to seek validity is what gives birth to our "objective" meanings, according to Edmund Husserl, but note I put objective in quotations to refer to the observation that I am referring to a subjective transcendentalism rather than an objectivity that Husserl tells us is illusory. Science and logic can give us no help if the emotional temperament is missing, yet scientism is found today expressing its need for validation. Dawkins's "The God Delusion" is an expression that is asking religiosity to love science too. But how can religion love science if scientism lacks the emotional certitude to deal with its own pregivens? It is not unsurprising that atheist Sam Harris is now making a call for contemplation within atheistic circles. Contemplation delivers the reflexive capacity to deal with our drive for validation, for both believer and nonbeliever.

Husserl (page 168) writes on elementary intentionalities that seek validity: "The being of these intentionalities themselves is nothing but one meaning-formation operating together with another, `constituting' new meaning through synthesis. And meaning is never anything but meaning in modes of validity. Intentionality is the title which stands for the only actual and genuine way of explaining, making intelligible."

All objective philosophy and positive science are unreal, that is, they all depend on pregivens that are subjective in nature. To question the pregivens is to enter phenomenology, and it is here that psychology transforms itself into Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. All "objective" science requires its purification by a transcendental psychology. Husserl (page 257) writes: "a pure psychology as positive science, a psychology which would investigate universally the human beings living in the world as real facts in the world, similarly to other positive sciences (both sciences of nature and humanistic disciplines), does not exist. There is only a transcendental psychology, which is identical with transcendental philosophy."

All of our beliefs are dependent on Husserl's pregivens, and to explore the pregivens is to enter the transcendental world that rediscovers hidden meanings of dimensionality. This activity engages our emotions, and so it is that the innate feeling is found supporting a universal grammar. As long as we remain true to our purpose, to love our self, to love others, to love God, we may always re-look at our slumber and find the hidden dimensions in our own mistakes; we can always overcome our feelings of doubt in this way, finding a deeper feeling expressed in a deeper beauty. This allows us to purify our feelings, by referring to the original intention that was never meant to do harm to ourselves, others or God. Husserl's universal drive that seeks affirmation is no more than the past that seeks wholeness with the present, it is no more than what I call the affirmation of Trinity, it is the work of the Holy Spirit among our vast plurality. This insight was meant to be shared, but in sharing this expect the emotional outcries that are found seeking their own validation.

Trinity: The Scientific Basis of Vitalism and Transcendentalism

The Return to Things Themselves
Husserl is a tremendous apologist of "philosophy as rigorous science." This volume ("The Crisis") serves as the philosopher's clearest and most distinct exposition of the problems that beset modern Civilization and that still prevent many of us from appreciating an understanding of reality unmediated by empiricist and historicist biases.Most succinctly, Husserl has shown how and why it is possible for practical judgment to remain unbiased, and for theoretical/pure reason to remain in touch with life.

Husserl has helped later generations re-discover a rational/classical alternative to both modern reason and modern irrationalism.With Husserl, the critique of modernity points to a reason above "the machine." That is why Husserl rejected the anti-rationalist disposition displayed by his brilliant student, Martin Heidegger, whose inconclusive turn to pre-Socratic Wisdom arguably suffered from an inadequate understanding of the Socratic/"mediating/moderating" Quest for wisdom.

With Husserl, two options were disclosed to public attention: 1) a "new [atheistic, nihilistic] thinking" finding its core representation in Heideggerian "Existentialism"; 2) Classical (pre-Cartesian, non-Machiavellian) Rationalism, or "rational life" not subject to the Cartesian tendency to decay into the historicization and mechanization of reason/philosophy.

Most scholars today have found a way to dilute "Existentialism" to a degree that makes it possible to place "Existentialism" at the service of the powers that be (conformism).Among the very few who prefer to seek out a classical, non-historicist understanding of reason and history, we find two of Husserl's students--Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss.The first helped expose the essential link between Husserl's teachings and classical Socratic/Platonic philosophy; the second, inaugurated an exceptional return OF classical political rationalism--of a School of Philosophy, in the Platonic sense--at a time when the "temple" of science (the Academy) had become a sea of suspicion-breeding sophisticated ideologies.

It need not surprise the disinterested bystander that Strauss has henceforth become target of many an ideological reprisal.What is perhaps most "disturbing" about Strauss is that he makes it extremely difficult to critique rationalists such as Husserl for their (unremarkable?) inadequacies.That is because with Strauss such a critique presupposes access to a degree of speculative reason that is higher, and NOT lower, than the one exemplified by Husserl: one must understand an author as clearly and distinctly as he understood himself, BEFORE claiming to understand him "better."

Husserl's last introduction
It is somewhat ironic that Phenomenology, as a term or as a philosophical school, has yet to really reach the popular consciousness, given that phenomenology is in many respects a study of consciousness and how reality impacts consciousness. Phenomenology in the most formal sense of being a school of philosophy is largely traced to Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl's great work at the turn of the last century, Logical Investigations, set the stage for the development of phenomenology as a way of seeing, a descriptive study with roots in empiricism going back to inspiration from Aristotelian ideas. This is a key word - description. Rather than being a set of constructs and principles typical of previous philosophical systems, Phenomenology attempts to describe reality fully as reality is presented to our senses.

Phenomenology is different from scientific study in that it does not pretend toward a universal truth or experience unmediated through our subjectivity (a principle modern science seems to be incorporating more and more). Editor Dermot Moran has a solid introduction to the subject, including distinctions of different kinds of study, some of the personalities involved in the development of phenomenology, and the current state of the discipline.

This book by Husserl is one written late in his career.The Nazi party was well on its way to taking complete power in Germany, and other forces of despair were very present in the Western culture.Husserl's protege Heidegger had gone from phenomenology to existentialism, a philosophical framework that Husserl distrusted, but understood as completely in keeping with the overall crisis of meaning and purpose that he saw taking root in society at its very core.

Husserl's work from 1900 forward was always involved in recasting and adapting phenomenology to the current culture; each of his books in that time had as a title or subtitle 'An Introduction to Phenomenology', and this particular text was no different.Often overlooked in this text's presentation is that it was actually unfinished at Husserl's death, and had once again taken phenomenology in new directions.Perhaps the most radical departure of this version of phenomenology to Husserl's earlier constructs is the incorporation of psychological ideas.

Husserl's concern is to overcome the lack of meaning found in science and technology, the lack of telos and the lack of an inherent moral structure.Husserl traces the history of ideas and search for meaning in intellectual enterprise, and ends with a sense of a 'life-world' that draws closer to the aims of existentialism than he had ever done before.

This is a fascinating text.

. . . the Spirit alone is immortal.
Written at the end of his career and on the eve of the Holocaust, the Crisis stands, I believe, as one of the greatest one volume educations in print today.Unlike his more "technical" works which rigorously deal with phenomenology in itself, the Crisis is more of a look at the need for phenomenology and phenomenological psychology in modern humanity's life.Looking at the history of science and philosophy, Husserl traces the development and "success" of scientism and materialism.In doing so phenomenologically, Husserl makes a very strong case for the need of phenomenology in order to overcome the lifelessness of materialism and inaugurate a "heroism of reason" and humanism.Anyone interested in philosophy, science, sociology, civil rights, etc. I urge to read this book actively and critically.For non-specialists and people who aren't "scholars" of any kind or degree may find the language a bit dense or heavy at times, but ! . . . it's good for you.The volume also features appendices which include the classic Vienna Lecture as well as other essays and lectures.The Crisis is a classic and brilliant look into science, philosophy and society which, unlike a lot of theory today, offers a cohesive system grounded in humanism, to wit, Husserlian phenomenology.Please read this book. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Some experts tried to capture a modern thinker
By 1981, when HUSSERL SHORTER WORKS was published in Great Britain and the United States, philosophy was a field in which prone thinkers sought anyone who could tell them that they were alright.Long after Husserl's death in 1938, Marly Biemel translated manuscript E-III-5 into English in August 1952.The introduction to this "Universal Teleology" by F. A. Elliston in this book calls it "one of the few occasions on which Husserl comments on a pervasive and consequential dimension of human experience--sexuality."(p. 332).As the introduction makes plain, Husserl was concerned only with normal drives and moral considerations.Perhaps having sex was much less common than the expectation of infinite gradual processes in those days, so intention actually played a large role for people who were otherwise quite content to be considered monads.`Of ' is just a two-letter word which appears numerous times on pages 335-337 in its description of:

The intersubjective drive in each and every subject viewed transcendentally:Relative world of monads, each constituting for itself an objective temporal world and, ultimately, the human monadic world and the temporal world of men.
... of the monadic totality ... (p. 335).

... of all monads ... of a universal development ... of relative worlds of monads ... of constitution ... of the monadic totality ... (Marginal Note, p. 335).

... of procreation. ... of the indeterminate hunger ... of course, of a "food," of a familiar object which can satisfy a hunger). ... of sexual hunger ... "This determinate sexual hunger has its modality of realization in the mode of copulation." ... of abstinence of repugnance. ... of the other.
... of the primary mode ... of each drive ... of the two primordialities. ...(Text, p. 335).

... of the "perceptions of the strange," ... of their world ... of his species.
... of the drive, ... of the world ... of parents, above all those of mother and child. ... of copulation.
... of drives ... of other ego-subjects. ... of the originary modal intention which simply emerges and constantly fulfills its own nucleus. ... of the internal consciousness of time, ... of intentionality of the will).Shouldn't we or musn't we posit a universal intentionality of the drive which unifies every original presence as permanence of a temporalization which concretely moves it forward from presence to presence in such a way that all content is the content of the realization of the drives and it is determined by the goal toward which the drive aims and in such a manner that the superior drives in every primordial presence are transcended and force themselves within every other presence thus connecting all of the presences as monads, while they are all implied in each other--intentionally? ... of every primordiality ... of objectification ... of the world ...
... of a universal teleology ... of fulfilling itself ... of a total system of fulfillment.
... of the centrality of the ego ... of the intentional implication, ... of all monads, of the changing immediate and mediate reciprocal transcending of the drives of the community of the monads. ... of the mediacy of transcendence, ... of monadic degrees ... of development of the ego and of the world. ... of the degrees of animal monads of the animal, ... of the infantile and pre-infantile monads--in the permanence of the "ontogenetic" philogenetic development.(p. 336).
... of the egos ... of acts ... of the constitutions of "beings," and lastly of an horizon of the world ... of a unitary and conscious community of monads.This is the community of universally constituted drives which has, corresponding to it, a world which always brings anew the monads to a new formation and to their "development."In this form the totality of the monads gradually comes to self-consciousness and attains its maximum universality as a human community.(pp. 336-337).
... of the knowledge of the world ... of a transcendental reduction ... of the generative connection of all degrees of monads: ... of their ontogenetic development.
... The question arises concerning the intentionality of copulation.In the fulfillment of the drive, ...
... of the drive ... of the life of the other, of what follows as the act of reproduction ... as an act of copenetration which is in the life of the world.
... of my concrete being ... of the ego ... of intentionality ... of the world ... of the world ... of intersubjective pre-time.The intersubjective "act of reproduction" "motivates" natural processes in the life of the other ... of pregnancy.
Teleology encompasses all of the monads. ...
... the world of my and our experience, ... of this world.(p. 337).

Another two-letter word, `as, ' shows up in "as a man" and "in which the animal experiences itself as having a world, as an animal of his species."(p. 336).

This book might be suitable for an introduction to advanced philosophy, one of the thinkers that Heidegger studied shortly before charting his own path.HUSSERL SHORTER WORKS has 21 selections, each with its own introduction, arranged in five parts.The Glossary on pages 365-370 explains roughly 50 English words, about 40 German words, a few in Latin and Greek, and some like "irreal" which might not belong to any language.The Husserl Bibliography starts with Abbreviations on pages 371-376, then works in chronological order on pages 377-380, followed by Works on Husserl and Phenomenology on pages 381-430.

The second selection's introduction, "On the Misfortunes of Edmund Husserl's ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Article `Phenomenology' " by Herbert Spiegelberg (pp. 18-20) reveals that the original translator had to reduce the original 7,000 German words to 4,000 English words, and fifteen sub-headings in the German text were dropped.This book did not have such severe space limitations.As printed in this book, the final three paragraphs are called:

"16. The Phenomenological Resolution of All Philosophical Antitheses."(p. 34). ... Read more

Book Description
In his first book, Philosophy of Arithmetic, Edmund Husserl provides a carefully worked out account of number as a categorial or formal feature of the objective world, and of arithmetic as a symbolic technique for mastering the infinite field of numbers for knowledge. It is a realist account of numbers and number relations that interweaves them into the basic structure of the universe and into our knowledge of reality. It provides an answer to the question of how arithmetic applies to reality, and gives an account of how, in general, formalized systems of symbols work in providing access to the world. The "appendices" to this book provide some of Husserl's subsequent discussions of how formalisms work, involving David Hilbert's program of completeness for arithmetic. "Completeness" is integrated into Husserl's own problematic of the "imaginary", and allows him to move beyond the analysis of "representations" in his understanding of the logic of mathematics.
Husserl's work here provides an alternative model of what "conceptual analysis" should be - minus the "linguistic turn", but inclusive of language and linguistic meaning. In the process, he provides case after case of "Phenomenological Analysis" - fortunately unencumbered by that title - of the convincing type that made Husserl's life and thought a fountainhead of much of the most important philosophical work of the twentieth Century in Europe. Many Husserlian themes to be developed at length in later writings first emerge here: Abstraction, internal time consciousness, polythetic acts, acts of higher order ('founded' acts), Gestalt qualities and their role in knowledge, formalization (as opposed to generalization), essence analysis, and so forth.
This volume is a window on a period of rich and illuminating philosophical activity that has been rendered generally inaccessible by the supposed "revolution" attributed to "Analytic Philosophy" so-called. Careful exposition and critique is given to every serious alternative account of number and number relations available at the time. Husserl's extensive and trenchant criticisms of Gottlob Frege's theory of number and arithmetic reach far beyond those most commonly referred to in the literature on their views. ... Read more

Book Description
Exploring the full range of Husserl's work, these essays reveal just how systematic his philosophy is. There are treatments of his most important contributions to phenomenology, intentionality and the philosophy of mind, epistemology, the philosophy of language, ontology, and mathematics. An underlying theme of the volume is a resistance to the idea, current in much intellectual history, of a radical break between "modern" and "postmodern" philosophy, with Husserl as the last of the great Cartesians. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

not bad but unjustified in its perspective
Cambridge companions are about philosophers and thinkers who have opened new and alternative ways of thinking in history of philosophy and have well established themselves in Western thought. Now there is no problem in writing about Husserl or anybody else in the history of philosophy from whatever vantage point one wants to; it can prove fruitful exercise.But when one claims to illuminate key historical figures for the student, one is responsible to illuminate the point of view from which its really justified at all to compile such a companion on the relevant philosopher.Using this book as a guide to Husserl would leave you wondering "well so what did this guy do all in all."Husserl as presented here is a philosophical logician ofRussell variety, but seriously perplexed in his engagement with the problems, but with occassional insights in this or that subject.Well if this is what we should understand from Husserl, then he doesn't deserve a place in no companion to landmark philosophers. If he does he should be taken from the point of view of the tradition in which he has achieved his historical stature as the founder of the phenomenological school (which doesnt mean we should be uncritical and dogmatic)
The essays here deserve much better than two stars, some of them are very good quality.But the overall conception, being the kind of book its claimed to be, is very misleading.

Husserl on Mathematics
The Cambridge Companion to Husserl contains essays byvariousHusserl scholars who attempt to show the relevance of Husserl's ideas to many recent issues in philosophy.Barbosa says that I seem to ignore Husserl's ideas of categorial intuition and categorial abstraction and to characterize Husserlian mathematical epistemology in terms of detecting invariants in the flow of experience.Evidently Barbosa did not read the paper very carefully.Footnote 17 gives some examples of places to look in Husserl's writings for the view that ideal objects (including mathematical objects) are to be understood as invariants through the variations in our cognitive acts and processes.Many more citations to Husserl's works could be added to this footnote.In my paper I do not use the terms 'categorial intuition' and 'categorial abstraction'.So I am guilty of not using these terms but I am not guilty of failing to discuss the ideas of intuition and abstraction in mathematics.There are many technical Husserlian terms that I do not use in the paper.I do use the terms 'intuition' and 'abstraction'.In places where I use these terms and describe Husserl's views on mathematical intuition and the abstractions, idealizations and formalizations involved in mathematics, I also cite Husserl's texts on categorial intuition and categorial abstraction.An attentive reviewer would only need to see footnotes 16, 19 and 24.Open Husserl's Logical Investigations, for example, to sections 40-58 and read the Chapter title:Sensuous and Categorial Intuitions.

Generally it is a good reference
"The Cambridge Companion to Husserl" is useful in the following ways.First it helps to somehow finish with the legend that the reason Husserl turned away from psychologism was because of Frege's review.Secondly there are very good essays on Husserl's phenomenology, particularly Jakko Hintikka's "The Phenomenological Dimension" which restores the role of phenomenology not as merely looking for noemas, but to refer and know the object itself, giving an account of the Husserlian difference between sense (meaning) and reference (object).Another good essay was Dallas Willard's "Knowledge" which accounts for the epistemological dimension of Husserl's phenomenology.

This anthology also accounts for Husserl's analytical philosophy.From these readings the best essay I could find was Kit Fine's "Part-whole", which deals with the often disregarded Husserlian doctrine of the part and whole in the third logical investigation.The other essay that seemed less interesting was Peter Simons' "Meaning and language".This essay has the defect of not taking into account the Husserlian difference between "states of affairs" and "situation of affairs" which leads him into many equivocal views on Husserl.

However, the worst essay in this anthology was Richard Tieszen's "Mathematics".This apparent authority in Husserlian doctrine on his philosophy of mathematics seems to ignore the Husserlian notions of "categorial intuition" and "categorial abstraction" which both are the way in which mathematical and logical objects are known. This is explained in Husserl's sixth investigation from sections 40-52 and sections 59 to 66. However, Tieszen seems to ignore this and attributes Husserlian mathematical epistemology to an unexplained way that we detect invariants from the flow of experience.Readers should take this into account when evaluating Tieszen's essay.

A must for the beginner or the advance phenomenologist.
Ever wonder how we can know anything outside our consciousness?Ever wonder what the consciousness is itself, or what structures it possesses?Ever wonder how we can have any objectivity if we live as subjectivecreatures?If you have then phenomenology may be something that interestsyou. To explore this topic, one can't help but encounter Husserl.Hefounded the discipline and laid broad grounds which must be thoughtthrough.Even as a graduate student in philosophy, I find the Husserliantext to be extremely difficult to read.This is not because the materialitself is intrinsically hard.Husserl himself stressed the importance ofintuitive understand.His ideas, once understood really do appeal to thisintuitive understanding of how things are.What makes reading Husserldifficult is that all of the English translations have somehow forsakengood prose for accuracy.This and because the Husserlian corpus is verybroad makes phenomenology a little threatening.

Enter the CambridgeCompanion to Husserl. Succinct, relevant to the field, and applicable toeveryday thinking, this book is a wonderful partner for the thinker who isbeginning to think phenomenologically.It summarized Husserl's thoughtsclearly so that the beginner can understand.However, it is not Husserlfor Dummies!The thoughts expressed are subtle enough, so that newinsights can be garnered in rereads of the the essays.All main areas ofhis philosophy are covered: the epistemology, the derivative ontology,language theory, ideas on math and objectivity.

Though not Husserl forDummies! neither is it Husserl for the Husserlian. As a student, I had thepleasure of studying with two of the authors: David Smith and Rick Tiezen. From personal experience, both men are particularly precise and rigorouswith their thinking.Besides teaching at UCIrvine, Smith also teacheselementary school children the fundamentals of philosophy.Bothexperiences carries in his writings, as he is able to express complexthoughts cogently to experts and laymen alike.As for Tiezen is expertiseas both a logician, mathematician and phenomenologist makes his especiallyqualified to speak on Husserl's mathematics.Half of professor Tiezen'stime is spent with freshmen in introductory classes.The other halfworking with ornry graduate students like myself.Both men's ability toteach high and low shows in their writings, making the Companion a pleasureto read. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

A comprehensive exposition of Husserlian thought
This well-coordinated volume, written by first class scholars in an easily accessible language and brilliant style, presents to the reader nearly all aspects of Husserlian phenomenology, usually linked up to the more overarching philosophical issues. The individual chapters are very much based on the extensive studies of the unpublished and unfamiliar material and thus provide the best to-date presentation of Husserl's mature ideas and lifelong reflections. A must for any scholar interested in consciousness research and excellent brief for analytic philosophers wishing a closer acquaintance with phenomenological thought. The picture of Husserl that emerges from this volume is of an extraordinarily profound thinker who kept revising own theories as his insights progressed, a picture quite remote from the standard analytic caricature of him as "obscure Cartesian idealist". ... Read more

Book Description
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was one of the most influential philosophers of the Twentieth Century. Founder of the phenomenology movement, his thinking influenced Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida.

In this stimulating introduction, David Woodruff Smith introduces the whole of Husserl's thought, demonstrating his influence on philosophy of mind and language, on ontology and epistemology, and on philosophy of logic, mathematics and science.

Starting with an overview of Husserl's life and works, and his place in Twentieth century philosophy and in Western philosophy as a whole, David Woodruff Smith introduces Husserl's concept of phenomenology, explaining his influential theories of intentionality, objectivity and subjectivity. In subsequent chapters he covers Husserl's logic, metaphysics, realism and transcendental idealism, and epistemology.Finally, he assesses the significance and implications of Husserl's work for contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

Including a timeline, glossary and extensive suggestions for further reading, Husserl will be essential reading for anyone interested in Husserl, phenomenology and Twentieth century philosophy. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Accessible introduction to Husserl's thought
This work by Woodruff Smith, who has written many books and papers on Husserl and his philosophy, offers a good and clear introduction to this great Philosopher's thought.Somewhat under-appreciated in the analytic tradition, Husserl is increasingly being recognised on both Continental and Analytic traditions as one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century.

This book examines Husserl's method of 'phenomenology' and his explorations in the philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, epistemology, conciousness, metaphysics and ethics.It also briefly explores the continuance of his work by his many students, including Edith Stein, Heidegger and Sartre.

This book shows how Husserl remains relevant to today's philosophers and also how he anticipated some of the questions now being raised, especially in the philosophy of mind and conciousness.It is a must read for anyone interested in Husserl and the philosophy of mind.

An excellent resource regarding Husserl
In January of 2002, I bought a copy of the two volume set of Logical Investigations for a college course regarding major figures in philosophy, or some such. Later that year I picked up a copy of the Ideas, for another course, the next semester. Unfortunately, Husserl remained something of a mystery to me, despite having attempted to make my way through his primary works.

With Husserl, part of Routledge's new series of introductory works on Western philosophers, David Woodruff Smith attempts to give an overview and analysis of what makes Husserl such an 'influential philosopher.' With the hope that D.W. Smith would clear away the fog I believed I was still in, I picked up a copy.

First, I must comment on the book itself, since that was what had the biggest impact on me.

As another reviewer mentioned, the price of this book is quite amazing for both the number of pages within, as well as the content itself (more on that in a bit).

However, the copy I received had a fairly major issue as concerns the binding. The first 48 pages (at the 16-17 and 48-49 page marks) threaten to fall out at any moment. I consider myself a fairly careful reader, and as such, believe this is only the second book where I have had pages falling out (and the first such book already had the pages detached when I purchased it).

This binding issue seems to be an issue with Routledge books in general, in that they don't allow for the book to be spread open too far at all. Since I do believe I'll consult this book again, it's really unfortunate that the binding was done so poorly. This is also why I can only give Husserl four stars, instead of the five it would otherwise have received.

That said, we come to the contents of the book.

It's clear from the very beginning that D.W. Smith has an angle on his writing, putting Husserl alone with Aristotle and Kant as the greatest systematic philosophers. True to this, we won't see Smith being too critical of Husserl which works well enough in the book.

We're presented with an overview of Husserl's life and works, followed immediately by an overview of his philosophy (in Chapter 2). The overview is then supplemented by six chapters dealing with each issue in further detail (Logic, Ontology, Phenomenology x 2, Epistemology, and Ethics). The main book closes with a very short chapter on Husserl's legacy.

We are also given an in-depth glossary and bibliography. The glossary itself is well worth the book's price.

Overall, each of the chapters is well written, shedding light on Husserl. For the most part, no previous knowledge of Husserl is required, which makes this volume a resource to both those already interested in, as well as those new to, Husserl.

For those who may have read only his 'first' work, the Logical Investigations, the chapter on ethics will be of particular interest, as it sheds a very human side to Husserl (as does the initial chapter on his life).

The legacy chapter seems very short, as if it was merely tacked on for looks. Smith mentions terms but doesn't spend enough time on them, serving only to confuse rather than enlighten or interest. I daresay that someone new to Husserl should skip the chapter entirely.

===

Overall, as I said before, I have given Husserl four stars of five merely because I've never purchased a Routledge book that I thought was 'built to last.' Other than that, there is no reason not to buy this book, especially given the value for the price.

I believe this book will both serve to interest those new to Husserl, clarify and expand upon some of his more complex points to those of intermediate knowledge, and point the way to those paths taken from Husserl to those who may be considered more advanced.

As to whether D.W. Smith has helped to lift the fog for me, I can say that I feel comfortable with my previous decisions regarding Husserl. However, I'm not quite ready to put him up there with Kant and Aristotle ;)

Ideal reference
Written by David Woodruff Smith (Professor of Philosophy, University of California Irvine), Husserl is an in-depth examination of the life, and more intently, the philosophic concepts created and refined by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the founder of phenomenology movement, whose ideas were a key influence upon Heidegger. Chapters walk the reader through Husserl's philosophical system, and explore logic, ontology, phenomenology as "the new science of conscious experience", epistemology, ethics, Husserl's legacy, and more. Intermediate to advanced philosophy students will be best equipped to follow the complex concepts presented, in this ideal reference especially recommended for philosophy and college library reference shelves.

ACCESSIBLE HUSSERL AT LAST!!!
David Woodruff Smith's Husserl is a comprehensive Introduction to the work of the founder of phenomenological philosophy that is textually accurate, comprehensive in scope and accessible to the layman. In addition to the biographical and historical information provided, the text provides a systematic exposition of Husserl's philosophy covering all aspects of his philosophical work in detail, including the vital areas of the phenomenological theory of perception and the constitution of perceptual objects [both real and ideal]; the latter topic is often omitted from even the most esoteric of the available Introductions. It is also chock full of concrete examples, schemata, and helpful diagrams - a rarity for this literature. The glossary and annotated bibliographies by subject matter are a rare bonus for texts at this price point. The writing style is ruthlessly straightforward [short, terse sentences aimed at description and explanation], which is a good thing for readers coming from other philosophical interest areas, or the social sciences , and avoids the unexplained technical and Greek terms that so often ruin Introductions of this type for the novice reader. In short, a great English language Introduction to Husserl that is exhaustive in its scope, well organized, and accessible to the non-specialist. It is also inexpensive, especially by the standards of present day philosophy texts. Text runs 427 pages, not including Glossary and Index, not 248 as cited above. I am still searching the Index for the "Kitchen Sink" entry. Note that Smith is coming from an Analytical perspective. ... Read more

Book Description
The editor, Iso Kern, of the three volumes on intersubjectivity in Husserliana XIII-XV, observes that in his Nachlass Husserl probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one, i.e., The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911). Husserl regarded this work (along with the 1907 "Five Lectures") as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He regarded these lectures as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, for his theory of the life-world, and for his planned "great systematic work." It contrasts favorably with several later "introductions" because, although quite brief, it has a larger scope than they do and conveys in a relatively elementary way to the students the sense of fresh new beginnings. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself. That the second part of the lectures was never written down, can be accounted for in part, because at that time Husserl was busy writing the 1911 path-breaking essay, which complements these lectures, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science." ... Read more