Product Description
Now available with a new Index, Kuhn's classic book offers "a landmark intelleectual history which has attracted attention far beyond its own immediate field (Nicholas Wade, Science). "Perhaps the best explanation of (the) process of discovery."--William Erwin Thompson, New York Times Book Review.Amazon.com Review
There's a "Frank & Ernest" comic strip showing a chickbreaking out of its shell, looking around, and saying, "Oh, wow!Paradigm shift!" Blame the late Thomas Kuhn. Few indeed are thephilosophers or historians influential enough to make it into thefunny papers, but Kuhn is one.

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is indeed aparadigmatic work in the history of science. Kuhn's use of terms suchas "paradigm shift" and "normal science," his ideas of how scientistsmove from disdain through doubt to acceptance of a new theory, hisstress on social and psychological factors in science--all have hadprofound effects on historians, scientists, philosophers, critics,writers, business gurus, and even the cartoonist in the street.

Some scientists (such as Steven Weinberg and Ernst Mayr) areprofoundly irritated by Kuhn, especially by the doubts he casts--orthe wayhis work has been used to cast doubt--on the idea ofscientific progress. Yet it has been said that the acceptance of platetectonics in the 1960s, for instance, was sped by geologists'reluctance to be on the downside of a paradigm shift. Even Weinberghas said that "Structure has had a wider influence than anyother book on the history of science." As one of Kuhn's obituariesnoted, "We all live in a post-Kuhnian age." --Mary Ellen Curtin ... Read more

Customer Reviews (144)

Oldie by Goodie
This is a classical book on scientific philosophy. How this book changed the world does not need my complimnet. The only reason I gives it four rather than five is because I highly recommend the newest version.

Big History
If you have an interest in purchasing this book, then you already know that it contains many groundbreaking concepts, the most important of which is the paradigm shift, which has relevance way beyond the world of science.
This is the import of the book: while reading it, one begins to realize that as thorough and referenced it may be, it remains a very metaphoric model for the march of history within almost all disciplines, where the world of imagination somehow transforms our collective view and consequent mode of perception and action in all areas of life.
I, who am a musician by trade, had a particularized need to use the book to help understand the 20th century and its zeitgeist, post WWII especially. The world of science was, for that century, a seductive one and people of retentive intelligence found themselves enamored of its methods in their search for meaning post-holocaust and post-Hiroshima-Nagasaki.
As I sit at a computer in Japan writing this, the job of the 21st Century must be to begin to make sense of our collective recent history and to find the common threads that connect us all on the planet in constant global discussion on present issues as they present themselves.
The search for fresh perspectives is the real stuff of great science and we should feel compelled to race forward in search of them concerning our past. History will teach us, if we can understand and supercede it, as described so beautifully in Tom Kuhn's masterpiece.

Must-read for anyone interested in science.
If you are at all interested in science, this book is a must-read. It offers a great overview of the historical perspective of the scientific method and its evolution. Be warned, however, that it is not light reading. It looks like a small book, but all but the seasoned vet of the English language will find this book to be very dense reading.

My Favorite Book!!!
This book is so good. It opens you mind to theories and concept more then any other book I have ever read. It explains the paradigm shift in science and who they have effected science concepts today. I felt smarted after I read this book.

Inescapable for philosophers of science...
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions begins modestly enough with the following claim, "History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed" (pg.1). Thomas Kuhn envisions a new role for the history of science in shaping our image of what science is, and how it works. While this claim seems modest enough in reality it is the beginning of one of the most revolutionary books in the philosophy of science, and easily one of the most influential books of the twentieth-century. A close study of the history of science leads, in Thomas Kuhn's opinion, to some fundamental changes in some of our most sacredly held beliefs about science and how it works. What are some of these changes?

I.

The first thing history reveals, or the first thing Thomas Kuhn chooses to point out, is the inability of purely methodological directives to dictate a unique substantive conclusion to many scientific questions (pg. 4). Our customary view of science is based on some notion of the "scientific-method" which we take to be a unique and extremely effective way of getting at the truth. This method is usually conceived as some mixture of inductive and deductive logic and is often summarized as the "hypothetico-deductive" method. This view of science is not entirely wrong, as Thomas Kuhn writes, "Observation and experience can and must drastically restrict the range of admissible scientific belief, else there would be no science. But they cannot alone determine a particular body of belief" (pg. 4).

If we analyze in detail all the relevant scientific beliefs held by a scientific community at a given time we will find many beliefs that are either not justified in anyway from the empirical evidence or are, at least, not uniquely determined by the empirical evidence available to that community. When we study the history of science we find that there are often various schools in a single field at one time that are distinguished not by any differences in method (they are all scientific in that sense) but rather by their incommensurable ways of seeing the world (what Thomas Kuhn will call paradigms).

II.

The notion of a paradigm is difficult to define precisely. In some ways, I think, it is easier to give examples of paradigms than to define a paradigm precisely. The Ptolemaic, Copernican, and Newtonian systems are all cases of "paradigms". They defined the relevant field in which they worked, gave answers to some questions, left some questions unanswered but with some indication of the direction in which answers were to be found.

There are two aspects that I tend to think are central to Thomas Kuhn's notion of a paradigm. First, it is a way of seeing the world. It provides answers to some basic questions, such as: What are the fundamental entities of which the universe is composed? How do these interact with each other and with the senses? What questions may legitimately be asked about such entities and what techniques employed in seeking solutions? (pg. 5)

Second, a paradigm constitutes a "research program" for the relevant scientific community. There are always some problems left unsolved by a paradigm but a paradigm at least points in the direction of how those problems are to be solved. This aspect of a paradigm is extremely important since Kuhn believes this is what separates "science" from "non-science". Science is not distinguished simply because it attempts to answer questions based on the "empirical method". Science begins when the relevant community has adopted a paradigm and begins to examine the more "esoteric" scientific problems dictated by the paradigm.

III.

One of the major functions of a paradigm is that it allows scientists to perceive anomaly. If the positivist theories of science are taken to an extreme then the range of application of a theory could never extend beyond the range of its actual confirmation. This would make it impossible for a scientist to use any theory to describe any phenomenon not already observed which would make scientific research impossible (pg. 99).

The paradigm allows scientific research by allowing a theory to have a larger range of application beyond the confines of its actual confirmation. This creates certain expectations within the scientific community, and when these expectations are not met there is an instance of an anomaly. Anomalies are extremely important in the "progress" of science since their accumulation eventually leads to scientific crisis and paradigm change. If science is simply limited to an "empirical method", and paradigms are left entirely out of account, this aspect of science becomes unintelligible.

IV.

Thomas Kuhn is also critical of the "falsification" theory of science put forward by Karl Popper. Kuhn writes, "If any and every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected at all times" (pg. 146). The fact is that science as it is ordinarily carried out (normal science) is not in the business of "testing" paradigms. The scientific paradigm never comes up for testing or possible falsification in normal scientific activity in Kuhn's view, and no single failure of a given paradigm to accord with the facts provides an adequate ground for rejection of that paradigm. If it did all paradigms, or theories, ought to be rejected at all times since no theory accords perfectly with the facts.

V.

So if theories are not "falsified" what induces a change between paradigms? This is another revolutionary aspect of Kuhn's work that I find particularly exciting as a philosopher. The first point to be made is that a transition between paradigms will only occur when a scientific theory has reached a crisis based on its inability to solve a number of anomalies.

But even in this case the transition between paradigms is not simply a matter of logic. These anomalies do not "disprove" the theory once and for all, and in the transition between paradigms there is ultimately no theory neutral way to assess the paradigms since they are to a large degree incommensurable with each other. The proponents of competing paradigms are each arguing from their own perspectives based on assumptions not shared by the other side. This is why decisions about paradigms cannot be reduced to pure logic since each side is beginning from different premises.

This is the part I find exciting as a philosopher because it brings the methods of science a little closer to the methods of philosophy. The decision between paradigms is not a matter of strict "deductive proof" or unique determination based on inductive logic, but is a matter of "persuasion". The paradigm that prevails is the paradigm that is able to persuade the relevant members of the scientific community to adopt it. In attempting to persuade the relevant community one cannot rely on any single argument or style of argument. One has to make all the arguments one can.

I tend to think this is how all fields "progress" and so Kuhn seems to bring science a little bit closer to fields like philosophy. Although it is not my intention to collapse the distinction. Philosophy and science are, and should remain, distinct.

VI.

This review only gives a very cursory overview of a few of the themes from Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and I have purposely left out some of Kuhn's most controversial thesis. There are certainly controversial thesis in this book, for instance, Kuhn's notion that paradigms actually determine perception in some way so that proponents of different paradigms literally see the world differently; or, Kuhn's rejection of the idea that scientific progress leads us closer to "the truth". It is ultimately not necessary to agree with all of Kuhn's thesis to find value in this book.

Anyone with an open mind can find value in this book. It causes us to rethink our notion of science, which is arguably the central fact of our modern world and culture. No one can understand the modern world without some understanding of science, and for that task Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is absolutely essential reading.

-Brian ... Read more

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In keeping with Kuhn's wishes (he died in 1996), editors James Conant and John Haugeland organized The Road Since Structure to include 11 philosophical essays written since 1970. In the first part of the book, Kuhn spells out his theory as it developed in the 1980s and 1990s; in the second part, he replies to a number of criticisms and misreadings. The third section is a fascinating interview with Kuhn conducted less than a year before he died. For general interest readers, the lengthy interview--in which Kuhn candidly and engagingly discusses the trials and tribulations of his life and philosophical career--will probably be the most interesting part of the book. For those attuned to Kuhn's controversial work, The Road Since Structure is an indispensable aid for understanding his theory as it developed and for appreciating the full force of his replies to a host of critical objections. As always, Kuhn's clarity and fluid prose render accessible a field fraught with opaque writing. --Eric de Place ... Read more

Customer Reviews (7)

Khun on Khun
In addition to what the others said, I'd like to add that seeing how Khun replies to Khun in this book was very exciting. It is also worth emphasizing that this book is not only about the concepts Khun brought to philosophy of science, but also about other concepts of Khun times. I recommand another book for French reader by Michael Esfled. Philosophie des Sciences - Une Introduction, or see this link: http://www.amazon.fr/review/RD31MLLF7SWO2/ref=cm_cr_rdp_perm.

Incommensurability
Aristotle's physics (ch. 1). Aristotelian physics is about qualities: temperature, position, colour, etc. Matter is a mere substrate, a sponge imbibed with qualities. This proves the nonexistence of vacuum: in a vacuum there is no matter, no sponge, to absorb the quality of place; thus there can be no place which is vacuous. Motion means change in quality. Locomotion is the special case where the quality in question is that of place, but there are also other motions, such as that from sickness to health, or that from acorn to oak. These natural motions have a natural end point: a rock wants to rest at the centre of the world, a man wants to grow healthy. This is the state they reach when left to themselves. Violent motion (lifting a rock or poisoning a man) is required to perturb this state.

Metaphor of "evolutionary epistemology" (ch. 4). The faith of rival organisms (=rival theories) is determined by the relative fitness of each, not by comparing them with an ideal organism (=absolute truth). One cannot assess the evolutionary benefit (=truth) of a particular trait (=proposition) without knowing to which organism (=theory) it belongs. Organisms, like theories, need not fit a static, immutable world; rather their world is largely defined through their own actions. Scientific theories fly south in the winter, as it were. Progress is often possible only by narrowing the niche, i.e., through speciation (=specialisation).

Linguistic incommensurability (ch. 2). Interpretation does not equal translation. One can learn a second language (or a rival scientific theory) as one learned the first, by immersion. But that does not imply the ability to perfectly translate between them (or effect an objective comparison). Attempts at reference-preserving translation will always be flawed whenever there is a mismatch of taxonomies, both because a single concept in one language (or theory) typically maps to several concepts in the other or fails to map at all, and because the hierarchy of classes and subclasses in the taxonomy of a language is necessarily projected onto the world when the world is described in this language.

Relationship between history of science and philosophy of science (ch. 5). Kuhn says of the historical trend in philosophy of science that "one can reach many of the central conclusions we drew with scarcely a glance at the historical record itself" (p. 111). What is needed is not actual history, but the realisation that theories are judged only comparatively. A number of well-known implications follow (difficulties for truth and realism, possibility of incommensurability, etc.) which are usually attributed to a historical approach. On the other hand: "I don't think that the [philosophers] who were doing history ... saw everything in it that I was seeing in it. They were not coming back and asking 'What does this do to the notion of truth, what does it do to the notion of progress,' or if they did, they were finding it too easy to find answers that seemed to me superficial." (pp. 311-312).

Kuhn's missing link
This posthumously published book is a collection of Kuhn's papers published between 1970 and 1993 together with a transcript of an autobiographical interview given by Kuhn in 1995, a year before his death.The book also contains a complete bibliography of his works.

Most of the important contributing philosophers of science in the twentieth century formed their views by reflection on the great scientific revolutions in modern physics, notably relativity theory and quantum theory.But in the first paper in this book, "What are Scientific Revolutions?" (1987), Kuhn reports that his most formative intellectual experience was his attempt in 1947 to understand the physics of Aristotle - what in his autobiography he calls his "Aristotle experience."

What distinguishes the contrast between the physics of Aristotle and Newton is the vast gulf in time, which makes their contrast quite radical in comparison to the contrast between, say, Einstein's theory and Newton's immediately preceding theory.Also the ascendancy of Newton's theory was not due to a decisive empirical test, like the eclipse experiment that decided for Einstein's theory over Newton's.It is this radical contrast between Aristotle's and Newton's physics that occasioned Kuhn's comparably radical thesis of scientific revolutions, that they are nonempirical conversions from one "paradigm" to another incommensurably different one.

When Kuhn set forth his thesis of scientific revolutions in 1962 in his famous book titled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the book was not welcomed by philosophers of science, who expected and demanded a coherent philosophy of language and a linguistic analysis for the Kuhnian thesis.The papers in Road Since Structure are in large part the fossil record of Kuhn's successive and unsuccessful attempts to evolve his missing link between history of science and philosophy of science.The papers show his groping, eclectic, and somewhat naive efforts at philosophy of language by a scholar who was firstly a historian of science.

Readers interested on my further comments on Kuhn are invited to read my book titled History of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science or Google my web site philsci for free downloads of my book by chapter - and also to read my other book reviews in this Amazon web site.

Thomas J. Hickey

Good Collection
Unless you're a research scientist or have found yourself wrapped up in the miniscule debates over Kuhn's writings ( eg. "What exactly IS a paradigm, perfesser?"), this book is delightful! Of particular interest are the two essays "What Are Scientific Revolutions?" and "The Trouble With The Historical Philosophy of Science." Some of this can be found in "The Essential Tension" as he was always repeating himself to different audiences.

Did Kuhn ever recover from 'Structure'?
As with (to a lesser extent) Feyerabend, Kuhn wrote his contreversial opus in the mid 60's. I think it's safe to say that anything hinting at anti-authoritarianism, as it seemed to do on the surface, was begging to be misunderstood. Honestly, after 'paradigm shift' became a bastardized slogan for everything from class-struggle to new-age revelations through meditation, I'm not sure Thomas Kuhn ever recovered from this world-wide misunderstanding. What I read in "The Road Since Structure" corroborates that as we find an author that constantly needs to clarify, "This is what I'm saying. This is what I'm not saying. Now that we're clear, let me repeat myself!"

First, as anyone who's read "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" knows, Kuhn has no talent for clear writing. Nothing's changed since. These essays, although more concise and to the point (perhaps that's Kuhn having learned his lesson) are still difficult reads. The first section, I think, is the book's 'payoff'. It is here that he reiterates, clarifies and expands on what is and is not scientific revolution, incommensurability and paradigm. Two essays in particular, "What are Scientific Revolutions?" and "The Road Since Structure" are worth the price of the book alone.

The second section consists of replies to Kuhns many and in an ideological sense, far ranging critics. Most of these papers were written for symposia and are difficult in the sense of listening to only one end of a phone dialogue. As he is generally responding to papers of others, without access to those papers, it is akward reading to say the least. Still, for those of us scientific philosophy nuts, the essays "Reflections on My Critics" (part of a symposium featuring Lakatos, Popper and Feyerabend amongst others) and "The Natural and the Human Sciences" are excellent illucidations of Kuhns thought.

Honestly, the interview, I didn't like. Much of it is Thomas Kuhns history and as for the reviewer below that bemoans a self-absorbed Kuhn talking about himself and his "intellectual project", I'm not sure what else you should expect from an interview of a philosopher. Interviewers like to ask about the interviewee and philosopher's like to talk about what they work on. Honestly though, if you are at all familiar with Kuhns life, this interview offers little that you didn't already know. ... Read more

Product Description
"A masterly assessment of the way the idea of quanta of radiation became part of 20th-century physics. . . . The book not only deals with a topic of importance and interest to all scientists, but is also a polished literary work, described (accurately) by one of its original reviewers as a scientific detective story."--John Gribbin, New Scientist

"Every scientist should have this book."--Paul Davies, New Scientist ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

An extremely challenging book
Anyone who has learned quantum mechanics has been told, in a general way, what Planck did and how it fits into the history of quantum physics. Kuhn shows that Planck thought about his goals and his results very differently than do textbook writers today.

Warning! This is a very tough read:
- You will not get much out of this book unless you are able and willing to follow detailed arguments in thermodynamics and statistical physics, in fairly gory mathematical detail. Quantum history-lite this isn't!
- You will also not get much out of this book unless you are willing to relax about the "right" way of thinking about thermodynamics and quantum theory. However YOU may think about it, Planck thought about it differently -- and Kuhn attempts to follow his thought, zigging & zagging as he did. If you're not willing to follow along closely and attentively for the ride, you will miss the story.

The payoff from reading this book is a more vivid understanding and appreciation for how very very differently we think about physics than the way it physicists saw it 100 years ago.

All you wanted to know about q.m. but were afraid to ask
The solution to the blackbody radiation problem is often quoted in Physics books as the formal bridge between the classic and quantum world viewpoints. However, as Kuhn points out, the full solution and not just the answer is nowhere else to be found.
Well beyond the satisfaction that reading this book should present to any serious Quantum Physics related student it is an absoulte requirement in the History of Physics.
Yes, the mathematical arguments get quite dense and most are not trivial. However, little is needed beyond basic calculus, statiscal mechanics and thermodynamics. View this as an excellent excuse to get going in those areas.
If every time you hear something about the beginnings of q.m. something stirs in your guts telling you that something is not quite right about the story you're being fed, that the full story isn't being told, then who could be better than Kuhn to show you that you were after right, after all?

How the Quantum came to be
Excellent book, as Kuhn's usually are, on the origin of quantum theory. "Everyone" knows Planck arrived at the quantum by studying black-body radiation, but what you are never told is *why* he was doingthat! Kuhn reaches back as to why Planck was, and has an interesting storyto tell for it (the question of thermodynamic irreversability vsreversability in classical mechanics). Another major part of Kuhn's tale isthat even after he arrived at his quantum hypothesis, Planck still saw itas a direct extension of classical physics. It was others, mainly Einstein,who realized the revolutionary nature of the quantum (and who ran with theidea), and physicists like Planck had to conceptually play catch up in thequantum revolution in the first decade of the 20th century. One seriousWARNING: while interesting and well written, the book has some verytechnical parts, requiring at least intermediate college physics. While notflooded with equations, Kuhn freely gets into thermodynamics andstatistical mechanics (entropy, free energy, H-theorem,...) in explainingthe core of Planck's early work. The reader should be prepared for sometechnical physics on the journey! ... Read more

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"Kuhn has the unmistakable address of a man, who, so far from wanting to score points, is anxious above all else to get at the truth of matters."--Sir Peter Medawar, Nature ... Read more

Customer Reviews (7)

Wonderful digestible essays on Scientific History and Philosophy
Brilliant!
Kuhn is one of very few Scientific Historians, who happens to also be a philosopher. In many ways, he is the father of coming at the three disciplines in this manner. There are so many truly brilliant concepts in this book, it is hard to really point any any one area that would sell this book.

Some of the themes:
1) How is knowledge captured? What exactly is this learning, particularly as relates to new discoveries? What exactly is happening to the individual as he takes in this knowledge.
2) Why is it that lots of innovation tends to happen all at once and then there are periods of considerably less innovation?

He moves the entire discourse away from just rules based learning to far more complex ideas of learning. For example, so many in education would simply think that if you could get a child to parrot rules, this is learning. However, Kuhn puts forth a wonderful argument for a different type of learning. This plays beautifully into the current work done on plasticity of the mind.

Particularly for the used price, this book is cheap for the breadth of knowledge it offers.Kuhns, unlike other philosophers and historians, writes in a manner that extremely digestible. Definitely get this book if you are interested in any of these topics.

Not much new since Structure
Almost all of these articles consist in pretty straightforward elaboration and extrapolation of the ideas in Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. No fundamentally new ideas are introduced (although there are some trivial adjustments in terminology, which people have made too much fuss about).

"The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science." It is an unfortunate textbook dogma to think that theories are confirmed by measurement, or, even worse, that scientific theories are constructed to fit given measurements, for the following reasons. (a) It is ambiguous what constitutes reasonable fit with data; one person's confirmation is another's refutation, as historical examples show (e.g., Ptolemy/Copernicus, etc., p. 185, and Galileo on falling bodies, pp. 193-194). We must conclude that the tables of data in science textbooks serve not to confirm the theories but to define the bounds of reasonable fit. (b) Most theories make very few measurable predictions. Therefore measurements may be indecisive (e.g., caloric and dynamical theories of heat, p. 200) or pertain only to relatively incidental aspects of the theory (e.g., relativity theory, p. 188). (c) To the extent that naive confirmation by measurement has been attempted, it has routinely rejected correct theories (e.g., Dalton on chemical composition, p. 195, Laplace on the speed of sound, p. 196) and it has turned out that "nature itself needs to be forced to yield the appropriate results" (p. 197). (d) "the road from scientific law to scientific measurement can rarely be traveled in the reverse direction" (p. 219). Successful measurements have almost exclusively been achieved where "the quantitative implications of a qualitative theory led the way" (p. 198, countless examples throughout). For these reasons, "only a miniscule fraction of even the best and most creative measurements ... are motivated by a desire to discover new quantitative regularities or to confirm old ones" (p. 187). Instead, the objective of measurement is "to improve the measure of 'reasonable agreement' characteristic of the theory in a given application and ... to open up new areas of application and establish new measurements of 'reasonable agreement' applicable to them. ... this can be fascinating and intensely rewarding work. And there is always the remote possibility that it will pay an additional dividend: something may go wrong." (p. 192). We all know how crucial anomalies can be, but even without them measurements would be valuable with respect to theory choice since "I know of no case in the development of science which exhibits a loss of quantitative accuracy as a consequence of the transition from an earlier to a later theory" (p. 213). By contrast, explanatory power has been abandoned repeatedly, even to the extent of rejecting earlier ideas as unscientific, e.g., Newton's gravity, or Lavoisier's theory which "deprived chemistry of one principal traditional function---the explanation of the qualitative properties of bodies in terms of the particular combination of chemical 'principles' that composed them" (p. 212).

"A Function for Thought Experiments." Since thought experiments do not introduce new empirical data one may think that the only way they can improve a theory is to isolate and resolve inconsistencies inherent in the theory. Kuhn shall argue against this view. His only substantial illustration is a thought experiment of Galileo showing an inconsistency in Aristotle's definition of speed: two things move as fast if they cover the same distance in the same time. Consider an inclined plane. One ball is sliding down the plane, another is dropped vertically from the same height. Call the vertical height H. By Aristotle's definition the dropping ball is faster: it has covered the distance H before the rolling ball has done so. But it is also slower, if H is measured from the bottom of the inclined plane instead of the top. But this does not prove that Aristotle's theory is intrinsically inconsistent, for it would be consistent if there was no accelerated motion. Thus thought experiments can improve theories not only by discovering inherent fallacies but by drawing attention to "previously unassimilated experience" (p. 261).

"Comment on the Relations of Science and Art." This is an extremely simpleminded article concerned only with reiterating foolish prejudices. Let us examine a few of these. "Unlike art, science destroys its past [and does not have museums] to inculcate craftsmanship or enlighten public taste. ... only historians read old scientific works. ... In no area is the contrast between art and science clearer. ... Picasso's success has not relegated Rembrandt's paintings to the storage vaults of art museums" (p. 345). This is ridiculous. What better description could there be of high school and undergraduate science than as a museum of past science intended "to inculcate craftsmanship or enlighten public taste"? And what works are on display in these museums if not the theories of the Rembrandts of science (i.e. Newton et al.)? Further, "Having seen Matisse's Odalisque, one may regard Ingres' with new eyes but one does not stop looking. Both can therefore be museum pieces as two solutions to a scientist's puzzle cannot." (p. 347). But they can in science too, and they are: Matisse/Ingres can be replaced by Newton/Einstein, geocentric/heliocetric, etc. Finally: "For the scientist ... the solved technical puzzle is the goal, and the aesthetic is a tool for its attainment." (p. 343). Since this is dogmatically stated without argument it is hard to argue against it on the basis of Kuhn's text, but I will try. If scientists were in their essence puzzle solvers one would expect them to be fond of chess, crossword puzzles, detective novels, etc. But instead they like music, as Kuhn points out elsewhere: "Many mathematicians and theoretical physicists have been passionately interested in and involved with music, some having had great difficulty choosing between a scientific and a musical career." (p. 64). Music is not puzzle solving but a pursuit of beauty within a structured framework.

Science's Greatest Historian
Thomas Kuhn's writings on the History of Science are, IMHO, the most honest, succinct, and courageous available.Nobody who considers themselves a "scientist" or Historian should pass this author by!

"Science progresses, funeral by funeral."- Max Planck

Dorje

A comment on Magellan's comments
In the last few lines of Magellan's "A few comments on the evolution of the philosophy", Thomas Kuhn was strongly criticized.This criticism perhaps originates from the same misunderstanding of human nature that produced Confusianism and Maxism.
What is brave about Kuhn is that he dared to point out the weakness of mankind.Indeed scientists eventually accept new ideas and theories because they are closer to truth as revealed by the new experimental observations and findings.But this paradigm shift can indeed be painfully long as people first try to exhaust all the means to rescue the old paradigm.Scientists should be trained to have the ethnics of merely pursuing truth and only truth.However, as human beings (shame on them), some scientists care more about their reputation and survival than about what is true.When the majority of a community is like so, the paradigm shift indeed begins as an external process, i.e., the shift is forced upon and not voluntary.

Another beautiful mind
Kuhn's ideas are almost always insightful, sometimes brilliant, though he can be challenging and somewhat dense to read. The last point is an observation rather than a criticism.Unlike some academic writers who use a lot of jargon and unnecessarily big words to sound authoritative, Kuhn is "scholarly" in the best sense -- meticulous about detail and extremely thoughtful in his explanations. There's a lot of great stuff here, just not light reading.

A collection of essays like this is especially nice because Kuhn's writings on a variety of topics can be sampled in manageable chunks of about 10 to 30 pages each.His consistent theme is how communities of scientists come to understand, test, and advance the state of knowledge in their fields of study.What makes the essays so fascinating for me is Kuhn's deft exploration of the inherent social nature of how science is done and how it moves forward.And though Kuhn is writing specifically about SCIENCE as a social endeavor, a number of the insights can be readily applied to other areas.

Finally, Kuhn's analyses, insights, and critiques carry added weight because he's not writing about science as an outsider.He started out as a scientist/practitioner and it shows in the crisp way he explains and weaves scientific examples into his writing. Well worth the effort to read! ... Read more

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For scientist and layman alike this book provides vivid evidence that the Copernican Revolution has by no means lost its significance today. Few episodes in the development of scientific theory show so clearly how the solution to a highly technical problem can alter our basic thought processes and attitudes. Understanding the processes which underlay the Revolution gives us a perspective, in this scientific age, from which to evaluate our own beliefs more intelligently. With a constant keen awareness of the inseparable mixture of its technical, philosophical, and humanistic elements, Mr. Kuhn displays the full scope of the Copernican Revolution as simultaneously an episode in the internal development of astronomy, a critical turning point in the evolution of scientific thought, and a crisis in Western man's concept of his relation to the universe and to God.

The book begins with a description of the first scientific cosmology developed by the Greeks. Mr. Kuhn thus prepares the way for a continuing analysis of the relation between theory and observation and belief. He describes the many functions--astronomical, scientific, and nonscientific--of the Greek concept of the universe, concentrating especially on the religious implications. He then treats the intellectual, social, and economic developments which nurtured Copernicus' break with traditional astronomy. Although many of these developments, including scholastic criticism of Aristotle's theory of motion and the Renaissance revival of Neoplatonism, lie entirely outside of astronomy, they increased the flexibility of the astronomer's imagination. That new flexibility is apparent in the work of Copernicus, whose DE REVOLUTIONIBUS ORBIUM CAELESTIUM is discussed in detail both for its own significance and as a representative scientific innovation.

With a final analysis of Copernicus' life work--its reception and its contribution to a new scientific concept of the universe--Mr. Kuhn illuminates both the researches that finally made the heliocentric arrangement work, and the achievements in physics and metaphysics that made the planetary earth an integral part of Newtonian science. These are the developments that once again provided man with a coherent and self-consistent conception of the universe and of his own place in it.

This is a book for any reader interested in the evolution of ideas and, in particular, in the curious interplay of hypothesis and experiment which is the essence of modern science. Says James Bryant Conant in his Foreword: "Professor Kuhn's handling of the subject merits attention, for... he points the way to the road which must be followed if science is to be assimilated into the culture of our times."

Customer Reviews (18)

Great Job!
The product was exactly as described.And shipping was fast.Very good, will buy again.

Book disintegrates
The book sent to me was in such poor condition that it disintegrated into a pile of yellow flakes. I'm sure it's a well written book but I'll not be able to find out given the poor quality control by resellers.

The Copernican Revolution
I had wanted to read this book for along time (50 years?) and finally did it. Very satisfying & intellectually challenging.

Excellent
Great book, even if you do not understand the specific details of the developments that were going on during this time. Of course Kuhn does a good job in displaying the Copernicus was really not that revolutionary, but he played a big role in the initiation of heliocentric theory ect.

a wonderful trip trough the sky
This is a good book about one of the most exciting developments of the science. Very well written and full of images. ... Read more

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Few philosophers of science have influenced as many readers as Thomas S. Kuhn.Yet no comprehensive study of his ideas has existed--until now.In this volume, Paul Hoyningen-Huene examines Kuhn's work over four decades, from the days before The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to the present, and puts Kuhn's philosophical development in a historical framework.Scholars from disciplines as diverse as political science and art history have offered widely differing interpretations of Kuhn's ideas, appropriating his notions of paradigm shifts and revolutions to fit their own theories, however imperfectly.Hoyningen-Huene does not merely offer another interpretation--he brings Kuhn's work into focus with rigorous philosophical analysis.Through extended discussions with Kuhn and an encyclopedic reading of his work, Hoyningen-Huene looks at the problems and justifications of his claims and determines how his theories might be expanded.Most significantly, he discovers that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions can be understood only with reference to the historiographic foundation of Kuhn's philosophy.

Discussing the concepts of paradigms, paradigm shifts, normal science, and scientific revolutions, Hoyningen-Huene traces their evolution to Kuhn's experience as a historian of contemporary science.From here, Hoyningen-Huene examines Kuhn's well-known thesis that scientists on opposite sides of a revolutionary divide "work in different worlds," explaining Kuhn's notion of a world-change during a scientific revolution.He even considers Kuhn's most controversial claims--his attack on the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification and his notion of incommensurability--addressing both criticisms and defenses of these ideas.

Destined to become the authoritative philosophical study of Kuhn's work, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions both enriches our understanding of Kuhn and provides powerful interpretive tools for bridging Continental and Anglo-American philosophical traditions. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Good account of Kuhn's "SSR"
This is an excellent account of the work of Thomas Kuhn - esp. in bringing out the development of his thought on epistemology and ontology as it relates to his philosophy of science. Profitable to read it after The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: A Reader's Guide (Reader's Guides).

Excellent analysis of the difficult details ofKuhn's work.
The author shows that he masters the subject with insight and is able to reconstruct either chronologically or by problems, thesis, objections and possible interpretations, the philosophical work of T.S.Kuhn. He choices topresent the reconstruction from a caritative point of view, wich allows himto concentrate into the internal problems of Kuhn's theory of science. InPart I he locates Kuhn's work in the context of the Historiography ofScience. Part II concentrates in the problem of scientific knowledge andKuhn'shard and highly misunderstood thesis about "the constructionof the world". Part III develops the subject of the dynamic ofscientific knowledge and Kuhn's point of view about scientific progress. It is particulary helpfull to have at hand Kuhn's books while readingHoyningen-Huene's book because he has a gift for suitable quotation. ... Read more

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The early twentieth century brought about the rejection by physicists of the doctrine of determinism--the belief that complete knowledge of the initial conditions of an interaction in nature allows precise and unambiguous prediction of the outcome.This book traces the origins of a central problem leading to this change in viewpoint, paradoxes raised by attempts to formulate a consistent theory of the nature of light. Dr. Wheaton discusses the experimental work on the new forms of radiation found at the turn of the century and shows how the interpretation of energy transfer from x-rays to matter gradually transformed a classical wave explanation of light to one based on particle-like quanta of energy. Further, he explains how, at the end of the period between the discovery of x-rays (1896) and the invention of quantum mechanics (1925), influential scientists came reluctantly to accept a wave-like interpretation of matter as well.The result was the adoption of "wave-particle dualism," according to which light and matter are interpreted as both particulate and wave-like.One result of his analysis is an explanation of why there were two independent but equivalent formulations of the new quantum mechanics.This distinctly different account of one of the major rhetorical shifts in modern physical thought will be of fundamental interest to physical scientists and philosophers, as well as to historians of science. ... Read more

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Der Erwerb des Buches enthält gleichzeitig die kostenlose Mitgliedschaft im Buchklub des Verlags zum Ausprobieren - dort können Sie von über einer Million Bücher ohne weitere Kosten auswählen. Das Buch besteht aus Wikipedia-Artikeln: Paul Feyerabend, Thomas S. Kuhn, Glenn Theodore Seaborg, Richard Dawkins, John Ousterhout, Ernest Lawrence, Charles H. Townes, Steven Weinberg, Emilio Segrè, Donald A. Glaser, Luis Walter Alvarez, Owen Chamberlain, Wendell Meredith Stanley, John Howard Northrop, John Searle, Donald Davidson, Hans Kelsen, Judith Butler, Thomas Laqueur, R. B. Kitaj, Andreas Papandreou, Hubert Dreyfus, Steven Chu, Andreas Floer, Paul Edwards, Ernst Kantorowicz, Roger Tsien, Wu-Yi Hsiang, Stephen Smale, Rosario Ferré, Philip Selznick, Jean Pierre Vité, Leszek Kołakowski, Charles Singer, Christina Romer, Subrata K. Mitra, Manuel Castells, Bruce Ames, Anderson Hunter Dupree, Gerald D. Feldman, Christopher Alexander, Walter Benn Michaels, Tim White, David Romer, Hendrik Lenstra, Bernard Baars, Barbara Ehrenreich, Edwin Mattison McMillan, Erik H. Erikson, Richard M. Buxbaum, Shiing-Shen Chern, Daniel E. Koshland, Ernest Callenbach, George F. Smoot, Julia Robinson, Hans Kurt Tönshoff, Melvin Calvin, Werner Angress, Kenneth Waltz, Richard Goldschmidt, John David Jackson, Eugene Woldemar Hilgard, George A. Akerlof, Nathan Glazer, Hans Rosenberg, Matthew Rabin, Abraham Haskel Taub, Herbert Genzmer, Egon Brunswik, Peter Brown, Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, Thomas Nagel, Gilbert Newton Lewis, Lotfi Zadeh, Warren E. Miller, Adam Hochschild, Oskar Schmieder, Simon White, Maxine Hong Kingston, John Heilbron, Philippa Foot, Charles Morrey, Stephan Kuttner, Paul Grice, Mary Main, Michael Nagler, Richard Borcherds, Albert Armin Ehrenzweig, Peter A. Boodberg, Sather Professor, David Daube, David Burton Wake, Arshi Pipa, James Sethian, Leo Breiman, Hans Joachim Bremermann, Hubertus van Mook, Klaus Pringsheim junior, William Scott Ferguson, Ala...http://booksllc.net/?l=de&id=254675 ... Read more

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Seminararbeit aus dem Jahr 1999 im Fachbereich Philosophie - Theoretische (Erkenntnis, Wissenschaft, Logik, Sprache), einseitig bedruckt, Note: keine, Universität Rostock (Institut für Philosophie), Veranstaltung: Proseminar: Zur Wissenschafts- und Erkenntnistheorie im 20. Jahrhundert, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Die Proseminararbeit kontrastiert die Wissenschaftsaufassung von Thomas S. Kuhn mit Paul K. Feyerabends Generalkritik an wissenschaftstheoretischen Konzeptionen. Nach Kuhns Auffassung erfolgt der Erkenntnisgewinn eines Faches nicht ausschließlich linear und kumulativ, sondern durch so genannte Paradigmenwechsel und wissenschaftliche Revolutionen. In Abgrenzung zu Poppers Kritischem Rationalismus plädiert Feyerabend für Wissenschaftspluralismus und Methodenfreiheit. Erkenntnisgewinn resultiert nach Feyerabend aus dem Widerstreit verschiedener Ansätze und Hypothesen und folgt nicht allein der Logik einer abstrakten übergeordneten Wissenschaftstheorie oder einer Falisifikationsregel. ... Read more

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When the scientific paradigms to stop giving answer to the problems that belong them, violent breaks they occur in which the science is revolutionized, destroys the paradigms eroded and substitutes them with other new.Thomas S. Kuhn analyzes in this work "the behavior of the scientific communities responsible for selecting the most apt way of practicing the future science" after those moments of crisis ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Excelente libro, terrible traducción
El libro muestra un desarrollo histórico de la ciencia excelente. Perfecto para comprender la naturaleza y desarrollo de la cienca a través del tiempo. Presenta las complejidades de la producción científica y su relación con el desarrollo ulterior de la ciencia. Sin embargo, a pesar de ser lectura obligada para cualquiera que desea conocer más acerca de la ciencia, recomiendo la versión en inglés. Esta versión en particular contiene numerosos errores de concordancia y no permite seguir una secuencia lógica en la lectura. Mas que exponer la ideas del autor, el traductor tiende a confundirlas. ... Read more

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This digital document, covering the life and work of Thomas S(amuel) Kuhn, is an entry from Contemporary Authors, a reference volume published by Thompson Gale. The length of the entry is 1251 words. The page length listed above is based on a typical 300-word page. Although the exact content of each entry from this volume can vary, typical entries include the following information:

• Place and date of birth and death (if deceased)
• Family members
• Education
• Professional associations and honors
• Employment
• Writings, including books and periodicals
• A description of the author's work
• References to further readings about the author