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Citation Details
Title: Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Nature, Course Notes from the College de France.(Book review)
Author: Leonard Lawlor
Publication: The Review of Metaphysics (Magazine/Journal)
Date: March 1, 2006
Publisher: Thomson Gale
Volume: 59Issue: 3Page: 663(2)

Article Type: Book review

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Product Description
Until now, ethicists have said little about the body, limiting their comments on it to remarks made in passing or, at best, devoting a chapter to the subject. Embodied Care is the first work to argue for the body's centrality to care ethics, doing so by analyzing our corporeality at the phenomenological level. It develops the idea that our bodies are central to our morality, paying particular attention to the ways we come to care for one another. Hamington's argues that human bodies are "built to care"; as a result, embodiment must be recognized as a central factor in moral consideration. He takes the reader on an exciting journey from modern care ethics to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body and then to Jane Addams's social activism and philosophy. The ideas in Embodied Care do not lead to yet another competing theory of morality; rather, they progress through theory and case studies to suggest that no theory of morality can be complete without a full consideration of the body. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Sense & Non-Sense
Quick transaction, item to detail. I was very pleased getting it before my seminar started. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Merleau-Ponty's argument for phenomenology
I would like to begin by saying I agree with Idiosyncrat in regard to the importance of this work for understanding Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as a whole.

I would like to add some reasons why I consider this particular work important especially for those who are interested in phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty was a phenomenologist in the tradition of Husserl and Heidegger. The path Merleau-Ponty follows to phenomenology, especially in The Structure of Behavior, is, however, unique.

I.

Phenomenology as a general approach to philosophical questions begins with the work of Husserl. Merleau-Ponty belongs to this tradition to the degree that he uses the methods of phenomenology and phenomenological analysis in approaching philosophical problems. But there are some differences in approach between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

Unlike Husserl, Merleau-Ponty does not begin his analysis in The Structure of Behavior with a `phenomenological reduction' and he does not attempt to offer, at first, any philosophical arguments for the adoption of the transcendental (or phenomenological) attitude. Merleau-Ponty also does not choose to begin his analysis with "consciousness" as Husserl does, but with behavior which Merleau-Ponty believes is neutral in regard to the classical distinctions between 'mental' and 'physical' (pg. 4). This means that Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, will ultimately ground his phenomenology at a deeper (existential) level, as opposed to merely analyzing explicit, or theoretical, acts of consciousness.

Merleau-Ponty summarizes the uniqueness of his method best in his Phenomenology of Perception. He writes, "we shall take objective thought on its own terms and not ask it any questions which it does not ask itself. If we are led to rediscover experience behind it, this shift of ground will be attributable only to the difficulties which objective thought itself raises" (pg. 83). This is the method that I think is unique to Merleau-Ponty. Husserl is looking for an apodictic ground for philosophy, and Heidegger is interested in the question of the meaning of Being. Neither of these questions are questions which objective thought asks itself but require a more radical form of reflection (which may be motivated for its own reasons). Merleau-Ponty will only adopt the transcendental, or phenomenological, standpoint after objective thought has led itself into a number of aporias which it is unable to solve on its own. He will begin by simply taking objective thought on its own terms.

In order to take objective thought on its own terms Merleau-Ponty chooses to begin The Structure of Behavior with an analysis of the scientific theories of behavior themselves, rather than with some version of the phenomenological reduction. The Structure of Behavior analyzes these theories in some detail as well as the reasons for their failures.

There are a number of reasons that the scientific theories Merleau-Ponty examines fail to make behavior and perception intelligible; they treat behavior as based on a one way causal relation between stimulus and response, they believe that the stimulus acts on the organism through its own absolute properties as opposed to its place within a larger whole (or Gestalt), they attempt to build up complex behavior from simple reflexes, and they fail to perceive the immanent meaning within behavior treating it instead as meaningless mechanical reflexes built up through conditioning.

All of these failures are ultimately reducible to the fact that all of these theories base themselves on an inadequate ontology which treats consciousness as transparent self-presence and nature as purely external partes extra partes. Merleau-Ponty will take up the task of elaborating a more adequate ontology in his later works (Phenomenology of Perception, and The Visible and the Invisible); but his later work largely takes the conclusions of this work for granted. So this is a very important work for those who are interested in Merleau-Ponty and his unique method of phenomenology.

[As a sidenote: I should point out that Merleau-Ponty is not rejecting science. In The World of Perception he writes, "The question which [contemporary phenomenological] philosophy asks in relation to science is not intended to contest its right to exist or to close off any particular avenue to its inquiries. Rather, the question is whether science does, or ever could, present us with a picture of the world that is complete, self-sufficient and somehow closed in upon itself, such that there could no longer be any meaningful questions outside this picture" (pg. 43)]

IV.

And as one final note. A number of the reviewers have also drawn attention to the fact that this is a very dense book. That is definitely true. The Structure of Behavior is full of references to physiologists most of whom wrote in German or French and so are inaccessible to those of us who do not speak those languages. For those undertaking this book I would strongly suggest reading Gestalt Psychology by Wolfgang Kohler, and The Organism by Kurt Goldstein along with this book. I found those books extremely helpful in my attempts to understand Merleau-Ponty's text. I would also suggest Koffka's Principles of Gestalt Psychology if you have time (I have not had time myself yet, but it is one of the works that Merleau-Ponty references regularly and you should be able to get a used copy in English).

-Brian

Haunting questions
Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behavior is a dense text book on clinical biology. One has to be astonished at the range of his scholarship having read his books on other subjects. By "behavior" he is mostly talking about animal behavior. He has only thrown in one or two references to inauthentic human behavior. I see Merleau-Ponty as a thinker who fought hard for the notion that human beings are not merely mechanical objects. It doesn't quite come across here. If we are going to study stimulus reaction tell us why carnival rides grab our erogenous zones or how young boys can be physically aroused around females before they know the facts of life. The book left me with other troubling thoughts. Should what the Nazis learned in their clincal studies be off limits? Where are the moral limits to research?

Essential for understanding his second book
Merleau-Ponty is far better known for his second book, the monumental Phenomenology of Perception.The Structure of Behavior is an earlier stab at the same themes, and its philosophical views are less developed than on the latter work.

Does this make it optional reading for those seeking to understand Merleau-Ponty?Not at all.In the first two chapters of Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty discusses and critiques the major currents of theoretical psychology in his time (Behaviorism and Gestalttheorie), at a level of detail far beyond that which he does in the Phenomenology of Perception.In fact, in the initial chapters of the latter work, he repeatedly refers the reader to the earlier one's discussion of psychology.While the Phenomenology of Perception is justly celebrated for its engagement with the facts and findings of empirical psychology, it surprisingly does not reveal Merleau-Ponty's knowledge of the discipline like the present book does.

In short, students of his latter work will do very well to read at least the first chapter of this book, probably the first two.One will find it much easier to understand his psychological background after reading them.

A psychologist's philosopher
Merleau-Ponty's background in psychology is evident in this wonderful yet dense volume. Merleau-Ponty begins a critique of psychology that starts by questioning the assumption of the reflex in psychophysiology, continues, byquestioning Pavlovian reflexology, and culminates with a view of behavioras comprised of transummative orders. In reaching this conclusion,Merleau-Ponty recapitulates the Gestalt psychology notion of a whole beinggreater than its parts. Readers and scholars should find a great deal inMerleau-Ponty that can be related to John Dewey, G.H. Mead, and J.J.Gibson. The scholar willing to undertake the project of tracing the linesof thinking emanating from Gestalt Psychology's turn-of-the-centuryinfluence will find Merleau-Ponty a towering figure whose work cannot beignored. ... Read more

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The world was first introduced to the expertise and originalityof Japanese scholars in phenomenology in Analecta HusserlianaVol. IX (1979). The third generation of Japanese scholars, belongingto the newly-founded Merleau-Ponty Japanese Circle, are now presented.Following Merleau-Ponty's tendency, the studies collected here seem tomake a fresh phenomenological start in relation to classicalHusserlian phenomenology, turning deliberately towards the `concrete',`the wild world', `flesh', `embodiment', `natural signs', `primalnature'. The rule of intentionality, natural language is therebydevalued.
The wealth of insights, the freshness of intuition and the seminalpower of these fascinating enquiries well merit a close reading. ... Read more

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Phenomenology or Deconstruction? contains new readings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul RicÂœur, and Jean-Luc Nancy. Jacques Derrida's engagement with phenomenological themes generates a new understanding of "being" and "presence" that exposes significant blindspots in traditional readings of both phenomenology and deconstruction. In reproducing neither a stock phenomenological reaction to deconstruction nor the routine deconstructive reading of phenomenology, Christopher Watkin provides a fresh assessment of the future of phenomenology along with a new reading of the deconstructive legacy. Through careful studies of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, RicÂœur, and Nancy, Watkin shows how a phenomenological tradition much wider and richer than Husserl or Heidegger takes into account Derrida's critique of ontology while maintaining a commitment to the ontological. This new reading fundamentally recasts the relation between deconstruction and phenomenology and marks the first sustained discussion of the possibilities and problems for future "deconstructive phenomenology."

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More than sixty years ago, Simone de Beauvoir identified the importance of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's writings to feminist theory. His exploration of the relationship between the body and the space it inhabits is key to modern phenomenological thinking. But there has been little agreement on how Merleau-Ponty's ideas ultimately have an impact on feminist philosophy. Does his emphasis on physical subjectivity lend a certain agency to all bodies, regardless of sex? Or do Merleau-Ponty's specific descriptions of physical experience betray an intrinsic bias toward a male heterosexual point of view? The essays presented here by Olkowski and Weiss attempt to situate Merleau-Ponty in the larger context of feminist theory, while impartially evaluating his contributions, both positive and negative, to that theory. ... Read more

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TEXTS AND DIALOGUES contains essays, interviews, and exchanges by one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century.It is now available for the first time in English translation, accompanied by contemporary evaluations of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical activities, an introduction by the editors, and a comprehensive Merleau-Ponty bibliography.

"Merleau-Ponty's concept of perception provided a platform not only for criticising the prejudices of 'classical' thought, but also for a vast range of writings on politics (from an unaligned 'revolutionary socialist' standpoint), literature, and art.[This book] functions like an ideal biography.It gives us a sense of Merleau-Ponty in his 'carnal singularity'; and it makes you realise how desperately sad it is that in 1961, when he was in his early fifties, and full of plans and hopes, he died." -- Jonathan Ree, "Radical Philosophy"

"What we find in these pieces that span Merleau-Ponty's career is a philosopher coming to terms with social and political shifts, intellectual currents, and the movements of history in the midst of which he found himself." -- Wayne J. Froman, "Canadian Philosophical Review"

"The introduction...provides the best intellectual biography of Merleau-Ponty currently available in English.It is comprehensive, highly condensed, and affords the reader a capsule vision of Merleau-Ponty's development as a thinker." -- M.C. Dillon, Distinguished Teaching Professor, SUNY, Binghamton

"Maurice Merleau-Ponty commented widely, in journals and weeklies, on major issues in politics and major shifts in post-war European culture.He was so scrupulously informed on what he wrote about, with vigor and originality, that many of these writings have hardly dated and will enrich the debates of today.This volume also contains some evaluations Merleau-Ponty made of, and positions he took with regard to, the philosophical writings of his contemporaries.These shed significant light on his own published books of philosophy." -- Alphonso Lingis, Professor of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University

"Among the recent books on Merleau-Ponty, this one will prove most useful and interesting, revealing unknown aspects of his thought, further clarifying his philosophy.It is also important because these works are not otherwise available, even in French." -- M.R. Barral, "Choice"

"The writings of Merleau-Ponty contained in this volume span the entire length of his philosophical career from 1933 to 1960 . . . TEXTS AND DIALOGUES is an indispensable book for anybody seeking a serious knowledge of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical itinerary, as well as for the grain of his voice that we hear throughout." -- Bernard Flynn, "Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal" ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

A Dialectic without Dreams
Merleau-Ponty is generally read for his work in phenomenology, not his work on dialectics. This is both a pity and a mistake. While he certainly does deserve to be remembered as the third great phenomenologist of the past century, after Husserl & Heidegger, his being forgotten as a dialectical thinker is almost inexplicable.

I say almost inexplicable because, I fear, the reason he is ignored as a dialectical thinker is because he advocated, and superbly demonstrated, a dialectic without myths, utopia or dreams. In the great chapter (2) on Lukacs he says, "[t]he dialectic is this continued intuition, a consistent reading of actual history, the re-establishment of the tormented relations, of the interminable exchanges, between subject and object. There is only one knowledge, which is the knowledge of our world in a state of becoming, and this becoming embraces knowledge itself." He speaks of interminable exchanges, implies the permanence of tormented relations, affirms that knowledge always becomes. This is a dialectic scraped clean of the utopianism of the Marxist classless society, contemptuous of some miraculous Kojevean 'End of History', sans any vain 'Hegelian' promise of some never-never land in which Science will precisely equal Wisdom.

So then why dialectic, or, more precisely, why use the dialectical method if it offers no goal? Immediately after the sentences quoted above M-P says, "[b]ut it is knowledge that teaches us this." The dialectic, as M-P understands it, gives us, better - can give us, an understanding of history, and our present, but as to the future it promises exactly nothing. How could it promise more? If becoming, and the unknown, press on us forever, every totalization is always in danger of being threatened by some unanticipated contingency that changes this totalization into some unpredicted, and above all, unpredictable (until it occurs) Other.

By way of contrast let me now mention that for Hegel, finally, one could say that Dialectic remained a retrospective method and not a predictive science - at least until the precise end of the dialectical process. "The Owl of Minerva takes flight only at night." But, for Hegel, I think it is correct to say that when Subject and Object become One, Forever, we will be able to say that the all-knowing owl is always flying because the Absolute (Spirit) is always dark. We now perhaps better understand the content of the Hegelian characterization of (and objection to) the early position of Schelling - as a 'night in which all cows are black' - this position wasn't wrong; it was merely premature. Thus at the extreme end of Hegelian theory, one is always in danger of seeing it toppling over into the Kojevean 'End of History' position, which M-P in the epilogue characterizes as an idealization of death.

M-P holds, in this book, that this is not the position of Marx and Lukacs. "In Marx spirit becomes a thing, while things become saturated with spirit. History's course is a becoming of meanings transformed into forces or institutions. This is why there is an inertia of history in Marx and also an appeal to human invention in order to complete the dialectic. Marx cannot therefore transfer to, and lay to the account of, matter the same rationality which Hegel ascribes to spirit." Hegel is pleased to be taken to mean that Spirit is an active helpful partner of humanity in dialectic; a materialist dialectic can make no such claims of matter. What Merleau-Ponty, btw, is here denying, for those who have ears, is that there can be an end to any genuine material dialectic. ...Matter itself is permanently, in every human sense, an irrational factor. In other words, being and reason can never be one. Whatever Rationality in things we find - we find it there because we put it there. "Marxism cannot hide the Welt-geist in matter." Dialectic in which a dialectical partner is permanently non-rational becomes a science of circumstances. Thus M-P maintains that for Lukacs (and, I think, himself) that only revolutionary creativity can `guarantee' "a coherent and homogenous system."

...But no system is permanent. "A dialectical conception demands only that, between capitalism, where it exists, and its antecedents, be one of an integrated society to a less integrated one." By more integrated M-P means a more `socialized' society, societies in which, since there is more common ground, "destinies can be compared." It is ultimately here in social interaction that, for M-P, dialectical knowledge arises. But, as indicated earlier, nothing is guaranteed. "The principle of the logic of history is not that all problems posed are solved in advance, that the solution precedes the problem, or that there would be no question if the answer did not pre-exist somewhere, as if history were built on exact ideas. One should rather formulate it negatively: there is no event which does not bring further precision to the permanent problem of knowing what man and his society are..." One is here tempted to say that M-P here answers two of the questions we asked at the beginning of the review. Why resort to the method of dialectic? - It brings (or exposes a) further precision to our knowledge of the problem of man. Why no certain Telos, no end to history, no grand finale that finds Science and Wisdom in permanent embrace? - The "problem of knowing what man and his society are" is permanent.

For M-P the problems of society reside only in human history; neither spirit nor matter will save us. "The sense of history is then threatened at every step with going astray and constantly needs to be reinterpreted." "There is less a sense of history than an elimination of non-sense." Oh, and this indeed would be the 'reason' M-P, the dialectical thought of M-P, was forgotten. A dialectic, shorn of fairy tale, certainty or reward, would attract none of our scholarly saints, or even our Leninist `realists.' Over the last two centuries there have been only three reasons, often entwined, to turn to dialectic; the pursuit of Knowledge, the pursuit of utopia/revolution, or the pursuit ofsome always obscure inner `intuition' or joy. ...Apparently, given the way M-P is ignored by Hegelian and Marxist dialecticians, the only pursuit that was decisive was the last.

This has only been a brief commentary on a small slice, a handful of pages, of this superb book, that, I hope, will make others interested enough to read it. The discussions of Weber, Lukacs, Trotsky and Sartre are all excellent. M-P is a political philosopher who deserves to be read along with the great and important political philosophers of the 20th century: Georg Lukacs, Antonio Gramsci, Hannah Arendt, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss. Ignore any of them and increase your ignorance. ... Read more

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Philosopher Merleau-Ponty's rebuttal to psychological and psychiatric theories of behaviorism. First American Edition. ... Read more