Book Description
"The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects," writes John Searle, "in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false." One of the world's most eminent thinkers, Searle dismantles these theories as he presents a vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind. He begins with a look at the twelve problems of philosophy of mind--which he calls "Descartes and Other Disasters"--problems which he returns to throughout the volume, as he illuminates such topics as materialism, consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, mental causation, free will, and the self. The book offers a refreshingly direct and engaging introduction to one of the most intriguing areas of philosophy. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (13)

Good Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind
I used this book to teach a course in the philosophy of human nature and I loved it. Searle touts his brand of philosophy in this work called "biological naturalism." It is the view that all of our conscious states arise from neurobiological processes. The book is also an introduction to the common problems in philosophy of mind. But you better come prepared for a somewhat technical (in some places) discussion of free will, mental causation and the mind-body problem. As usual, however, Searle is crystal clear in his explanations and arguments. Moreover, he appears to be pretty convincing in his refutations of materialism. This book is informative and a pretty good read.

Good introduction to the topic, but his own theories are flawed
This book served as my introduction to the mind/body problem, and his introductory material (the first 100 pages or so) was actually quite decent.He explained the issues, gave the differing views on the issues, and was rather comprehensive and fair for the most part.The only complaints I had about that section were (1) that he often gave the reader the bare minimum of information and left the reader to figure out what it meant instead of giving a clear example of what he was saying (the issues he was discussing were ofter very difficult to understand, and I would have to read a section and sit and think about it for five minutes to figure out what exactly he was saying, when he could easily have given examples to significantly speed up the process), and (2) I think he unfairly dismissed dualism without really giving many reasons why it was not correct.I agree that there are significant problems with dualism, but I think his treatment of it was far too brief and not especially fair.

The rest of the book, however, was not so great.The position he takes is called non-reductive physicalism.This means that he thinks the mind is nothing but physical processes but is not reducuble to physical processes.The whole rest of the book is about how this theory explains things like consciousness, free will, etc.The two main problems I had with this part of the book are far more significant than those I had with the first part.They are (1) the failure to adequately explain how a mind which is entirely physical processes can escape being reduced to physical processes, and (2) his section on free will.

The reason he wishes to escape reducing the mind to physical processes is that if we do that we are left with determinism.Everything we think, and thus do, is then reduced to the outcome of physical processes leaving no room for free will.The problem is that Searle offers no legitimate explanation of how we escape reductionism if the mind is "just physical processes" (that is exactlty how Searly says it).Other non-reductive physicalists like Nancy Murphy do go into detailed explanations (which I find unconvincing as well), but Searle just passes it off as plausable then moves on, effectively skirting the issue by changing the topic to how this theory explains mental phenomenon like free will.

The problem with that is that when he gets to free will, he is forced to admit that his system does not seem able to account for free will, so he calls it a mystery and appeals to quantum mechanics.He acknowledges that randomness does not amount to freedom (which many who advocate quantum mechanics as the basis of free will fail to acknowledge, so at least it's a step forward), but he is forced to look there for help because, as he notes, it is the only non-determined field of science we know about.Since he has already decided that nothing non-physical can be a part of our minds, he is left with no choice but a listless appeal to quantum mechanics, though he openly admits he has no idea how this solves anything and that it does not really seem to work.Perhaps this is a good indication that his starting point of physicalism is lacking.

In short, this is a good introduction to the mind/brain topic, but his own ideas about the subject are largely unconvincing and seem to me to be rather lacking in evidence.That said, I would recommend it to anyone wishing to learn about these issues, as the non-redcutive physicalism is a growing position you would do well to know about and understand, and Searle presents the one of the most comprehensive discussions of that position in this book.He also presents an excellent critique of reductionist philosophies of mind, from behaviorism to functionalism to the newer theories about how the mind is to brain as computer program is to hardware.

Overall grade:B

Confused, Muddled Thinking
John Searle provides what he thinks is a corrective to other introductory works in the philosophy of mind. In traditionally Searlean prose, he guides us through what he sees as the major problems of philosophy of mind, giving a background and providing some solutions of his own to the major problems. The writing style is clear, simple, and concise, which makes the book quite readable and indeed pleasant at many points. It is when you begin to dig beneath the words and extract Searle's arguments that the book falls apart.

In the beginning, we see a rather good explication of Descartes' views on the mind, which lead into contemporary approaches to the subject. This is where the book runs into problems. The first approach other than dualism that Searle considers is behaviorism. Here, he betrays philosophical superficiality by completely ignoring the valuable points made by behaviorists and painting a terrible caricature that barely qualifies as a straw man. As he continues, it becomes obvious that Searle has failed to understand virtually every argument in the history of the philosophy of mind. His treatment of functionalism is terribly vague and while his outline of various anti-functionalist arguments is useful, his characterization of their rebuttals is not.

As the work goes on, we get more into Searle's positive work, which is even more muddled than his critical work. He freely contradicts himself, such as in the chapter on free will, where he goes against one of his core philosophical principles (common sense). There is also his theory of consciousness, in which the brain causes the mind, which is separate and sits on top of the brain, but it is not dualism. Such conceptual muddles plague this book, making it difficult to even make sense of what Searle wants to say.

In the end, the book deserves two stars because it causes violent disagreement and is a suitable starting place for discussions and inquiry. However, anyone reading this book would do well to get another introductory book (I recommend Kim) or a good anthology (I recommend Chalmers) to accompany it, because alone the book is wholly inadequate at mapping the field or providing a positive position. It is probably more valuable as an introduction to John Searle, and someone interested in Searle's philosophy of mind would find this an easy way to get acquainted with his ideas.

Great, Accessible Book
I'm not going to present Searle's thesis (or criticize it) here.That's what the book is for.I will point out how many comments this book has, which discuss its critical points--good evidence that it is wonderfully accessible!If you majored in philosophy, went on to other things, but still have an interest in the field, this is the best book on the Philosophy of Mind you can buy.The same goes for high school students looking to explore the subject.Searle consciously aims his book at "young John Searle," so he presents philosophy clearly without dumbing it down.In my opinion, we of the educated public are not looking for "philosophy of the Matrix" written by nobodies; we're looking for book like this: great ideas aimed at an intelligent audience (think philosophy major graduating seniors at Princeton), written by the leading experts in their fields.Come on, old philosophers...your name and ideas might be circulating in the wider public (outside the APA) long after you are!

Basic premises are erroneous.
Searle does an excellent job of logic on all that he says.However, as his basic premises are erroneous, so is all that follows.Neither Will, Consciousness, Mind, nor Intelligence come from the physical universe.These are properties of LIFE itself, which is anterior to and creator of the physical universe. LIFE first creates Matter (out of Itself) and then intelligently evolves forms within Matter in which to inject Itself for the purpose of experience and play. ... Read more

Book Description
One of the most important and influential philosophers of the last 30 years, John Searle has been concerned throughout his career with a single overarching question: how can we have a unified and theoretically satisfactory account of ourselves and of our relations to other people and to the natural world? In other words, how can we reconcile our common-sense conception of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that we believe includes brute, unconscious, mindless, meaningless, mute physical particles in fields of force? The essays in this collection are related to this broad overarching issue that unites the diverse strands of Searle's work. As many as these essays have previously only been available in relatively obscure books and journals, this collection will be of particular interest to philosophers and those in psychology and linguistics.Since 1959, John R. Searle has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, where he is now the Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language. His many books include Mind Language and Society, (Basic, 1998). The Construction of Social Reality, (Free Press, 1997), and Speech Acts, (Cambridge, 1969). His works have been translated in 21 languages. Seale has received many prizes, awards and honors, including the Fulbright Award (twice), the Guggenheim, and ACLS Fellowships.Download Description
One of the most important and influential philosophers of the last 30 years, John Searle has been concerned throughout his career with a single overarching question: how can we have a unified and theoretically satisfactory account of ourselves and of our relations to other people and to the natural world? In other words, how can we reconcile our common-sense conception of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that we believe includes brute, unconscious, mindless, meaningless, mute physical particles in fields of force? The essays in this collection are related to this broad overarching issue that unites the diverse strands of Searle's work. As many as these essays have previously only been available in relatively obscure books and journals, this collection will be of particular interest to philosophers and those in psychology and linguistics. Since 1959, John R. Searle has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, where he is now the Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language. His many books include Mind Language and Society, (Basic, 1998). The Construction of Social Reality, (Free Press, 1997), and Speech Acts, (Cambridge, 1969). His works have been translated in 21 languages. Seale has received many prizes, awards and honors, including the Fulbright Award (twice), the Guggenheim, and ACLS Fellowships. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Not a fan, but still very good.
Yeah, so, I'm going to avoid the part where i think that a couple of important things in this book are stated too vaguely for a responsible philosopher, or where i mention that he seems to make one or two blatant errors of omission.I'm going to avoid these things for the dual reasons that a) they aren't really relevant to whether you should read this or not, and b) i allow for the possibility that i'm imagining these gaps because i haven't understood him, in which case i'm the stupid one.Given my presistent commitment to Legends of the Hidden Temple, that's a distinct possibility.

In spite of what i consider some overly-squooshy language in a handful of places, this is a great book.I'd read intentionality, but never speech acts, and this book seems to tie all of searle's ideas into one large discussion about speech, intention, consciousness, with a few of the expected cuts on AI.It's really put together very well, and the flow from discussions of consciousness to intention to speech acts makes each of the constituent pieces more poigniant.Searle very rarely drifts into blustering territory, writing clearly and concisely in most of the cases where i found a need for really detailed exposition.Good stuff.

So, like i say, 7 times out of 10, i find Searle less than compelling, but this is a really nice survey of a lot of his ideas, and worth a read either as an introduction to his thinking or as a piece that ties together a lot of his older ideas into one coherent package.He's an important guy with important ideas who has helped shape a lot of important discussions, agree or disagree, this book articulates these contributions well.

A Superb Collection of Articles...
Searle has collected a large and important variety of articles in this text, which spans several years of thinking on issues such as: the nature of consciousness, free will, the mind-body problem, rationality, and collective action.Only one article on Kripke's meaning skepticism has been not previously published.

The vigor and force of questions that Searle queries regarding how it is possible to reconcile our intuitions about having a 'free will' in a world of physical laws and (all things being equal) deterministic principles is important and fundamental.I highly recommend this volume, which conveniently assembles previous articles, and it makes clear Searle's position on these problems.Indeed, it makes clear exactly how difficult and challenging philosophical problems and questions are--and why philosophers stay awake at nights thinking about them...and why no easy solution is forthcoming in philosophy or science...

The articles are written in Searle's usual style--with problem solving on his mind--clearly stating the problem to be addressed and evaluated--a model of philosophical prose...

And I might add...the cover photograph of Searle is splendid--him in a tweed coat...autumn leaves...just in case you've wondered what a suave academic is supposed to look like nowdays... ... Read more

Amazon.com
John Searle's summation of earlier writings is not just an essential tie-up volume for existing readers; it is also a perfect introduction to the work of one of the clearest heads in the philosophy of mind. Searle's book is a riposte to all those academics who make a career out of contradicting and complicating such default positions as the existence of an external reality, the reality of personal consciousness, and the reasonable fit of language to the perceived world. Certainly, we should examine these positions! But the first duty of philosophy, Searle argues, is that it should attempt to accommodate what is known. As far as we can tell, for example, consciousness is a biological product, but there is a long-running contention between the materialists--whose reductive descriptions of consciousness arrive, finally, at an embarrassed denial that consciousness exists at all--and the dualists, who cannot describe consciousness without evoking some supernatural involvement. Neither position is tenable--each offers some corrective to the other. The good explanation is in there somewhere, but the sheer intractability of the debate won't let it be expressed. In situations like this, Searle argues, it is always the terms that are wrong. Terms, mind you, that in this case include "matter," "mind," "physical," and "mental"! Searle--married as he is to common sense--is of necessity one of our most iconoclastic and creative thinkers. --Simon Ings, Amazon.co.uk Book Description
One of America's best-known philosophers offers a succinct, easy-to-follow guide for applying philosophical theory to real life.

Disillusionment with psychology is leading more and more people to formal philosophy for clues about how to think about life. But most of us who try to grapple with concepts such as reality, truth, common sense, consciousness, and society lack the rigorous training to discuss them with any confidence. John Searle brings these notions down from their abstract heights to the terra firma of real-world understanding, so that those with no knowledge of philosophy can understand how these principles play out in our everyday lives. The author stresses that there is a real world out there to deal with, and condemns the belief that the reality of our world is dependent on our perception of it.

"A remarkable feat. This is the book for anyone who wants to learn about the big philosophical questions."-Owen Flanagan, Duke University

"This book is a major event. John Searle has brought together and elucidated forty years of brilliant work on Mind, Language, and Society. Bravo!"-Jerome Bruner, New York University ... Read more

Customer Reviews (25)

Most of the criticisms are apt, but
...I like it anyway. I just really like John Searle's personality. Yes, he's smug, yes, despite being sloppy, yes, almost surely he sets up straw men quite regularly, and yes, he would definitely sneer at anyone who argued with him. If you disagree with Searle, probably you won't like him very much and if you do agree, you should probably be careful to check whether or not you like him because he's convincing or because he's reassuring. I just really like reading his books and articles for their vast power to entertain.

Chapter 1 is essentially an attack on post-modern nonsense. One of the things I love about Searle is that (like Carl Sagan, perhaps) he's interested in bringing down views that he deems preposterous, and can we argue that this isn't at least a little bit fun? One of my favorite books about the post-modern is "Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul De Man" by David Lehman. Next to Lehman, Searle is downright respectful of the opposition...though to be honest I judge Lehman's approach to be far more along the lines of what is deserved. Chapter 2 begins with a similar treatment of those in analytic philosophy who would embrace dualism or materialism. For about 50 pages, he's convincing, indeed moving in spots. Unfortunately, he sets the problem up far better than he "resolves" it. Indeed, for about 15 pages he blathers on about how consciousness is just "a biological phenomenon like any other" (only not like any other), and how once we realize this we won't be troubled by materialism, dualism, the threat of epiphenomenalism etc. I don't think there's an argument there anywhere, and certainly no one could be convinced or more probably even figure out what he means. However he does at least pause to "wrinkle his nose" at any approach that ignores natural selection (most writers on the mind-body problem avoid this entirely, which is almost surely catastrophic for their views), which I applaud. From there it's on to intentionality, social reality, language etc. in a similar vein.

Ultimately, the value of John Searle as a philosopher is not in any arguments he comes up with, but in the fact that his intuitions are extremely good--he almost always comes down on the right side of the fence. In short, he follows his nose, with an uncanny aptitude for finding what's most apt to wrinkle it at. More importantly, he's not afraid to do so, which I for one find damn refreshing.

Searle Summarized
In this short, readable book, John Searle gives an account of how minds, language, and social institutions are situated within a material universe.The account goes roughly like this:consciousness is a biological phenomena;conscious minds exhibit intentionality (i.e., the ability to refer to or "fit" the external world); and intentionality allows human minds to create social institutions and vest meaning in words.Searle transcends standard materialist and dualist positions in philosophy.He insists that mental, social, and linguistic phenomena must be explained in natural terms, but he does not try to "reduce" them to other categories or "explain" them out of existence.Along the way, he discusses a variety of issues ranging from realism to philosophical method.

A professor at UC Berkeley, Searle has a genius for cutting to the heart of a philosophical position and keeping his concepts tied to reality and common experience.He also writes so well that it's hard not to be carried along by his argument.At the same time, I never really bought his argument that consciousness is a purely biological category, especially after he conceded that "first person" conscious experiences cannot be reduced to "third person" facts about brains.Nor did I understand his account of how consciouness operates as a "macro" feature of the brain able to cause effects in "micro" features such as neurons.He draws an analogy with an automobile engine, where macro-features such as pistons and spark plugs have causal effects even though everything in the engine obeys the laws of subatomic physics.Unfortunately, the analogy doesn't convince: whatever else consciousness is, it doesn't seem to function like a piston.Searle blames our inability to see the force of his analogy on our cramped intuitions about causation.He doesn't provide any alternative intuitions.

It seems undeniable that conscious experience is constructed by material brains -- anyone who doubts this should read a few clinical essays by Oliver Sacks or A. R. Luria that describe the deformed consciousness of brain-injured patients.However, the mind also exhibits so many non-physical features that fitting it into "nature" may be harder than Searle lets on.The puzzle isn't solved -- just restated -- by insisting, "The mind is OBVIOUSLY real (so materialism is false), the mind is OBVIOUSLY part of the brain (so dualism is false), the mind OBVIOUSLY can cause effects in the brain (so epiphenomenalism is false)," and so forth.Maybe Searle is right that materialism and dualism are outmoded categories.Even so, consciousness is such a peculiar biological phenomenon, and so totally unlike any other process or feature of our bodies, that dualistic philosophies will inevitably emerge -- and will, in turn, spawn materialistic counter-philosophies aimed at resolving the paradoxes of dualism.The dualism/materialism debate may be sterile, but I doubt that Searle has brought it to an end.

None of these remarks should be taken as serious criticism of "Mind, Language, and Society," which covers a lot of ground beside the mind/body question.In only 150 pages or so, the book summarizes work Searle has published over the years in modern classics such as "The Rediscovery of the Mind," "Intentionality," and "The Construction of Social Reality."(In fact, I recall that Searle presented some of this material in undergraduate courses at Berkeley in the late 1970s.)Even though Searle doesn't discuss the free will problem or give equal time to opposing positions, his book is first-rate, and I definitely want to read it a second time.Anyone who has already taken a few introductory classes in philosophy and wants to probe deeper into the subject would benefit from reading it.

Searle is no scientist.
In this book Searle takes on the broad topics of scientific realism, the mind-body problem and the puzzle of socially constructed concepts (e.g. money), among other things.His goal seems to be to defend the "common sense" view on these topics, but as a philosopher he wants to do so rigorously.In this case, "rigorous" means mixing lots of specialized terminology with an otherwise breezy style, which has the overall effect of making him sound smug.His is a rare style that manages to convey that the author would sneer at any counterarguments to his positions; maybe this is because he stakes out his ground almost wholly by attacking the positions of others and deeming them obviously wrong.

What's worse, despite his fantastic reputation, his philosophy seems really sloppy to me.For example, he claims that "consciousness" is a definite non-physical property of the brain that has evolved.Then, he argues against epiphenomenalism by noting how implausible it would be that something so useful evolved while making no real difference.Seeing as how evolution is a physical theory, Searle seems to be arguing in circles.And that's about how the whole book is, seeing as how you have to buy into his mind-body "resolution" before you can even start pondering his ideas on the other stuff.

So, if you feel that invoking "the way it is like" to drink a glass of wine is a good philosophical argument for consciousness being non-physical and are already dead-certain that rocks have no such sensations, the you might find this book a reassuring read.

Personally, I think that to understand a proposition you have to also understand its negation.And while Searle claims to be an expert at characterizing what it is to be conscious, I have a hard time taking any of his "analysis" seriously, since he surely can't explain to me what it's like to be unconscious.

For those with a scientific bent, there are better authors out there covering similar material.In particular, I recommend "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience", by Max Bennet and PMS Hacker.Hacker makes sure the philosophy is reasonable, Bennet makes sure the science is accurate.Searle's book falls a little shy in both areas, which makes his smuggness all the more infuriating.

Excellent and Unorthodox Introduction to Philosophy
I'd like to note, first of all, that I didn't find Searle as uncharitable as some of the other reviewers here. He did give a few low blows, but I think his arguments appeared as straw-man's because rather than refute a lot of the other claims, he was integrating them subtly: dropping off parts which were unnecessary and then using the leftovers to create a greater and more encompassing theory. He never goes into depth of why he finds the parts of theories credible that he does, as this book is not intended for deep analysis. The reader must simply take Searle's word for it at times to understand what he is getting at (Searle does provide a nice "Further Reading" section at the end for readers who are more interested in the "why's" behind his arguments).

Which leads me into the content of his book...

This book is a modern introduction to more recent philosophical issues. Searle sums up in the first chapter most of the out-standing problems in the field that remain unsolved from the last few hundred years. These include the mind-body problem, skepticism, realism, and issues relating to consciousness such as binding and intentionality. Searle has an interesting perspective in that he tries to alleviate conflicts by "going behind the issue and merging premises." With this method he finds complete theories that integrate many perspectives that before seemed contradictory.

The writing of this book is not as thick as his other works. Most of his language is quite precise and his arguments are logically spelled out. The analogies are simple for easy understanding; more advanced readers will probably want to contemplate further implications of Searle's ideas than he discusses.

Searle is yet another voice in the last few decades that has shown a tendency towards integration to solve logical issues. This seems to be a trend with many other authors, and might be called the "leading edge" of philosophical thought right now. The book takes the reader from step one, and slowly builds up a view of reality that integrates mind, society, and language exquisitely.

And if you happen to be a proponent of one of the many theories Searle disagrees with, try to be patient, and see where he's going. He does use a condescending tone now and then. But other than that, recommended...

Interesting, but Uncharitably Written
Ever since I read "The Construction of Social Reality" I have admired Searle.Yet, after reading this work I am left with a foul aftertatse that i can't shake off.

Essentially, Searle is presenting a summary package of his overall philosophy and, in doing so, is also writing a sort of "introduction to philosophy" type book, where he will take the reader through the various problems of philosophy.However, he does a disservice to the uniformed reader by seriously underrepresenting his opponent's arguments.I'm not sure if he does this simply because he is writing to a more elementary reader and, thus, feels justified in brushing off the "hard" philosophical positions by using words like "preposterous" to characteristically push them to the periphery, but this is a common tactic in this book.In the very first chapter Searle classifies the "default positions" that the "common man" will undoubtedly take for granted in every day life.These are positions like naive realism, the correspondance view of truth, the referential theory of meaning, etc.He then states that it is his intention to defend these doctrines, which is fine, but he also is very upfront about his presupposition that denying any of these doctrines is obviously absurd.While in the end I'm sure it matters very little, there is still an air of unsportsman-like conduct festering in Searle's writing.Searle should know better than to commit the strawman fallacy, even if he is writing a more elementary text.It can misrepresent some serious challenges that "ought" to be given serious attention to the average reader.After reading Searle's book, one might mistakenly think that these matters are pretty much settled.

It is still an interesting read, but if this is one of your first reads as a student of philosophy I encourage you delve deeper into the issues Searle has addressed. ... Read more

Book Description
Written in an outstandingly clear and lively style, it provokes its readers to rethink issues they may have regarded as long since settled. ... Read more

Book Description

Our self-conception derives mostly from our own experience. We believe ourselves to be conscious, rational, social, ethical, language-using, political agents who possess free will. Yet we know we exist in a universe that consists of mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles. How can we resolve the conflict between these two visions?

InFreedom and Neurobiology, the philosopher John Searle discusses the possibility of free will within the context of contemporary neurobiology. He begins by explaining the relationship between human reality and the more fundamental reality as described by physics and chemistry. Then he proposes a neurobiological resolution to the problem by demonstrating how various conceptions of free will have different consequences for the neurobiology of consciousness.

In the second half of the book, Searle applies his theory of social reality to the problem of political power, explaining the role of language in the formation of our political reality. The institutional structures that organize, empower, and regulate our lives-money, property, marriage, government-consist in the assignment and collective acceptance of certain statuses to objects and people. Whether it is the president of the United States, a twenty-dollar bill, or private property, these entities perform functions as determined by their status in our institutional reality. Searle focuses on the political powers that exist within these systems of status functions and the way in which language constitutes them.

Searle argues that consciousness and rationality are crucial to our existence and that they are the result of the biological evolution of our species. He addresses the problem of free will within the context of a neurobiological conception of consciousness and rationality, and he addresses the problem of political power within the context of this analysis.

A clear and concise contribution to the free-will debate and the study of cognition,Freedom and Neurobiology is essential reading for students and scholars of the philosophy of mind.

Customer Reviews (5)

Dense, Disappointing, and Interesting
This book is a dense and yet fast read. The final chapter deserves to be read several times.

Chapter one is Searle trying to give a brief encapsulation of the themes that he has treated elsewhere. Heavy going, but surprisingly rapid reading.

In chapter two, Searle wrestles with the implications of neurobiology for "free will." He finds that he cannot decisively state whether humans have free will or not. Assuming that consciousness is a function of the physical brain, composed of neurons, glial cells, etc, he argues that either there is no free will (even though we must believe there is) and everything we do is deterministic, or else free will comes via the randomness of quantum fluctuations.

This dichotomy was so bad that I seriously entertained the thought of writing the author and demanding my money back. I finished this chapter before bed and then awoke around 0500 in an absolute panic attack because I could not readily refute Searle. I do not see randomly dictated behavior as any better than predetermined behavior. Neither one is freedom.

As I wrestled with my panic, I realized that the horror of either of Searle's two options comes from having a "Me" with intent and desire, who is then denied the ability to realize any intent or desire by fate or by random chance.

I think that the drastically self-referential, non-linear nature of the brain makes an independent sense of "Me" possible w/o invoking some mystical split between mind and brain. I do not see that it is impossible for this sense of "Me" to develop its own preferences in a way that is neither random nor predetermined.

The final chapter truly made the book worthwhile. It consists of a brief essay on political power. Searle compares deontic power and status functions with the brute power imposed by force. He finds the notion of political power completely foreign to the physicist's notions of power.

What old people write when they no longer care about readers
My hope was that this book was a good philosopher, musing seriously over a host of recent results on how the mind is constituted and works from fMRI and other neurobiology studies. Instead I got a good philosopher doing vague musings without any basis in fact, continuing 16th century metaphysical musings as he wishes, without being constrained by fact, truth, how brains work, what social psych knows about social modules, mirror neurons, consciousness bundlings, and everything else exciting in what we know now about us-ness.

One star is too much.This book is cleverly mis-named by its editors to sell. Anyone interested in the name the book now actually has will be severely, severely disappointed in the book, at any price, however cheap.This book is a waste of space and increasingly it looks like its author is something similar.

Musings on Free Will
These essays are a low-voltage rehash of ideas set out in Searle's earlier books, where his one-mind concept of consciousness is set out much more lucidly. His musings on Free Will lack focus and clarity and the author ends up without taking a clear position on a topic where his brilliant philosophical studies should have allowed him to enlighten his readers.

Superficial
You'd expect a book with this title to actually have some neurobiology in it, but you'd be disappointed. This slim volume consists of two diffuse philosophical essays, one about free will, and the other about political power. Both are simplistic, in my view, and don't bring any new ideas to the table. The essay on free will was the most interesting, but despite the book's title, the author doesn't bring in any neurobiology. Instead he basically says that neurobiology should be involved, and possibly quantum mechanical randomness, because that's the only nondeterministic mechanism he can think of that might be related to the nondeterminism of free will. That particular idea is explored much more deeply in Roger Penrose's book "The Emperor's New Mind," which despite its flaws, is a much deeper and more solid book.

Searle finally writes about man as "zoon politikon"
This book is 3 chapters: an intro chapter, a chapter on free will & neurobiology, and a chapter on political power.The book was previously just two lectures Searle gave in 2001 at Sorbonne.Eventually, Searle's editor published these two lectures in France without Searle's involvement leading Searle to end a quaint story saying, "It is the first time in my life that I published a book I did not know that I had written" (pg. 2).Searle added the intro chapter for his edition.Although the first essay on free will is meager progress on what Searle says elsewhere (see Searle's Rationality in Action (Jean Nicod Lectures)), the 2nd chapter on political power is a promising addition to what Searle has already hinted at in The Construction of Social Reality and Mind, Language, and Society : Philosophy in the Real World (he admits this fact, see pg. 33).

SEARLE ON FREE WILL & NEUROBIOLOGY
Searle puts in the title "Reflections" because he admits to not giving answers, especially to the problem of free will.Instead Searle wants to muse: "I cannot give you a solution to the problem of free will, but I hope to be at least able to state the problem in a precise enough form so that we can see what possible solutions would look like (pg. 31).
Searle is frustrated by free will and neurobiology because free will seems to be a phenomenological experience that is irreducible to epiphenomena, yet how can we be free to will when conscious states are realized in neurological states which are "completely deterministic"? (pg. 38 see all 40).But the notion of the freedom of the will does not go away, according to Searle, "if you say to the waiter `Look, I am a determinist - che sará sará, I'll just wait and see what I order,' that refusal to exercise free will is only intelligible to you as one of your actions if you take it to be an exercise of your free will" (pg. 43).
At this point Searle offers 2 hypotheses: (1) free will is an illusion and the deterministic physical laws which govern our neurons also govern consciousness i.e. epiphenomenalism; (2) "we have to suppose that the logical features of volitional consciousness of the entire system have effects on the elements on the system.This is true even though the system is composed entirely of the elements" (pg. 63).Thus, "the passage from one state to the next is explained by the rational thought processes of the initial state of neurons/consciousness.At any instant the total state of consciousness is fixed by the behavior of the neurons, but from on instant to the next the total state of the system is not causally sufficient to determine the next state.Free will, if it exists at all, is a phenomenon in time" (pg. 65).Searle's struggle to make free will somehow a feature (is "feature the right word, Searle sometimes says "realized" but we might want to ask for clarity) of neurophysiology has been on difficult grounds since at least Thomas Nagel wrote that we can know everything about a bat except what it is like to be a bat (see "What is it like to be a bat?" in Nagel's book Mortal Questions (Canto)). Searle wants "Hypothesis 2" to be correct but he concludes that it is currently "a mess" (pg. 77).

SEARLE ON DEONTIC POWER
Before this essay, Searle never had anything to say about politics (this is not completely true: see little-known book "The campus war; a sympathetic look at the university in agony).Searle says, "When I was an undergraduate, it was widely believed that political philosophy was dead" (pg. 13).However, after writing about institutional reality as collective intentionality in "The Construction of Social Reality" he decided that this chapter "Social Ontology and Political Power" would apply his linguistic account of institutional reality to the "special problem of political power" (pg. 33).
Searle begins by saying that "our tradition of political philosophy" has been "unsatisfying" because it doesn't ask the proper questions first: instead of "What is a just society" we should ask "What is a society in the first place?" (pg. 80)Searle describes a group of numbered and ordered propositions which develop through his essay; I will quote them here in truncated form (hopefully without losing meaningfulness).
(1) All political power is a matter of social functions, and for that reason all political power is deontic power (2) Because all political power is a matter of status functions, all political power, though exercised from above, comes from below (3) Even though the individual is the source of all political power, by his or her ability to engage in collective intentionality; all the same, the individual, typically, feels powerless (4) The system of political status functions works at least in part because recognized deontic powers provide desire-independent reasons for action (5) It is a consequence...that there is a distinction between political power and political leadership (6) Because political powers are matters of status functions they are, in large part, linguistically constituted (7) In order for a society to have a political reality it needs several other distinguishing features:...a distinction between the public and the private sphere with the political as part of the public sphere,...the existence of nonviolent group conflicts, and...group conflicts must be over social goods within a structure of deontology (8) A monopoly on armed violence is an essential presupposition of government.

Anyone serious about studying the extensions of Searle's thought must buy this book primarily for the brief essay on political philosophy.His essay on free will, Searle admits, is largely conceptually at an impasse. ... Read more

Book Description
It has long been one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy, and it is now, John Searle writes, "the most important problem in the biological sciences": What is consciousness? Is my inner awareness of myself something separate from my body?

In what began as a series of essays in The New York Review of Books, John Searle evaluates the positions on consciousness of such well-known scientists and philosophers as Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, and Israel Rosenfield. He challenges claims that the mind works like a computer, and that brain functions can be reproduced by computer programs. With a sharp eye for confusion and contradiction, he points out which avenues of current research are most likely to come up with a biological examination of how conscious states are caused by the brain.

Only when we understand how the brain works will we solve the mystery of consciousness, and only then will we begin to understand issues ranging from artificial intelligence to our very nature as human beings. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (28)

free consciousness or master brain?
The problem I have with most books on this subject, is too much time being spent on theories, rather than adding up the facts...

So, let me get straight to the point.

If the brain was the true seat of consciousness, then one should explain the conscious phenomenon that leads up to entities that have brains.In view of the evolutionist view of single cell life forms, that do, beyond any doubt possess a conscious reality independent of what we would consider to be a brain for conscious dependancy.There are plenty of microbes, bacteria's, plants, etc., that fall under this category that have been instrumental in constructing various brain possessed complexed life-forms on planet earth.How can the reality of these entities be discredited as not possessing a type of consciousness or conscious reality?I argue that it can't... and I will explain through demonstration with a book that I am writing in view of atoms that forms into elements and elements that form into microscopic simple organic cellular forms, to later more diverse complicated life-forms where human beings and other types of intelligent bi-pedal beings come into existence based on an outside intelligent causer.

Also, to sum up the view of computers being consciously intelligent or explaining human intelligence or any other type, would be a lost cause outside of not showing a mathematical dependacy in view of scientific intentionality.Being that a fluncuation of energy into contextual systematic dimensional light states are at work( manipulated gross-matter ).As, already accepted by most scholars on this subject, the context of computers is based on the logic of it's creator creating a mimic of it's own attributes in so far as to what solution it will serve or yield ( case dependent ).


Let me go on the record and say, what ever that is created, is an Artificial Intelligence. Because, there is a reality that precedes the program that has been objectified, therefore, in virtue of this scientific Truth a type of existence can only be ( caused ) by whatexist, not by a miricle or accident since these terms or non-scientific within the confines of their erroneous usage.

In better words you cannot scientifically prove a miricle, to do so would prove it not to be a miricle in view of people who mystify certain unexplained matters...Therefore, in view of what reality or consciousness is... consciousness is simply existence that entails the endless potential of math, science and art that is used to manipulate, alter and transform energy/matter... which is what can be observed beyond any doubt or theory to be factual...It does not matter what medium you choose to experiment with to test and see if this is true, it is undeniably unavoidable.

Any philosopher will debate or argue using some type of scientific base as their basis, just as scientist will use philosophical thoughts as their breeding ground to expound upon existing incomplete theories to test and conclude what is objectively factual as oppose to an untrue idea about physical phenomenon's...

Just as it takes energy to move or to create a different flux or effect of energy, the same can be seen of consciousness.Although the context may differ, there is none the less a connecting conservation of attribute in so far of what is needed for any type of phenomenon to exist in a particular manner, as this can only be achieved through consciously-physical intentionality.Case in point, the reality of being a scientist is to consciously intend to produce experiments to explain or to create phenomenon's...

The problem I see in leading schools of thought is how scientist view what energy/matter is...I can assure any world renown physicist... that you cannot know of either without consciousness, nor could brains develop independent of energy/matter which shows the inconsistency of the brain being the seat of consciousness, since something in particular is being developed and cannot be viewed as being outside of the scope of intelligent design, the brain along with other human organs are certain structual forms that have specific functions that makes up a human as well as other animals and even certain insects. Indeed, what human can exist with a brain but be born without a heart and function as a living human being?None...!So, much for the brain being the seat of consciousness...

If one would be stupid enough to ignore this profound Truth then one should not proclaim that there is a difference between their brain and their feet as they are simply denying distinction in that respect. Therefore, there is a difference between non-creatable consciousness and what mirrors it via programed reality...

On closing with my shallow briefing, the whole view of creationist vs evolutionist bares a lot of truth from both perspectives and yet both sides fail to properly discredit the other.Creationist are correct when they suggest the existence of what some refer to as a conscious being above and beyond human intelligence, but the way that it is explained is incorrect and only contradicts certain scientific trues...Just as the evolutionist are correct about how different casualties in the universe develop over a succession of time and quality of enviromental pro-survival fitness, this is only concerning the mechanical condition of described realities, be this, animate organic entities or seemingly inanimate bodies...But, the evolutionist view cannot scientifically prove the ontology of non-creatable consciousness as being a condition of energy particles, in view of needing to come into being what is self-consciousness, although there is a shared facet between the two perspectives that can be seen as being one and the same...

Searles view of the brain being a series of biological capacities or processes is true but only explains a certain type of mechanics dealing with a certain type of conscious experience as I pointed out, which also has been explained in the eastern world of thought, time and time again.There are people who are not born with all of their senses in tack and yet they can exist and function enough to survive as a human being because of possessing certain vital organs and not just the brain.The human experience cannot be summed up as being the result of any one particular sensory over the other in view of the 5 senses.Indeed, there is a sense perception that must be in order for the others to have meaning and purpose and this has nothing to do with the human brain per se, but belongs to a higher level of conscious reality that cannot be caused by anything such as a brain.If consciousness overall was only a phenomenon of the brain, then the cells and proteins that make up the brain is just a human fantasy, but we all know better than this since the human brain can be self-imposed upon and destroyed by human consciousness, so much for that pro-survival feature.The human brain along with everything else of a human is made out of energy/matter that is definitely being controled and constructed into a certain field of formation.This can easily be seen with atoms to elements and elements into organisms that consciously function without brains.This phenomenon can be seen through out the universe, so to suggest what one detects as being defined solely by subjective interpretation via brain conditions, is to ignore when one does not make such an attempt, but only observes what goes on independent of needing to be defined by the observer...Searles view would be like saying that a child who see's fire who does not understand what she or he is seeing has some how unknowingly created the properties of the fires meaning and interaction with what the fire can or will function as...If this is what the author is suggesting theorectically, then his view is very flawed and contradicting.

A dolphin no more constructs Disney cartoons, than a dog that detects a baseball game having any input in the meaning of the game which is a construct of the human condition or reality... The reality of the human mind/brainfunction and structure are interdependent as the human brain only houses the interaction of what is detected by the nervous system that transmits back to the neuron circuitry of the brain for animal minds to perceive as a conscious experience or conditon of transient phenomenon via electromagnetic ionizing of atomic elements in their respective localities of space-time ( identification ).This is done through the electrons projecting and receiving photonic messages between the differing atoms for the physical experience at hand...There is definitely an outside of cause...

Of course if Mr. Searle was equally versed in scientific knowledge then he would see that not all that is perceived through the mind/brain connection is solely a construct of it, but belongs to a higher reality that cannot be defined by human logic as if to treat consciousness in general, as being a circumstantial object of a brain via some particle inertia becoming mysteriously interupted causing a big-bang in the universe that eventually led to animal intelligence, as some people rant on about... ( chuckles )

Consciousness as a whole, non-created that is, clearly shows that everything in the universe is of the same reality in a diversified state of being, individualism, form, math, science, art, structure, and function is what takes place through intelligence not the lack thereof... sure consciousness cannot be reduced in Truth, but perception can and has...Therefore without perceptual intelligence there can be no conception and so, let any brave scientist show me a brain that can develop devoid of this...



As certain schools of thought grow more comfortable with not being at the top of the intelligent chain these views of what consciousness is will be more accepted in view of what has to be in order for their to be life as we know of it...

A gentleman reviews the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.
John Searle believes consciousness is a result of the biological properties of the human brain.To quote him exactly:"biological brains have a remarkable biological capacity to produce experiences, and these experiences only exist when they are felt by some human or animal agent."That does not seem like a controversial statement, but Searle has been subject to merciless ad hominem attack because of that and some of his other contributions to the discussion of consciousness.In this book he not only deftly defends himself, he leaves his chief critic, the squid-like philosopher Daniel Dennett, writhing in the dust in a most satisfying manner.

Searle is a philosopher, not a scientist, so his concern is to help the scientists keep their metaphysics straight.With that in mind, he reviews six leading theories of consciousness, including Dennett's, and clearly explains their virtues and deficiencies.His deft and gentlemanly demolition of Dennett is particularly satisfying, but all the essays are interesting.He packs an enormous amount of information and insight into this deceptively simple little book.

Consciousness is a difficult subject to approach scientifically because it is a subjective experience.What we can observe and measure about it are only the external manifestations of consciousness - the observer can never get "inside" the experience of another - at least not yet.That doesn't mean that consciousness will never be understood scientifically, Searle believes, just that we aren't there yet, and getting there will require humility and clear thinking.He believes consciousness will eventually be understood when we understand exactly and in detail how the brain works.We are very far from that point today, but Searle points the way forward.

Pretentious and Misrepresentative of other attempts
This book is a collection of extremely pretentious responses to several other authors of books on this topic.He often misrepresents (or possibly just misunderstands) many of the arguments of other authors.The only thing going for this book is that it covers many different authors who attack the problem of consciousness from different angles.One can get an idea of who the big players in this field are from this book.

Common sense amid the preposterous and the half-right.
So you think you might be conscious?Are you materialistically conscious, in a way that denies reality to your inner monologue?Are you conscious in a way that mirrors quantum mechanics and computational philosophizing?Are you mind and body, or mind in body?From Crick to Dennett to Chalmers, from Descartes to the funny papers, reading about mind and body is simply hard work, because nobody adopts a direct style in order to de-mystify their work.One comes to believe that most authors writing about human consciousness are more concerned about being seen as big brains, than about advancing general knowledge in a way open to debate.

Except this book is great, precisely because it is clear, and the author has original insights to offer.Consciousness, our inner monologue, is irreducible, a real phenomenon, but it springs from nature, and is caused by the brain.

By examining the hot writers of the day, in a series of reviews of their works, Searle is able to demonstrate the jargon, purposive mystification, and mistakes made by both the brain scientists and the computational mystics.He offers simple statements of testable fact as an antidote to the over-wrought and over-long insights of the glittering stars of modern consciousness mongering.

When you get done here, you will be better informed, able to think your way at least partly around this issue, and aware of some of the current mistakes that dominate the field.Rather than dualism, or materialistic monism, this book offers an intuitive view of biological brains giving rise to irreducible consciousness.Impressive for a short book.And it is quite readable, for we lay persons, as well.

Interesting debate on consciousness wrapped around book reviews
"The Mystery of Consciousness" is simply an expansion and revision of a series of book reviews from the mid 90s.Searle has added a first and last chapter in which he expounds his own views and included the written responses of a couple of the authors to his original reviews.Essentially then, the book is a work of criticism with a dash of the author's own views.

The book is well-written and interesting.Searle can tear an argument into its constituent pieces, summarize it and raise objections as clearly as anyone.It also provides an excellent survey of some important authors on the subject:Crick, Penrose, Dennett, etc.However, as usual with unsolved philosophical problems, it is far easier to tear down the arguments of others than to make a clear, correct argument yourself.Further, it becomes obvious that the authors (including Searle) are talking past each other...using the same words with different meanings.

The problem is illustrated at the very beginning.On page 5, Searle writes:
"One issue can be dealt with swiftly.There is a problem that...does not seem very serious to me, and that is the problem of defining "consciousness" .... if we distinguish between analytic definitions, which aim to analyze the underlying essence of a phenomenon, and common-sense definitions .... it does not seem to me at all difficult to give a common-sense definition of the term:'consciousness' refers to those states of sentience and awareness that typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue until we go to sleep again"

And hence come many difficulties, because the other authors Searle is studying are not all using this definition.They are not all even using their own common-sense definitions, but may be using analytic definitions.Thus Searle's comments like "consciousness is irreducible" are obvious to him, using his exact definition, but not all obvious if consciousness is defined some other way.Further, science and mathematics are littered with common-sense definitions that turned out to be useless or wrong, for example the assumption that light consisted of waves and matter of particles, and the absolute monistic nature of each as one or the other.His mantra that "Consciousness is a biological phenomena like digestion or photosynthesis" is tautological if we are referring to his intuitive definition, but flatly false if defined in other ways.

Thus the weakest part of this book:the exchanges between Searle and Dennett and between Searle and Chalmers.In the Searle/Dennett debate both end up shouting past each other, pointing out the absurdity of the other's positions and the obviousness of their own, because they are using different definitions of not only "consciousness" but "mind", "qualia", "artificial intelligence" and even such basic terms as "subjective" and "objective".The Chalmers conversation is a little less acrimonious, but just as unsatisfactory...Chalmers at least comes across as more of a gentleman than Dennett or Searle.

The final chapter, Searle's summary of his own position, is excellent.It is more balanced and self-critical than his remarks in the original reviews, and offers an excellent Q&A that anticipates the objections to his views and answers them.Nonetheless, as Searle himself recognizes, the book leaves us mostly with questions, and I believe we will eventually find even the questions are wrong.For example, the question "How does the brain generate consciousness?" may ultimately turn out to be as misguided as "How many epicycles are involved in the orbit of Mars?"

... Read more

Book Description
This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. It examines Searle's work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional conceptions of content, the relative priorities of thought and language in the explanation of intentionality, the status of the distinction between force and sense in the theory of meaning, the issue of meaning scepticism in relation to rule-following, and the proper characterization of 'what is said' in relation to the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Written by a distinguished team of contemporary philosophers, and prefaced by an illuminating essay by Searle, the volume aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of Searle's work in philosophy of language, and to suggest innovative approaches to fundamental questions in that area. ... Read more

Book Description
John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

Excellent Modern Theory of Mind
P>In his usual manner, Searle tackles the problem of consciousness and how the mind works in this thorough examination of both classical and contemporary concerns. It's an exceedingly masterful task that is richly rewarding, if only slightly frustrating because of his poor syntactical structures.

Analytic philosophy is often difficult enough, and this book is of average difficulty, but when an author does not write clearly with near-run-on sentences, myandering and labyrinthine syntax, and in less than necessary obtuseness, it is a drawback. This is my only complaint.

Part of the problem is the author's, part reader's. Searle is going against the analytic grain by expositing a theory of mind that is at once novel and distinctive, clearing up confusions and ambiguities along the way. But these new ideas and the direction of fit they present are exciting and facinating, even if the presentation is less than perfect.

It's hard to imagine modern-day analytic philosophers going out on a limb with actual theory (they tend toward the criticism of others), so that it is refreshing that someone of Mr. Searle's reputation and caliber takes a stab at presenting a coherent theory of mind in new dress and ambiance: Naive realism.

This isn't the first book of Searle's I'd recommend. That honor goes to "Mind, Language, and Society," his short, but densely argued, and clearer exposition, of several ideas (some of which he adumbrates from this volume). If you like what you read in THAT book, this book will further delight you.

What's so agreeable about Searle, if not his syntax, is his willingness to posit a coherent theory of mind in the traditional vein but in entirely new clothing. It's refreshing to see a modern philosopher actually doing philosophy, not critiquing the philosophy of others. Searle would probably have advanced his cause by having someone else tidy up his presentation, as this drawback reduces the splendor of the overall book.

Frames the large picture of the mind-body duality
The current philosophical debates about what is the mind and how can it translate intentions into body actions including language and action are summed up into a convincing, clear-headed, yet arrogant and extremely mis-guided approach to this philosophical question. Searle's logical formalism may"pull-the-wool" over many people's eyes, but his statements have garnered much negative criticism in the eyes of his peers.

Perhaps the best way to sum up his book is that he believes there is no difference between the mind and the body, and that the original question is flawed, yet at the same time, he establishes the existence of an intention, an entirely mental concept have physical equivalences. This is really an uninspired type of answer, and is largely considered a cop-out by most. ... Read more

Book Description
Boy Still Missing

It is June 1971 and Dominick Pindle, a tenderhearted but aimless Massachusetts teenager, spends his nights driving around with his mother and dragging his wayward father out of bars. Late one evening Dominick's search puts him face-to-face with his father's seductive mistress, Edie Kramer. Instantly in lust, he begins a forbidden relationship with this beautiful, mysterious woman. Before long, though, their erotic entanglement leads to a shocking death, and Dominick discovers that the mother he betrayed had secrets as dark and destructive as his own.

Rapt with confusion and guilt as the startling facts about his family begin to emerge, Dominick heads to New York City in search of retribution and the truth about his mother's disquieting past. He soon finds refuge with Jeanny Garvey, a young, soulful idealist who might save him from his dire fate, but not before he makes a desperate choice that endangers everything he holds clear -- and puts both their lives at risk.

Charged with the exhilarating narrative pace of a thriller and set during a complicated and explosive era, Boy Still Missing is a stunning debut novel. It renders a deeply affecting portrait of a boy whose passage into adulthood proves as complex and impassioned as the history that unfolds before his eyes. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (43)

What's a Boy to Do?
I've never heard of this book until a friend recommended this book to me while we were helping a friend move.The friend that was moving had set aside a box of books that she was going to donate.Of course, being the bookworms that we are, we couldn't resist the urge to rummage through.Thus, I was directed to this book.

I cannot believe that I had never heard of this book before.Most of the reviews give this book a high praise.While it isn't the best book that I've read, it's is one of the best books that I've read recently.

Like the Library Journal says, it's all about alcoholism, adultery, abortion, adoption and abduction.Dominick is a 15-year-old young man in Holedo, Massachusetts.He accompanies his mother at the end of the day, looking for his drunk father in bars.If his father is not found in any bars, there's only one other place he can be...at his mistress', Edie.

The thing is Dominick and Edie begin a secret and "innocent affair".Dominick feels responsible for her, especially after they discover that she's pregnant by his father.However, unknown to everyone, Dominick's mother is also pregnant.

The book moves somewhat slow but soon picks up the pace after Dominick's mother is found dead in a motel when she tried to do a homemade abortion.At the same time, Edie disappears.Dominick feels extremely guilty because he stole money from his mother to help out Edie.Edie promised to pay him back.Dominick is angry and decides revenge.But first, he must find her.

"Boy Still Missing" is a good read, filled with suspense and twists.

Novel Still Missing
I ordered this book b/c I saw that it had received almost 5 stars.I was quite unimpressed.A 15 year old boy has sex in the room where his mother died with a kidnapped one month old lying quietly nearby.A little ridiculous as is the rest of the book.

Polarized opinions
The story is fiction and it seems implausible but it still rang true to me.

I say 'read it'.

Decent book
I was shocked by all of the 5 star ratings for this book.
It is not a book that I will regret reading but it is not a book that i would highly recommend.
I was a little let down with the climax that came crashing down into nothing.

GREAT BOOK
I'm not going to go over what the book is about as many have already done that. I just want to say that I am NOT friends with the author. Everyone who has given this book a bad review has said that if we give it a good review we must be friends with the author. THIS IS NOT TRUE. i am an avid reader and I found this book to be wonderful. I could not put it down. And this was his first book. I am now reading his second book and find it to be just as good. (Strange But True) I would recommend this book to anyone. Do yourself a favor and get the book from the library or buy it and find out for yourself. Do not go by the negative reviews you are reading here. It is a wonderful book.

... Read more

Book Description
In this major new work, John Searle launches a formidable attack on current orthodoxies in the philosophy of mind. More than anything else, he argues, it is the neglect of consciousness that results in so much barrenness and sterility in psychology, the philosophy of mind, and cognitive science: there can be no study of mind that leaves out consciousness. What is going on in the brain is neurophysiological processes and consciousness and nothing more - no rule following, no mental information processing or mental models, no language of thought, and no universal grammar. Mental events are themselves features of the brain, "like liquidity is a feature of water."

Beginning with a spirited discussion of what's wrong with the philosophy of mind, Searle characterizes and refutes the philosophical tradition of materialism. But he does not embrace dualism. All these "isms" are mistaken, he insists. Once you start counting types of substance you are on the wrong track, whether you stop at one or two. In four chapters that constitute the heart of his argument, Searle elaborates a theory of consciousness and its relation to our overall scientific world view and to unconscious mental phenomena. He concludes with a criticism of cognitive science and a proposal for an approach to studying the mind that emphasizes the centrality of consciousness to any account of mental functioning.

In his characteristically direct style, punctuated with persuasive examples, Searle identifies the very terminology of the field as the main source of truth. He observes that it is a mistake to suppose that the ontology of the mental is objective and to suppose that the methodology of a science of the mind must concern itself only with objectively observable behavior; that it is also a mistake to suppose that we know of the existence of mental phenomena in others only by observing their behavior; that behavior or causal relations to behavior are not essential to the existence of mental phenomena; and that it is inconsistent with what we know about the universe and our place in it to suppose that everything is knowable by us.

John R. Searle is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (10)

Excellent start point
I've found this book excellent as a start point for rethinking the way to study the brain and the mind. Searle states very clear the different aspects of his sketicism against the currently installed ideas and opens the path to a much more interesting way of thinking about the our brains and our mind.
I recommend reading this book in order to start studying the amazing and interesting world of the mind and it also allowed me to research other books related to areas covered by Searle and shed more light in a yet young science and philosophy of the brain and mind.

Excellent Highly-Accessible Polemic
What a wonderful book! I had tried to access philosophy of mind through David Chalmers and Roger Penrose to no avail. Talk about arcane and inane philosophy! Then, I decided I might try something "lighter." What a difference Searle's dense, but clear, ideas make! This book is a great place to begin (or end) one's enquiring into the philosophy of mind, and a treasure trove of so much that is intuitive. So much in the field of conscious is counterintuitive that it is refreshing to read someone who subscribes to one's intuitive beliefs.

First, like most philosophically-minded individuals, I like to think philosophy of the mind is not so arcane and inaccessible that we ordinary individuals can't get it, e.g., Penrose, Chalmers, et al. At least Searle treats the reader like educated adults without unnecessary obfuscation. Don't misunderstand me: This is dense reading, and hardly a sentence passes without something important being claimed. But, rather than being unintelligible, it is wholly intelligible. For example, Chalmers tries to explain supervenience over 40 pages, Searle explains in one paragraph. Not simple, but clear and unadulterated exposition.

Second, some other readers must have omitted the Preface and First Chapter. This book is intentionally polemical; Searle makes it clear from the outset. He adamantly opposes some of the philosophical and psychological paradigms currently in cognitive science, and he addresses those problems in the first few chapters (and throughout the book). He opposes dualism and materialism of all sorts and admits that he is a "naive naturalist," whatever that is. His arguments are often contentious, as he admits up front. But as tendentious as he is -- there's a lot riding on the premises and conclusions of others, so in the end he has to highly contentious. Fortunately, he's also persuasive.

Third, as a "naive materialist," Searle argues that the simultaneous firing of neurons and existent mental states (hence the phenomenon "consciousness" is irreducible to anything further) are causally interchangeable, because they are the same phenomenon. Ergo, consciousness is not epiphenomenally, nor occurrently, nor simultaneously, but epistemically, empirically, and ontologically foundational (each a different property of the same phenomenon). This is an important, and liberating, concept, forcefully argued throughout the book. What's inimical about all the other concepts Searle fights is their use of the homunuclus fallacy and their anthropomorphizing of physical processes.

Fourth, he make the claim for a number of other intuitive, contra counterintuitive, claims. For example, the "unconscious" just does not make any sense. It almost seems like a contradiction, and according to Searle it is. As Gertrude Stein once said, "There's no there, there." Again, I've always thought this to be linguistically intuitive, now he makes a broad-based argument against its existence even morphologically (and several more things like "universal grammar" "binary intelligence," etc.).

Finally, I believe this book is necessary reading by all interested in consciousness and the mind. Even if one doesn't agree with his arguments and their conclusions, it's highly important to know and understand them. And because Searle is so accessible, he's a refreshing, indeed cogent, alternative to some of the myopic, convoluted, and constipated thinking going on in the field.

Clearest monograph EVER!!!
Searle advocates Biological naturalism" as a valid theory, exposing the misdirectedness of the ever present mind-body problem as being entwined in the western philosophical tradition.Even though Cartesian Dualism has long been predominantly set aside, Searle argues, many of its concepts and vocabulary cloud current theorizing on the subject.Searle argues strongly for recognizing the Subjectivity of consciousness as a 1st-person ontology in itself, unexplainable by an objective epistemology, since its very nature is opposed to that method of investigation.By recognizing this Subjectivity as a property of the brain, and allowing that the mental and physical of the mind-body opposition need not be exclusive, Searle describes consciousness as a property of assemblies of neurons, in the sense that liquidity is a property of H2O moleculse.Unimaginable at the molecular level, but undeniable through a wider point point of view.
The clarity of Searles writing alone makes it worth the read, and his ideas address, if not solve, many of the most interesting topics in the philosophy of mind.Highly recommended to anyone interested in that field.

The study of the mind is the study of consciousness.
This book gives a good picture of the structure of the mind and of its irreducibility.
It explains clearly what's the stumbling block of all scientific and philosophical problems with consciousness: the fact that the mind is only a subjective first-person experience.

But the most interesting part, for me, was his convincing attack against cognitivismn (the theory that the brain is a computer and the mind a computer program).

Nevertheless, I found his book 'The Mystery of Consciousness' more interesting, more profound and more specific, because it laid bare the accuracies / errors of other author's who wrote about the same important items.

state of analytic philosophy of mind at the end of century
I sympathize with many of Searle's views about the inelliminability of the intentional character of consciousness, and the general misguidedness of philosophy of mind.. but I would ask: is this a big discovery? why read Searle rather than Husserl in the first place? Is his naturalism of any philosophical depth or interest? I would say no. I believe reading this book is a waste of time, as it was for me... ... Read more

Customer Reviews (13)

Another Gem from Searle
John Searle is a great philosopher and a keen performance artist.Whether writing or lecturing, he likes to roll up his sleeves, speak plainly, define terms, make distinctions, expose sloppy thinking, clear up conceptual tangles, get to the bottomline -- and show how smart he is at every step of the way.Searle doesn't see philosophical puzzles as things to marinate in and examine from a dozen different angles.He sees them as problems to solve, once and for all, like a scientist proving a theory or a lawyer arguing a case.He would probably be insufferable if he didn't make so much sense.(I took undergraduate classes from him at Berkeley.He lectures exactly the way he writes.)

"The Construction of Social Reality" is a typical Searle masterpiece.In it, he sets forth and answers the question, How can facts about social institutions (such as money or marriage) be objectively true in a world made up of atoms and fields of force?His answer is simple but far-reaching:institutions, he says, are constituted by collective beliefs that confer status and powers on physical objects (such as currency notes) or physical events (such as the words, "I do").They are thus mind-dependent but still objective, in the sense that statements such as "Dollars are legal tender in the U.S." or "John and Dawn are married" can be said to be "true" or "false."However, when beliefs die out, change, or are rejected, the institutions they constituted come to an end.The Russian monarchy no longer exists because no one believes in it any more.Searle unpacks this basic idea in intricate detail in fewer than 200 pages.

"The Construction of Social Reality" is lucid, well-argued and subversive:if Searle is right, then our deepest institutions (including property) are constituted by convention and sustained by habit, with no role whatsoever for God, Nature, or Morality except as reinforcing myths.No one could read this book without having his or her view of institutions deepened and perhaps transformed.Maybe Searle hasn't had the last word on social ontology, but he has definitely made a lasting contribution to the literature on the subject.Highly recommended.

Searle sinks, swims in unknown waters
With due regard for Mr Searles'eminence, he is out of his depth critiquing the construction of social reality. He neither mentions nor footnotes Berger & Luckmann's "The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge." This 1967 book was the theoretical starting point for the entire recent scholarship now known loosely as social constructionism. Whether you agree with it or not, you at least have to deal with it, and show you have read it. Any book that does not is ipso facto defective.

Towards a philosophy of social reality?
Personally, I'm not so sure whether Searle really gets it. In my opinion he really downplays power relations and differences that are a major part of social reality. This book is best juxtaposed with a book that does address conflict and interrelations between indviduals, i.e. Pierre Bourdieu's work.

Searching Under the Street Lamp
John Searle is unique among today's Anglo-American philosophers for his understandable and breezy writing style.He tells you what he is going to tell you; tells you; and then tells you what he told you - almost as though he were briefing the Pentagon. Construction of Social Reality is a fine example.

Searle is a philosophical realist and has always made a compelling case for our living in a single world, part of it outside of us and part within us, part objective and part subjective, part ontologic and part epistemic.In this book, in fact, he reviews the various combinations quite neatly.(Searle, in the early chapters, also includes animals other than humans.Another positive!)

In trying to convince us that institutions are as real as the brute facts of existence and mind he stumbles.He is correct on one score; i