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Customer Reviews (7)

The Philosopher in Winter
Anyone who likes good philosophical writing will enjoy "Dependent Rational Animals."In it, Alasdair MacIntyre argues for a concept of human flourishing that acknowledges the virtues of acknowledged social dependence as well as those of independent practical reasoning (the normal focus of virtue theory).Parts of the book are underargued -- particularly the section on politics -- but the writing is lucid, and the philosophy is wise and compassionate.Best of all, the book opens our eyes to the obvious but often overlooked truth that any account of human good is seriously partial and deficient if it neglects the reality of dependence -- a state occupied by everyone at some point in his or her life, and by some persons for their entire lives.Mind opening.Highly recommended.

Interesting but Incoherent
An interesting and generally accessible work by the well known philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre.MacIntyre is known well for his denunciation of the moral bankruptcy of the modern world and his embrace of an Aristotleian/Thomistic account of virtue ethics.This book is an effort to provide a positive account of a desirable life and sketch out a form of political philosophy.MacIntyre begins this book with a fairly straightforward discussion of how at least some non-human animals and humans are not qualitatively different in cognitive capacity but rather on a continuum.If anything, I'd state the case even more strongly than MacIntyre; recent clever experiments establish that rodents, for example, can generalize causal inferences.While MacIntyre is not completely explicit, the discussion of animal-human intelligence is an effort to ground a teleological account of human 'flourishing' in which the purpose of humans is to be, well, human.In MacIntyre's account and by analogy with his discussion of animal behavior, the distinctive telos of humans is to become independent practical reasoners embedded deeply and meaningfully in a web of necessary social interactions.MacIntyre emphasizes our interdependence, both in becoming independent practical reasoners and at other times when we are inevitably impaired.MacIntyre argues as well that this account is distinctly different from most modern moral philosophy, which he views as having a destructively individualistic orientation.

There are several problems with MacIntyre's analysis.I doubt that his method really establishes a convincing human telos.No one would argue about the importance of human rational capacities and sociability, but does his analysis lead to his version of the telos?If there is anything really distinctive about humans as a species, its our remarkable social flexibility.Hunter-gather families and clans, oligarchic city-states, primitive monarchies with priest-kings, and many others.All these involve practical reasoning and social interdependence.Along the same lines, how does MacIntyre's effort at naturalistic analysis establish that the cooperative values that he prefers?Why can't human interdependence and needs be satisfied by exploitation and coercion?These are just as characteristic of human life as the values he prefers. This is true for social non-human primates, canids, and hyenas as well. MacIntyre's goal appears to a form of primitive egalitarianism but why not Aristotle's version of the telos which legitimized slavery and the subordination of women?Not only is MacIntyre vague about how to define the goods or ends of human existence, he is also imprecise about the virtues, which he regards as crucial.Is a virtue an instrument to an end, as most of his comments suggest, or is it an end in itself as some of his discussion of just generosity seems to imply? Failure to clearly define how he reaches his conclusions regarding the proper ends of human life and lack of clear definition of virtue gives much of the discussion a hand-waving quality.I suspect that MacIntyre has a covert agenda; his frequent citation of Aquinas and the appearance towards the end of the book of the term natural law leads me to think he really thinks there is a theistic backstop for his position.

I'm not sure as well about his statement that moral philosophy fails to acknowledge human dependency.My impression is that the individualistic orientation of much moral philosophy has more to do with the rejection of external authority as a source of morality than blindness towards human dependency.Indeed, much political philosophy, which is an aspect of moral philosophy, often begins with an explicit recognition of human weakness and interdependence.This occurs as far back as the account of the Prometheus creation myth in Plato's Protagoras. MacIntyre attempts to deal with some alternative traditions but these are mainly straw man arguments as he compares his position with a fairly weak account of preference utilitarianism and with Nietzsche's amoralism.

MacIntyre's effort to apply his views to a positive political philosophy are likewise not successful.His reasoning leads him to disparage the modern liberal state as being unable to provide the type of primitive egalitrarianism he wants (this is certainly true) and and too much based on exploitative power relationships and competing economic interests to be morally adequate.He finds the family both too weak and potentially too confining to be adequate.Hence, the need for smaller and more moral communities.But is the modern liberal state as bad as MacIntyre would like us to believe?Given his emphasis on the importance of human dependence and mutual care, the fact is that liberal societies have done more to alleviate the problems of human dependency than other societies in human history and the ability to mobilize the resources of entire states is crucial in this endeavour.There is even evidence (see Herrmann et al., Science 319, 2008) that liberal democratic states encourage the type of altruistic behaviors that MacIntyre sees as the basis for a moral society.As MacIntyre acknowledges briefly, the type of communal groupings he prefers are at risk for the same types of exploitative relations that he assigns to the state.Indeed, the types of close social communal networks he would like to see are most likely to arise in smaller groups with strong familial, ethnic, or ideological bonds.These are often the types of groupings most prone to destructive behaviors and tend to resist the idea of universal human values.Moreover, in order to get the types of communities that MacIntyre desires, the initial locus of reform will have to be the state.His reluctance to deal with structure of the state is self-defeating.On the basis of poor justification, MacIntyre would like to exchange our admittedly imperfect state, which has some real virtues, for a vague utopianism.

Philosophical account for the need of virtues as toanimals and humans
Alasdair Macintire, well known forseveral renowned philosophical books, for example "After virtue". He is an authority on the issue of virtues and Aristotelian philosophy, where virtue plays an inmportant role. What is striking about this book however,is that recent research done on dolphins, chimpanzees and other intelligent nonhuman animals, has been taken notice of by the author. This includes self consciousness and rationality. He, in an excellent way, made these insights philsophically relevant In his previous works he has never made much about animal existence. Now for the first time he meaningfully incorporated new scientific insights on intelligent and rational animals in his thinking on virtues. This indeed a gain in thinking on animal (and human) existence. He does not hesitate to put his views forward. For those who are interested in philosophy and animal issues,this book will be an great asset.

In the second half of the book he also addresses the issue of dependence on and the need for virtues in human social life. Amonst many other things , he explains why neither the state nor the family would be primarily normative, why virtues guide us, but are not rigid rules. While he regards emotions as as important, his wisdom namely"Sentiment , unguided by reason , becomes sentimentalism and sentimantality is a sign of moral failure" (p124)is most relevant today;This surely applies to our making sense of both human and nonhuman animal exsistence.

In a time where the killing and possible extinction of whales dolphins,chimpanzess orang utangs by human ignorance, arrogance and error as well as and certainenvironmental problems, and where people are looking for moral answers, this book indeed tells us why humans need virtues. The book itself fulfill in a contemporary need.

Unflinching attempt to address fundamental questions
Many virtue theorists seem to think it enough to say that "qua humans" we should flourish, and that figuring out how to flourish "just is" what practical reasoning is, and hence that virtue is intrinsic to being human in about the same way that having roots is intrinsic to being a tree, and that those of us who fail to "see" that are somehow irrational in wanting some further argument. They skip blithely over the obvious fact that much reasoning that seems quite practical and wildly successful seems rather less than virtuous. MacIntyre indulges in no such self-satisfied question-begging. Whatever else is to be said for MacIntyre's "Dependent Rational Animals," he displays the virtue of engaging directly and forthrightly the hard questions that unsympathetic or unconvinced souls would pose for his position.

The way he argues that we need the virtues is quite startling in originality. Generally, ethicists take as their standard the autonomous, self-sufficient reasoner--where "reason" means something like "able to give a logically defensible verbal justification," usually in terms of some sort of universal rule. MacIntyre sees this as a mistake. The question, he thinks, is how any of us ever come to be independent practical reasoners and what it means to be such. We must, he thinks, understand that "reasons to act" have little to do with our linguistic ability or capacity to display verbally a syllogism that concludes with the action in question. Rather, "reasons to act" are more concrete, pragmatic, and instrumental.
Thus, we can say that intelligent animals act with reasons, despite having no language, if their actions are clearly aimed at ends, especially if it is clear that they choose their instrumental acts on the basis of perceptions of the current environment.

*Human practical resoning* begins in this aspect of our animal nature--our ability to learn in practice what we need to do in order to accomplish the things we need to accomplish if we are to flourish. Note that the issue here is learning in practice, and identifying correctly through our practice what we find to be needful for our flourishing. Reason, then, is grounded in the practice of flourishing.

And rather than look at "autonomous" adults, MacIntyre points out the obvious fact, usually overlooked by ethical theorists, that we are actually always dependent on each other in myriad ways. Our mutual dependency dictates that we need communities of giving and receiving various things--including education, formal and otherwise--not only to flourish but to be able to know, and reason, about flourishing. Without the virtues, the conditions for practical reasoning *at all* cannot exist.

The argument, then, is that our animality and dependency dictate what constitutes both flourishing and practical reason about flourishing, and that we can demonstrate that the virtues are necessary for being independent practical reasoners who flourish.

Rather, that's the strategy of the argument. The argument itself is, of course, much more involved. In its entirety, does it work? I'm not sure. I don''t know that everyone would agree with his axiomatic/unargued starting point, that to flourish requires us to be independent rational thinkers, even in the sense of "rational" he's spelled out here. We of democratic mien see thing that way, of course--but so far as I know, MacIntyre doesn't provide an argument for the overriding necessity of independence.

A couple of things are troubling--his apparent reliance on D.W. Winnicott's psychoanalytic account of child development, for instance. I'm not sure whether it really matters--so long as one accepts the notion that persons cannot develop into independent rational thinkers without the support of others, MacIntyre's affinity for Winnicott can be seen as a personal quirk, I think.

But that does lead to one perplexity: a lot of what MacIntyre says about the necessities of human life--matters of our dependence--is empirical, in a fairly straightforward sense, more than philosophical. Does this matter? It seems so to me. At least some of his argument turns on empirical claims about conditions for human flourishing for which he provides no argument or evidence.

Finally, MacIntyre sees current society as more or less beyond the pale ethically--according to him, neither our families nor our nation states promote virtue or independent practical rationality of the sort he has spelled out. One could conclude, of course, that we live in vicious ands heathen times, so to speak--and perhaps we do. Or one could wonder whether MacIntyre's empirical claims, and the philosophical argument he bases upon them, may not have more to do with his tastes than with the conditions of human flourishing. Is it really so obvious that in our culture we fail to flourish? Taken from the perspective of human history, our developed nation states have a few things going for them that resemble flourishing: the highest levels of material welfare, more equitably spread (in spite of the great distance we have to go in achieving equality); the most widespread education and highest rates of literacy; the lowest rates of infant mortality; the longest life spans; the greatest emphasis on human rights, including for women and minoeriites; the easiest access by non-elites to the arts; the cheapest books (relative to per capita income); the most efficient (if not yet ideal) institutions for international consultation and cooperation, and . . .

I like MacIntyre''s version of how life ought to be. I recommend reading the book. But I suggest that one not fail to note that his empirical claims are less than obviously true, while some empirical facts about our flourishing seem to have escaped his notice--or at least been given less weight than many folks would give them.

One other thing: This book is badly written.Never mind the needlessly poor sentence structure in which he so often indulges (and he obviously knows better, since he often writes clearly). But the structure of the argument and its exposition is generally less than transparent. (The reviewer who thought first that MacIntyre had gone soft reflects this fact.) For instance, on page 107, he tells us there are two ways that a certain thing is important, then spends twelve pages discussing the first--without ever getting around to identifying the second, so far as I can discern. That sort of sloppiness is not unusual in the book. Do you think maybe one of the minor virtues, one of the small obligations owed by people who write books for which they ask our money, is that they not be lazy about how they express themselves?

Okay, so I was wrong
I take back my previous review, in which I speculated that MacIntyre had "gone soft." On second and third reading, this is just a wonderful book - a welcome return to ambitious Aristotelian naturalism in ethics. So much better than "After Virtue". ... Read more

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Alasdair MacIntyre—whom Newsweek has called "one of the foremost moral philosophers in the English-speaking world"—here presents his 1988 Gifford Lectures as an expansion of his earlier work Whose Justice? Which Rationality? He begins by considering the cultural and philosophical distance dividing Lord Gifford's late nineteenth-century world from our own. The outlook of that earlier world, MacIntyre claims, was definitively articulated in the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopaedia Brittanica, which conceived of moral enquiry as both providing insight into and continuing the rational progress of mankind into ever greater enlightenment. MacIntyre compares that conception of moral enquiry to two rival conceptions also formulated in the late nineteenth century: that of Nietzsche's Zur Genealogie der Moral and that expressed in the encyclical letter of Pope Leo XIII Aeterni Patris.

The lectures focus on Aquinas's integration of Augustinian and Aristotelian modes of enquiry, the inability of the encyclopaedists' standpoint to withstand Thomistic or genealogical criticism, and the problems confronting the contemporary post-Nietzschean genealogist. MacIntyre concludes by considering the implications for education in universities and colleges. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Catholicism vying for a place at the table?
Trusted sources recommended this book and it indeed carries an air of great intelligence. The theme is also interesting--the fragmenting of the Victorian consensus. I learned a lot about that consensus, what it consisted of, and how figures I'd learned about contributed to its collapse. The author nicely contrasts an iconic statment of that consensus with Nietsche, using him as the evolutionary origin of those doing the collapsing. So far, so good. But I sensed a hidden agenda behind this book, which is to make sure that whenever other philosophies gather at any table, place be made for Roman Catholicism as one of them. I've no objection to Roman Catholocism that I know of, but I felt the status claimed for it in this discussion, as the ultimate bastion of Western tradition, uncalled for. Despite the huge intelligence of the text and the insight I felt I gained, at base I felt I was being fed a line by a spin doctor. I would gladly read more by this author, but I will watch out for the spin.

Clarifies the alternative streams of modern thought.
It is not often that a book of moral philosophy provides both a deep education in the history and content of thought, and a concrete set of alternatives to transform modern living.

In this book, MacIntryre argues that the three supposedly incommensurable approaches to moral life that are left on the table in modern moral philosophy ought to be acknowledged.The battle between the three approaches is too often papered over.A better method would be to acknowledge to students that the Universities themselves are at war over these approaches, and are in fact an arena for this conflict, rather than an equal and uninvolved home for all ways of thinking.

He is right.Any student of philosophy recognizes quickly that the instructors are speaking within incommensurable theories, speaking past one another.This book explains why, and does not attempt to provide a solution, other than to recognize that a war is going on.

A Thomist like MacIntrye argues that a child must be brought up within the traditions of the truth as preparation to learn the truth.Yet modern science and the 19th century encyclopedists argue that truth is progressive.And Nietzche argues that an exposition of truth is merely the will to state the truth as seen by the person, a form of the will to power.

These incommensurable approaches can only be the source of conflict in learning.To win, MacIntyre argues, would require one to transcend the others by explaining the problems of the other modes of thinking, solving those problems for the other mode, and moving the debate on.None have as yet triumphed, although MacIntyre holds out hope for Thomistic arguments, based in Aristotle and moving from there.

His discussion of the Augustine/Aristotle debates of the 14th Century Parisian university is rivetting (OK, I admit it, I am exaggerating).This is a difficult but worthwile compendium of lectures, informative and educational.A reader will understand modern philosophy better as a byproduct of reading this book.

Clarifies the alternative streams of modern thought.
It is not often that a book of moral philosophy provides both a deep education in the history and content of thought, and a concrete set of alternatives to transform modern living.

In this book, MacIntryre argues that the three supposedly incommensurable approaches to moral life that are left on the table in modern moral philosophy ought to be acknowledged.The battle between the three approaches is too often papered over.A better method would be to acknowledge to students that the Universities themselves are at war over these approaches, and are in fact an arena for this conflict, rather than an equal and uninvolved home for all ways of thinking.

He is right.Any student of philosophy recognizes quickly that the instructors are speaking within incommensurable theories, speaking past one another.This book explains why, and does not attempt to provide a solution, other than to recognize that a war is going on.

A Thomist like MacIntrye argues that a child must be brought up within the traditions of the truth as preparation to learn the truth.Yet modern science and the 19th century encyclopedists argue that truth is progressive.And Nietzche argues that an exposition of truth is merely the will to state the truth as seen by the person, a form of the will to power.

These incommensurable approaches can only be the source of conflict in learning.To win, MacIntyre argues, would require one to transcend the others by explaining the problems of the other modes of thinking, solving those problems for the other mode, and moving the debate on.None have as yet triumphed, although MacIntyre holds out hope for Thomistic arguments, based in Aristotle and moving from there.

His discussion of the Augustine/Aristotle debates of the 14th Century Parisian university is rivetting (OK, I admit it, I am exaggerating).This is a difficult but worthwile compendium of lectures, informative and educational.A reader will understand modern philosophy better as a byproduct of reading this book.

a essential text for those interested in moral philosophy
In Three Rival Versions Alasdair MacIntyre contends that there are three primary modes of moral inquiry.The first he calls encyclopeadia and is primarly a cateloging of moral principles understood as mirroring realitybypost-Enlightenment moral philosophers.The second is the genealogicalmethod which finds its orgin in Nietzsche's critique of morality.Althoughmany think of these two modes of inquiry as exhaustive of the possiblemodes of inquiry, MacIntyre claims that there is a third alternative rootedin the Thomistic tradition.In Three Rival Versions MacIntyre articulatesand defends this third alternative against the encyclopeadic andgenealogical versions of moral inquiry.This work is an essential text forunderstanding the contemporary debates in moral philosophy. ... Read more

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Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the most controversial philosophers and social theorists of our time. He opposes liberalism and postmodernism with the teleological arguments of an updated Thomistic Aristotelianism. It is this tradition, he claims, which presents the best theory so far about the nature of rationality, morality and politics. This is the first Reader of MacIntyre's work. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Excellent Entry to Alasdair MacIntyre
This is a reader, but it is---I am grateful--- not characterized by abridgments, brief summaries, or short excerpts. It is a great point of entry to A. MacIntyre and is intended more to present MacIntyre's mature thought than it is to trace his changes in perspective over time. Knight has also written for this volume a very good intro to MacIntyre that is well worth reading.

Lucid Presentation of MacIntyre
Kelvin Knight provides a concise, but adequate sample of MacIntyre's work.The articles contained in the text are sufficient for a novice ofphilosophy to gain a light grasp on MacIntyre's main points, especiallyconcerning Machiavelli in response to Strauss's analysis of the topic. Thearticles collected, especially "The Claims of 'After Virtue'",contain a counterpoint to much of Strauss and Mansfield's work. This isvery valuable considering the proliferation of the historian and hisprodigy's opinions on the topic. ... Read more

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Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the most creative and important philosophers working today. This volume presents a selection of his classic essays on ethics and politics collected together for the first time, focussing particularly on the themes of moral disagreement, moral dilemmas, and truthfulness and its importance. The essays range widely in scope, from Aristotle and Aquinas and what we need to learn from them, to our contemporary economic and social structures and the threat which they pose to the realization of the forms of ethical life. They will appeal to a wide range of readers across philosophy and especially in moral philosophy, political philosophy, and theology. ... Read more

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A Short History of Ethics is a significant contribution written by one of the most important living philosophers. For the second edition Alasdair MacIntyre has included a new preface in which he examines his book "thirty years on" and considers its impact. It remains an important work, ideal for all students interested in ethics and morality.

"The second edition of this classic will be more widely read than the first, one expects, if only because in the intervening three decades the author has become perhaps the most important moral philosopher in the English-speaking world." —First Things

"This brilliant and provocative book is not so much a history of ethics as it is an essay about the history of ethics, with numerous examples. . . ." —Philosophical Review

". . . MacIntyre is always provocative, and this book will continue to excite engagement with fundamental moral issues." —Choice ... Read more

Customer Reviews (9)

An unevenly engaging History of Ethics
Alasdair MacIntyre's "A Short History of Ethics" is an uneven attempt at examining the history of Western culture through the development of ethics. It is quite clear that MacIntyre aims to advance his thesis of the decline of morality and ethical philosophy in the modern era with this short history of ethics. MacIntyre is generally skeptical and critical of most ethical theories, and offers a succinct criticism of most theories immediately after introducing them. While some chapters, like those on Homeric and pre-classical and Hellenistic Greek Philosophy, Christianity, New Values, and Modern Moral philosophy, offer engaging insights, others are redundant and seemingly irrelevant to the advancement of his general thesis. MacIntyre admits in the preface that this book suffers from too many aims. This problem is most troubling when MacIntyre attempts to offer a ~20-page summary of Plato or Aristotle which can neither be expected to inform the advanced reader or to introduce these seminal philosophers to beginning students of philosophy. While there are surely better "History of Philosophy" and "History of Ethics" books available, MacIntyre's "Short History of Ethics" occasionally surprises the reader with insightful criticisms and arguments which make it an uneven if mildly engaging little book on Ethics.

Too much analysis, too little exposition, but it is a good read
The title of the book is misleading. It gives one the impression that AM will gives us a survey of the history of ethical positions. While he does do this to a degree, that is not the point of the book. AM's argument is that key terms in ethics change meaning with the change in language and/or social custom (269). Secondly, key moves in philosophy and social theory change ethical foundations.

AM begins with Greek ethics and gives a thorough review of it. Interestingly, AM wrote this book before he endorsed Aristotelian ethics as the way out of the modern morass. He is more critical of Aristotle here than he is in After Virtue.

The next key move is Christianity. This section is weak for a number of reasons. AM had not yet converted to Christianity and as a result he depended on much out-of-date and long-refuted German scholarship on Christianity. Secondly, ten pages on Christianity? He tried to summarize Augustine and Aquinas in two paragraphs! That being said, his summary, while too brief, was accurate. Augustine and Aquinas reinterpreted key sections of Plato and Aristotle, respectively, into explicitly Christian categories.

But something changed in the history of Christianity. Luther arose. Luther introduced a character that had been absent in ethical discussions: the individual. Luther also introduced new rules for social ethics. Luther bifurcated morality by positing absolute and unconditional ethical commands on the one hand (God says so) with the self-justifying rules of market and state on the other (124). This paved the way for autonomy and secularism.

The rest of Western ethics can be seen as a footnote or an outworking to this. With the idea of contract introduced, social ethics now revolved around the tenuous idea of "natural rights." Western thinkers could not (still can't!) reconcile an authoritarian state with limits to the state's power. Locke tried and came very close to doing this.

Evaluation:
The Good: the reader has a good understanding after reading AM. This book's argument is much tighter than that of After Virtue. Also, AM does a superb job in showing (hinting, rather) the inevitability of interpreting ethical norms from within a community. He perfects this move in After Virtue.

The Bad: The writing style could be improved. It is like watching an elephant run. I forgot how man times the author used the word "just" (and not in the sense of justice). Secondly, as he notes in his preface, his section on Christianity is weak. Thirdly, he spends too much time on analysis and too little on exposition. This is okay if the reader already understands the thinker in question. It is annoying if he doesn't.

My title might have given the impression of a negative review of the book.Far from it.Alasdair MacIntyre is the most important ethicist I have read, and I heartily commend all of his works.

Ethics
The book arrived in a VERY timely fashion!!The book was in okay condition (not spectacular), but good enough for me and worth the savings.

Excellent introduction
I was always in a certain kind of doubt when it was asked of me to recommend one or the other of numerous histories of philosophy. They are not your ordinary texts, which you can browse about in your leasure time. They often require some thinking to really grasp what author had in mind and where does he stand at all. After all history of philosophy is elusive subject even to profficient ones. Looking back, in something less than seven thousand years of culture as we know it (it began with emergence of Summerian epos - Gilgamesh), one finds himself before wast ammount of data, to put it that way. When faced with them, one feels compelled to escape in any direction avaliable to him.

But neverthelles, something drives you to continue your studies, to learn and feed upon knowledge of others, to live in times long forgotten and to think an re-think thought again and again. But without that initial spark which puts great flames in motion all would be in vain. MacIntyre book is one that feeds that flame, helping it to grow.

If one really wants to understand key questions of ethics and how, at the first place they came to be, one should start with MacIntyre. You won't find your asnwers listed here, rather contrary, MacIntyre, in his almost positivistic scepticism, states many pro et contra arguments for theories presented in his book, that reader finds himself confused on many occasions. But precisely that kind of expose is what drives one to continue searching and to complete questions posed by MAcIntyre. A task that takes whole lifetime and more.

In the end I have to mention that ethics described here concernes itself mostly with western ethics and ethical thought. East is left out. For which purpose, I'll let you find for yourself.

A Book on Moral Philosophy
Professor Alasdair MacIntyre in "A Short History of Ethics" produced an interesting book covering the long history of moral philosophy. The author provides a historical background and perspective for studying the selected texts on moral philosophy.

The book first provides the reader with an account of Greek thought and the philosophical basis of their thinking. The author then proceeds to discuss the history of philosophy to the present day. The reader is then able to appreciate the discussion of moral philosophy in the appropriate historical context.

I enjoyed reading the book, although I would not classify it among the best books on the subject. The author seems to assume that the reader has some understanding of philosophy which would make it difficult for those without some understanding of the subject to follow his arguments. However, the book should be of value to people with an interest in moral philosophy.
... Read more

Product Description
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, the sequel to After Virtue, is a persuasive argument of there not being rationality that is not the rationality of some tradition. MacIntyre examines the problems presented by the existence of rival traditions of inquiry in the cases of four major philosophers: Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hume. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (5)

Slightly dull sequel to AFTER VIRTUE
This so-called sequel to After Virtue is heavier in both its abstruse argumentation, erudition and physical mass.In many ways, it lacks the excitement and provocative character of After Virtue, and its contents are much more specialized. One can feel this particularly in the heavy treatment of Homer, Aristotle and Plato, which is neck-deep in linguistic hairsplitting over the precise meanings of Greek words.For those readers with scant interest in the classics, the first part of the book, despite its many gems, tries one's patience.

The overarching thesis of the book is sound nonetheless.To give a very basic outline, MacIntyre traces several traditions, broadly being the predominant Hellenist and Christian ones, before moving on to establish liberalism as its owntradition.Not every philosopher is give exhaustive or detailed treatment.Aristotle, Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hume are the real stars here.The Scottish Enlightenment is dwelt upon in much detail to explain Hume, so other important philosophical movements such as British Empiricism, German Idealism, etc. are marginalized.Despite these omissions [the book is long enough as it is], the central thesis coheres nicely and arrives at its conclusion in a most decisive manner.

Though MacIntyre's thesis that liberalism itself constitutes a tradition may seem tame, taken into proper perspective, it is actually quite revolutionary.Considering that modernity [à la Descartes] rejected all appeal to tradition and sought to construct a purely rational account of the human and his society and to, thereby, construct a utopian future applicable to all times and places, to claim that it is itself a traditional is a smack on the face that effectively historicizes the Enlightenment tradition.Therefore, justice and rationality-in other words what is proper action and what are the proper reasons for acting-must be understood through the historicized lens of the context of a specific tradition that any ethical discourse plugs into for its legitimacy.

The book concludes with a cogent discussion of the nature of traditions, their birth, evolution, death, and how we can understand the nature of our own beliefs as being a part of tradition.The key, determinant events in these narratives are `epistemological crises'.MacIntyre tries to makes the case that Thomism has hitherto best weathered the tests of time.

A major work of contemporary philosophy
This is a review of _Whose Justice? Which Rationality?_ by Alasdair MacIntyre.

This is a very challenging book to read, but also one that will deepen your thinking about the world, whether you agree with it or not.

We largely take it for granted that (1) people disagree significantly about a wide range of issues related to ethics, and that (2) people do not agree about enough standards of rationality to resolve these ethical disagreements.MacIntyre puts this by saying that "logical incompatibility and incommensurability" both obtain (p. 351).What conclusion should we draw from these facts?One common response is relativism, which is roughly the view that the truth or falsity of a claim depends on the perspective from which it is evaluated.However, MacIntyre argues against relativism based on a brilliant reinterpretation of several major Western philosophical traditions.

The Western Englightenment (of which Descartes is paradigmatic), rejected appeals to tradition, canonical texts and authority, and attempted to put in their place the "appeal to principles undeniable by any rational person," and hence independent of culture, history, etc."Yet both the thinkers of the Enlightenment and their successors proved unable to agree as to what precisely those principles were which could be found undeniable by all rational persons" (p. 6).Since the Enlightenment, most Western thinkers have either (1) continued to search for principles that are universally acceptable to all minimally rational humans (and continued to fail in this quest), or (2) given up on the quest for universal principles of reason, but -- paradoxically -- continued to assume the Enlightenment prejudice that any rational justification would have to be universal, ahistorical, and acultural.

MacIntyre suggests that neither approach has learned the lesson of the failure of the Enlightenment project, which is that any rational justification has to be parochial, historical and in a particular cultural context.

Since rational justification must be historical, the bearers of justification are not "theories" in the abstract, but embodied traditions.MacIntyre examines four sample traditions in this book (although he admits there are many more):the Aristotelian-Thomistic, the Augustinean, and those of the "Scottish Enlightenment" and modern liberalism.

Traditions like these can undergo "epistemological crises":situations in which a tradition, by its own standards, increasingly discloses "new inadequacies, hitherto unrecognized incoherences, and new problems for the solution of which there seem to be insufficient or no resources within the established fabric of belief" (p. 362).A tradition may find a way to survive such a crisis (as Thomas Aquinas helped Christianity to do by synthesizing Augustineanism and Aristotelianism), but it may also fail.And because the possibility of failure is there, relativism is false:a tradition can come to see that its claims are false even by its own standards.

Even if my tradition is not in an obvious crisis, I can realize that I have a rational justification for rejecting or modifying it.Suppose I am confronted with an alien intellectual tradition which is both incompatible and incommensurable with my own.Because the two are incompatible, I cannot simply agree with both traditions.But because of incommensurability, I cannot directly convince the adherents of the rival tradition that they are wrong (nor can they directly convince me).I can, however, learn to be "bilingual" in the two traditions.The Aristotelian can learn, for example, to "speak Confucian," as it were.Having done so, he occupies a special perspective, from which he may conclude that the Confucian worldview offers a superior interpretation of the strengths and weaknesses of his own tradition.Or he may conclude the opposite.Or he may conclude that some sort of synthesis is possible, which is superior to either one individually.For this reason also, relativism is not true, despite the fact that traditions are, when speaking one to the other, incommensurable:someone occupying one tradition *can* see that his views are fundamentally mistaken.

MacIntyre argues that, of the four traditions he considers in this book, three have entered inescapable epistemological crises, while one (the tradition of Thomas Aquinas) has answered all challenges so far.The bulk of the book is a history of the four traditions.If you want to get the outline of MacIntyre's view, I recommend chapters 1 (the intro), 7-8 (on Aristotle), 9 (on Augustine), 10-11 (on Aquinas's synthesis), 16 (on Hume), 17 (on liberalism), and 18-20 (MacIntyre's grand theory).

This is, of course, an easier book to read if you have read some previous philosophy (Thomas Kuhn's _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ is in the background of much of what MacIntyre says, even though he doesn't cite Kuhn very often), but a bright, motivated non-philosopher can read and greatly enjoy this book too.

Almost more trouble than it was worth
Why in the world did MacIntyre feel that he needed to provide a sequel to After Virtue, his magnum opus?Well, as he states in his introduction, his moral system demands a fuller account of rationality and justice.He givesa detailed historical exposition of justice and rationality in HomericGreece, Plato, and Aristotle then moving on to Augustine, Aquinas, and theScottish Enlightenment.The retelling of each of these viewpoints' ideason justice and rationality are lucid and breathtaking at times if you canstand MacIntyre's rather wordy writing style.

So how, in his mind, doeshis account of rationality and justice 'win?'It seems automatic to seeksome purely objective standard by which to weigh the arguments of each ofthese specific systems, but as MacIntyre points out, the mere idea of apurely objective standard is deeply embedded in the Enlightenmenttradition: a tradition which MacIntyre showed in "After Virtue"to be seriously flawed.Instead, the system first must be internallycoherent but second, and more importantly, must overcome epistimologicalcrises that it faces.A certain system gets into trouble if a rival systemcan better resolve the epistimological crises facing it.MacIntyre thinksthat the Aristotelian tradition, especially as embedded in Thomism, 'wins'by this account.While the sense of victory is not as obvious as in AfterVirtue, I think that MacIntyre has a coherent and reasonably compellingargument in his favor.

This book can be read in isolation, but is bestread after reading After Virtue, giving you a clearer idea of the problemthat MacIntyre is addressing.

Whose JusticeMWhich Rationality?
I,m not claer on the concepts of justice on this book of Macintyre .I need someone help me the clearity.Please!

a pivotal work
In another cogent examination of contemporary moral philosophy, Alasdair MacIntyre examines moral philosophies from the perspective of their bases.He points out the critical need to remember which frame of thought we arespeaking in. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (24)

A mad genius?
This is the kind of infuriating book that makes you wonder whether the author is on to something big, or whether he is simply a highly erudite purveyor of bunk. I suspect the former, but I can't rule out the latter either!

"After Virtue" is a sophisticated work of moral philosophy, historical criticism, and much else besides, and I readily admit that I haven't assimilated all its arguments.

At the same time, MacIntyre strikes the reader as a highly eclectic thinker, and this is what makes you wonder whether he has a point (everyone who rejects the current political scene en toto will bee seen as quaint or indeed eclectic - no matter whether he's right or wrong), or whether he is simply a confused intellectual stitching together what really can't be united. Indeed, one of the chapters of the book is titled "Nietzsche *or* Aristotle? Trotsky *and* St. Benedict". Benedict and...who? I also noticed that some of MacIntyre's followers call themselves revolutionary Aristotelians!

I don't think any review can give this book its due, so here I will only attempt the barest outline. MacIntyre is usually considered left-wing, and he does indeed criticize slavery, the subordination of women, and racism. He also has a soft spot for some Marxists, including Trotsky, whom he seems to regard as a closet critic of dogmatic Marxism. MacIntyre also rejects liberal capitalism, individualism and postmodernism. But in the name of what? After converting to Roman Catholicism, MacIntyre began to see the philosophy of Aristotle as a positive alternative, and some years after writing "After Virtue" he also embraced Thomism. He doesn't simply criticize postmodernity, but believes that the roots of our present-day intellectual confusion go back to the Enlightenment, and perhaps even further, to Protestantism, Jansenism and the thoughts of Machiavelli.

In MacIntyre's interpretation, Aristotelianism sees the moral virtues as connected to the social role of the individual as part of a broader community, a community which collectively strives towards the highest good for man. Man is seen as a creature with a telos, a purpose, and striving to fulfill this purpose is the very definition of being a "good man". This further means that one can derive an "ought" from an "is" through a rational analysis of man's telos. Thus, man is not an ostensibly free individual disconnected from his social roles and functions. There is no real identity for man apart from such roles and functions (the author attacks existentialism on this point, which claims the opposite). Nor is man a creature that can freely choose any goal whatever - or rather, he can so choose, but the consequences are the confusion, anomie and meaninglessness characteristic of our times. MacIntyre's communitarian or collectivist angle rules out liberal capitalism, and the idea that one can indeed derive an "ought" from an "is" collides head-long with most modern moral philosophers from Hume onwards.

During the Enlightenment, according to MacIntyre, the Aristotelian notion of a telos was dispensed with, creating a contradictory moral philosophy where the private strivings of each individual were dualistically opposed to a non-teleological morality no longer based in human nature, but coming from outside in the form of abstract, general rules. Even later, philosophers like G.E. Moore claimed that "the good" cannot be defined at all and is graspable only by a nebulous intuition, and this eventually opened the door to dispensing with any moral language or knowledge whatsoever. Modern philosophers who hark back to Hume or Kant can't solve the problem either, since their systems still lack the teleological link between the individual as he is and the moral rules as they ought to be. The only alternatives to our present sorry state are Nietzsche or Aristotle. Either boldly embrace the void and the Übermensch, or restore the classical and medieval understanding of the virtues and teleology.

Are you with me so far? ;-)

The book also contains a criticism of bureaucratic managers, social planners, and social scientists. Here and there, the author also takes on Marxism (despite a nostalgic residue of Marxism in his own worldview). MacIntyre believes that the social sciences cannot predict human behaviour, that humans are by nature unpredictable, and that all bureaucratic planning will therefore inevitably fail. He also emphasizes the role of intentions and ideas in history, thus criticizing the Marxist notion that purely material factors are decisive in history. Of course, this idea exists even outside Marxist circles. Still, there is something uncannily "Marxist" about his book. When MacIntyre describes the Aristotelian position, he says that man should expand his creative and productive powers, this being part of the human telos. But isn't this simply a Marxist notion projected onto Aristotle, who rather saw the contemplative life of the philosopher as the highest goal of man?

Since I haven't read MacIntyre's later works, which are elaborations of "After Virtue", I cannot really offer a meaningful criticism of his book. Still, what needs to be elaborated includes the exact meaning of the virtues (what exactly is "justice" anyway?), their rational or empirical derivation (how do we know that MacIntyre's definitions of "justice" are true?), and a more elaborate political line (what on earth could "Trotsky and St. Benedict" possibly mean?). Also, it will be interesting to see how MacIntyre squares Neo-Darwinism with the notion of human teleology. Finally, if human behavior is unpredictable, how can we know what the objective human purpose actually is?

Naturally, I have ordered several of the author's later works...

In the meantime, I will give this book five stars, not necessarily because I agree with all of it, but because of it's level of interest and erudition. A mad genius? Or just mad? The jury is still out.

Slow and rather painful reading--which is too bad because it's an interesting theory
Albeit MacIntyre is among the worst writers to grace political philosophy shelves, he makes some interesting arguments following in the Anti-Enlightenment tradition of Burke and Devlin, notably, as well as others. Be prepared for slow, dense, often nearly nonsensically convoluted writing that is very hard to pick apart to understand what he's saying, but you will also gain valuable exposure to MacIntyre's really original, interesting arguments.

The Anti-Enlightenment school of thought rejects most of the Enlightenment's basic assumptions. It refutes the facts that rationality is a solid foundation for political/moral decisions, that the two essential tenets of the Enlightenment, individual rights and the reliance on science, are reconcilable, and that individual rights exist at all, for which there is no empirical evidence. Earlier writers like Burke and Devlin held that traditional social convention is a good moral foundation, while MacIntyre doesn't so much advocate social traditions as he does the importance of social context.

MacIntyre has an intricate and, in my opinion, rather complicated theory here. Although I only did the portions of the book that I was assigned in class, I would not really have understood what was going on if I hadn't had an accompanying series of lectures about the theory. If you are assigned this reading, set aside substantial time to get it done. If you just want to read it for pleasure, realize that at times it will be arduous and slow. It is somewhat interesting, but definitely impractical and not at all riveting, perhaps due to the pretty awful writing.

Philosophy and History
MacIntyre's book is very clear and well written.Without for a moment slipping into the contemporary trap of "relativism" he explores how an understanding of context is necessary to understanding a philosophers work.This necessary link between history and philosophy forces an acceptance that the development of new philosophical ideas may indicate and/or cause the loss of certain societal characteristics.The title gives this away...

A feeble effort to justify feudal aristocracy
Continuing in the line of communitarian know-it-all savants like Karl Marx, who is better at describing a problem than solving it, MacIntyre displays a dazzling grasp of the short comings of the Western liberal tradition that brought us such things as the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. However, once he tries to introduce his alternative, his "traditionalism project" quickly degenerates into logical absurdities and ridiculous posturing.
He should be embarrassed to claim the "good watch" example of clerical logic. Not only is his logic purely instrumental and manipulative, but when he tries to extend it to a "good farmer" he begins to incorporate extraneous standards of value. To say that a good farmer wins lots of prizes at agricultural shows is simply to defer to another judicial body - the ag show judges. To say that a good farmer has the best soil renewal program is the beg the question, "who decides what a good soil renewal program is?" (A soil renewal program could have different levels of effectiveness depending on whether the proposed crop was grapes or tobacco.) Even worse, by the "good watch" instrumental logic, a "good woman" would be, take your pick, (1) the one who has the most babies, (2) the one who has intercourse with the most men, etc.
MacIntyre's implied assertion that Athens had a rational basis for moral analysis flies in the face of "The Trial of Socrates" and the dramas of Sophocles ("Antigone," for example). The truth is that pagan "classical" societies were just as turbulent and roiled as current society.
MacIntyre's pretense at philosophical objectivity based on Aristotelian ethics is thin and transparent. It is clear that MacIntyre's real quarrel would be more honestly directed at Luther, Calvin, Milton and the Protestant Reformation. Like Osama Ben Laden, who raves about the tragedy of Andalucia (where Islam was driven out of Western Europe in the 1490s) MacIntyre secretly longs for a return to the days before Galileo, when the Roman church was the final arbiter of all things - mandating an image of earth as the center of concentric crystaline spheres which separate mankind from heaven.
MacIntyre has a pathetic longing for a life governed by well defined instrumental virtues of inherited social position set in a feudal aristocratic social order. It's too bad that this inclination leads one to spend one's life in a fruitless effort to justify the dark ages of Europe. This book will sell best to readers who prefer a rigid social hierarchy based on a a chicken yard pecking order of physical strength. Following that model for society, it wouldn't be long before we returned of world of warlords, whose violent and vicious sycophants would prowl around in large pickup trucks on which would be mounted 50 caliber machine guns. These vehicles were known as "technicals" in Somalia in 1992 - which I guess is the ideal world of Alasdair MacIntyre.

A Must-Read Groundbreaking Treatise of Our Civilization's Thought
Alasdair MacIntyre effectively illustrates the greatest moral problems facing our culture today-- problems hundreds of years in the making and with roots beyond mere partisan debate. Written in relatively clear, necessarily precise philosophical language, one can easily understand MacIntyre's arguments and in so doing will understand why the western world has become what it is today and why it must change.Read it. ... Read more

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MacIntyre is one of the major British philosophers of the post-war years. He is a convert to Roman Catholicism. Edith Stein was an intellectual of considerable importance in the period between the two World Wars, also canonised as a Saint. A Jewish convert to Catholicism, she died in the gas chambers of Auschwitz. Stein's published essays focused largely on the structure of the person and a careful articulation of the essential nature of community and its basis in our nature as persons. MacIntyre looks at Stein as both a theologian and philosopher, and reveals many of the fundamental issues in both disciplines. ... Read more

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Edith Stein lived an unconventional life. Born into a devout Jewish family, she drifted into atheism in her mid teens, took up the study of philosophy, studied with Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, became a pioneer in the women's movement in Germany, a military nurse in World War I, converted from atheism to Catholic Christianity, became a Carmelite nun, was murdered at Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1942, and canonized by Pope John Paul II. ... Read more

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How should we respond when some of our basic beliefs are put into question? What makes a human body distinctively human? Why is truth an important good? These are among the questions explored in this collection of essays by Alasdair MacIntyre, one of the most creative and influential philosophers working today. Ten of MacIntyre's most influential essays written over almost thirty years are collected together here for the first time. They range over such topics as the issues raised by different types of relativism, what it is about human beings that cannot be understood by the natural sciences, the relationship between the ends of life and the ends of philosophical writing, and the relationship of moral philosophy to contemporary social practice. They will appeal to a wide range of readers across philosophy and especially in moral philosophy, political philosophy, and theology. ... Read more

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Alasdair MacIntyre's writings on ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of the social sciences and the history of philosophy have established him as one of the philosophical giants of the last fifty years. His best-known book, After Virtue (1981), spurred the profound revival of virtue ethics.Moreover, MacIntyre, unlike so many of his contemporaries, has exerted a deep influence beyond the bounds of academic philosophy.This volume focuses on the major themes of MacIntyre's work with critical expositions of MacIntyre's views on the history of philosophy, the role of tradition in philosophical inquiry, the philosophy of the social sciences, moral philosophy, political theory, and his critique of the assumptions and institutions of modernity. Written by a distinguished roster of philosophers, this volume will have a wide appeal outside philosophy to students in the social sciences, law, theology, and political theory.Mark C. Murphy is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University.He is author of Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge, 2001) and An Essay on Divine Authority (Cornell, 2002), as well as of a number of articles on natural law theory, political obligation, and Hobbes' moral, political, and legal philosophy.His papers have appeared in Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Nous, Faith and Philosophy, Law and Philosophy, American Philosophical Quarterly, the Thomist, and elsewhere. ... Read more

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A new edition of a classic philosophical inquiry into psychoanalysis and the Freudian notion of the unconscious, by one of the foremost contemporary philosophers in the world, with a substantial new preface by the author. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Genealogical Narrative
Alasdair MacIntyre's First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues was the Aquinas lecture in 1990 at Marquette University. This is related to his argument in After Virtue that modern philosophy has very literally lost its way, and the problems it faces are insoluble. The difficulties are twofold, and stem from the Cartesian turn to the self in the XVith century. Modern philosophy cannot reestablish contact with the outside world when our starting point is self-knowledge, and modern philosophy also cannot accept that any principle could be 'first' in any absolute sense of the word, because final causality has been rejected.

MacIntyre rightly claims that Thomism does not suffer these defects, but he cautions against a premature victory, because Thomism has been decisively rejected by modern philosophy and modern science, so that there is no chance of effective dialogue between Thomism and other traditions. The very vocabulary of Thomism is a stumbling block. However, modern philosophy has not been able to completely eliminate the Aristotelian roots of all philosophy and science, and so keeps returning to themes that it cannot adequately address.

Thus MacIntyre proposes to use the tools of modern philosophies, such as the genealogical narrative, to help reconnect modern philosophy and Thomism. A historical approach might make the rejection, and the reasons for it, evident, and allow fruitful dialogue by allowing for the fruits of modern philosophy to be discussed in a context that will allow them to finally flourish. Essentially, the goal is to enable contemporary philosophy to become more itself by freeing it from the tension created by the premises that cast doubt upon the philosophical enterprise. ... Read more

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The work of Soren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) has recently been the subject of new interpretations. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the prolific Dane’s notion of ethics implies an arbitrary leap of faith. In this lively forum, scholars respond to MacIntyre and further explore his ideas. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Reclaiming Kierkegaard from the "irrational."
It is easy to misunderstand such a subtle philosopher as Kierkegaard. From his cryptic style and pseudonymns creeps a message heavily veiled, and best understood by a select view. Both "existentialism" and "irrational" become easily misused buzz words far too often applied to Kierkegaard. This book argues that such has been the case with Alasdair MacIntyre in his book AFTER VIRTUE. Fortunately, those who seem most on the mark in their interpretations of Kierkegaard have been gathered here in this collection of essays defending Kierkegaard against MacIntyre's claims that Kierkegaard is an irrational fedeist. KIERKEGAARD AFTER MACINTYRE is a brilliant and responsible exposition of the depths and intricacies of "the father of existentialism" by, whom I believe to be, the most "well-versed" Kierkegaardian scholars. Most helpful in this book was the light it shed on the influence both Kant and Artistotle had on Kierkegaard's conception of the self and decision-making, and the importance of understanding what are Kierekgaard's thoughts through all the pseudonymity...especially when it comes to his writings on the Judge and the Aesthete in Either/Or.

The book is highly enjoyable with concise essays that make their points while citing the various passages of Kierkegaard. One can easily check their refences if one is skeptical of the context. And what I enjoyed most was the fairness of the book. MacIntyre himself ends the collection of essays, and has the last words in response to the book's claims that he has radically misunderstood Kierkegaard. A good read and a definite must for anyone who wants to stay on top of the issues at hand in Kierkegaardian scholarship. ... Read more

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This volume explores the common ground between Marxism and Christianity. It argues that Marxism shares in good measure both the content and functions of Christianity and does so because it inherits it from Christianity. It details the religious attitudes and modes of belief that appear in Marxism as it developed historically from the philosophies of Hegel and Feuerbach, and as it has been carried on by its latter-day interpreters from Rosa Luxemberg and Trotsky to Kautsky and Lukacs. It sets out to show that Marxism, no less than Christianity, is subject to the historical relativity that affects all ideologies. This new edition has been updated to take account of the collapse of Communism in the former Eastern bloc and whether Marxism, in particular, is still relevant to those who seek a changed social order today. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

Christian Criticism of Vulgar Marxism
Alasdair MacIntyre's "Marxism and Christianity"(1968) is a rewritten concise summary and reflection upon the intellectual history of Marxism as it developed from Hegelian theories of alienation in Marx's early manuscripts to an economic and political doctrine in his later life, and the theoretical and practical difficulties which theoretical Marxism has suffered since then. Although the book's title alludes to Christianity, MacIntyre rarely discusses the historical relationship of Christians and Marxists, except for the use of juxtaposing the similarities and differences of the two ideological camps. MacIntyre claims to have written the first edition of this book in 1968 at the young age of 23 before substantially rewriting it for a later edition, and there appears a noticeable appreciation, fondness, and concern for the historical marginalization of both Christianity and Marxism, which he compares unflattering to liberal democracy and late-modern capitalism.MacIntyre's principal concern in this book is his concern for the distortion and vulgarization of Marxism, which he writes of as the only coherent and hopeful political ideology which has ever succeeded inmobilizing broad support to remedy the deficiencies of capitalism. He employs comparisons to Christianity primarily to criticize the ethical and methodological deficiencies of Marxist politics and ideological mutation. The majority(100 of 144 pages) of the book is concerned to summarize and comment upon the intellectual development of Marxism from Hegel's antitheological writings, the Left Hegelians, and early Marx to later Marx and subsequent Marxist ideology. This is the weakest and most tedious section of the book as it, despite a good attempt by MacIntyre to skip from subject to subject, cannot adequately address this immense subject with any depth or clarity.In the concluding and by far most interesting chapter of the book, MacIntyre's distinct dissatisfaction with liberal democracy is apparent and, although he does not offer an alternative, he appears to hope for the rectification of either Marxism or Christianity. In this aspiration, it seems his subsequent writings would indicate that he chose the latter Thomistic Christian tradition.

Emphasis on Marx's social critique
The emphasis in this book was on the social side of Marxism. Some seeds of political wisdom were there, even when at times I thought it contained too much babble about certain individuals' philosophical views.

The real problem under modern days' disorderly capitalism is that the true workers lose their understanding of their own contribution to society. And this in turn leads to the ever widening gap between the rich property owners and the poor workers. Man is turning himself into a commodity.

We are like witless animals donating our personal power to external forces. And the more estranged individuals become from their own essential being, the more also will the mankind become estranged from what is true humanity. Even the moral laws are being externalized in form of some abstract written laws, which only too often contradicts with the benefit of the society.

(Published 1st in 1968. The reviewed edition: 2001, 9780715626733)

Marxism from a master Hegelian
Mac Intyre is always worth reading. This is a slim volume, and despite thetitle, contains little concerning Christianity. Mainly the book serves asan overview of modern Marxism from a sympathetic vantage point.Importantly, the author finds certain key areas of overlap between Marxismand Christianity. At a philosophical level, he believes Marx takes overHegel's reworking of core Christian themes and turns them into asecularized version of history and the millenium. Moreover, Mac Intyre seesin Marxian practice a paradox: a tendency to perpetuate proto-religiousphenomena in what at times seem like cultish practices, such as Stalin'scult of the personality.More substantially, he sees a pervasive ambiguityin Marx's writings between determinism and voluntarism. In short, just howmuch difference does the "human factor" make in the shaping of history, aquestion that, in Mac Intyre's view, Marx was never able to resolve.

Hebelieves Christianity and Marxism share a key objection tomodernliberalism, the dominantideology of our age. Liberalism systematicallyseparates fact from value: facts are one kind of thing, values are another,and there is no logical connection between them. Therefore, the individualis sovereign in deciding what to do and not do, because the world does notimply any one set of values to live by.For both Christians and Marxists,knowledge of the world and its order leads to self-knowledge and theability to avoid predictable frustrations. Knowledge thus becomes aprerquisite to formative action that is valid not just for one person(liberalism), but for all people. At its best Marxism, like Christianity,functions as a relentless critic of society's reigning illusions - aconclusion not uncongenial to Hegel's philosophy of spiritualprogression.Thus the author remains a leading Christian Hegelian in thiswork as well as in others. ... Read more