Book Description
Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme brilliance, it captured the imagination of a generation of philosophers.For Wittgenstein, logic was something we use to conquer a reality which is in itself both elusive and unobtainable. He famously summarized the book in the following words: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly; and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.' David Pears and Brian McGuinness received the highest praise for their meticulous translation. The work is prefaced by Bertrand Russell's original introduction to the first English edition. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (40)

Not for the average reader but thorough, if not at times tedious, in acomplishing its task...
The `Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' is the German monk and philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein's commentary on language and its logical failures. This not only applies to its uses in philosophy but in all fields. He explains in length how a logical proposition, by definition, cannot carry any weight because logic itself is only a framework, consisting of no substance. It can therefore only lead us to a simplification of what we already know; much in the same way that the mathematics, as a method, can lead to a simplification, if data and relationships are given but not create numbers where they didn't exist before. Because of their interchangeable nature, he often applies mathematics as a way of explaining his principles within language. These are laid out in step by step framework of propositions preceded by numbers and decimal places signifying their order and importance.

Although his book deals with an issue of great importance to philosophy and has received excellent reviews from many great philosophers, including an enthusiastic introduction by Bertrand Russell, I found this book to be, for the most part, pretty dull. After his general criticism of language is understood it seems that he spends most of the book going into an unnecessarily detailed proof of this being the case. As a foundational work, maybe this approach was necessary in order to explain away any grey areas and gaps through which criticism could be made. For the average reader however, who is interested in understanding new principles and gaining new philosophical insight, this book may come across as overly tedious, and overcomplicated. Wittgenstein's propositions on language could, I believe, be explained, still persuasively, but in much more understandable and readable manner, and in a great deal less space.

If you are interested in a step by step, text book style read, then maybe this book will interest you. If like me, however, you prefer to cut through the jargon and onto understanding the core principles, I would encourage you to skim-read through the first two thirds of the book picking out what makes sense and not spending too much time trying to understand what can in places seem like impossibly mind boggling equations, knowing that at the heart the principles themselves are pretty simple. From around page 60 onwards I found that the book got more interesting as Wittgenstein moves from proving the validity of his propositions to their implications. For me it was this end that made the book. Had I given up half way through, as was tempting, I would have missed the best part. It was in these last pages that the genius of Ludwig Wittgenstein really shone through.

What there is
After this book, a sort of spa treatment for the over philosophical mind, deep cleaning our comprehension of the world into a notion of propositions and the relation between them, Wittgenstein himself cast off the training ladder of the Tractatus, as he advised his readers to do at the end of the book. He argued that the logical positivists he had inspired were mistaken in demanding excessive precision from human expressions. This led to his later theory of language games - picturing of reality is often only incidental to the success of language. On you go folks, good luck...

ow, my brain...awesome.
stick an alfred north whitehead lecture and a collection of hegel quotes into a blender and...it will make a mess. instead, i'd suggest reading a book. this one has lots of mathmematically themed explanations of what we know (or don't) and what we can express or understand (or can't). a little migraine-inducing at times, but then again no one said it was a stephen king novel. it's actually quite short, but since he fits such expansive theories into such neat little stanzas, it seems like 'war and peace' after someone dropped it from the sears tower. if you like thinking about thinking for thinking's sake, this guy is one pimped out g-money hustlah. or not. great stuff.

Worth a PHD for the writer.
"That which we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence".

'The world is all that is the case'
The Tractatus was Wittgenstein's attempt to solve all philosophical problems.Believing he was successful, he retired from Philosophy after publishing this text to become a schoolteacher for several years in Austria, before returning to philosophy.

The Tractatus is one of the most important intellectual works of the 20th century, arguably as important as Bertrand Russell's and Whitehead's 'Principa Mathematica', Heidigger's 'Being and Time', and Husserl's 'Logical Investigations.'This little work, beautiful in its logical simplicity and purity, can be regarded as the manifesto of analytical philosophy in the 20th century.

The Tractus is essentially a work dealing with epistemology, what we can and cannot know about the world.However, rather than looking at the mind or conciousness or sensations, Wittgenstein instead looks at how we use language and logic to describe the world.If we can solve the inherent logical ambiguity of language, we can then solve philosophical problems which are in fact simply faults which come from lack of logical coherence or clarity when we use language to make certain statements about things and the relationship between things.

Wittgenstein's approach is somewhat reductionistic.The propositional format of the work mirrors the Ethics of Spinoza, though for Wittgenstein the world is made of certain basic atomistic components which have fairly simple relations to each other.These arrangements may change in space and time but the world remains the same.

A number of propositions deal with logical problems explored by Russell, Frege and others.Some of these are very abstract and subtle and require careful study to properly understand.

Towards the end of the treatise Wittgenstein's concerns seem to border on the mystical.'It is not what the world is, but that it is, which is mystical' and 'What we cannot speak of, we have to pass over in silence.'These Zenlike statements seem to hint at a deep mystery about things which crops up when we reach questions beyond the scope of language and logic, which can only be approached with silent contemplation, somewhat like Nicholas of Cusa's approach to the mystery of God.While Wittgenstein was not a religious man, his statements in this sense have often been quoted by philosophers and scientists whenever a metaphysical question which seems unanswerable arises in their discourse.

Wittgenstein later abandoned many of the statements he made in the Tractatus when he returned to philosophy, instead focusing more on problems with language rather than logic.This is somewhat unfortunate, given the elegance and beauty of this work from the philosophical viewpoint.

While the ambitions of Wittgenstein to solve all problems by clearing up our usage of language may seem excessive looking back, the clarity and precision of this work is admirable and the project worthwhile.For this and for many other reasons, it remains a work worth studying carefully and with sympathy, even after a century or so after its publication. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (7)

The blue book
The blue book is concerned with an exploration of meaning in language. Reputedly one of Wittgenstein most direct and accesible works, it is subtle and containing many of his ideas that appear in the previous Tractatus and later Investigations. A good dose of semiotics is needed to organise his ideas in a context more accessible to the casual reader interested in linguistics and neuropsychology.

Essential for understanding the P.I.
The Blue & Brown Books are fun to read.They establish most of the concepts that are discussed in the P.I. These concepts are notated below, along with page numbers.My notes below indicate the page numbers where these concepts occur in the B&B Books, as well as in the P.I.If you read the B&B Books, you will have a relatively easy time recognizing the concepts (but not necessarily understanding them), as they are set forth, when you read the P.I.You will know what to look out for.Additionally, it seems that much of the first 50 pages of the P.I. is spent not doing philosophy, but is spent reflecting about philosophy.This 50 page span of reflection is apt to be particularly confusing, unless one first reads the B&B Books. The end-result of reading the B&B Books that is:When you proceed to read the P.I., you will feel self-assured and happy in recognizing the same concepts, and new variations of these concepts, that appear in the P.I.

To summarize, W.'s philosophy first of all shows how the grammar of our language makes us think that mental acts (or mental processes, mental images, or feelings), of which we are conscious, are required for our various language games.Again and again, W. discloses paper experiments demonstrating that mental acts (of which we are conscious) are not at all required for language games.Next, W. explains how our various language games are like games, where these language games include: meaning, understanding, referring, commanding, and so on.W. devotes much space to providing exercises disclosing different classes of language games, where the exercises are meant to convince us that there is no essential mental act (of which we are conscious).Finally, W. provides an answer as to what is essential for a word to transmit meaning, understanding, reference, a command, a request, and the like.However, W. provides only a sketchy answer, namely, that the answer lies in some institution or use.

NOTES
MENTAL ACT OR MENTAL PROCESS.Notion that meaning, referring, understanding, depends on a mental image or a mental process. Wittgenstein explains how the grammar of the layperson gives birth to this notion. Wittgenstein explains that this is a false notion and, at times, makes fun of this notion.
a. The mental image or mental process is like consulting a paradigm or prototype (page 128, 165, 166 of B&B Books);
b. The mental image or mental process is like consulting a table (page 100 of B&B Books);
c. The mental image or mental process is like "accompaniment of another," "some kind of addition" (page 168, 169 of B&B Books).Wittgenstein reveals what the layperson believes understanding and imagination to require a mental image or mental process.Wittgenstein says that the layperson exclaims:"But when I image something, something certainly happens!" (page 97 of PI).
d. "You say to me: "You understand this expression . . . as if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word . . ."(page 41 of PI).
e. "What really comes before our mind when we understand a word?-Isn't it something like a picture? Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube." (page 46 of PI).
f. Wittgenstein shows how we are tricked into thinking there is this mental act or mental process, in an example of the language game of intending: "But didn't I already intend [by way of a mental process] the whole construction of the sentence . . . at its beginning?So surely it already existed in my mind before I said it out loud . . . But here we are construing a misleading picture of "intending" . . ." (page 92 of PI).
g. Wittgenstein says that the layperson says, "we sometimes call it "thinking" to accompany a sentence by a mental process . . .," thus implying that this is how the layperson comes to think that language games must be accompanied by a mental process.
h. Wittgenstein says that the layperson comes to believe that language games require a mental image or mental process, since the layperson has the false picture that "the processes called . . . recognizing always consisted in comparing two impressions with one another.It is as if I carried a picture of an object with me and used it to perform an identification of an object as the one represented by the picture." (page 133 of PI).
i. Wittgenstein makes fun of the notion that language games require a mental image or mental picture, when he writes that "It is no more essential to the understanding of a proposition that one should imagine anything in connexion with it, than that one should make a sketch from it." (page 102 of PI).
j. Wittgenstein tells how the layperson is tricked into thinking that language games of understanding require a mental process or mental picture, as the layperson is all to willing to say: "But when I imaging something, or even actually see objects, I have got something which my neighbor has not. . . I understand you.You want to look about you and say: "At any rate only I have got THIS."" (page 102 of PI).
k. "A gun is fired in my presence and I say: "This crash wasn't as loud as I expected" . . . was there a crash, louder than that of a gun, in your imagination?" (page 40 of B&B Books),
l. "I see someone pointing a gun and say "I expect a bang".The shot is fired. . . . so did that bang somehow already exist in your expectation? . . . Did something of the shot already occur in my expectation?" (page 110 of PI),
m. Wittgenstein explains how we are tricked into thinking that the mental image or mental process exists.Wittgenstein points out that people generally agree to the proposition that "The purpose of language is to express thoughts.-So presumably the purpose of every sentence is to express a thought." (page 118 of PI).Wittgenstein points out that the layperson's agreement to this proposition is what makes the layperson believe that the mental images or mental process are necessary for language games (page 118 of PI).
n. Wittgenstein provides another example that shows that a mental act or a mental process need not accompany language games (example of expecting)."We say "I am expecting him", when we believe that he will come, though his coming does not occupy our thoughts." (page 129 of PI).
o. Wittgenstein provides yet another example showing that language games do not require a mental image or mental process."You were interrupted a while ago; do you still know what you were going to say?"If I do know now, and say it--does that mean that I had already thought it before, only not said it? No." (page 138 of PI).
p. Meaning, referring, understanding do not depend on mental acts (mental acts of which we are conscious) because of the fact that we can say, "Napoleon was crowned in 1804," and also mean "the man who won the battle of Austerlitz." (page 39; 142 of B&B Books).
q. Wittgenstein argues that meaning, referring, understanding, are not dependent on a mental picture, because we can say, "King's College is no fire," even though (if you did have a mental image) there would be a dozen buildings that look just like that image. (page 39 of B&B Books).
r. "When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." (page 90 of PI).
s. Wittgenstein shows how the grammar of the layperson suggests that language games require a separate mental image or mental process: ""One is tempted to use the following picture: what he really `wanted to say', what he `meant' was already present somewhere in his mind even before we gave it expression."(page 91 of PI).
t. Wittgenstein agrees that mental images do occur, even though he says that they are not a necessary part of any language game, with the exception of the language game of describing what you imagine: "The mental picture is the picture which is described when someone describes what he imagines." (page 98 of PI).
u. Wittgenstein makes fun of the notion that a mental image blue is used when we use the language game of color (of the word blue): "Has anyone shewn me the image of the colour blue and told me that this is the image of blue?" (page 100 of PI).

FEELINGS (feelings are a subset of mental acts or mental processes).Notion that language games (e.g., meaning, referring, understanding, intending) depend on a mental process, where the mental process is a feeling.Wittgenstein explains that this is a false notion and makes fun of this notion (pages 100, 105, 112, 129, 132 135, 144, 145, 148, 156 of B&B Books):
a. Feelings of familiarity (page 180 of B&B Books);
b. Relaxing of a strain (page 100 of B&B Books);
c. Feelings of tension or feeling relieved (page 129 of B&B Books).
d. "When I said, "Give me an apple and a pear and leave the room," had I the same feeling when I pronounced the two words "and"?" (page 79 of B&B Books)
e."Didn't I have a sort of homely feeling when I took in the word `tree'?" (page 156 of B&B Books).

GENERAL PROPERTIES OF ACTUAL GAMES (games of sports, cards, board games) AND LANGUAGE GAMES.Concept that that there are many different types of games, that it is fruitless to define "games" by any single characteristic game, that it is fruitless to find a common element in all games, and that games are better defined by way of a family of resemblances.
a. Wittgenstein states that the search for this common element is like attempting to strip off "its particular costume" or like trying to find the real artichoke by stripping off its leaves (page 125 of B&B Books).
b.Wittgenstein provides examples of the multitude of games, for example, bounded card games and unbounded card games (page 91, 92 of B&B Books),
c.A game is something characterized by "a multitude of circumstances" (page 157 of B&B Books),
d. But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions . . . [o]ne might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread-namely the continuous overlapping of these fibres . . . " (page 28 of PI).

LIST OF LANGUAGE GAMES.Wittgenstein uses these examples to demonstrate the absence of a mental image or mental process in these language games, and also to demonstrate the existence of the family quality in these language games:
a. Languages game of can (page 116 of B&B Books),
b. Languages game of trying (page 116 of B&B Books),
c. Languages game of searching (page 129 of B&B Books),
d. Languages game of expecting (page 183 of B&B Books),
e. Languages game of familiarity (page 181 of B&B Books),
f. Languages game of color (page 134 of B&B Books),
g. Languages game of understanding (page 113, 155), "I then try to remember what happened in my mind when I understood the words I did understand and when I didn't understand the others . . . this experiment will sow us a multitude of different characteristic experiences, it will not show us any one experience which we should be inclined to call the experience of understanding . . . [b]ut opposed to these there will be a large class of cases in which I should have to say "I know of no particular experience at all, I just said `Yes', or `No'". Wittgenstein then provides a list of these experiences (page 156 of B&B Books);
h. Languages game of sameness (pages 140, 141 of B&B Books),
i. Languages game of observing (page 152 of B&B Books),
j. Languages games of recognizing (page 127,165 of B&B Books),
k. Languages games of thinking (page 148 of B&B Books).Wittgenstein argues that the self observation of any mental image or mental act that occurs during thinking, will not tell us what thinking is: "In order to get clear about the meaning of the word "think" we watch ourselves while we think; what we observe will be what the word means"-But the concept is not used like that.(It would be as if without knowing how to play chess, I were to try and make out what the word "mate" meant by close observation of the last move of some game of chess.)" (page 88 of PI).Here, Wittgenstein is implying that the language game of thinking requires context(page 88 of PI)."Say: "Yes, this pen is blunt . . . [f]irst thinking it; then without thought; then just think the thought without the words .. . [b]ut what constitutes thought here is not some process which has to accompany the words if they are not to be spoken without thought." (page 91 of PI).
l. Languages games of willing, volition, intention (page 150, 151, 157).""is it time to get up?", he tries to make up his mind, and then suddenly he finds himself getting up.Describing it this way emphasizes the absence of an act of volition."Wittgenstein also uses the example of volition to illustrate the "game character" of the language game of volition: "But there is not one common difference between so called voluntary acts and involuntary ones, viz, the presence or absence of one element, the "act of volition."" (page 152 of B&B Books),
m. Language games of belief (page 151 154 of B&B Books),
n. Language games of using a name or naming (page 173, page 16 of PI),
o. Language games of observing (page 152 of B&B Books),
p. Language games of deriving (page 124 of B&B Books),
q. Language game of similarity or having something in common (page 133, 135, 136 of B&B Books),
r. Language game of reading (page 122 of B&B Books),
s. Language games of interpreting drawings."And yet one feels that what one calls the expression of the face [a drawing] is something that can be detached from the drawing of the face.It is as though we could say: "This face has a particular expression: namely this" (pointing to something). . . [W]e are, as it were, under the optical delusion which . . . makes us think that there are two objects where there is only one.The delusion is assisted by our using the verb "to have", saying "The face has a particular expression"." (page 162, 163 of B&B Books).See also page 168 169 of B&B Books).Here, Wittgenstein points out how the layperson's use of ordinary grammar makes him think that a mental image or mental process is needed in the language games of understanding, of interpreting, etc., whereas, in fact, understanding, interpretation, etc., comes from context or from an institution.
t. Language games of interpreting music.""What is it like to know the tempo in which a piece of music should be played?"And the idea suggest itself that there must be a paradigm somewhere in our mind, and that we have adjusted the tempo to conform to that paradigm.But in most cases . . . I will . . . just whistle it in a particular way, and nothing will have been present to my mind but the tune actually whistled (not an image of that)." (page 166 of B&B Books)."Sing this tune with expression.And now don't sing it, but repeat its expression!-And here one actually might repeat something.For example, motions of the body, slower and faster breathing, and so on." (page 91 of PI).Here, Wittgenstein seems to be showing how the layperson's use of grammar indicates that expression is a mental process separate from the singing (page 91 of PI).
u. Similarly, in a discussion of the language game of recognition, Wittgenstein states that "Suppose the game . . . consisted in this, that B should say whether he knows the object or not but does not say what it is.Suppose he was shown an ordinary pencil . . . [w]hat happened when he recognized it? . . . the words "Oh, this is a pencil" did not refer to a paradigm, the similarity of which with the pencil shown B had recognized.Asked "what is a pencil?", Be would not have pointed to another object as the paradigm or sample, but could straight away have pointed to the pencil shown to him . . . [h]e just reacted in this particular way by saying this word." (page 128 of B&B Books).
v. Wittgenstein explains why the notion that a mental image or mental process is used in understanding, interpreting, etc., a word or a drawing.Wittgenstein explains: ""The word falls", one is tempted to explain, "into a mould of my mind long prepared fro it". But . . . I don't perceive both the word and a mould . . ." (page 170 of B&B Books).

INSTITUTIONS, CONTEXT, USE, SITUATIONS.Wittgenstein concludes that meaning, referring, understanding, etc., depends on some connection to context, uses, institutions, connection.

a. "The meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it.The meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the expression . . . I want to play chess, and a man gives the white king a paper crown, leaving the use of the piece unaltered, but telling me that the crown has a meaning to him in the game . . . I say: "as long as it doesn't alter the use of the piece, it hasn't what I call a meaning."" (page 65 of B&B Books).
b. "[W]e refer by the phrase "understanding a word" not necessarily to that which happens while we are saying or hearing it, but to the whole environment of the event of saying it." (page 157 of B&B Books).
c. Wittgenstein indicates that meaning comes not from a mental image or mental process, but from use."What we call their meaning is not anything which they have got in them or which is fastened to them irrespective of what use we make of them." (page 170 of B&B Books).
d. Regarding the language game of naming, Wittgenstein says: "We can therefore say that if naming something is to be more than just uttering a sound while pointing to something, there must also be . . . the knowledge of how in the particular case the sound . . . is to be used." (page 173 of B&B Books).
e. "This thought ties on to thoughts which I have had before . . . [t]his thought is connected with those earlierthoughts", and yet be unable to shew the connexion." (page 139 of PI).
f. "Of course, if the meaning is the use we make of the word . . . [b]ut we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the "use," which is extended in time . . . [b]ut can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand it in this way?" (page 46 of PI)."One cannot guess how a word functions.One has to look at its use and learn from that." (page 93 of PI).
g. "An intention [in language game of intending] is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions." (page 92 of PI).
h. This concerns the language game the color red. "What am I to say about the word "red"?--that it means something "confronting us all" and that everyone should really have another word, besides this one, to mean his own sensation of red?Or is it like this: the word "red" means something known to everyone . . ." (page 81 of PI).Thus, Wittgenstein seems to say that meaning comes from something confronting us all, from something known to everyone.
i. The following concerns the language game of expecting."An expectation is imbedded in a situation, from which arises.The expectation of an explosion may, for example, arise from a situation in which an explosion is to be expected." (page 129 of PI).
j. This concerns Wittgenstein's connection of language games with use.""It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash.". . . Can't the use-in a certain sense-be grasped in a flash? (page 65 of PI).Here, Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting how meaning comes from something other than a mental image or mental process: "A machine as symbolizing its actions:the action of a machine-I might say at first-seems to be there in nit from the start.What does that mean?-If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems to be already completely determine.We talk as if these parts could only move in this way . . . "The machine's action seems to be in it from the start . . ." ". . . the possible movements of a machine are already there in it in some mysterious way . . ." (page 66 of PI).
k. "I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it . . . a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign posts, a custom." (page 68 of PI).
l. "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)." (page 68 of PI).

Precursor to the Investigations
The so-called "Blue and Brown Books" are in fact Wittgenstein's notes in the period leading up to the publication of his Magnum Opus, the "Philosophical Investigations". As I understand, these notes (as well as many other collections of Wittgenstein's notes that were published postthumously) were never intended to be published. The reason almost all of Wittgenstein's notes were published is his enormous importance in 20th century philosophy and the difficulty in fully understanding his positions.

Ultimately, to understand Wittgenstein one must read the "Philosophical Investigations"; this volume can only assist an advanced student of Wittgenstein in coming to terms with his philosophy, and cannot, in my opinion, serve as introduction to the investigations. Instead, I suggest reading the Investigations along with an introductory or exegetical text such as A. Kenny's "Wittgenstein" or P.M.S. Hacker's "Insight and Illusion", or any number of other texts written with the same purpose in mind.

To sum up: this book is recommended for advanced students as an ancillary to the "Investigations", not as a separate text.

Changed my life
If I can recall the one book that influenced my thoughts, even my life, more than any other, it would have to be Wittgenstein's Blue Book. It is THE reason to ever learn how to read!

Resplendent, explosive...
If you've never read Wittgenstein, bear down; and soon enough you'll cry,and shout, and praise God--blessed are the hours this man lived! Make roomon your bedside table, tear out and fold the pages so you can carry them inyour pocket; invest in your enlightenment. ... Read more

Book Description
In 1938 Wittgenstein delivered a short course of lectures on aesthetics to a small group of students at Cambridge. The present volume has been compiled from notes taken down at the time by three of the students: Rush Rhees, Yorick Smythies, and James Taylor. They have been supplemented by notes of conversations on Freud (to whom reference was made in the course on aesthetics) between Wittgenstein and Rush Rhees, and by notes of some lectures on religious belief. As very little is known of Wittgenstein's views on these subjects from his published works, these notes should be of considerable interest to students of contemporary philosophy. Further, their fresh and informal style should recommend Wittgenstein to those who find his Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations a little formidable. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Only really suitable as supplemental reading
It's interesting how many negative votes were cast for J. Fry who stated that it's okay, but not great.We can all hero worship Wittgenstein, and of course religion and psychology are amazing, too, so this volume must be deep and illuminating, right?Not really.Wittgenstein was, arguably, one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century, but most Wittgenstein lovers refuse to listen to Wittgenstein's own self-deprecations regarding any application of his work to anything other than as therapy for a certain kind of analytic philosophical method.Wittgenstein, like any great intellectual, had some interesting things to say about religion and culture, but he was far from a philosopher of these things.He himself disavowed the comprehensive mystical pronouncements at the end of the youthful Tractatus, though he himself continued to demonstrate some sympathies with them, mainly about the limits of philosophy to speak well about religion.

These lectures do not provide any major self-standing statement that applies Wittgenstein to religion.The best of it is simply his bringing up statements like "I believe in Judgment Day" or "The universe was created [fill in some non scientific timeperiod]" and Wittgenstein honestly saying:I'm not sure I understand what that person is really stating.I may jump to the conclusion that they are making a wrong scientific statement, but they may in fact be stating something more akin to a statement of a grammatical quality relating to a religious way of life.

But to understand what Wittgenstein means by taking that approach, one really needs to read his philosophy and even then, there is a lot of debate what it means to connect his philosophy with religion in this way.Peter Geach, Fergus Kerr, DZ Phillips, and George Lindbeck all come up with very different conclusions when doing just this. Personally, I think Lindbeck and Phillips are on the right track.

This isn't like reading a lecture by Nietzsche on an issue, and in this sense this volume is very thin in more ways than one.

Personally, I find reading "On Certainty" along with "Culture and Value" as a more valuable way of getting Wittgenstein's thoughts on these matters.

Valuable contribution to Wittgenstein corpus
This unique text contains a collection of Wittgenstein's lecture notes taken by his students Rush Rhees, James Taylor and Yorick Smithies. Their unique because of the informality of the delivery: reading these notes, one can almost imagine the philosopher seated in his flat at Cambridge, extemporaneously discussing the subjects of aesthetics, psychology and religious belief.

It has been said that these particular subjects were only superficially touched upon in Wittgenstein's main works, Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, and because of the informality of the discussions, are therefore more accessible for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy.

Although the notes on aesthetics and religious belief are interesting, Wittgenstein's views on Freud, i.e., psychoanalysis and particularly dream language, symbology and their interpretation throws a new light on psychoanalysis, in terms of the on-going argument as to whether it can be classified a true "science". The key to psychoanalysis' power and longevity is the cleverness and charm of the various arguments it proposes. The idea that _any_ opposition to Freud is a form of "resistance" from the unconscious has persisted throughout its history. This notion, at least in the beginning of the movement, successfully thwarted any productive dialogue and criticism.

Overall, however, Wittgenstein claimed that analysis was likely to do harm, he writes,

"Because although one may discover in the course of it various things about oneself, one must have a very strong and keen and persistent criticism in order to recognize and see through the mythology that is offered or imposed on one. There is an inducement to say, `Yes, of course, it must be like that.' A powerful mythology" (P.52)

Reading these informal "notes" has given me a better understanding of Wittgenstein's process of thought and investigation into these subjects. This volume is quite small, though it is full of insight and useful for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy.

Wittgenstein on Aesthetics
This book containslectures and discussions by Wittgenstein on topics that are not addressed in his major works: aesthetics and religious belief. The remarks were recorded by students and friends.

In his early work, the Tractatus, Wittgenstein said:Ethics and aesthetics are one. Both are "beyond" capture in a "meaningful proposition". His later philosophy has a surprising turn away from the earlier ideas.

Anyone doing aesthetics cannot ignore these remarks. Are poems important? Is laughter a concern of philosophy? The distinction betwen cause and reason is for W. at the root of a major misunderstanding in aesthetics.
W. was fascinated by St. Augustine, Cardinal Newman, George Fox, Luther.O.K. Bouwsma once remarked to me that W. had said to him that it was astounding that a man as intelligent as Cardinal Newman saw a miracle in the fact that Napoleon's troops weapons dropped from their hands in the attack on Russia.

Not bad, not great
Whatever sagacity I sought from Wittgenstein regarding religion wassomewhat lacking.The conversation he has regarding religion reallytouches more on death than on theology.Not quite what I was looking for. The section on religion is a bit of a misnomer. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (31)

Fine Biography
This is a very good biography of the brilliant, very influential, and rather odd Ludwig Wittgenstein.Monk sets out to provide a thorough narrative that depicts both Wittgenstein's career as a philosopher and his unusual personal life in a way that shows the unity of this life.Monk presents Wittgenstein as a man in constant search of an elusive goal of authenticity or a very demanding form of self-fulfillment.Wittgenstein seems to have been driven by a virtually religious need to pursue some form of meritorious life.This doesn't appear to be in any ordinary sense a desire to be useful to others but rather a sense that life would be misspent if not devoted to some kind of higher calling. This is the "Duty of Genius" referred to by the title of the book. Wittgenstein attempted to do this in various ways throughout his life.In addition to what was at times an obsessive preoccupation with philosophical issues, Wittgenstein sought fulfillment by serving as an enlisted man in the Austro-Hungarian Army, as an elementary school teacher, and as a hospital porter in London during the Blitz.In a particularly telling episode, he signed over all of his considerable wealth (his father had dominated the Austrian steel industry) to his equally wealthy siblings, apparently because he regarded affluence as an obstacle to self-fulfillment.Much of this search for fulfillment had an irrational or even mystical element, and its clear that he spent much of his life profoundly unhappy with himself.One gets the sense that if Wittgenstein had had conventional religious views, he might well have found satisfaction in a cloistered religious life.

Wittgenstein's personal relationships reflected his rather self-involved focus.In addition to his intellectual brilliance, he must have possessed considerable charisma.Throughout his life, he was able to attract the friendship and support of intelligent, and in many cases, remarkably patient individuals who were able to tolerate his often odd and sometimes thoughtless behavior.While he clearly had strong hermetic impulses, he clearly had a strong need for friends.In later years, he actually attracted disciples, and seems to have had somewhat homoerotic relationships with at least 2 of them.

How does this fit in with Wittgenstein's work in philosophy?Monk points out the strange way that Wittgenstein came to philosophy.In his early 20s, Wittgenstein had apparently embarked on a career as an engineer.He then became interested in basic questions of logic, influenced by the work of Frege and Russell.He sought out Russell, who accepted him as a disciple at a time when Russell felt that someone else needed to take up the task of continuing the work that Russell had started.Wittgenstein had little prior knowledge of philosophy.As Monk points out, while he later read some important philosophers, Wittgenstein had read little philosophy at this point in his life.Wittgenstein does seem to have been influenced by Schopenhauer but probably more importantly by figures from the Viennese milieu of his youth like the critic Karl Kraus.A particular favorite seems to have been an obscure Viennese writer named Weininger, of whom Wittgenstein remained very fond, and who originated the duty of genius notion.In later years, Wittgenstein would look to other unconventional thinkers for inspiration including Goethe's writings on biology and perhaps most surprisingly, the pseudo-historical analysis of Oswald Spengler.

Wittgenstein, then, was both congenitally and by choice, an outsider to the Western philosophical tradition. This accounts partly for his apparently unique approach to philosophy.

Monk emphasizes Wittgenstein's primary preoccupations with ethical self-transformation, the irrational, and methods, as opposed to conclusions in philosophy.This is one aspect of this book I found disappointing.The descriptions of Wittgenstein's philosophic work and the context in which they arise are not as good as the narrative about his personal life and psychology.To get the most out of this biography, I recommend reading Monk's concise book, How to Read Wittgenstein, which is about 100 pages and quite clear.Taking both the biography and Monk's other book together, Monk shows very well how Wittgenstein's personal life and philosophic work come together.If the point of life was a search or struggle for ethical self-fulfillment rather than attaining a given goal, its not surprising that Wittgenstein's analysis would stress methods and the limits of reason rather than scientifically oriented conclusions.If what made life valuable was aesthetic concerns and somewhat Romantic ideals of culture, then its not surprising that there would be mystical, even contradictory element in Wittgenstein's work.

Monk records that Wittgenstein's last words were, "Tell them I've had a wonderful life." An odd statement for a man who was so often profoundly unhappy.Yet, if the search for self-fulfillment rather than any definite piece of knowledge is the measure of success, Wittgenstein was one of the most successful men of his time.

you have to like the person to love the book
I do not have major problems with the book though the writing certainly did not capture my attention. I stopped liking and admiring Wittgenstein half way through the book. I was drawn by his ideas to his biography. However, just like what an old saying says -"If you like the egg, you don't need to know the chicken that laid it", I should have just stayed with the ideas. Wittgenstein might be an accidental genius but certainly not someone likable (by my criteria).

Excellent biography brings Wittgenstein to life
The positivist, analytical tradition in philosophy is what most people would associate Wittgenstein with in the first instance, provided they had heard of him in the first place. Because of his, and because of his philosophical attacks on the meaningfulness of the concepts of metaphysics, theology, spirituality and even most of logic, he is often depicted as some sort of cold, unfeeling Grand Master sitting on a pinnacle of Genius of Philosophy. But as Ray Monk's biography shows with much vigour, he was in reality a very troubled, confused, unhappy, spiritual, and above all very human person.

Making use of all the manuscripts available as well as the many correspondences of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk, a philosopher at the U of Southampton, is able to show the Wittgenstein we know as a person that one could not only sympathize with, but even pity. Because as it appears from the biography, Wittgenstein was a deeply unhappy man. His relationships were, from early life on, troubled - not as often supposed because of their bisexual nature, but rather because of his general revulsion to what he calls "sensuality" on the whole, and his tendency to flee from the people he loved. His friendships fared no better, since Wittgenstein was both fickle and dominating, unable to deal with disagreement and very strong in his views even on very minor things of daily life - which leads to repeated diary notes and comments by everyone, from Keynes to Russell, on how talking to Wittgenstein was simply too exhausting. Add to this a constant wrestling with the fact that Wittgenstein was very religious, yet thought all religious theory meaningless babble, and you have a recipe for depression.

Monk of course also pays attention to the content of his philosophical views, and makes sure that these are, in broad outlines, accessible and useful to a general public. For specialists and professional philosophers this will rather be a tantalizing overview than a sufficient working out of Wittgenstein's philosophical views, but fortunately Monk has also written several works of secondary literature on the subject, so that people can read those if they enjoy this biography (which I would certainly read first): How to Read Wittgenstein. What Monk does best is to integrate these philosophical viewpoints into the larger narrative of his life, precisely as a good biography of a philosopher requires. The only thing I found somewhat unsatisfying was why Wittgenstein changed his views so strongly after the Tractatus, more or less rejecting the entire foundation this work was based on. One would have expected something personal to reflect as radically the change in philosophy, but either it isn't there, or Monk doesn't bring it out.

The style of writing Monk uses is very pleasant, and he avoids being opinionated either way (though he seems to sympathize with Wittgenstein's spiritual problematic a lot more than I would). An appendix to the book also deals with the (in)famous Bartley's commentaries on Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein (Modern)), in particular those parts dealing with his sex life. Ray Monk very sensibly here chooses the middle road - it is quite beyond any doubt that Wittgenstein had homosexual relations, but the idea of him prowling the Prater in search for rentboys belongs firmly in the domain of fantasy.
I devoured the 600-page biography of this neurotic genius in one weekend, owing to the fascinating nature of the subject as well as Monk's effective and lively portrayal of him. Very much recommended to a wide public.

Integrity and Introspection
This is biography the way it should be written--focused on what made the subject important, and providing background context only to the degree necessary to situate people and events.Wittgenstein's temperament and personality were so inextricably bound up in his thought that any distinction evaporates.He thought like the person he was:ascetic, intuitive, and introverted.He questioned the value of his doing philosophy, as he questioned the value of his own thinking.His sense of duty was the obligation to speak the truth, no matter how awkward...or to be silent.

Review: From the Bottom of My Heart
After reading this biography it suffices that I don't read any other. ... Read more

Book Description
"[Art as Language] is in itself extremely valuable as an example of the still largely unappreciated relevance of Wittgenstein's work to traditional philosophical issues. . . . This book, as a more or less encyclopedic critique of aesthetic theories from a Wittgensteinian perspective, will be enlightening to aesthetic theorists who want to know, not what Wittgenstein said about art, but what the relevance of his work is to their use of language as a point of reference for interpreting art."--Choice

"In a series of acute arguments, Hagberg dismantles the region of grand aesthetic theory that defines art in the terms philosophy has traditionally used to define language. . . . Written with excellence in argumentation, judiciousness, and a capacious knowledge of Wittgenstein."--Daniel Herwitz, Common Knowledge

"A clear and intelligent book. Hagberg's strategy is to show the consequences of holding a Wittgensteinian view of language and mind for aesthetic theories which are either based on, or analogous to, other non-Wittgensteinian positions about language and mind. This is an important project."--Stanley Bates, Middlebury College ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

A beautifully written book, true to Wittgenstein's method.
I can't claim to have read everything there is about Wittgenstein, or even half.But as a long time reader of Wittgenstein and his various explicators, I urge anyone interested in W. to purchase this book.Theauthor writes with *very* unusual clarity; so many books about Wittgensteinare written poorly--suffering from wordiness, clumsy syntax, logicalconfusions, etc.There's something about W. that brings out the worst inmany explicators, and that "something" is (typically) the attemptto find a general "method" or grand, overarching"principle."But to attempt such a grand, general approach is toviolate, right off the bat, Wittgenstein's arguments.

Professor Hagbergavoids that common trap completely.He does W. a great service by applyingseveral of W's. key arguments to specific contexts in art criticism andaesthetics.This approach--the specific *application* of specific*arguments* in specific *contexts* is very true to W.'s approach, and itpays off beautifully in some of the most lucid writing about W. (orphilosophical matters generally) that you'll ever come across.

Finally,this is a terrific book for both beginners and veterans of W.It'sespecially good for those readers who get tantalizing "glimpses"of what W. is about but who get frustrated with the often opaque, wordy,and clumsy explications of him.

In conclusion: I'm not kidding or evenexaggerating...this will be, for many interested in W., the very bookthey've been looking for but couldn't find...up to now. ... Read more

Amazon.com
Written by one of the century's truly great thinkers, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is a remarkable--and surprisingly approachable--collection of insights, statements, and nearly displayed thinking habits of the philosopher's work on language, symbols, categories, and a host of other topics. Organized into nearly 700 short observations, this book is a treasure trove for anyone who needs to think carefully about objects, categories, and symbols, especially in relation to structured logic applications in computer programming.

The short (and sometimes aphoristic) observations in Philosophical Investigations allow the reader to ponder basic questions on what describes a category, how language works in everyday situations, and how symbols function to represent our world.

Originally a series of notes to himself as he lectured on philosophy, the book is a brilliant grab bag of thought and example. Often framed as a question ("How do I recognize that this is red?"), the philosopher provides short answers in a sentence or two, never more than a paragraph. (The second part of the book uses longer answers of several pages to develop its arguments.) An index lets the reader browse on topics of interest--such as language, concept, games, or naming.

Any artificial intelligence researcher looking to understand human language will be intrigued by Wittgenstein's ideas on how symbols and language operate. And for anyone who designs software with objects, this book's careful attention to thinking about what makes a good category demonstrates rigorous thinking about everyday objects and things. Philosophical Investigations is at times a strange and often wonderful book that reveals the thought processes of one of history's finest minds. It exposes the fundamental problems of using language as a means of teaching machines to think using words. --Richard Dragan

Topics covered: Theory of language and language games, meaning and symbols, concepts and categories, behavior, games (including chess), color, images and perception, grammar and language, sensations, theory of mind and thinking. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (26)

Language games: controversial notion, but most thought provoking
One aspect of this book that makes it important for simply that contribution is the notion of "language games."If language produces reality, different languages produce different realities. In this book, German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein developed the related notion of "language games,"islands of language, unique each to itself, not wholly translatable one into another.Each of us inhabits a particular language game, he claims, which channels how we see things and understand the world and our places within it.Again, language shapes meaning and understanding and interpretation.The world is disclosed to us through our specific language game.If we live in different language games, we see different worlds. This concept entails, as philosopher Chantal Mouffe says, ". . . a critique of the rationalist conception of the subject [i.e., the knowing, reasoning human mind] that indicates that the latter cannot be the source of linguistic meanings since it is through participation in different language games that the world is disclosed to us."

This is a serious attack on the Modern conception of the human as a reasoning being who can affect change in desired directions through the exercise of that reason.Thus, reason does NOT allow us to see the world as it is and to change it as we wish in a manner leading to progress.The concept of language games is key for many postmodern thinkers.

If we think through language and the use of language is thought itself, what is perceived is indistinct from language use.The two cannot be separated, since language governs interpretation and perception and thought.To revisit the phrase from Wittgenstein, different people play and live in different "language games," that is, their languages lead them to see the world differently, to conceptualize things differently from those in different language games.So what for the person interested in politics?

In the final analysis, this means that whenever we try to understand the world, it is through language, through interpretation, since we cannot directly perceive reality outside of our language.This begins to suggest the likelihood that one's own culture or society or polity does not have universally "true" answers to key questions of human existence; our culture develops answers within its language game that make sense at that particular time for that culture.All is interpretation of uncertain texts within different language games.

Certainly, this is a strong argument.Many disagree that language per se shapes our views of reality.And that argument needs to be taken seriously.Nonetheless, the argument about "language games," although only a small part of this book, is a provocative concept, well worth thinking about.

Interesting short read, but not challenging
I think many readers are turned off by the broken up nature of the text. The format does not bother me. Wittgenstein freely admits in the preface that he did not have time to finsh the book or do it justice. Instead we have a series of numbered paragraphs/thoughts/ideas/questions. My favorite investigateion, if I were to pick one, was #47, that was a highpoint of the book for me. Look that one up for a taste of the book.

He is boiling down communication to its bare essentials or building blocks. He focuses on what it takes to truly convey a meaning to someone else. Most of the thoughts seem to explore language as a communication tool coupled with shared experience and intuition.

Maybe I've read other authors who explored these concepts before I've read Wittgenstein. Maybe this truly was ground breaking at the time, I'm no historian or profesional philosopher (if there is such a thing). It is certainly worth reading but it is not on my list of favorites. The book didn't change my world view. Maybe I just agree with him and look through a similar projectory as his world view. I was really optimistic going into this book, but can only give it a 3 because I will probably never read it again. 4 is for books I will probably read again, 5 are my favorites.

Not one of the great books.
Wittgenstein was cryptic in the extreme.This has been mistaken for wisdom.Though he was considered an oracle by the 20th century he is likely, as was Herbert Spencer, famous in his own day, to be ignored by the subsequent generation.

This is not a book to spend much time on if you have real philosophical problems to solve.If you are looking for curios in the history of philosophy, by all means spend an hour.

Learn from it but there is no need to worship it
This is a book which at one time was worshipped. It was taken to be the holy text that gave the true answers to the philosophical puzzles that graduate students in philosophy were puzzling over. Wittgenstein was the hero and his manner of ' doing philosophy' of walking and holding his forehead, and waiting in silence and thinking for long stretches of time while puzzling it out was imitated by his many followers. The 'Investigations' did not like the 'Tractatus ' before it present the system that would tell the whole truth , answer it all , as it were. It instead put the focus on philosophizing as an activity. And it is a remarkable, enigmatic, aphoristic text rich in suggestions and quandaries. It truly is a book that presents perplexing questions and makes it seem as if ' thinking' is a most serious and difficult business.
From the work come key concepts which have been added to ' vocabulary ' of philosophical. Wittgenstein 'Seek the use not the meaning' puts him of course in the company of the pragmatists. The concept of ' family resemblance' in defining a concept in which one does not see a single clear definition, but rather sees 'variations'whose ' meanings overlap' as in a Venn diagram is another powerful tool of analysis. ' Letting the fly out of the fly bottle' another metaphor for philosophizing too suggested the turn to ordinary language and everyday common experience as central for philosophizing. And this away from the formal abstract logical thinking of 'The Tractatus'.
Another point. The 'Philosophical Investigations' is a hard book to understand. And part of the mystique of Wittgenstein is the sense of his incredible ' genius mind' which most of us even those studying philosophy, cannot grasp.
My own sense is that if you ask trivial questions you get trivial answers. And that of course much of the metaphysical and religious discourse philosophical analysis, logicalpositivism dismissed as nonsense is precisely what is important. 'The Investigations' opens more in the direction( I believe) of allowing for these kinds of meaning. But I am not sure about this.
Another point. I do not pretend to understand not only not fully, not even ' largely' 'The Investigations'. The sense of not understanding though puzzling over it of course said something to me about my own ' lesser powers' in philosophy.
Years later I would simply recommend to readers of the work to not take it with the kind of seriousness we did then. Take it as an interesting text, even a poetic text, and parse it and find meanings in it which hopefully will enrich your life and philosophical understanding.
Do not pray to it. Wittgenstein was a great mind , but a mind to be studied and understood, a frail and fragmented mind also, and not to be worshipped.

essential philosophy for intelligent reader
A lot of philosophers today are dissatisfied with what they see as a contemptuous attitude of Wittgenstein towards the traditional method of philosophical inquiry: 1)looking at philosophical problem 2)analyzing it 3)formulating a theory capable of explaining it. They are right. Wittgenstein really had an intention to "prove philosophy to be a worthless activity". He possessed a method of his own: 1)looking at a traditional philosophical problem 2)analyzing it 3)finding inconsistencies in the logic of the problem or conceptual confusion involved in formulation of this problem. Whether or not he was right in thinking that this method is capable of solving ALL philosophical problems, there are some interesting arguments in this book.

I would like to list some of them to give an impression of what this book is like.

Famous PRIVATE LANGUAGE, for example, is directed against a version of scepticism called SOLIPSISM. (solipsism is the view that any assertion of the existence of external world and /or minds of other people is meaningless because we can perceive only contents of our own mind). Rather then trying to find an argument justifying the inference of the existence of other human minds from the observable human behavior, Wittgenstein challenges the common-sense conception we have of our consciousness (the one we share with Descartes). His perspective is interesting, especially the idea that our familiarity with our sensations is dependent upon our understanding of language.

Another argument, which I call VISUAL ROOM ARGUMENT, concerns itself with the supposedly private nature of perception (looking, imagining). Problem which Wittgenstein discusses is so subtle that readers who didnt previously "discovered" this problem independently will not understand what the hell is he talking about. Those, however, who already felt troubled by itwill be puzzled by sheer power of Wittgenstein intellect, when they grasp the connection between the this problem and the cluster of other problems concerning personal identity.

Apart from "dissolving" traditional philosophical problems, Wittgenstein also provides some simple but precise observations that drive us to the boundary of the territory where reason could be applied. He discusses the process of reading by urging us to engage in series of practical experiments, such as reading the numbers on wrist watch, while observing our mind processes in a way he suggests, or reading a line of nonsense while silently "saying to ourselves" meaningful sentence and then comparing the experience to our ordinary experiences of reading. Wittgenstein never forces us to adopt any particular doctrine (apart from his philosophy of language, which became rather notorious in academic circles), but anybody who will perform these experiments honestly will certanly look on his own mind from different perspective.

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Those who dont have any philosophical education need not worry. Wittgenstein despised philosophical jargon. He didnt use word "solipsism" in the private language argument. You wount find any logical formulas in PI. (this is not Quine). There is no references to other philosophers (apart from one or two mentions of Frege and James). HOwever Wittgenstein is not easy. Logical rigor of analytical philosophy can be overwhelming to those used to reading of Nietzsche and Kirkegaard. ... Read more

Book Description

Customer Reviews (2)

A Thankful Supplement to Wittgenstein's Most Difficult Text
In 1950, Wittgenstein tried to have all of his old notebooks destroyed. Thankfully, three sets of texts escaped this unhappy fate. The first two are some of Wittgenstein's personal notebooks from August 1914 to October 1915, found at the house of his sister; these comprise the main content of this book. The third set consists of three texts from the collection of Bertrand Russell, which are printed as appendices. The first appendix is Wittgenstein's 1913 "Notes on Logic," which was his first attempt to formulate a comprehensive, proto-Tractatus. The second is a few pages of notes that Wittgenstein dictated to G.E. Moore in 1914, who came to visit while Wittgenstein was living isolated with his thoughts in Norway. The third appendix consists of extracts of Wittgenstein's letters to Russell.

In the second edition of this book, images of a few passages of Wittgenstein's symbolism are printed in a fourth appendix; these were omitted from the first edition because no one could make heads or tails of them. (As far as this reviewer knows, no progress has been made there.)

In a lovely preface to the first edition of this text, first published in 1961, the editors give expression to the role that this text can play for the students of Wittgenstein. Unfortunately, it was omitted from the second edition, and so I quote from it here:

"We publish this material as an aid to students of the Tractatus. Most of it is no easier than the Tractatus itself; it naturally shews development; thus when it appears to present views different from those of the Tractatus, there is no need to reconcile the two. It should not be used without more ado as evidence for particular interpretations of the Tractatus. It does shew clearly, however, what problems formed the context of Wittgenstein's remarks in the Tractatus; in this way it will serve to cut short some argument where wholly irrelevant contexts are supposed by an interpretation." (v)

Indeed, this book is simply invaluable to any serious student of the Tractatus; I cannot imagine studying one without the other. Passages in the notebooks are cross-referenced with similar or identical ones found in the Tractatus, and helpful comments are given in footnotes by the editors. Although not all of Wittgenstein's cryptic personal remarks shed light on his published work, many of them provide the blessing of context for propositions in the Tractatus that are otherwise maddenlingly opaque.

As for the extent to which the Notebooks might reduce some of the extensive dispute about how to interpret Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: that much remains, appropriately, in extensive dispute. But if you have ever tried to tackle what may be Wittgenstein's most difficult work, only to find yourself banging your head against the pages, I guarantee that you will find great satisfaction in reading this book.

Insight into the Early Wittgenstein
This book shows well the development of Wittgenstein's early thought.It is easier to see where his influences effected his thought.The metaphysical nature of his early thinking and his debt to Schopenhauer areclearer in this text than they are in any other.I have substracted onestar only because I prefer his later thinking, and these notes, as thetitle states, are only from 1914 through 1916. ... Read more

Book Description
This volume is the first selection of the key writings of Wittgenstein - arguably the emblematic philosopher of the twentieth-century. Assembled for students, The Wittgenstein Reader represents the breadth, complexity, and evolution of Wittgenstein's work, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus - which set his philosophical agenda - to the later work on ethics and religion.This thematic selection corresponds roughly to the chronological development of Wittgenstein's philosophical interests, beginning with The Rejection of Logical Atomism through to Ethics, Life and Faith. Taken together, the selections are designed to add up to an overview of Wittgenstein's philosophical position, making The Wittgenstein Reader an ideal single text for course use. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (4)

Great text for doing philosophy in class
For those that wish to use Wittgenstein to engage students with philosophy this book is a great way to do that without having to purchase several more expensive books. This selection of the key writings presents the evolution of Wittgenstein from the Tractatus to his later works. It enables students to experience doing philosophy and moving from one stage to another and another in a practical way. It corresponds well to reflective thinking stages and helps demonstrate the philosophical succession that leads to our contemporary position on truth, beauty and goodness. I agree that "Taken together, the selections are designed to add up to an overview of Wittgenstein's philosophical position, making The Wittgenstein Reader an ideal single text for course use."

Mr from Mumbai,
"The Wolrd is the totality of facts, not of things. Not how the world is mystical, but that it is. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. And this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. So if you want to stay within the religious sphere you must struggle."

I qoute this phrase from your review; it was totally misunderstanding of yours. Your review will mislead the future readers of this amazing piece by Anthony Kenny.

If someone want to read Anthony's book, I strongly recommend his book about Aquinas. His English is really awesome: it was concise, powerful, and beautiful! not for americans tho'

A handy access to Wittgenstein's works (themewise sorted)
A very good introduction to Wittgenstein's works. Given the fact that Wittgenstein did not write in usual essay form and did not encourage publications of his works in his life time, the book is very goodcontribution to the context of Wittgenstein's readers. An abridgement ofthe Tractatus is given as first chapter.A good balance of thematicallyand chronological basis has been adopted in the sequence of other chapters.The sample chapter titles are : The Rejection of Logical Atomism , Meaningand Understanding,... TheFirst Person, .. The Nature of Philosophy,Ethics,Life and Faith. A good index is provided. Two weaknesses are : Theauthor provides a two-page introduction. A 10 page biography would havebeen proper . Also a last chapter which summaries the nature ofWittgenstein's works and its relation to other philosophical works wouldhave been better. From the point of view of Wittgenstein's scholars, theremarks are provided without any citation numbering. It complicatesrefering the book. Same sample Wittgenstein's remarks: The Wolrd is thetotality of facts, not of things. Not how the world is mystical, but thatit is. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity.And this simply means that the philosophical problems should completelydisappear. So if you want to stay within the religious sphere you muststruggle.

An excellent compilation by an excellent author
I myself am not a die-hard fan of epistemology.In fact, the only works dedicated to that topic which I can stand for long are written by Anthony Kenny.He does wonders with Wittegnstein.His commentary and selectionstruly make the philosophy come to life.Even if you aren't particularlyfond of the material, it still proves to be a highly valuable and highlyreadable work. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Difficult but good insight
Probably the best commentary I have read on Wittgenstein.Strong focus on the later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations.This book is not easy reading.Wittgenstein can be tough going and this book will notchew your food for you.Kenny can at times be almost as difficult as hissubject, however this book will reward your efforts and expand yourunderstandings. ... Read more

Book Description
This book comprises material on colour which was written by Wittgenstein in the last eighteen months of his life. It is one of the few documents which shows him concentratedly at work on a single philosophical issue. The principal theme is the features of different colours, of different kinds of colour (metallic colour, the colours of flames, etc.) and of luminosity--a theme whichWittgenstein treats in such a way as to destroy the traditional idea that colour is a simple and logically uniform kind of thing.
This edition consists of Wittgenstein's basic German text, together with an English translation. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Unfair to Goethe, Witty disappointingly missed Schopenhauer
**** - Four Stars, and not two as shown above.

--Remarks on Colour-- is the last fruit of one of the greatest intellectuals of the XXth century. It is a book that allows a most clear view of how intuitively brilliant Wittgenstein is; but in more than one sense, it is disappointing. Above all because he writes it largely on the shoulders of Goethe's --Farbenlehre-- and Runge's observations, without dedicating a single comment to him who has been increasingly disclosed as his mentor and master of youth: the unsurpassed creature of insight named Schopenhauer.

As a whole, Wittgenstein's book can be considered a bundle of topic additions and observations to the Farbenlehre. As everything he wrote, it is extremely sharp and illuminating, indeed of inestimable value. However, it lacks what Goethe's readers would be expecting to see: a personal position on those which were Goethe's main aims; firstly, the critique of Newton's famous spectrum of colors: two centuries ago, Goethe brilliantly challenged the Newtonian notion, still held in utmost esteem in our days, that white is composed by a melange of seven colors through a prism. Secondly, an appreciation of Goethe's attempt to postulate what he intuited as the original phenomenon, Urphaenomen, without being able to explain why: colors complement each other qualitatively in pairs - the most important examples would be orange and blue; yellow and violet; and, above all else, green and red.

Wittgenstein is also unfair to Goethe: criticizes him for not having presented a finished theory (III, 125) as if he had ambitioned that; whereas Goethe expressly states in his work that what he has to offer is but "Data zu einer Theorie der Farben". In fact, to translate --Farbenlehre-- in any language as "Theory" of Colors would be a similar mistake. The gap between Goethe's objective observations and subjective self-awareness is bridged precisely by Schopenhauer's treatise of 1816, --On Vision and Colors--, an attempt to account for the subjective forms of colours; Wittgenstein does not mention it once.

Maybe one could, very scholarly speaking, call this a case of bad bibliographical review by a genius thinker. For --Remarks on Colour-- does bring the impression that Wittgenstein did not really know Schopenhauer's treatise at all. But this can only bring astonishment to the reader: the same astonishment that arises when one sees how unnoticed the book has slipped through almost 200 years; for example by Rudolf Steiner, the brilliant thinker who prepared and commented the intents of Goethe in the present edition of the Farbenlehre (3 vols. Verlag Freies Geistesleben). In the case of Wittgenstein, this is especially striking when one considers how much he dwelled with the philosopher's works as he prepared his earlier projects, particularly as the Tractatus was written (a good account can be found at Bryan Magee's --Philosophy of Schopenhauer--, 2nd. ed.). Had Wittgenstein read --On Vision and Colors--, things would have been a lot different, and maybe this entire book would have followed a completely alternate path, since it would have to rise up to the task of judging the treatise of 1816. A sad instance of his neglect can be seen when, at page III-26, Wittgenstein makes comments which he does believe are quite decisive and original, and which would be indeed, had Schopenhauer not already explained why. Witty writes: "Blue and yellow, as well as red and green, seem to me to be opposites - but perhaps that is simply because I am used to seeing them at opposite points on the colour circle". It is something to be truly mourned that a man with such a marvelous intuitive grasp of this fact has missed the chance to meditate the theory that seeks to account for his perceptions. Because they bring no novelty to whomever has had the chance to read Schopenhauer's thoughts of why colors are qualitatively complementary.

At the end, the general impression that remains is that, theoretically, Wittgenstein's comments about colors stand one step below Schopenhauer's treatise, corroborating and indeed confirming it; exactly in the same way in which the --Tractatus-- stands one step below the --Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason--, corroborating and confirming it; and, likewise, not mentioning it.

Schopenhauer's treatise has been for many years out of print in English. Shouldering and even surpassing the Farbenlehre, it is perhaps the most important but, at once, the least read human study of the borderline where philosophy and physiology meet. Which is where Wittgenstein also stands with this little red book, so acclaimed by his own fans. ... Read more

Book Description
The Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) present his own distillation of two decades of intense work on the philosophies of mind, language and meaning. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (12)

A sea change in philosophy
Wittgenstein's importance to philosophy has, paradoxically, been overstated and understated at the same time.
It is overstated when individuals attach themselves to particular arguments and use them to justify dubious claims - and, I might add, this is what happens more often than not.Half understood, some of these arguments seem to carry a weight that they do not have, and muddy things up more than they help.
But understood in its entirety, W.'s philosophy is the most powerful and innovative (and I would say, correct) philosophy in recent times.

The key text.
Thisd just is the key text of 20th century philosophy. Written in aphoristic style and heavily reactive to the conversation between Frege Russell and the early Wittgenstein that gave birth to contemporary analytic philosophy it is a must read (in company with some of the texts from those three authors). Nobody should remain unchanged in their thinking by reading and striving to understand this work.

3 stars only for 50th Anniversary edition
Just a few comments on this 50th anniversary--supposedly FINAL--edition of the translation:
1) After 50 years Anscombe STILL did not fix the snafu in section 412 where she forgot to translate a parenthetical.She was informed of this in the 1950's!
2) To change the translation of "Lebensform" from "form of life" to "life-form" after all these years is unnecessary and stupid.It rings too much of biology and Star Trek.
3) To change the pagination, by which all references to Part II and inserts to Part I have been made for 50 years, is an unnecessary bother.
4) The translation has NEWLY-INTRODUCED typos in sections 38, 41, 47, and then I stopped counting.How is this an improvement?
Please bring the older editions back in print!

Nice Version of a Contemporary Classic
Originally published in 1953 the `Philosophical Investigations' was the latter of Wittgenstein's two influential philosophical texts (the Tractatus being the offer).This Fiftieth Anniversary edition provides the original German text and Anscombe's English translation on opposing pages.

The Investigations is widely considered to be one of the most influential philosophical texts of the last century.Although it touches on a range of issues including logic and philosophy of the mind it is largely focused on issues pertaining to the philosophy of language.That said, I share the view that Wittgenstein is difficult to categorize - in many ways he stands outside the mainstream of philosophy.

I have occasionally heard it said that Wittgenstein is appealing and accessible to non-philosophers.Undoubtedly this will vary from reader to reader, however, I think a good understanding of the philosophical questions of the time is essential to getting the most out of Wittgenstein - he spends little time framing the issues under discussion and without this background many of his musings may seem meaningless.

From a historic perspective this is one of the most important works in twentieth century philosophy, on a more basic level it is a choppy and poorly constructed work.I struggle with Wittgenstein, sometimes viewing him as trivial other times as profound.Clearly, many great thinkers are in the latter camp, as are ironically many neophytes who want to appear as if they understand Wittgenstein.

Overall, this is an excellent edition of a modern day classic - an essential addition to any serous student's library.I would not, however, recommend this as an entry point to the world of philosophy.

A fine book
This is one of the greatest books I have ever read--and I've read quite a few books. ... Read more